1.1 Genesis of the work
The subject of this chapter is Augustineās De dialecticaāpenned in 387 in Milanāwhere one can glimpse the first definitions of signum (āsignā), verbum (āwordā) and res (āthingā).1 Before becoming bishop of Hippo, Augustine was a master of rhetoric. His interest towards words and language in all its articulationsāalready displayed from his first juvenile treatise, the De dialectica, indeedāis therefore not surprising.
For years the work was considered of dubious paternity but was attributed to Augustine by Darrel Jackson and Jan Pinborg on the basis of lexicographical studies and quantitative textual analysis (Pinborg 1975).2 The De dialectica, coupled with the De musica and the De rhetorica, is part of the Augustinian design of a larger project on the liberal arts, as stated by the author in the Retractationesāthe book in which Augustine reviewed all his precedent works:
At the very time that I was about to receive baptism in Milan, I also attempted to write books on the liberal arts, questioning those who were with me and who were not averse to studies of this nature, and desiring by definite steps, so to speak, to reach things incorporeal through things corporeal and to lead others to them. But I was able to complete only the book on grammarāwhich I lost later from our libraryāand six books, On Music, pertaining to that part which is called rhythm. I wrote these six books, however, only after I was baptized and had returned to Africa from Italy, for I had only begun this art at Milan. Off the other five arts likewise begun thereādialectic, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, and philosophyāthe beginnings alone remained and I lost even these. However, I think that some people have them.3
The authenticity of this treatise, however, is not above suspicion, especially if one considers that much of the terminology Augustine outlined in the De dialectica does not occur elsewhere in his writings.4
The De dialectica poses serious difficulties of interpretation for its incompleteness as well as for the lack of sources. In fact, in regards to the first point, the work cannot offer conclusive interpretations insofar as only an unfinished draft of it was found. In the work, however, the concepts of signum (āsignā) and verbum (āwordā) are defined with clarity, as traceable in chapter V.
In regards to the second pointāthe unreliability of sourcesāfor some, the treatise does not offer significant originality on the theory of language,5 but it does present clear credibility about its Stoic origin.6 And yet inasmuch as the thought of the Stoics is not transmitted directly, but is derived from secondary sources, also on this ground there are margins of uncertainty.
The aforementioned difficulties, however, did not prevent clear and precise studies of the sources within the De dialectica. They were formulated by Balduin Fisher in De Augustini Disciplinarum Libro Qui est De Dialectica (1912) and by Karl Barwick in Probleme der Stoischen Sprachlehre und Rhetorik (1957), which still remain two essential studies for the interpretation of the treatise. Leaving aside a detailed enquiry of the sources of the De dialectica, which would fall outside the primary scope of this study, it is worth referring to the philosophical context upon which the innovative capacity of Augustineās theory of the sign is grafted.
1.2 Definition of dialectic and the Stoic legacy
The treatise presents ten chapters and revolves around five main themes: the concept and division of dialectics (ch. IāIV), the relationship sign-dicibile-thing (ch. V), the origin of the word, the power of the word (ch. VII), and the obscurity and ambiguity of the word (ch. VIIIāX).
Augustine begins with a definition of dialectic:
Dialectica est bene disputandi scientia. Disputamus autem utique verbis.
(Dialectic is the science of disputing well. We always dispute with words.)7
Augustineās definition of dialectic is, as regards to the first part of the citation, clearly derived from the Stoics. Barwik (1957, 8), to substantiate this hypothesis, refers to volume III, fr. 267 of the Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta: Ī“Ī¹Ī±Ī»ĪµĪŗĻĪ¹Īŗį½µ į½³ĻĪ¹ĻĻį½µĪ¼Ī· ĻĪæ ĪµĪ½ Ī“Ī¹Ī±Ī»į½³yĪµĻĪ»Ī±Ī¹. Darrel Jackson (1975, 121) underlines that the Augustinian definition of dialectic synthesizes the concepts of rhetoric and dialectic expressed by Diogenes Laertius. Jackson, however, ascribes the most likely source of this definition to Ciceroādialectic is ars bene disserendi8āand Quintilianārhetoric is bene dicendi scientia.9
For the Stoics, dialectic is āthe science of correctly discussing subjects by questions and answerā or āthe science of statements true, false, and neither true nor falseā.10 Moreover, the Stoics identify logic with dialectic, and the latter is understood as a semiotics, which is the science of signs. These concepts were already spelled out by the Stoics well in advance of Charles S. Peirce11 and John Locke12 as noted by Estelle Merrill Allen (1935, 10).
1.3 The structure of the De dialectica
For Augustine āwe always dispute with wordsā, which are divided into āsimpleā (simplicia) and ācombinedā (coniuncta):
Simplicia sunt quae unum quiddam significant ut cum dicimus āhomo, equus, disputat, curritā.
(Words which signify some one thing are simple, as when we say āhomo,ā āequus,ā ādisputat,ā ācurritā (man, horse, disputes, runs).13
Coniuncta verba sunt quae sibi conexa res plures significant, ut cum dicimus āhomo ambulatā aut āhomo festinans in montem ambulatā et siquid tale.
(Combined words are those which, when connected to one another, signify many things, for example, when we say āthe man is walkingā or āthe man is walking quickly toward the mountainā).14
Regarding verbs, all third persons are simple words15 as they have a single meaning, while the first and second persons of verbs are combined words since they show a double meaning. The distinguishing criterion underlying the difference between simple and combined words does not lie in the structure of the word but in the way in which words signify. The meaning prevails rather than the structure. The only exception to this is the impersonal verbsāāit rainsā or āit snowsāāas they are all verbs in third person and, as such, do not require any determination of person.
Augustine proceeds with his analysis of words providing some examples that clarify the above-mentioned distinction. A word like disputat (ādisputesā)āformed by the prefix dis and the verb putoāmay seem combined, but in reality is simple. In fact, it should be noted that in Latin, the first and the second person verbs signify the person who is speaking or the person spoken ofāand therefore are combined words. Conversely, with the exception of impersonal verbs, third person verbs have an undetermined subject and thus are simple.
Along with verbs, simple nouns are included among simple words, and propositions among combined words. For Augustine, combined words include not only complete propositionsāāthe man is walkingāābut also incomplete sentencesāsuch as āthe man quickly toward the mountainā. Combined words that express a proposition are in turn subdivided in two species: those that are subject to truth or falsity and those that are not.
In short, the word can present itself in isolationāthat is, provided with a single specific meaningāor can occur combined with other words. Combined wordsānamely, words that combined with each other signify more thingsāare divided into combined words where, despite the connection, the thought still remains suspended (for example, āthe man quickly toward the mountainā) and combined words that present a complete thought (for instance, āthe man is walkingā). The latter are further distinguished as combined words that do not signify what is true or what is false and combined words that signify what is true or what is false (statements).
Augustine proposed a further distinction that concerns statements. They are divided into āsimpleā (simplices) and ācombinedā (coniunctae). Complex propositions not only combine propositions but also find judgment in respect to the connection (copulatio) of one with the other. The connection of propositions is developed through the premises (concessa) and the conclusion (summa), thus constituting the argument (āif he is walking, he is movingā; āthat man is walking; therefore, that man is movingā) which is such that the premises are not compatible with the contradictory of the conclusion.
Several authors pointed out that the Augustinian system of the word presented in the De dialectica traces the Stoic distinction between incomplete lekton, complete lekton and full logical proposition (Baldassarri 1985, 10). Although there is a clear correspondence between the two articulations, there are also substantial differences. While in the Stoic doctrine the distinction specifically relates to the incorporeal (lekton), in Augustine it concerns words directly.
On the basis of this distinction of words, Augustine established a fourfold division of the dialectic:
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Simple words (de loquendo)
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Combined words
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Do not make a statement
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Do make a statement
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Neither true nor false
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True or false (de eloquendo)
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Simple (de proloquendo)
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Combined (de proloquiorum summa)
The following chart summarizes the structure and classifications outlined in the first four chapters of the treatise (see Fig. 1).
Figure...