From his early pre-critical writings to his last publications, Kant described women as having very different characteristics than men – characteristics that bear directly on moral agency. In a long chapter on the “contrast” between the sexes, in the early Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764), Kant writes:
The virtue of the woman is a beautiful virtue. That of the male sex ought to be a noble virtue. Women will avoid evil not because it is unjust but because it is ugly, and for them virtuous actions mean those that are morally beautiful [sittlich schön]. Nothing of ought, nothing of must, nothing of obligation. . . . They do something only because they love to, and the art lies in making sure that they love only what is good. I hardly believe that the fair sex is capable of principles, and I hope not to give offense by this, for these are also extremely rare among the male sex.
(GSE 2:231–232)3
Of course, Kant’s gallant ending in this passage does not diminish the gravity of his characterization of women as unreceptive to moral obligation and that of men as having to master the art of directing women toward the good. Nor does Kant’s claim that these sexual differences have been arranged wisely by “Nature” or “Providence” make this sound any better (GSE 2:228–243).
In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), one of Kant’s last publications, he continues to distinguish between “feminine” and “masculine” virtue, asserting that each has a different “incentive”, that women have “their own vocation” and that this is all part of a grand providential scheme (Anth 7:303–311).
When two people unite, Kant writes with reference to marriage, one must be subordinate to the other. Nature has made men superior to women in strength and courage, whereas women are naturally fearful, and this gives men the right to command. Women, by contrast, are superior to men in being able to conquer the inclination of the other sex toward them. As if this was not already damning with faint praise, Kant adds that men gladly submit to their wives’ regimes so as to be able to go about their own business (Anth 7:303–304).
In his legal and political philosophy, Kant never criticizes the legal tutelage of women; indeed, he justifies it explicitly by reference to male superiority. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant asserts that the only “human right” is the “innate right to freedom” that “belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity”. He further explicates this as a right to freedom, equality and independence (including the right to be one’s own master [Herr], MSRL 6:237). Yet Kant also argues that the “natural superiority” of men gives a husband the right to command over his wife as her master (Herr) (MSRL 6:279; cp. Anth 7:209). Further, he classifies “all women” as “passive citizens”, that is, as lacking civil independence and the right to vote. Dependent men (such as domestic servants) are also passive citizens, but Kant explicitly states that they should always have the option of working their way up to active citizenship (MSRL 6:314–315). Nowhere does Kant condemn the subordinate legal and political status of women or call for their emancipation.
Kant shows some awareness of the tensions in his own account. He feels the need to declare that the characteristics of women and their subordinate status do not run counter to the fundamental equality of men and women (MSRL 6:279), but his comments hardly move beyond a reaffirmation of natural male superiority. Moreover, he admits that the very notion of “passive citizenship” “seems to contradict the concept of a citizen as such” (MSRL 6:314). But this does not motivate him to apply his own republican principles to the internal organization of the family or the legal status of women. His claim in the Anthropology that when two people unite, one must be subordinated to the other (see above) contradicts his account of the freedom and equality of the citizens who are united in the republic (MSRL 6:314).
In his moral theory, the characteristics he assigns to men, such as courage, appear as the virtues of human beings. These are qualities that – he there claims – all human beings ought to strive to realize fully and in a morally appropriate way. The female characteristics do not appear to mark potential human excellences, however, and what Kant calls “feminine virtue” is not moral virtue in the strict sense of his ethics.
Kant repeatedly acknowledges that there are women whose conduct does not fit his characterization, such as women scientists. Rather than celebrating their exceptional accomplishments and calling for their civil and political emancipation, however, he describes them as aberrations (GSE 2: 229–230; V-Anth/Parow, 25: 355; Anth 7:307). 4 He says that he “would rather not deal with such women” and that, as a rule, “nature has put something into the man for which one will look in vain in a woman” (V-Anth/Parow 25: 355). The women he does praise are “upright women who, in connection with their household, laudably maintained a character suitable to their vocation” (Anth 7:308).5 He praises womanly women, women who do their womanly duties.