1.2 Absolute and Relative Knowledge, Absolute and Explicit Beginning
Heideggerâs distinctive and most important thesis in HPS, which drives his whole interpretation of the Phenomenology, is that phenomenology âbegins absolutely with the absolute.â7 To understand this thesis we need to have an idea of what Heidegger means with âbegins absolutelyâ and âthe absolute.â There are many indications in HPS that âabsolute knowledgeâ is used synonymously with âthe absolute.â8 So Heideggerâs thesis is that phenomenology begins absolutely with absolute knowledge.
Absolute knowledge is defined in contrast to relative knowledge. Yet, there are two ways to understand the ârelativityâ and, correspondingly, the âabsolutenessâ of knowledge: quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitatively relative knowledge is knowledge of a part, instead of the whole, of a domain. It exists âwhen there is still something else about which that knowledge knows nothing.â9 Or, again, it is that knowledge âwhich does not know everything there is to know.â10 In contradistinction to this notion of relative knowledge, absolute knowledge would be quantitatively absolute, meaning that âit ⊠know[s] everything there is to know.â11Quantitatively relative and absolute knowledge are determined, then, by the range of knowing (a part or the whole of a domain).
Heidegger claims that âfor Hegel the concepts of relative and absolute, as characters of knowledge, are to be understood not quantitatively but qualitatively.â12 (So, for Heidegger, Hegelâs âabsoluteâ is not, as commonly assumed, a term describing a mind that knows everything there is to know.) Qualitatively relative knowledge is knowledge that exhibits âa relation to that which is known,â âa knowledge of something,â13 or, if you will, a relation to and a knowledge of objects. Heidegger informs us also, very importantly, that in qualitatively relative knowledge, knowledge is âbeing carried over to that which it knows,â14 that it âis consumed by it, surrenders to it, and is knowingly lost in it.â15 It is a knowledge that is âcaught up and imprisoned by what it knows.â16 Later, Heidegger repeats this characterization of qualitatively relative knowledge: âto know relatively [is] to know merely by constantly fastening precisely on what is knownâ and âto be absorbed in what is known.â17
The notion of absolute knowledgeâs âbeing carried overâ to âwhat is knownâ (object) is especially significant here because it designates a âgapâ between the mind that knows and the object of knowledge. I will understand qualitatively relative knowledge as a âknowledge,â or, better, a mind, that assumes that knowledge is only about objects that are distinct from it and, what is more important, that for this knowledge to be established there has to be an active or passive relation to those objects: this means, it assumes that knowledge has to either be confirmed by distinct objects or be imposed on distinct objects. This structure holds even for a mind that purports to know itself or its knowledge as an object: it either demands confirmation of itself or its knowledge by a distinct material self or knowledge or conceives of itself or its knowledge as having a structure that has been imposed on it by a distinct presence of its self or its knowledge. As Heidegger points out, âsuch a relative knowledge ⊠Hegel calls ⊠âconsciousness.ââ18
Since absolute knowledge is ânot relativeâ knowledge, qualitatively absolute knowledge does not exhibit the characteristics of relative knowledge. Therefore, it is not exhibited as a relation to an object. This means: it does not involve a carrying over to the object, a consumption by it, a surrender to it, and a getting lost in it. To my mind, what Heidegger claims here is that absolute knowledge, determined in qualitatively absolute terms, is an intelligence or a mind that acquires knowledge, either of an object or of itself or of its knowledge, by staying solely within itself, to wit, by not ârelatingâ to objects, by not going over to them. In Heideggerâs words,
the manner of this knowing is not to know relatively, not to know merely by constantly fastening precisely on what is known, but rather [to know by] detaching oneself (sich ablösend) from what is knownâŠ. It means not to be absorbed in what is known âŠ19
Thus, Heideggerâs thesis that phenomenology begins absolutely with absolute knowledge means that phenomenology begins absolutely with qualitatively absolute knowledge, namely, with a knowledge that does not involve a mindâs going over to objects in order to know them.
If Heideggerâs thesis was simply that phenomenology begins with absolute knowledge, it would be obviously wrong, for phenomenology apparently or explicitly begins with consciousness. Sense-certainty, with which phenomenology begins, is explicitly a form of consciousness, not absolute knowledge. Yet, what Heidegger claims, more accurately, is that phenomenology begins absolutely with absolute knowledge. Therefore, in Heideggerâs reading of the Phenomenology, phenomenology has two simultaneous beginnings: (a) an absolute beginning, made with absolute knowledge, and (b) an apparent or explicit beginning, made with consciousness.
What does it mean to say that phenomenology âbegins absolutelyâ with absolute knowledge? What is an âabsolute beginningâ? To my mind, Heideggerâs signification of âabsolute beginningâ is that it is a beginning that involves the essence of the subject matter (die Sache) that begins. To say that phenomenology begins absolutely with absolute knowledge is to say that it begins essentially with absolute knowledge, to wit, that phenomenology is, âdeep down,â about absolute knowledge from the beginning (and not only at the end).20 It is to say also that the essence of relative knowledge or consciousness is absolute knowledge.
An absolute beginning, which captures the essence of the subject matter, does not exclude the possibility that it could also be an explicit beginning (that is to say, a discipline or a subject matter could begin explicitly with its essence), but, crucially, it also does not entail that it is immediately apparent or explicit (to wit, a discipline or a subject matter may not begin explicitly with its essence, although the essence will, of course, be there implicitly). Specifically, in the case of phenomenology (consciousness), it so happens that its absolute beginning is not explicit; it is, rather, hidden or âconcealed.â As Heidegger puts it, phenomenologyâs absolute beginning with absolute knowledge âis simply concealed from us.â21 Or, again,
relative knowledge is also absolute knowledge, although in a concealed way.22
The relation between the two beginnings of phenomenology, as well as their relation to the beginning of logic, is what we need to clarify in order to get the substance of Heideggerâs interpretation of the Phenomenology.
1.3 The Phenomenology-System versus the Encyclopedia-System
Heideggerâs puzzlement over the Phenomenology stems from his belief that, for Hegel, the âsystem of scienceâ contains two beginnings, one provided by phenomenology, another by logic. Insofar as the system begins with phenomenology, it takes the form of âthe phenomenology-system,â in which phenomenology âgroundsâ logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit. Yet, insofar as the system begins with logic, it takes the form of âthe encyclopedia-system,â in which logic grounds philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit.23 The question is why the system must have two beginnings and especially a beginning with phenomenology.
Logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit correspond, Heidegger maintains, to the constituent disciplines of traditional metaphysics. The latter has two parts: metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis. While metaphysica generalis consists of ontology, metaphysica specialis consists of speculative psychology, speculative cosmology, and speculative theology. Hegelâs philosophy of nature corresponds to speculative cosmology, his philosophy of spirit to speculative psychology, and his logic to âan original unityâ of ontology and speculative theology, an âonto-theology.â24
What is significant to note here is that, for Heidegger, traditional metaphysics and, consequently, the encyclopedia-system have absolute knowledge or âthe absoluteâ as their explicit subject matter. Logic begins by positing the minimal structure of absolute knowledge, which is pure, indeterminate being or, what means the same, th...