Seats of Power in Europe during the Hundred Years War

An Architectural Study from 1330 to 1480

Anthony Emery

• Editorial: Oxbow Books
• Año: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781785701047
• Categoría: History
• Categoría: European Medieval History

The Hundred Years' War between England and France is a story of an epic conflict between two nations whose destinies became inextricably entwined throughout the later Middle Ages. During that time the balance of architectural power moved from religious to secular domination, the Gothic form continued to grow and the palace-fortress was in the ascendancy. Seats of Power in Europe is a major new study of the residences of the crowned heads and the royal ducal families of the countries involved in the Hundred Years' War. Though they were the leading protagonists and therefore responsible for the course of the war, do their residences reflect an entirely defensive purpose, a social function, or the personality of their builders? As well as the castles of England and France it also looks at rulers residences in other European countries who supported one of the protagonists. They include Scotland, Castile, Aragon, Navarre, Portugal, the Low Countries, the imperial territories of Bohemia, and the papacy in Avignon and then Rome.The study concentrates on sixty properties extending from the castles at Windsor and Denilworth to those at Saumur and Rambures, and from the palaces at Avignon and Seville to the manor-houses at Germolles and Launay. A number of subsidiary or associated properties are also considered in more broad-based sections. Each region and its residences are prefaced by supporting historical and architectural surveys to help position the properties against the contemporary military, financial, and aesthetic backgrounds.Extensively illustrated in full color with over 120 photographs and over 70 plans this is an attractive and accessible overview of how architecture both shaped and was influenced by events during this tumultuous period in the history of Europe. Essential reading for students of architecture, architectural historians, historians and those interested in Medieval Europe.
The Hundred Years' War between England and France is a story of an epic conflict between two nations whose destinies became inextricably entwined throughout the later Middle Ages. During that time the balance of architectural power moved from religious to secular domination, the Gothic form continued to grow and the palace-fortress was in the ascendancy. Seats of Power in Europe is a major new study of the residences of the crowned heads and the royal ducal families of the countries involved in the Hundred Years' War. Though they were the leading protagonists and therefore responsible for the course of the war, do their residences reflect an entirely defensive purpose, a social function, or the personality of their builders? As well as the castles of England and France it also looks at rulers residences in other European countries who supported one of the protagonists. They include Scotland, Castile, Aragon, Navarre, Portugal, the Low Countries, the imperial territories of Bohemia, and the papacy in Avignon and then Rome.The study concentrates on sixty properties extending from the castles at Windsor and Denilworth to those at Saumur and Rambures, and from the palaces at Avignon and Seville to the manor-houses at Germolles and Launay. A number of subsidiary or associated properties are also considered in more broad-based sections. Each region and its residences are prefaced by supporting historical and architectural surveys to help position the properties against the contemporary military, financial, and aesthetic backgrounds.Extensively illustrated in full color with over 120 photographs and over 70 plans this is an attractive and accessible overview of how architecture both shaped and was influenced by events during this tumultuous period in the history of Europe. Essential reading for students of architecture, architectural historians, historians and those interested in Medieval Europe.

1

INTRODUCTION

THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR: 1330–1480

The phrase ‘The Hundred Years War’, first used by Desmichels in 1823, may be a highly convenient term to describe the attenuated late medieval conflict between England and France, but it is conceptually misleading. It is not so much that this struggle for supremacy extended well beyond the traditional limits of 1337 to 1453, but the fact that it was not a continuous war but a series of vicious conflicts, separated by extended periods of uneasy peace or truce marred by sporadic hostilities. Nor was it simply between the Plantagenet and Valois dynasties, but also between them and fiefs such as Brittany, Flanders, and Burgundy who chose to support one side and then the other as the political or economic situation demanded. To a lesser extent, it also involved several other European countries, creating a complex pattern of political, financial, economic, military and social consequences. Though this study is precise in its scope, one consequence common to this as to most other aspects of the war is that a conflict which began between protagonists who only knew the feudal order was concluded about 150 years later by a society increasingly dominated by trade and finance at the dawn of the Renaissance.

The origins of the conflict were deep rooted and lay at least as far back as the Angevin inheritance of Aquitaine in the mid-twelfth century. The more immediate cause was the dynastic crisis in France in the years following the death of Philip IV in 1314 and his short-lived successors, and the feudal responsibilities and family conflict inherent in the close relationship between the royal houses of France and England. It was also about the gradual development of national characteristics and consciousness, particularly in France with the associated concept of a single state centred on Paris, and to it opposition by a number of great princes and vassals of the French crown anxious to develop their own political independence, particularly the count of Flanders and the king of England as duke of Aquitaine.

Nor were the key protagonists equal. France was the wealthiest kingdom in western Europe with a population estimated at between 15 and 21 million inhabitants. Though agriculturally rich, the royal domain embraced only about half the kingdom with the remainder essentially held by four almost independent fiefs of the French king – Aquitaine, Brittany, Burgundy and Flanders. The machinery of government, centred on Paris, was expanding though with difficulty in the mountainous south, but Philip IV (1285–1314) had won his conflict with the papacy, with the added benefit of the pope’s proximity after his relocation from Rome to Avignon from 1309. England and Wales was a poorer country with a population of about four and a half million, principally spread across central and southern England, and lacking the benefit of a substantial manufacturing industry. On the other hand, it was far more cohesive than France, with a well-oiled central administration, a more efficient means of levying taxes and raising an army, and far greater loyalty from the leading magnates. There was, though, a potential danger along the northern frontier if Scotland formed an alliance with France. Neither country believed that the conflict was more than a quarrel about feudal sovereignty nor that it would extend beyond a few seasons of warfare. This might have been so, had not Edward III formally assumed the title and arms of the king of France in 1340, inaugurating a new posture in Anglo-French relations, and making it impossible for either side to compromise.

The extended period of tension and conflict that makes up the Hundred Years War can be divided into three key phases. After an initial period of uncertainty for Edward III, a string of successes including Crécy (1346), the taking of Calais (1347) and victory at Poitiers (1356) culminated in the treaty of Brétigny (1360). Within less than twenty-five years, France had been brought to its knees, its king captured and the chivalry of France left in disarray. A measure of peace lasted until 1369 when the French took the offensive under the reforming and capable Charles V (1364–80) and recovered most of the lands they had lost within seven years. The death of the key protagonists, the Black Prince (1376) and Edward III (1377) in England and du Guesclin (1380) in the same year as Charles V in France, combined with the accession of royal minors, a sequence of political crises, and financial exhaustion in both countries by the mid-1380s led to the truce of 1396 that was supposed to last for twenty-eight years.

France remained impotent for three decades. The French king’s madness fostered intrigue and civil war, primarily between the houses of Orléans and Burgundy. The struggle against England was no longer the country’s primary concern which was now dominated by a small group of ambitious territorial princes. This period of French anarchy forms the second phase of the protracted struggle between the two dynasties, though England was also beset with internal problems. Richard II had been displaced by Henry of Lancaster but Henry’s hold on the throne was initially tenuous and subsequently dogged by illness.

The final phase of the war was initiated by an ambitious Henry V who won a resounding victory at Agincourt (1415), followed by the systematic conquest of Normandy before capturing Paris. He replaced the scorched-earth practice of the previous century with a policy of land settlement, and by the treaty of Troyes (1420) he was recognised as heir to the throne of France. This phrase of the war initially favoured the English, but with their failure to capture Orléans (1428–9), the die was cast for their gradual expulsion by an enemy fortified by the moral high ground of a legally crowned French sovereign. Paris was regained (1436), followed by English withdrawal towards the Channel and expulsion from Aquitaine until Calais remained England’s sole possession (1453). The war petered out, unmarked by any truce or formal declaration until the treaty of Picquigny (1475), though the conflict did not cease for the French until the duchy of Burgundy had been absorbed into the royal domain in 1477.

War brought fame to men on both sides, and this was of vital importance to the greater and lesser aristocracy, particularly as both sides considered they were fighting a ‘just’ war. Fame meant honour and the esteem of a person’s peer group, and it increased his standing in society. The most obvious way of demonstrating this – be he duke or magnate – was to prove his prowess on the battlefield, display his coat of arms on every public occasion, and build a palace-fortress, castle, or fortified house commensurate with his position. So what was the effect of the war on residential architecture in France and England? Were many castles built to cope with the latest developments of assault and defence or were they primarily demonstrations of authority and power? To what extend did residences in France affect building practices in other parts of Europe? And was the war a determinant in this or not?

This study is essentially concerned with the residences built and occupied by the leaders of European society who participated in the war to a greater or lesser extent. But it is impossible to assess the particular impact of such an extended and bitter conflict simply by considering the relevant buildings in isolation. It is essential to place them in the context and changing circumstances of the time, to consider the range of options and benefits available to the participants, and to recognise how financial motivation and realisation changed over a century or more. War brought devastation as well as benefits to many combatants. Some participants squandered their rewards as much as others judiciously husbanded their prizes. And these were spread across a broad spectrum of society of which building – domestic, collegiate, or ecclesiastical – was only one option, albeit the most conspicuous and long-lasting.

One factor is fundamental to this situation throughout the long struggle. The war was fought almost entirely on French soil. That was not how the French intended the war to begin or to develop. In March 1336 Philip VI transferred the fleet that had been assembling for a crusade from the Mediterranean to the mouth of the Seine preparatory to an invasion of England in support of his Scottish ally. Plans to dispatch armed galleys from Rouen and Bruges to England in 1339 (confirmed by the discovery of the supposed French invasion plan at the sack of Caen seven years later) were serious enough for Edward III to counter with the destruction of the French fleet at Sluys in 1340 and prevent any such invasion for the next twenty years. Preparations made in the 1370s and 1380s were a valid attempt to convert the invasion of south-east England into a reality. For over twenty years lowland England suffered from French and Castilian raids but no French army invaded English soil. Across the Channel, France suffered from a 120 year span of devastating attacks by the English and other military forces in a harrying that permanently scarred the country. The havoc was particularly severe during the earlier phases of the war and again during the 1440s in Normandy and Aquitaine, but the English conquests were more easily won (and recovered by the French) with fewer ravages during the latter phases.

SEATS OF POWER

The Hundred Years War is a story of two nations whose destinies became inextricably entwined throughout the later middle ages. But although it was an epic conflict between England and France, it involved a number of other European countries who, from time to time, supported one of the protagonists. They include Scotland, Castile, Aragon, Navarre, Portugal, the Low Countries, the imperial territories of Bohemia, and the papacy in Avignon and then Rome. But a further factor of this war was that supporters changed sides depending on the political or economic pressures exerted on them, or on the scale of the bribe necessary to buy their diplomatic support or alliance. The constancy of a country towards one side or the other in a way which is usually taken for granted today, could never be relied upon during this period but could be swayed by diplomatic gifts, bribes, or threats. However, it could also aid some traditional fidelities such as Castile’s alliance with France which lasted from 1369 to the end of the war.

The seats of power are those residences occupied by the political leaders of the countries involved during the different stages of the war. More precisely, they were the palaces, castles, and houses occupied by the monarchs and royal princes who were the leading protagonists during the conflict. An analysis of these properties will demonstrate how they varied in scale and layout to reflect the standing, the abilities, and the financial resources of their builders. They will also include references to some of the residences of key members of the nobility who were among the leading captains of war such as Lord Neville of Raby or Guy de la Trémoille of Sully-sur-Loire. This survey is not intended to be comprehensive. To keep it within reasonable bounds, it only includes two or three of the castles or houses of the aristocracy or those of royal officials, even though some of them were among the prime beneficiaries of the war.

In undertaking such a formidable conflict, no monarch could ignore the commercial interests of his country which he was so dependent on for funding his war effort. An early lesson was learnt at the beginning of the conflict when the Florentine banks suffered badly under Edward III during the late 1330s. His English lenders proved more capable and built imposing houses to prove it in Hull and at Penshurst and in London. A century later, the house of Jacques Coeur at Bourges is similar testimony to his manipulative ways, though the equally successful Cardinal Henry Beaufort in England preferred to up-grade rather than rebuild his inherited residences at Bishops Waltham and Wolvesey at Winchester.

The weakness of the French crown was a major factor responsible for the protraction of the war. With the exception of Charles V (1364–80), France was not well served by its monarchs. A similar weakness affected England from the end of Edward III’s reign to Henry V, that is from 1377 to 1415, and again from 1440 until 1461 through factional rivalries under the saintly but ineffective Henry VI.

The political and territorial division of France also ill-served its monarch. Had the country been unified like England with a centralised administrative and judicial system, then the English defeat would have been accomplished far more swiftly. But France was made up of a substantial royal domains and a number of semi-autonomous provinces. The formal boundaries of the French king’s suzerainty had been established by the Treaty of Verdun in 843. He ruled two-thirds of the present state and Flanders but none of the lands east of the Rhône and Meuse which owed allegiance to the Holy Roman Empire. Five hundred years later, the Hundred Years War was fought against the background of the fluctuating relationship between the Valois monarchy centred on a limited territorial domain, and four major principalities – Brittany, Aquitaine, Burgundy and Flanders – as well as several smaller territorial principalities which together made up the greater part of the country. It was only after the war was concluded that the relationship was permanently resolved by the unbending affirmation of royal authority and power.

GOTHIC ARCHITECTURE DURING THE LATER MIDDLE AGES

From the mid- to late 12th century, Gothic architecture swiftly pushed aside the Romanesque form, spreading from the Île de France through northern France and then to England. It dominated ecclesiastical patronage throughout the thirteenth century, whether on a large or small scale, but was most obviously expounded in the development of the great churches – those of cathedral and monastic status. The pointed arch, enlarged windows, vaulting development, and the expansion of interior spaces characterised the Gothic style. And its progress primarily rested on the shared interests of the crown, bishops, and abbots with the people’s support.

However, the fourteenth century witnessed a new clientele – an essentially secular one – responsible for imposing residences, town halls, guild halls, and educational foundations. The consequences were immediately apparent in two directions. The period was dominated by the rise of the palace-fortress, an imposing residence within a defensible curtilage, and that contributed to the growth of the Gothic form outside the bounds of its ecclesiastical origins in a period described as ‘the age of nobility’.¹

The development of the palace-fortress was a phenomenon of the mid third of the fourteenth century. The imposing papal fortress of Benedict XII (1334–42) at Avignon was extended with a sumptuous residence by his immediate successor Clement VI (1342–52). Emperor Charles IV’s construction of Karlstein Castle took place between 1348 and 1355. Casimir the Great initiated his expansion of Wawal Castle in Cracow from about 1350 while Edward III’s redevelopment of Windsor Castle began in 1355. David II followed more modestly at Edinburgh Castle in 1357 while the royal palace at Barcelona was given a sensational new audience hall between 1359 and 1362. Charles V of France remodelled the Louvre between 1360 and 1370 followed almost immediately by the fundamental redevelopment of Vincennes Castle as a major fortress within a huge defensive enceinte (1361–71). Shortly afterwards, the Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights was expanding his personal accommodation at Malbork Castle with an extremely comfortable palace complex towards the close of the century.

These programmes cost more than almost any contemporary ecclesiastical work. The latter was no longer in the ascendancy. The balance of architectural power had moved from religious to secular domination and this was confirmed by its application to a number of lesser projects outside crown circles including the palace-fortresses of princes and leading nobles at Saumur and Pierrefonds in France, Raby and Bolton castles in England, Torrelobaton in Castile, and Albrechtsburg Palace at Meissen where the factors of display and rank came to the fore.

Many of these projects were purposely designed with a public face to impress all visitors. The extended inner courtyard façade at Windsor Castle was designed with a gate house towards each end. The castle at Vincennes became a small walled city dominated by a massive tower-house. The impregnable castle at Karlstein protected the imperial jewels and relics. Westminster Hall was remodelled and crowned with a roof which is one of the masterpieces of medieval carpentry, while the Louvre boasted a spectacular staircase that influenced French secular architecture for over two hundred years. But implicit in these projects was also the developing secular religion that came to be linked to Christendom – the aristocratic values of chivalry, largesse, and display.

Equally important was the fact that the Gothic form of architecture had spread from its French roots across most of Europe, leaving only Italy outside its overwhelming influence. Whereas the portals, sculpture, traceried windows, and twin towers of a cathedral façade had visually trumpeted the strength and command of Christianity, now the decorated façades and imposing towers of kings, princes, magnates, civic leaders, and prosperous merchants proclaimed a more diverse patronage covering a wider European span than previously. The Gothic style had spread to Flanders, the Iberian Peninsula, the Holy Roman Empire and even Naples and, in so doing, developed more fluid and localised forms. The Flemish cloth halls, the Florentine Palazzo Vecchio, and the Spanish lonja or exchange at Valencia and Palma were spectacular displays of civic pride. Meanwhile the mendicant orders who now became the crusading guardians of Christian orthodoxy favoured the simplicity of hall-style churches for preaching their message of poverty, while the extensive use of brick by the Hanseatic countries spread to civil structures breaking the previous exclusivity of stone for high quality buildings.

Secular residences on a substantial scale were swiftly followed by the desire for comfort and privacy. Castles and palaces had been deficient in both prior to the fourteenth century. Building expansion to take account of such considerations might be thought to be a consequence of a more settled Europe. But this development occurred during the protracted war between France and England. And it was in England during the 1350s that this development was first articulated where the more public rooms of great hall and chapel at Windsor Castle were separated from the suites for the king and the queen with the former enjoying a sequence of nine royal rooms of increasing privacy and decorative display. Mural fireplaces became increasingly popular, traceried windows were indistinguishable from ecclesiastical forms, while internal galleries, terraces, and pleasure gardens followed within a century. Sculpture, hitherto the preserve of an ecclesiastical precinct, was now prominent in secular interiors as at the Louvre, Vincennes Castle and Westminster Hall, and also on the exteriors of leading residences as at Pierrefonds and Lumley Castle.

There is no division in architecture between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In northern Europe, the Gothic style continued uninterrupted and did not fundamentally change until the second quarter of the sixteenth century. Secular structures continued to predominate rather than major ecclesiastical buildings but not overwhelmingly so. Several major cathedrals were built in Spain following the marriage between Aragon and Castile (Salamanca from 1513, Segovia 1525–57), but it was palaces that predominated in France and England towards the close of the fifteenth century with major...