2.1 Part I: Introduction to knowledge
To study any topic, we must first have a preliminary idea of the kind of things we are going to investigate. Biologists must know what they are talking about when referring to âarmadillosâ, âcellsâ or âmitochondriaâ. Similarly the epistemologist: she, however, is concerned with such notions as knowledge, justification and belief, and with how they are related. Here and in the next chapter we shall start to look at just what we mean by âknowledgeâ, and in the rest of the book we shall investigate the nature of knowledge and the problems associated with it. Our primary concern will be with factual knowledge. I can know that Glasgow is in Scotland, that it was Descartes who wrote the Meditations, and that Bernice bobs her hair. Such knowledge is sometimes called âknowledge thatâ or âpropositional knowledgeâ; âpropositionalâ because itâs expressed in terms of the knowledge I have of certain true propositions or thoughts: I know that the proposition Glasgow is in Scotland is true. As well as with the words, âknows thatâ, factual knowledge is also expressed using such locutions as âknows whyâ, âknows whereâ, âknows whenâ, âknows whetherâ, âknows whoâ, and âknows whatâ. Such ways of speaking indicate that you know certain facts: in knowing where I left my keys, I know that they are in the coffee shop; in knowing when the programme starts, I know that it starts at 9 oâclock. Such knowledge can also be expressed without using the word âknowâ at all. I could say that âMy keys are in the cafĂ© over thereâ or that âThe programme starts nowâ. These statements are nevertheless expressions of factual knowledge.
There are other kinds of knowledge apart from factual knowledge. One is know-how: I know how to ride a bike and how to make a Tequila Sunrise cocktail. This is sometimes called âability knowledgeâ. We need to be a little careful here since I can have such knowledge without actually possessing the relevant ability. Practical constraints may prevent me from exercising a certain ability even though I know how it should be done: I may have temporarily lost my sense of balance and thus cannot ride my bike, or I may have run out of grenadine and so right now I cannot make a Tequila Sunrise. Knowing how to do certain things can involve the possession of factual knowledge. If I know how to play snooker, I must know that the blue ball has a points value of five, and that a red ball must be potted before I can pot a colour. However, in order to have other abilities, I do not require knowledge of any facts. I know how to perform such basic actions as walking, swimming and speaking without knowing that I move my body or mouth in a particular way: I can have know-how without the relevant propositional knowledge.
A third type of knowledge is knowledge by acquaintance. I know a certain person because Iâve met her; I know that melody because Iâve heard it before; and I know Yosemite National Park because Iâve been there. I can have such knowledge without knowing any facts about these things. I can, for example, know that melody without knowing what it is called, or without having any further beliefs about it at all; I just know it. Other languages use a different word to talk about this kind of knowledge. In French, âsavoirâ is to have factual knowledge, whereas âconnaĂźtreâ is to have knowledge by acquaintance. In German the two relevant verbs are âwissenâ and âkennenâ. Knowledge, then, can involve acquaintance; various practical, intellectual and physical skills; and the knowledge of certain truths or facts. This book is mainly concerned with the latter kind of knowledge.
2.3 Part III: Justification
Knowledge has traditionally been seen as involving justification: if I am to have knowledge, I must have true beliefs and I must have good reason or justification for holding them. In part III we shall focus on this key notion of justification. First, though, we must be careful to distinguish the epistemic sense of âjustificationâ from certain other uses of the term. The basic idea â and one that we shall go on to develop (and question) â is that my beliefs are epistemically justified if I have good reason to think that they are true.
The basic role of justification is that of a means to truth ⊠If epistemic justification were not conducive to truth âŠ, if finding epistemically justified beliefs did not substantially increase the likelihood of finding true ones, then epistemic justification would be irrelevant to our main cognitive goal and of dubious worth. (BonJour, 1985, pp. 7â8)
There are, however, non-epistemic ways of assessing beliefs. The possession of certain beliefs may bring me success in various ways. Some people believe that positive thinking can aid recovery from illness. If I think in this way, then I may cope better when I am ill (even if such beliefs are false). There is therefore a sense in which such thinking is justified given the benefits it brings to my state of mind. One could call this pragmatic justification as opposed to epistemic justification. There is a philosophical argument for believing in the existence of God that relies on such a notion of justification, one that we shall discuss in chapter 16, section 4. The key to the argument is that we should believe in God, not because there is good evidence of his existence, but because of the rewards such a belief would bring if it turned out to be true; we would, for instance, have eternal life in paradise.
There are also other species of justification that must be distinguished from the epistemic notion. We may have what could be called âafter the factâ justification. In the play A Streetcar Named Desire, Stanley Kowalski thinks that he survived the battle of Salerno because he believed he was lucky.
Stanley: You know what luck is? Luck is believing youâre lucky. Take at Salerno. I believed I was lucky. I figured that 4 out of 5 would not come through but I would ⊠and I did. I put that down as a rule. To hold front position in this rat-race youâve got to believe you are lucky. (T. Williams, 1962, p. 216)
He did survive and so there is a sense in which his belief was justified, justified in that it came true. He was not, however, epistemically justified since he didnât have a good reason to believe that he would be one of the lucky survivors â his odds were not good (as he admits); he simply had faith. There may also be broadly ethical reasons for holding certain beliefs. It could be said that you are justified in believing what your friend says, simply because she is your friend. Here we may not be talking about either pragmatic or epistemic justification: there may be nothing in it for you, and she may not be very reliable. There is nevertheless a sense in which you are right to accept what she says. We must be careful, then, to focus on the kind of justification that is âconducive to truthâ, and not on these non-epistemic forms (although we shall see in c...