Individuals in every social group or culture make great use of humour in their everyday life and conversations. Scholars interested in humour have sought to explain it in general terms, but this endeavour has proven to be extremely difficult because this multifaceted, relative and idiosyncratic phenomenon varies according to culture and historical context. Consequently, many have concentrated on its essence, mechanism(s) and effects on society by means of different approaches and from different perspectives. It is therefore not surprising that Humour Studies is an interdisciplinary field that covers anthropological, psychological, philosophical and linguistic research (Norrick 1993: 3; Palmer 1994: 3).
The goal of the present chapter is to offer an overview and discussion on some of the most prominent theories of humour that can hopefully provide the reader with sufficient knowledge of this fascinating phenomenon. Since each chapter of data analysis in this book focuses on one type of humour creation and its translation (Chapter 3 discusses the use of wordplay; Chapter 4 deals with culture-specific references; Chapter 5 investigates multilingual humour and Chapter 6 concentrates on the audio description of humour), the relevant literature pertaining to each of these topics is not introduced here.
This chapter comprises an account of several scholarsâ attempts at defining the concept of humour, its use and functions in everyday life and language. In particular, it addresses the relationship between humour and its markers, including laughter. In addition, it provides the reader with a summary of some of the theories of humour which were mostly developed throughout the twentieth century, with particular emphasis on Raskinâs (1985) Semantic Script Theory of Humour (SSTH) and the General Theory of Verbal Humour (GTVH), first outlined in Attardo and Raskin (1991) and further developed in Attardo (1994, 1998, 2001, 2017b). Furthermore, it includes a discussion on important issues relating to the production of humour in conversation, which is particularly relevant because, to some extent, comedy attempts to replicate everyday language and situations (Bubel and Spitz 2006: 73; cf. also Chovanec and Tsakona 2018: 8 for similar considerations), although it can be said to have its specific style(s) (Juckel et al. 2016). Most importantly, it considers the issues raised by the translation of humour in general (e.g. Attardo 2002; Antonopoulou 2004a, 2004b; Chiaro 2005, 2008, 2017), whereas the core issue relating to the translation of humour in the audiovisual setting will be dealt with in the following chapter. As explained in the conclusions to this chapter, on-going research is still needed to shed light on humour, as well as on its translation.
1.2 Defining Humour and Its Markers
At the turn of the twentieth century, in his essay âOn Humourâ, Luigi Pirandello (2017 [1908]) explored this phenomenon from different angles (philosophical, psychological and sociological) and concentrated in particular on its realisation in literary texts produced in several languages (English, French, German and Italian). He ultimately concluded that the very essence of humour cannot be captured, owing to its complex nature. Rather, it can be understood by considering its many aspects (ibid. 134). Nonetheless, several scholars in various fields of research have attempted to provide a definition. For example, towards the end of the same century, the renowned linguist Victor Raskin (1985: 2) has remarked that âthe ability to appreciate and enjoy humour is universal and shared by all people, even if the kinds of humour they favor differ widelyâ. Moreover, he defines humour as âa universal human traitâ (ibid.; emphasis in original). Scholars in several fields of research (e.g. anthropology, psychology) have seconded the idea that humour is universal (Apte 1985; Martin 2007). As Guidi (2017: 19) has pointed out: âhumour is considered a universal, partly natural and partly acquired, mode of communicationâ (emphasis in original).
Following the idea that humour is partly natural and partly acquired, it is therefore interesting to understand how this mode of communication operates and what factors (e.g. participants, their experience and psychological status, the society they live in, the stimulus, the situation it describes) characterise and influence it. To this end, Raskinâs (1985) definition comes in handy when he describes âan individual occurrence of a funny stimulus [as] the humour actâ (ibid. 3; emphasis in original). Although it is generally agreed that humour is universal to mankind, we also need to bear in mind that humour creation and perception vary according to the different cultures, contexts and situations considered. The cross-cultural and cross-linguistic investigation of humour can help to detect similarities and or differences in the way people share, negotiate or respond to it.
When humour is expressed via language (cf. the concept of âVerbally Expressed Humourâ, as defined in Ritchie 2000; Chiaro 2004, 2005, 2006), it may be accompanied by a host of linguistic, paraverbal and non-verbal markers (Canestrari 2010). Prosodic features such as voice pitch, pauses, facial expressions, mimic and so forth have often been believed to mark humorous discourse (cf. Attardo et al. 2013 and Gironzetti 2017 for an overview). However, more recent research shows that other features like smiling and gazes are more likely to be used when jokes are told in naturally occurring conversation (Gironzetti et al. 2016). The scope of this section is not to delve into an extensive discussion on markers. Nonetheless, it is worth recalling Attardoâs (2000) distinction between irony markers and factors. The former are dispensable as they can be removed without removing the irony of the text (although its perception may be affected); conversely, the latter are essential to signal the ironic intent of an utterance and removing them can also result in text that is not perceived as such (ibid. 7â10, quoted in Burgers and van Mulken 2017: 385â386; cf. also Gironzetti 2017). Broadly speaking, stage performers and comedy actors in general make extensive use of markers as aiming specifically to entertain the audience (cf. Rutter 2001; Dore 2008, 2018a).
During humorous exchanges, the participants may react to a humorous stimulus in several ways. Hay (2001) analyses how humour is supported in conversation and describes a series of strategies which may be considered more appropriate in a given context. They include: contributing more humour by jointly constructing the scenario, echoing the words of the speaker and offering sympathy or contradicting self-deprecating humour (cf. ibid. 60â61 for a full list; Clift 1999 for a discussion on the use of irony as humour support). Interestingly, Hayâs analysis seems to show how some of these supporting strategies may depend on personal choice or style (e.g. contributing with more humour, irony), while others are socially imposed (e.g. contradicting self-deprecating humour). As can be noted, the participants in conversational exchanges entailing humour can establish and continuously negotiate it via a series of strategies. The jocular mode is proposed by the speaker and may or may not be adopted by the listeners. As Whalen and Pexman (2017: 374) explain: â[b]y employing mode adoption, one can demonstrate comprehension of the initial remark and participate jointly in the pragmatic functions of humorous discourseâ (cf. Section 1.5 for more details on this).
The most debated of all humour markers remains laughter. Raskin (1985) has attempted to explore its relationship with humour from a physiological and psychological point of view. He discussed the various manifestations of laughter and concluded that âhumour usually causes laughterâ but âhumour holds no monopoly on laughterâ (ibid. 4â5, 14â19). Chiaro (1992: 11) and Nash (1985: xi, passim) have suggested that humour and laughter have an implicit relationship, while Palmer (1994: 1, passim) and Morreall (1983) see laughter as an integral part of humour. By contrast, Oring (2003: x) talks about laughter and humour as separate phenomena, which are, however, directly linked. For his part, Norrick (1993: 133) has considered laughter as a parameter that can signal the presence of humour in the text. This view is linked to the âlaughableâ concept developed in Conversation Analysis (cf., for instance, Jefferson 2004) that sees laughter as one possible signal that both interlocutors consider a turn to be funny. It is a view, however, that makes no claims as to the inherent funniness of the text under scrutiny (Glenn 2003; Holt 2011 and Glenn and Holt 2017 for an overview).
Norrick has contended that laughing establishes rapport among the participants in a conversation (ibid. 5, passim; cf. also Jefferson et al. 1987 on laugher and intimacy and Chovanec 2018 on laughter as a means of interpersonal bonding). However, Norrick has also highlighted the fact that some people may choose not to respond or to withhold laughter. In doing so, they may be signalling that they understand and, at the same time, are distancing themselves from the humour they perceive (ibid. 133; cf. also Mulkay 1988: 114â119 for a similar discussion; Bell 2015 on laughter and failed humour). To some extent, this has been confirmed by one of my recent studies. It concentrates on the way comedians and audiences negotiate humour during stand-up performances. The analysis demonstrates that social norms do influence the audienceâs reaction when it comes to taboo topics such as murder: although the jocular mood of the context elicits laughter from the audience, a reaction of mild disapproval can still be perceived (Dore 2018a: 114).
Attardo (1994: 10) has questioned this relation by remarking that more often than not humour is incorrectly assimilated to laughter (cf. also Attardo 2012). He points out that there are five reasons why humour and laughter cannot be considered directly related. Firstly, laughter can be provoked by other causes (e.g. hallucinogens); secondly, it may serve other purposes (cf. also Norrick ibid. 37â40 and Billig 2005: 223 on the use of laughter to express embarrassment; Belin et al. 2008 and Sauter et al. 2010 on laughter to express happiness) and thirdly, laughter is not directly connected to the intensity of humour (e.g. some people may respond to humour with a loud laugh, others only with a mild chuckle). Moreover, humour may elicit a laugh in some people and only a smile in others. Finally, both smiles and laughter can be simulated, thus requiring interpretation (e.g. in different social contexts they may have different meanings; Attard...