PART ONE
PATHS OF INTERPRETING THE BEING-THERE OF DASEIN IN THE AWHILENESS OF TEMPORAL PARTICULARITY
âFacticityâ is the designation we will use for the character of the being of âourâ âownâ Dasein. More precisely, this expression means: in each case âthisâ Dasein in its being-there for a while at the particular time (the phenomenon of the âawhilenessâ of temporal particularity, cf. âwhiling,â tarrying for a while, not running away, being-there-at-home-in . . . , being-there-involved-in . . . , the being-there of Dasein) insofar as it is, in the character of its being, âthereâ in the manner of be-ing.[9] Being-there in the manner of be-ing means: not, and never, to be there primarily as an object of intuition and definition on the basis of intuition, as an object of which we merely take cognizance and have knowledge. Rather, Dasein is there for itself in the âhowâ of its ownmost being. The how of its being opens up and circumscribes[10] the respective âthereâ which is possible for a while at the particular time. Beingâtransitive: to be factical life! Being is itself never the possible object of a having, since what is at issue in it, what it comes to, is itself: being.
As that which is in each case our own, âDaseinâ does not mean an isolating relativization into individuals who are seen only from the outside and thus the individual (solus ipse [myself alone]). âOur ownâ is rather a how of being, an indication which points to a possible path of being-wakeful. Not a regional demarcation in the sense of an isolating contrast.
Accordingly, âfacticalâ means something which is of itself articulated with respect to, on the basis of, and with a view to such a factical character of being and âisâ in this manner. If we take âlifeâ to be a mode of âbeing,â then âfactical lifeâ means: our own Dasein which is âthereâ for us in one expression or another of the character of its being, and this expression, too, is in the manner of being.
Chapter One
Hermeneutics
§2. The traditional concept of hermeneutics
The expression âhermeneuticsâ is used here to indicate the unified manner of the engaging, approaching, accessing, interrogating, and explica facticity.
The word áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”Ï
ÏÎčÏ°Îź [hermeneutics] (áŒÏÎčÏÏÎźÎŒÎ· [science], [art]) is formed from áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”ÏΔÎčÎœ [interpreting], áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”ία [interpretation], áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”ÏÏ [interpreter]. Its etymology is obscure.1
It is related to the name of the god áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÌÏ [Hermes], the mes of the gods.
A few references will allow us to narrow down the original meaning of this word and understand as well the way its meaning has changed.
Plato: ÎżáŒ± ÎŽáœČ ÏÎżÎčηÏα᜶ ÎżáœÎŽáœČÎœ áŒÎ»Î»â áŒą áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ·ÌÏ Î”áŒ°ÏÎčÎœ ÏÏÌÎœ ÏΔÏÌÎœ (âthe poets are but the heralds of the godsâ).2 Thus the following applies to the rhapsodes who for their part recite the poets: ÎáœÏ°ÎżÏ
ÌÎœ áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎÏÎœ áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ·ÌÏ ÎłÎŻÎłÎœÎ”ÏÏΔ; âWill you not thus turn out to be heralds of heralds?â3 A áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”ÏÏ [interpreter] is one who communicates, announces and makes known,[11] to someone what another âmeans,â or someone who in turn conveys, reactivates, this communication, this announcement and making known. Cf. Sophist 248a5, 246e3: áŒÏÎ”Ï±ÎŒÎźÎœÎ”Ï
Δ, âshall report aboutâ*: making known what the others mean.
Theaetetus 209a5: ÎÏÎłÎżÏ [discourse] = áŒĄ ÏηÌÏ ÏηÌÏ ÎŽÎčαÏÎżÏ±ÏÏηÏÎżÏ áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”ία [the expression of differences]. The making known is a making explicit of differences in addition to and in relation to what is Ï°ÎżÎčÎœĂłÎœ [common].â (cf. Theaetetus 163c: what we see of the words and what interpreters of them communicate.)⥠â not theoretical comprehension but âwill,â wish, and the like, being, existence, i.e., hermeneutics is the announcement and making known of the being of a being in its being in relation to . . . (me).
Aristotle: ÏáżÌ γλÏÏÏáż (ϰαÏαÏϱηÌÏαÎč áŒĄ ÏÏÏÎčÏ) áŒÏÎŻ ÏΔ ÏᜎΜ γΔÏ
ÌÏÎčÎœ ϰα᜶ ÏᜎΜ ÎŽÎčÎŹÎ»Î”Ï°ÏÎżÎœ, ᜧΜ áŒĄ ÎŒáœČÎœ γΔÏ
ÌÏÎčÏ áŒÎœÎ±ÎłÏ°Î±ÎčÌÎżÎœ (ÎŽÎčĂČ Ï°Î±áœ¶ ÏλΔίοÏÎčÎœ áœÏÎŹÏ±ÏΔÎč), áŒĄ ÎŽâ áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”ία áŒÎœÎ”ϰα ÏÎżÏ
Ì Î”áœ. âLiving beings use their tongue for tasting as well as for conversing as they go about their dealings[12]; of these, tasting is a necessary mode of their dealings (hence it is found in most of them), but addressing and discussing something with others (conversation about something) exists in order to safeguard the authentic being of living beings (as they live in their world and by means of it).â4 Here áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”ία simply stands for ÎŽÎčÎŹÎ»Î”Ï°ÏÎżÏ [conversation], i.e., discussing the world as we go about dealings with it. And such discussion is simply the factical mode of the actualizing of λÏγοÏ, and this (discourse about something) has as its concern ΎηλοÏ
ÌÎœ { . . . } ÏĂČ ÏÏ
ÎŒÏÎÏ±ÎżÎœ ϰα᜶ ÏĂČ ÎČλαÎČΔϱÏÎœ (i.e., discourse âmakes beings openly manifest, accessible for our seeing and having of them in their expediency and inexpediencyâ).5
See also áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”ÏΔÎčÎœ, Philostratus.6 Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum Commentaria.7 Pericles in Thucydides: Ï°Î±ÎŻÏÎżÎč áŒÎŒÎżáœ¶ ÏÎżÎčÎżÏÏáżł áŒÎœÎŽÏ±áœ¶ áœÏ±ÎłÎŻÎ¶Î”ÏÏΔ áœÏ ÎżáœÎŽÎ”ÎœĂČÏ ÎżáŒŽÎżÎŒÎ±Îč ጄÏÏÏÎœ ΔጶΜαÎč ÎłÎœÏÌÎœÎ±ÎŻ ÏΔ Ïᜰ ÎŽÎÎżÎœÏα ϰα᜶ áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”Ï
ÌÏαÎč ÏαÏ
ÌÏα, ÏÎčλÏÏÎżÎ»ÎŻÏ ÏΔ ϰα᜶ ÏÏ±Î·ÎŒÎŹÏÏÎœ Ï°Ï±Î”ÎŻÏÏÏÎœ. [âAnd yet I, with whom you are angry, am as competent as any man, I think, to know and announce the right measures, and as good a patriot and superior to the influence of money.â]8
Aristotle: λÎÎłÏ ÎŽÎ, . . . , λÎΟÎčÎœ ΔጶΜαÎč ÏᜎΜ ÎŽÎčᜰ ÏηÌÏ áœÎœÎżÎŒÎ±Ïáœ·Î±Ï áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”᜷αΜ. [I mean that . . . the language is making something known through words.â]9
Among the âwritingsâ of Aristotle, one has been handed down with the title ΠΔϱ᜶ áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”áœ·Î±Ï [On Interpretation]. It deals with λáœčÎłÎżÏ in terms of its basic accomplishment of uncovering beings and making us familiar with them. The title of this text is very fitting in light of what was noted above. However, neither Aristotle nor his immediate successors in the Peripatos introduced the text under this title. It was handed down from Aristotleâs literary estate to his students as an âunfinished draftâ and âwithout a title.â The title was already in use in the time of Andronicus of Rhodes. H. Meier, who has established the authenticity of the text on solid grounds, conjecturally puts the earliest appearance of the title in the first generation after Theophrastus and Eudemus.10
In the present context, what is solely important for us about áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”᜷α functioning as the title of Aristotleâs particular investigation is what this tells us about the history of the meaning of this word. What discourse accomplishes is making something accessible as being there out in the open, as being available. As such, λáœčÎłÎżÏ has, regarding what it accomplishes, the distinctive possibility of áŒÎ»Î·ÏΔÏΔÎčÎœ [being-true] (making what was previously concealed, covered up, available as unconcealed, as there out in the open). Because Aristotleâs text deals with all this, it is rightly called ÏΔϱ᜶ áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”᜷αÏ.
This sense of áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”ÏΔÎčÎœ took on a general meaning among the Byzantines and corresponds to our term âto mean.â A word or combination of words means something, âhas a meaning.â (A Platonism of meaning deriving from this.)
Philo describes Moses as a áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”ÏÏ ÏΔοÏ
Ì [interpreter of God], a messenger who announces and makes known the will of God.11
Aristeas: ÏÎŹ ÏÏÌÎœ áŒžÎżÏ
ΎαίÏÎœ ÎłÏ±ÎŹÎŒÎŒÎ±Ïα âáŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”ÎŻÎ±Ï ÏÏ±ÎżÏΎΔÎčÌÏαÎčâ (the writings of the Jews ârequire translation,â âinterpretationâ).12 Translation: making what was presented in a foreign language accessible in our own language and for the sake of it. In the Christian churches, áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”ία then came to mean as much as commentary (enarratio): áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”ία Î”áŒ°Ï ÏᜎΜ áœÏ°ÏÎŹÏΔÏ
ÏÎżÎœ [âcommentary on the Octateuchâ]. Commenting, interpreting: pursuing what is authentically meant in a text and thereby making the matters which are meant accessible, facilitating access to them. áŒÏ±ÎŒÎ·ÎœÎ”ία = áŒÎŸÎźÎłÎ·ÏÎčÏ [exegesis].
Augustine provides the first âhermeneuticsâ in grand style. Homo timens Deum, voluntatem ejus in Scripturis sanctis diligenter inquirit. Et ne amet certamina, pietate mansuetus; praemunitus etiam scientia linguarum, ne in verbis locutionibusque ignotis haereat; praemunitus etiam cognitione quarumdam rerum necessariarum, ne vim naturamve earum quae propter similitudinem adhibentur, ignoret; adjuvante etiam codicum veritate, quam solers emendationis diligentia procuravit: veniat ita instructus ad ambigua Scripturarum discutienda atque solvenda.
âMan should approach the interpretation of ambiguous passages in Scripture with the following provisions: in fear of God, with the sole care of seeking Godâs will in Scripture; thoroughly educated in piety lest he should take pleasure in falling into quarrels over words; equipped with knowledge of languages lest he should get hung up on unfamiliar words and locutions; supplied with knowledge of certain natural objects and events which are introduced for purposes of illustration, lest he should misjudge the strength of their evidence; supported by the truth which the texts contain. . . .â13
In the 17th century, we meet up with the title Hermeneutica sacra [Sacred Hermeneutics] for what is otherwise designated as Clavis Scripturae sacrae14 [A Key to Sacred Scripture], Isagoge ad sacras literas15 [Introduction to Sacred Writings], Tractatus de interpretatione16 [Treatise on Interpretation], and Philologia sacra17 [Sacred Philology].
Hermeneutics is now no longer interpretation itself, but a doctrine about the conditions, the objects, the means, and the communication and practical application of interpretation. Cf. Johannes Jakob Rambach:
I. | âDe fundamentis hermeneuticae sacraeâ18 [âOn the Principles of Sacred Hermeneuticsâ]. On the right plan of approach for the interpretation of texts, of the meaning of the texts. |
II. | âDe mediis hermeneuticae sacrae domesticisâ19 [âOn the Internal Means of Sacred Hermeneuticsâ]. Religious analogy as a principle of interpretation. Circumstances, affects. Arrangement, relations. Parallelism in Scripture. |
III. | âDe mediis hermeneuticae sacrae externis et litterariisâ20 [âOn the External and Literal Means of Sacred Hermeneuticsâ]. Grammatical, critical, rhetorical, logical, and scientific ones. Translation and commentary. |
IV. | âDe sensus inventi legitima tractationeâ21 [âOn the Proper Treatment of Discovered Meaningâ]. On communication, supplying arguments, porismatic and practical application. (Porismata [inferences], ÏÎżÏ±ÎŻÎ¶Î”ÎčÎœ: âto inferâ in the sense of drawing conclusions.)[13] |
With Schleiermacher, the idea of hermeneutics which had formerly been viewed in a comprehensive and living manner (cf. Augustine!) was then reduced to an âart {technique} of understandingâ22 anotherâs discourse, and seen as a discipline connected with grammar and rhetoric, it was brought into relation with dialecticâthis methodology is formal, as âgeneral hermeneuticsâ (theory and technique of understanding any foreign discourse) it encompasses the special disciplines of theological and philological hermeneutics.
A. Boeckh took up this idea of hermeneutics in his Encyclopedia and Methodology of Philological Disciplines.23
Dilthey adopted Schleiermacherâs concept of hermeneutics, defining it as âthe formulation of rules of understandingâ (âtechnique of interpreting written recordsâ),24 but he supported it with an analysis of understanding as such a...