German Unification

Process And Outcomes

M. Donald Hancock

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429710735
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Historia
• Categoría: Historia alemana

The East European revolutions of 1989 led to momentous changes throughout the region. Nowhere were they felt more dramatically than in Germany, where unification unexpectedly became reality, unfolding with breathtaking speed, unhindered by major obstacles. However, joy over the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of the borders was soon dampene

Part One
Background and Impetus

1
The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the GDR: Evolution, Revolution, and Diffusion

Helga A. Welsh

In the fall of 1989 the magnitude of political change and the speed with which it occurred in Central and Eastern European countries caught the world by surprise. Despite national variations in the demise of communist rule, the causes and manifestations of the politico-economic crisis of the regimes in Eastern Europe displayed remarkable similarities. Likewise, the goals of establishing pluralist political systems and market-oriented economies are cornerstones in the transition processes currently underway in the region of Central and Eastern Europe.

One after another, ruling communist parties were forced to renounce their leading roles in politics and society and had to negotiate the transition to substantially altered political and economic structures. Although the interdependence of these developments was striking, from a more global perspective Central and Eastern European countries and, in 1991, the Soviet Union were among the last hold-outs in the “third wave” of democratization that had started in the middle of the 1970s.¹

The spread of polyarchy in the 1970s and 1980s reflected global developments² but the events themselves were nevertheless relatively independent,³ at least among those countries where a shift from right wing, often military-based regimes occurred. This was different in the setting of Eastern European communist systems, partly because their goals were not limited to the maintenance of power and the implementation of selective policies but instead were aimed at implementing an alternative form of political, social, and economic development. The failures of this effort were evident throughout the region. In addition, existing institutionalized networks of communication and interaction were finely meshed, and the “model” or “demonstration” effect of the pluralist countries of Western Europe, and the “West” more generally, was particularly strong; the transition processes were and remain substantially influenced by external forces from within and without the region. Therefore, the domino-effect fall of communist regimes points to particularly strong interdependence effects in Central and Eastern Europe; within-system and across-system diffusion effects coincided.⁴ Graffiti found in Prague captured this notion nicely: Poland, Ten Years. Hungary, Ten Months. East Germany, Ten Weeks. Czechoslovakia, Ten Days.⁵

Communism’s demise showed variations across national settings in Central and Eastern Europe but it was the outcome of long-term processes of regional change which came to fruition in the late 1980s. By the 1980s, the evolutionary changes in Hungary and Poland and the almost complete lack of these changes in the rigid, conservative regimes in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany had become emblematic of divergent political developments within the Soviet sphere of influence. In those countries where elite intransigence had been prevalent, changes occurred with rapid speed. In Poland and Hungary, by contrast, factions within the Communist parties opened up channels of communication with the opposition, thereby allowing for a more gradual change.

During the 1980s the survival skills of the Solidarity movement were an indicator of the growing weakness of the Polish United Workers’ Party. Finally, in the spring of 1989, the startling outcome of the Roundtable negotiations and the stunning electoral success of Solidarity removed any doubts about the erosion of trust and public rejection of the ruling Communist party. But it was the decision by the Hungarian government to dismantle the border fortifications to the West, known as the iron curtain, that set in motion unprecedented and unexpected developments. East German citizens on vacation in Hungary took the opportunity to voice their frustration with the lack of political and economic reform in their country and decided to emigrate to West Germany. The following events are well-known and well-documented: The mass exodus acted as catalyst for popular upsurge in the GDR, then in Czechoslovakia, in Bulgaria and finally in Romania.⁶

Although there was genuine surprise at “how seemingly stable, enduring social systems fail and collapse”⁷ in such short order, ex post facto explanations abound.⁸ James N. Rosenau, for example, suggests five global dynamics that contributed to the legitimacy crisis of authoritarian regimes.⁹ In addition to the Gorbachev factor, he cites “the impact of technology, the consequences of new interdependence issues, the advent of authority crises, and the greater competence of subgroups and citizens” as major contributing factors for the changes in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere. J.F. Brown points to six interrelated causes that reflect some of these themes in the specific setting of Eastern Europe: forty years of failure, in particular economic failure; the illegitimacy of communism; societal opposition; the loss of confidence in the ability to rule and the accompanying lack of willingness to apply means of force to maintain rule; the improvement in East-West relations; and, finally, the Soviet factor.¹⁰

These issues will be taken up by analyzing the situation in the former GDR but with a view to developments in the other Central and East European countries as well. Although the interdependence of national and international factors in the demise of communism was striking, the emphasis in this chapter is on within-system developments which were nevertheless influenced by external factors. In addition, the focus is on the underlying causes and not on singular political events that preceded the implosion of the political regimes in the GDR and in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Dilemmas of Reform and Modernization

Social scientists have long been interested in the link between socioeconomic and political development. According to the reasoning underlying much modernization literature, the higher levels of socioeconomic achievement, the greater the pressures towards a more human, open, competitive, and ultimately more pluralist society.¹¹ Socioeconomic modernization in turn creates pressures for changes in the political environment, including greater participation, social differentiation, and secularization. Although attention was first given to the study of developing countries, by the end of the 1960s students of communist affairs increasingly addressed the links between modernization and political change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Partly the result of the growing dissatisfaction with the totalitarian political model, it was also encouraged by economic reforms in European socialist systems.¹²

Indeed, measured in terms of socioeconomic modernization, Central and Eastern European countries had reached a level that was considered conducive to the emergence of pluralistic policies. The absence of far-reaching system transformation in them was attributed almost exclusively to the veto power of the Soviet Union.¹³ Therefore, seen from the perspective of the modernization approach, these nations were viewed as “anomalies in socioeconomically highly-developed countries where particularly intellectual power resources have become widespread.”¹⁴

Apart from the pressures of modernization it has been argued that the imperatives of economic reform ultimately would lead to political democratization (but not necessarily system transformation), albeit “gradually through incremental changes.”¹⁵ The severity of economic problems required drastic economic changes leading to painful consequences for large segments of the population, e.g., high rates of inflation, rising levels of unemployment, declining levels of real income, and greater pressure toward qualitative performance. In order to offset disturbing effects of economic reform, broad-based support and thus rewards like enhanced civil and political rights would be required.

However, even if the negative side effects of economic reform could be contained, economic restructuring entailed, among other things, diffusion of decisionmaking power and the necessity of providing accurate economic data to planners and politicians. In the long run, participation and openness could not be limited to the economic sphere alone and had to be extended to the political realm as a whole.

Signs of Systemic Crises

The Limits of Political Participation

By the end of the 1960s the political situation in Eastern Europe seemed consolidated, both domestically and internationally. Party domination through the exercise of command and violence had been largely replaced by manipulation and persuasion. Jowitt termed this the “inclusion phase.” In contrast to the revolutionary and the consolidation phases, the inclusion period seemed to be characterized by “attempts by the party elite to expand the internal boundaries of the regime’s political, productive, and decisionmaking systems, to integrate itself with the non-official (non-apparatchik) sectors of society rather than insulate itself from them.”¹⁶ In short, elements of political participation were addressed.

In communist-governed political systems such as those in Eastern Europe where educational achievements and political mobilization were highly valued, demands for independent political participation and political articulation could not be oppressed or ignored forever. As these demands became more forceful, the weaker the perceptions of the political system became.

Adopted in 1976, the latest version of the SED’s program incorporated the main characteristics of a “developed socialist society.” The interpretation of developed socialism and its adaptations to national conditions have varied widely in Central and Eastern Europe and have served mainly to undergird existing policies that were often quite different from one another in different political settings. However, some common denominators were obvious. It was asserted that the communist party would remain the centerpiece of political life and that its importance would actually increase. The doctrine of developed socialism stressed the growing significance of the scientific-technological revolution for a productive national economy. Continuing development and perfection of socialist democracy were particularly stressed, and it was asserted that citizen participation in state and economic affairs was on the way to becoming the most distinctive feature of life under socialism.¹⁷ However, to political leaders in the communist bloc the paradox of how a political system can become more democratic “while still guaranteeing that the party will continue to guide, if not control, the governing of society”¹⁸ proved intractable.

Efforts to enhance political participation witnessed the additions of new political actors, adaptations of political structures, and changes in political functions as seen in the changing roles of the mass organizations and non-communist parties, the emphasis on local politics, and the emerging role of the Protestant churches in the GDR.¹⁹ In many cases, however, changes were limited to form rather than substance,²⁰ i.e., they were largely quantitative. At the same time, the potential for merely quantitative increases in the existing arenas of participation was virtually exhausted by the middle of the 1980s. For example, on the average every citizen over fourteen years of age in the GDR was a member in at least three mass organizations and/or political parties.²¹

In an effort to mobilize and integrate ever greater sectors of society to the communist community, most communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe had distanced themselves from the Leninist idea of the vanguard party of the best and brightest and had switched to mass membership parties. This is evidenced, among other things, by the continuous increase in membership numbers. In the GDR, the membership of the SED had grown consistently from 1.6 million in 1961 to 2.3 million in 1988—which was the equivalent of roughly 20 percent of the adult population.

Although the reasons for entry into the Communist Party should not be explained solely or even predominantly with careerism, party membership nevertheless had lost much of its ideological fervor and was often an act of pragmatism. With the advent of Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika, it became increasingly difficult to defend the orthodox conservatism of the GDR leadership at the level of the party cells. The growing dissatisfaction among ordinary party members is partly evidenced by the fact that the number of proceedings against SED members (23,000) and resignations from the SED (11,000) reached new heights in 1988.²² However, neither mass resignations nor organized factionalism within the SED occurred at any noticeable scale. Reluctance to undertake personal risks, diffuse support for different reform concepts, and a belief in the possibility to exert pressure on the party leadership that would result in reform processes were important factors in the failure of organized opposition to emerge within the ranks of the SED.²³

At the same time, in the words of Bradley Scharf, “a kind of ‘hidden’ evolution of authority patterns emerged. Continuing personnel changes in institutional leadership produced a moderation of authoritarian relationships,” which affected paternalistic patterns of behavior at work places where educational standards were high.²⁴ This applied not only to the intelligentsia in research institutes, in universities, and among the cultural elite in general but reached the level of the SED as well²⁵ and contributed to growing diversification of political thinking. Although it became possible to articulate reformist ideas, such ideas were nonetheless ignored by the political leadership.²⁶

The Honecker era by no means was totally inflexible to external influences. Periods of domestic relaxation and tightening of control alternated, depending on the leadership’s p...