Schopenhauer matured at a time when philosophy was trying to find its proper bearings from the revolutionary impact of Kantâs transcendental idealism. Kantâs philosophy is undoubtedly among the most inspiring and thought-provoking of the entire modern era. One of the reasons that Kant still engages many philosophers today, as well as causes wildly different interpretations both in the past and the present, is that he remained vexingly unclear on a great number of issues. Keeping both his popularity and ambiguity in mind, it should not come as a surprise that a myriad of very different thinkers arose in the Kantian aftermath, often claiming to be Kantâs true successors. Most of these successors built upon Kantâs architectonic rationality and completed the system of reason Kant never finished. Only one proponent of Kant, perhaps even his greatest adulator, understood Kantâs philosophy in a very different light. Schopenhauer advanced the view that transcendental idealism, if thought through correctly, leads to a profound sense of pessimism. Needless to say, he often stood alone in his interpretation of Kant, as well as his advocacy of pessimism. Nevertheless, this chapter seeks to provide a first tentative suggestion that Schopenhauer was on the right track and that he built upon at least one forgotten strait of Kantâs transcendental philosophy.
By this, I do not mean to dismiss or even diminish the influence that several other sources might have had on Schopenhauerâs philosophy. Indeed, there is something to be said for the idea that Indian thought, Platoâs philosophy, Goethe and even Christianity are significant factors that profoundly influence Schopenhauerâs philosophy (we will return especially to Christianity). The reason for focusing on Kant in this monograph is obvious: despite the fact of Schopenhauerâs very vocal praise of Kant, not many commentators have explored the connection between their respective philosophies in terms of organic development. Such development is of the kind that Schopenhauer took an element of Kantâs philosophy, often ignored or dismissed, and followed its train of thought to its logical and organic conclusion. This preliminary chapter seeks to sketch out the contours of the aftermath of Kantian philosophy (section one); then it discusses the potential influence of Indian thought on Schopenhauer (section two) and finally summarizes some of the elements of Kantâs philosophy that organically lead towards Schopenhauerâs philosophy (section three). Particularly those elements in this final section will be explored more comprehensively when Schopenhauerâs philosophy is presented more systematically in the chapters to come.
Section 1: The Kantian Aftermath
By the end of Kantâs life, transcendental philosophy had already become the standard for academic discussions on a variety of subjects. In fact, there were entire courses at various universities uniquely devoted to clarifying and edifying Kantâs transcendental idealism, most importantly his Critique of Pure Reasonâ a work that still commands the interest of many scholars. Among these professors that made a career of teaching âKantianismâ (while offering relatively minor criticism) was first and foremost Karl Leonhard Reinhold, whose idealistic revisionary reading of Kant significantly influenced Fichte, Jacobi, Schelling and Hegel. Schopenhauerâs primary source for Kantâs philosophy was, however, a slightly less appreciative reader of Kant, namely Gottlob Ernst Schulze. Schulze inspired Schopenhauerâs life-long admiration for Kant, but also urged Schopenhauer to study Platoâs dialogues closely.1 In his anonymously published Aenesidemus, Schulze launched a skeptical attack on Kantâs epistemological model or, more precisely, Reinholdâs reading of Kantâs epistemology. Schulze argued that Kantâs introduction of an unknown thing in itself as the cause of sensory intuitions was inconsistent with Kantâs argument that causality is valid only for subjective consciousness and therefore loses all validity outside of it. Accordingly, Schulze suggested to remove the in itself from Kantâs philosophy and emphasized the need to remain skeptical about anything outside of self-consciousness. Schulze advocated that a more rigorous sense of idealism was the proper conclusion to be drawn from Kantâs epistemological premises in the First Critique.
Although Schulzeâs skeptical attack on Kantâs philosophy finds only some resonance in Schopenhauerâs philosophy, young Arthur did take most of his first teacherâs advice to heart, as he would carefully study both Kant and Plato. At times, he could even be read as attempting to reconcile the respective insights of Kant and Plato (e.g., WWV1 201â202). Schopenhauer would, contrary to Schulze, remain true to transcendental idealism by emphasizing the rigorous (toto genere) distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal. Schopenhauerâs slightly naĂŻve allegiance to one unfashionable aspect of Kantâs philosophy fell on deaf ears ever since the more overtly idealistic preoccupations of Schelling, Fichte and Hegel clearly began to dominate the philosophical field. At a young age, Schopenhauer was enthralled by these philosophical projects, particularly when he moved to Berlin to attend Fichteâs and Schleiermacherâs Berlin-lectures. While initially deeply enthusiastic, Schopenhauer would turn his back on both after only a short time. Besides doctrinal, methodological and existential disagreements, Schopenhauer himself would single out several minor issues that annoyed him. For instance, Fichteâs excessive use of philosophical terminology vexed Schopenhauer, and Schleiermacherâs obstinate refusal to read the original texts of philosophers (dabbling with secondary studies),2 which he combined with syrupy patriotism,3 rubbed the Anglophile Schopenhauer the wrong way.4 Initially, one would find nothing but praise of Schelling in Schopenhauerâs notes and publications (see especially the first version of Schopenhauerâs doctoral dissertation), but his approval would wane after a while and make way for disdain similar to what Schopenhauer experienced for Fichte, Jacobi and Hegel.
After these earliest engagements with Kantâs philosophy (Reinhold, Schulze, but also Christian Garve), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling in his System des transcendentalen Idealismus (1800) and Johann Gottlieb Fichte in his Wissenschaftlehre (1794â1813) dedicated themselves to challenging Kantâs critique of idealism. Joined later on by Hegel, they would reinforce Kantâs claims on noumenal rationality and transpose this rationality to a system that would initially be named âphilosophy of identityâ. Accordingly, they advocated a more positive use of dialectical reasoning so as to apply the rational method germane to the Enlightenment to the full range of reality and through this, in Schopenhauerâs view, they blatantly miss âthe amazing Kantâsâ (UWS 1) most important contribution to the history of philosophy, namely his separation of appearances from the in itself. Kant himself even denounced, in an open letter of 1799, Fichteâs idealistic revision of his philosophy. While Schelling, Fichte and Hegel were largely sympathetic to Kantâs theoretical philosophy, they would object to Kantâs speculative agnosticism and extended rational dialectics beyond Kantâs critical boundaries in such a way that rationality was postulated to govern the full range of reality. Despite the fact of Kantâs public objection to Fichteâs idealism, his First Critique could be read as leaving the door open for a Fichtean âscience of reasonâ since Kant himself admits that âa critiqueâ is always âpropadeuticâ and must lead to âa system of pure reason (science), the whole (true as well as apparent) philosophical cognition from pure reason in systematic interconnection, and is called metaphysicsâ (B 869 / A 841).
Contrary to Fichteâs and Schellingâs appeal to dialectical rationality to complete the system of reason, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi influentially argued that the Enlightenmentâs emphasis on reason would necessarily lead to a form of nihilism, fatalism and atheism. In particular, Jacobi believed that Kantâs philosophy inadvertently leads to atheism by rejecting any truth from theology or religion that could clash with Enlightenment rationality. Jacobi was personally intermingled in the so-called Atheismusstreit that would ultimately condemn Fichte for advocating pantheism, which was, at that time at least, considered as equally offensive as atheism. Alternatively, Jacobi espoused renewed faith in revelation to counter the ensuing nihilism by fervently espousing a robust sense of transcendent orthodox theism: âGod is outside of me, a living Being existing on Its own, or else I am Godâ.5 Jacobi did aptly envision a future in which nihilism and, at least methodological, atheism would enter the scene. Friedrich Schleiermacher in his turn opposed the stark dualism that Jacobi detected between reason and faith by initiating a philosophical/theological movement that would become increasingly popular throughout the 19th and 20th centuryâmostly among theologians, howeverânamely liberal theology. Schleiermacherâs main interest was to reconcile the principles of the Enlightenment with Protestant Orthodoxy, effectively making him the philosophical father of what is now called âTraditional Hermeneuticsâ, later on continued by Wilhelm Dilthey, Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Schleiermacher developed his hermeneutics mainly in an attempt to find the proper way of interpreting the New Testament. In his Hermeneutics and Criticism, a work spanning twenty years and published posthumously, he developed different forms of hermeneutics, such as grammatical (technical) and psychological (holistic). One of his main interests was to first clearly discern interpretation from criticism and then combine these in a comprehensive project of âgeneral hermeneuticsâ. To read Kant as such a liberal theologian misses, in my view, a lot of the rationalist and Enlightenment tendencies of Kantâs appreciation of religion.6
In his post-idealistic philosophy (from especially 1809 onwards), Schelling would distance himself from Fichte and Hegel. In fact, Schellingâs metaphysics of will and freedom in his Freiheitsschrift (1809) come rather close to Schopenhauerâs philosophy in The World as Will and Representationâ something that has prompted repeated allegations of plagiarism. Schopenhauer himself noted a striking similarity between Kantâs, Schellingâs and his own philosophy repeatedly (e.g., BGE 82â84). In the first edition of his doctoral dissertation, Schopenhauer even praises Schelling for giving a âvery worthwhile and clarifying exposition of Kantâs teachingâ (UWS 76â77). In later editions of this work, Schopenhauer would remove the praise of Schelling and replace it with something coming rather close to a charge of plagiarism: âSo here Schelling stands to Kant in the fortunate position of Amerigo to Columbus: someone elseâs discovery is stamped with his nameâ (BGE 83). While Schopenhauer closely read Schellingâs Freiheitsschrift,7 it is doubtful whether the âmisanthropic sage of Frankfurtâ was aware of Schellingâs positive philosophy and philosophy of mythology/revelation in Berlin of the 1840s. The similarities between their respective projects have been pointed out by at least one scholar.8
In the wake of Kantâs death, numerous issues were up for debate and philosophers galore would propose their respective points of view throughout what RĂŒdiger Safranski calls âthe wild years of philosophyâ.9 The philosophical scene was open to defend such a myriad of philosophical positions as absolute/subjective idealism, fideism, Romantic naturalism or liberal theology.10 Most of these philosophical positions took their cues from Kantâs epistemological model in the First Critique, and even Schopenhauer claims to pick up only on Kantâs theoretical philosophy. Obviously, Kantâs practical philosophy and aesthetics were equally of interest to his immediate successors. But, Schopenhauer, like many others, would explicitly distance himself from Kantâs moral and religious philosophy.11 How authors such as Reinhold, Fichte and Hegel engaged Kantâs philosophy has been the subject of many excellent studies.12 For his part, Schopenhauer would claim that Kantâs distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal finally had silenced the long-standing philosophical debate between realism and idealism, and was moreover the single most impressive accomplishment of any philosopher ever since Plato. Kant did, however, not follow through in drawing the correct, rigorous conclusions of that separation. As such, Schopenhauer claims not only to be Kantâs successor, but also his corrector. In his view at least, his own philosophical system is âthe correct conclusion [Ergebniss] of Kantian philosophyâ (WWV2 13). While most of Schopenhauerâs assertions are certainly up for debate, a charitable reading of his philosophical project would try to uncover what specific line of argumentation Schopenhauer picks up from Kant and then continues to its correct conclusion. Before attending to this point, we have to make a slight detour to what some believe is a more significant inspiration for Schopenhauerâs philosophy, namely the Indian Upanishads.13
Section 2: The Indian Factor
Schopenhauer is often praised for his willingness to discuss non-Western philosophy. With the exception of Leibniz, Schopenhauer was likely the first modern philosopher to discuss charitably and elaborately Eastern thought. This is most overtly so for the Indian Upanishads. The Upanishads are a part of Vedic writings (Veda literally means âknowledgeâ), which are ancient spiritual texts of the Indian Hindu culture. These treat a vast diversity of subjects of a philosophical and spiritual nature and supposedly prepare a human being to pierce through the âshroudâ or âveilâ of Maya to perceive the world as it truly is, mainly through religious rituals and mysticism. There is serious debate whether or not Schopenhauer properly understood the meaning and purpose of these texts.14 This discussion is the subject for comparative research and, for our present purposes, it is mainly of interest in what sense Schopenhauer interpreted these texts and how he incorporated their subsequent insights, through a Kantian and Platonic transformation, in his philosophical project. I do not believe that Eastern wisdom has a privileged place as a formative influence of Schopenhauerâs philosophy. As such, this monograph focuses on the Kantian inspiration of Schopenhauer.
Schopenhauerâs exposure to Indian thought happened gradually, but clearly he believed that there was something to be gained, especially from the Upanishads. In 1801â2, the French Indologist Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron (1731â1805) published the first translation of, what he transcribed as the, Oupnekâhat in a European language, namely Latin (he authored but never published a French translation as well).15 This text is notoriously difficult to read because Anquetil-Duperron kept the Sanskrit grammar and translated the Sanskrit, word for word, into Latin. Interestingly, Schopenhauer praises this translation, even though the quotes he gives of this text are usually paraphrases: âI read this translation with the fullest confidence, which is immediately and joyfully confirmed. For how the Oupnekâhat thoroughly breathes the holy spirit of the Vedas!â (PP2 422).
While Schopenhauer certainly would increasingly expose himself to other texts of Eastern lore such as the Sanhita, Bhagavadgita and Samkhya philosophy (see: PP2 420â425), it is helpful to explore Schopenhauerâs report to the Upanishads further. The common assumption is that Schopenhauer was ...