Augustine's Theory of Signs, Signification, and Lying

Remo Gramigna

• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN:
  9783110595772
• eBook ISBN:
  9783110593709
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Linguistics

The aim of this study is to present, as far as possible, a general description of the theory of the sign and signification in Augustine of Hippo (354-430 AD), with a view to its evaluation and implications for the study of semiotics. Accurate studies for subject, discipline, and significance have not yet given an organic and systematic vision of Augustine's theory of the sign. The underlying aspiration is that such an endeavour will prove to be beneficial to the scholars of Augustine's thought as well as to those with a keen interest in the history of semiotics.

The study uses Augustine's own accounts to investigate and interpret the philosophical problem of the sign. The focus lies on the first decade of Augustine's literary production. The De dialectica, is taken as the terminus ad quo of the study, and the De doctrina christiana is the terminus ad quem. The selected texts show an explicit engagement with poignant discussion on the nature and structure of the sign, the variety of signs and their uses. Although Augustine's intention never was to establish a theory of meaning as an independent field of study, he largely employed a theory of signs. Thus, Augustine's approach to signs is intrinsically meaningful.

1 Words as signs in the De Dialectica

1.1 Genesis of the work

The subject of this chapter is Augustine’s De dialectica—penned in 387 in Milan—where one can glimpse the first definitions of signum (“sign”), verbum (“word”) and res (“thing”).¹ Before becoming bishop of Hippo, Augustine was a master of rhetoric. His interest towards words and language in all its articulations—already displayed from his first juvenile treatise, the De dialectica, indeed—is therefore not surprising.

For years the work was considered of dubious paternity but was attributed to Augustine by Darrel Jackson and Jan Pinborg on the basis of lexicographical studies and quantitative textual analysis (Pinborg 1975).² The De dialectica, coupled with the De musica and the De rhetorica, is part of the Augustinian design of a larger project on the liberal arts, as stated by the author in the Retractationes—the book in which Augustine reviewed all his precedent works:

At the very time that I was about to receive baptism in Milan, I also attempted to write books on the liberal arts, questioning those who were with me and who were not averse to studies of this nature, and desiring by definite steps, so to speak, to reach things incorporeal through things corporeal and to lead others to them. But I was able to complete only the book on grammar—which I lost later from our library—and six books, On Music, pertaining to that part which is called rhythm. I wrote these six books, however, only after I was baptized and had returned to Africa from Italy, for I had only begun this art at Milan. Off the other five arts likewise begun there—dialectic, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, and philosophy—the beginnings alone remained and I lost even these. However, I think that some people have them.³

The authenticity of this treatise, however, is not above suspicion, especially if one considers that much of the terminology Augustine outlined in the De dialectica does not occur elsewhere in his writings.⁴

The De dialectica poses serious difficulties of interpretation for its incompleteness as well as for the lack of sources. In fact, in regards to the first point, the work cannot offer conclusive interpretations insofar as only an unfinished draft of it was found. In the work, however, the concepts of signum (“sign”) and verbum (“word”) are defined with clarity, as traceable in chapter V.

In regards to the second point—the unreliability of sources—for some, the treatise does not offer significant originality on the theory of language,⁵ but it does present clear credibility about its Stoic origin.⁶ And yet inasmuch as the thought of the Stoics is not transmitted directly, but is derived from secondary sources, also on this ground there are margins of uncertainty.

The aforementioned difficulties, however, did not prevent clear and precise studies of the sources within the De dialectica. They were formulated by Balduin Fisher in De Augustini Disciplinarum Libro Qui est De Dialectica (1912) and by Karl Barwick in Probleme der Stoischen Sprachlehre und Rhetorik (1957), which still remain two essential studies for the interpretation of the treatise. Leaving aside a detailed enquiry of the sources of the De dialectica, which would fall outside the primary scope of this study, it is worth referring to the philosophical context upon which the innovative capacity of Augustine’s theory of the sign is grafted.

1.2 Definition of dialectic and the Stoic legacy

The treatise presents ten chapters and revolves around five main themes: the concept and division of dialectics (ch. I–IV), the relationship sign-dicibile-thing (ch. V), the origin of the word, the power of the word (ch. VII), and the obscurity and ambiguity of the word (ch. VIII–X).

Augustine begins with a definition of dialectic:

Dialectica est bene disputandi scientia. Disputamus autem utique verbis.

(Dialectic is the science of disputing well. We always dispute with words.)⁷

Augustine’s definition of dialectic is, as regards to the first part of the citation, clearly derived from the Stoics. Barwik (1957, 8), to substantiate this hypothesis, refers to volume III, fr. 267 of the Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta: διαλεκτική έπιστήμη το εν διαλέyεσλαι. Darrel Jackson (1975, 121) underlines that the Augustinian definition of dialectic synthesizes the concepts of rhetoric and dialectic expressed by Diogenes Laertius. Jackson, however, ascribes the most likely source of this definition to Cicero—dialectic is ars bene disserendi⁸—and Quintilian—rhetoric is bene dicendi scientia.⁹

For the Stoics, dialectic is “the science of correctly discussing subjects by questions and answer” or “the science of statements true, false, and neither true nor false”.¹⁰ Moreover, the Stoics identify logic with dialectic, and the latter is understood as a semiotics, which is the science of signs. These concepts were already spelled out by the Stoics well in advance of Charles S. Peirce¹¹ and John Locke¹² as noted by Estelle Merrill Allen (1935, 10).

1.3 The structure of the De dialectica

For Augustine “we always dispute with words”, which are divided into “simple” (simplicia) and “combined” (coniuncta):

Simplicia sunt quae unum quiddam significant ut cum dicimus ‘homo, equus, disputat, currit’.

(Words which signify some one thing are simple, as when we say ‘homo,’ ‘equus,’ ‘disputat,’ ‘currit’ (man, horse, disputes, runs).¹³

Coniuncta verba sunt quae sibi conexa res plures significant, ut cum dicimus ‘homo ambulat’ aut ‘homo festinans in montem ambulat’ et siquid tale.

(Combined words are those which, when connected to one another, signify many things, for example, when we say ‘the man is walking’ or ‘the man is walking quickly toward the mountain’).¹⁴

Regarding verbs, all third persons are simple words¹⁵ as they have a single meaning, while the first and second persons of verbs are combined words since they show a double meaning. The distinguishing criterion underlying the difference between simple and combined words does not lie in the structure of the word but in the way in which words signify. The meaning prevails rather than the structure. The only exception to this is the impersonal verbs—“it rains” or “it snows”—as they are all verbs in third person and, as such, do not require any determination of person.

Augustine proceeds with his analysis of words providing some examples that clarify the above-mentioned distinction. A word like disputat (“disputes”)—formed by the prefix dis and the verb puto—may seem combined, but in reality is simple. In fact, it should be noted that in Latin, the first and the second person verbs signify the person who is speaking or the person spoken of—and therefore are combined words. Conversely, with the exception of impersonal verbs, third person verbs have an undetermined subject and thus are simple.

Along with verbs, simple nouns are included among simple words, and propositions among combined words. For Augustine, combined words include not only complete propositions—“the man is walking”—but also incomplete sentences—such as “the man quickly toward the mountain”. Combined words that express a proposition are in turn subdivided in two species: those that are subject to truth or falsity and those that are not.

In short, the word can present itself in isolation—that is, provided with a single specific meaning—or can occur combined with other words. Combined words—namely, words that combined with each other signify more things—are divided into combined words where, despite the connection, the thought still remains suspended (for example, “the man quickly toward the mountain”) and combined words that present a complete thought (for instance, “the man is walking”). The latter are further distinguished as combined words that do not signify what is true or what is false and combined words that signify what is true or what is false (statements).

Augustine proposed a further distinction that concerns statements. They are divided into “simple” (simplices) and “combined” (coniunctae). Complex propositions not only combine propositions but also find judgment in respect to the connection (copulatio) of one with the other. The connection of propositions is developed through the premises (concessa) and the conclusion (summa), thus constituting the argument (“if he is walking, he is moving”; “that man is walking; therefore, that man is moving”) which is such that the premises are not compatible with the contradictory of the conclusion.

Several authors pointed out that the Augustinian system of the word presented in the De dialectica traces the Stoic distinction between incomplete lekton, complete lekton and full logical proposition (Baldassarri 1985, 10). Although there is a clear correspondence between the two articulations, there are also substantial differences. While in the Stoic doctrine the distinction specifically relates to the incorporeal (lekton), in Augustine it concerns words directly.

On the basis of this distinction of words, Augustine established a fourfold division of the dialectic:

1. Simple words (de loquendo)
2. Combined words
   1. Do not make a statement
   2. Do make a statement
      1. Neither true nor false
      2. True or false (de eloquendo)
         1. Simple (de proloquendo)
         2. Combined (de proloquiorum summa)

The following chart summarizes the structure and classifications outlined in the first four chapters of the treatise (see Fig. 1).

Figure...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• List of figures/List of tables
• Introduction
• 1 Words as signs in the De Dialectica
• 2 On the conditions and possibilities of knowing: philosophy of semiosis in Augustine’s De magistro
• 3 Of ‘things’ and ‘signs’ in Augustine’s De Doctrina christiana
• 4 Mala fide communication: deception, misleading, and lying
• 5 Image, likeness, and falsity: from Soliloquia to De Trinitate
• Conclusions
• Bibliography
• Person Index