Introduction
Scholars, most vigorously JosĂ© MarĂa MillĂĄs Vallicrosa, have revealed, examined, and highlighted Abraham bar កiyyaâs pioneering role as a mediator, or âcultural agent,â bringing Greco-Arabic sciences into the Hebrew and Latin cultures of Christian Europe.1 It was Daniel J. Lasker who pointed out his additional pioneering role in transforming anti-Christian themes in the transition from Jewish polemics in Muslim lands to Jewish polemics in Christian lands.2
Among bar កiyyaâs writings, the treatise Megillat ha-Megalleh (âThe Scroll of the Revealerâ) holds a special place. Through this work, bar កiyya influenced the Jewish genre of messianic speculation, a genre expressing the Jewish peopleâs messianic longings throughout history. The present article is devoted to examining the term âthe pure soulâ (ha-neĆĄamah ha-áčehorah) in Megillat ha-Megalleh. This term and its extension, âthe pure living soulâ (ha-neĆĄamah ha-áž„ayyah ha-áčehorah), appears in only two rather short passages in the treatise.3
The contents of the two passages in which bar កiyya deals with this term are complementary and form a single argument, which constitutes one of the workâs most intriguing notions.4 Consequently, it has drawn considerable attention from scholars engaging with Megillat ha-Megalleh.5 The significance that scholars attribute to these passages stems not only from their importance in the context of the debate about bar កiyyaâs own thought, but also from their similarity to sections in the Kuzari, the famous book by bar កiyyaâs contemporary Judah ha-Levi (d. 1141).6
Bar កiyyaâs statements about âthe pure soulâ raise blatant difficulties, whose resolution presents a challenge to readers. Some scholars have discussed, albeit partially, the complications in the way in which he presents the topic for discussion, although few of them have identified its inherent anti-Christian tone. In the light of previous scholarly efforts devoted to understanding the notion of âthe pure soulâ in Megillat ha-Megalleh, the present study seeks to propose a new direction in tackling the perplexing formulations of this notion. In addition, it seeks to present fresh insights regarding its provenance in Islamic culture and the specific Christian doctrine it aims to challenge.7 In this way, I hope to reinforce
Laskerâs assertion concerning bar កiyyaâs role as a mediator of non-scientific themes, including anti-Christian ones, from new angles.
âThe Pure Soulâ â Philosophical Aspects
I will now turn to my attempt at a new understanding of the notion under discussion here. In the following, I will try to demonstrate that bar កiyyaâs elaborations of the notion of âthe pure soulâ revolve around a peculiar interaction between philosophical elements taken from the doctrine of the soul that frequently occurred in the authorâs period and an apocalyptic vision of history. To allow us to properly appreciate bar កiyyaâs originality in transposing philosophical terminology and assimilating it into an apocalyptic worldview, we must first understand these concepts and the philosophical school from which they arose. The notion under discussion is the theory of the three souls, or the three different forces that make up the human soul. This theory is one of the basic building blocks of the philosophical understanding of the soul. It appears in various versions in the writings of Plato and Aristotle and was adopted and developed in later Greek philosophy, which continued to promulgate Platoâs and Aristotleâs thought to the end of antiquity. The theory of the three souls, or the three forces of the soul, was transmitted by means of translations and adaptations to the Arabic culture of the Islamic period, during which time it was also absorbed by Jewish writers.8
Bar កiyya introduces the main points of the three-soul doctrine in the third chapter of Megillat ha-Megalleh: he names the human beingâs first soul âthe appetitive desiring soulâ (ha-nefeĆĄ ha-mitÊŸawwah ha-áčŁomaáž„at), corresponding to âthe vegetative soulâ (Ar. al-nafs al-nabÄtiyyah); he calls the second âthe animal and living soulâ (ha-nefeĆĄ ha-behemit ha-áž„ayyah) as an equivalent of âthe vital soulâ or âthe animal soulâ (Ar. al-nafs al-áž„ayawÄniyyah); and he dubs the third
soul âthe speaking and thinking soulâ (ha-nefeĆĄ ha-dabranit ha-hogah) parallel to âthe rational soulâ (Ar. al-nafs al-nÄtÌŁiqah).9 The tripartite doctrine of the soul, which was well-known among Arabic writers,10 became particularly popular among Judeo-Arabic literature.11 All of these writers agreed on the superior position of the rational soul, the soul or part of the soul that was unique to humankind, while the vital soul was shared with animals and the appetitive soul with both animals and plants.
Given this shared basis, we can distinguish between two different approaches. I call the first the holistic-hierarchic approach and the second the dichotomous-Âhierarchic approach. In the holistic-hierarchic approach, the vegetative soul is the lowest soul; the vital soul is above it, and the rational soul is above both.12 The holistic aspect of this approach is manifested in the fact that this tripartite structure of the human soul is viewed as a whole, in which each part plays a critical role in the full existence and functioning of the human being. The vegetative soul and the vital soul provide the superior rational soul with services that are critical for its existence in their shared setting; that is, the human body.13 By contrast, the dichotomous-hierarchic approach takes the supremacy of the rational soul to an extreme and views it as primary, to the point of blurring the distinction of the tripartite division and providing a dichotomous alternative: the rational soul on the one hand, and the vegetative and vital souls on the other. Instead of coordination and completion among the three parts, there is tension and conflict between the supreme rational soul and the two lower souls: the former is independent of the body and matter, unlike the latter. It is an eternal soul whose source is the upper spiritual world, and it is destined to return to its source in that
world when the fleeting time binding it to the other two souls ends along with the material body. Thinkers subscribing to this approach tend to present the two lower souls in a negative manner, identifying them with humankindâs passions and other inferior features. Because of this, labels such as âthe appetitive soulâ (ha-nefeĆĄ ha-mitÊŸawwah) for the vegetative soul and âthe beastly soulâ (ha-nefeĆĄ ha-behemit) for the vital soul are used, and these also appear in bar កiyyaâs writing.14 Nonetheless, we should bear in mind that the holistic and dichotomous approaches are different perspectives of the same philosophical view of the human soul and that they share the same conceptual foundation. Therefore, they are not always clearly distinguished from one another. At times, they are found alongside one another and mixed together in the works of the same writer.15 Nevertheless, the distinction between them is important and is particularly relevant to our attempt to examine bar កiyyaâs thought. Of the two approaches, the Neoplatonic imprint is more prominent in the dichotomous-hierarchic view.16 In the case of Arabic culture (including Judeo-Arabic culture), this Neoplatonic imprint at times intersects with the tendency toward asceticism (zuhd), which preaches a life that limits the influence of the two lower souls as much as possible and that helps the ratio...