Operation Goodwood

Attack by Three British Armoured Divisions - July 1944

Ian Daglish

• Publisher: Pen and Sword Military
• Year: 2003
• ISBN:
  9781526788269
• Topic: Geschichte
• Subtopic: Zweiter Weltkrieg

Operation GOODWOOD is the story of the largest armoured battle fought in the campaign for north west Europe. Over a thousand British and Canadian tanks were employed as three British armoured divisions pushed forward down a narrow corridor in an attempt to achieve a clean penetration of the German lines. The clash between two very different armies resulted in a number of local battles, which are studied in detail. Close to Caen, this battlefield is particularly accessible to cross-channel visitors. This Battleground book guides visitors around the tanks battlefield, showing what remains and what has changed, using copious present-day images alongside previously unpublished1944 pictures, including detailed aerial photography of the battle in progress

CHAPTER ONE

THE BATTLE

Operation GOODWOOD was an odd battle. Midway through a series of Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery’s Normandy offensives, which more-or-less followed a similar pattern, GOODWOOD stands out. It was the biggest tank battle the British Army fought in the Second World War. Unlike most of Montgomery’s ‘set piece’ battles, it was fought in a manner which presented major logistical difficulties. A departure from the close network of Normandy hedgerows, the battlefield itself was unusually open. And debate is destined to continue over GOODWOOD’s outcome.

Was GOODWOOD an Allied failure? Many have said so. Some who participated on the side of the Allies felt that their sacrifices had not achieved much. The troops had other names for it, ‘The Atlantic Roller’, ‘Tank Alley’, and ‘The Caen Carve-Up’ were among them.1

One officer of the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry reacted to the GOODWOOD plan as ‘the Charge of the Light Brigade all over again!’ Another squadron commander, of the more experienced 3/Royal Tank Regiment, received ‘quite a few caustic comments from the old hands’ during his briefing, ‘...with reminders of the last time the battalion had taken part in a Balaclava-like charge at Mareth in the desert’.2

A more senior participant wrote afterwards of the ‘death ride of the armoured divisions’3 while others took their inspiration from Shakespeare, looking back on ‘the summer of our discontent’.4

From the Allied point of view, Operation GOODWOOD yielded impressive casualties and even more impressive losses of equipment, while failing to provide the dramatic breakthrough that war-weary civilians at home awaited. Matters were made worse by early news reports of a clean rupture of the German defences. The Times headline on 19 July read,

Second Army breaks through – armoured forces reach open country – General Montgomery well satisfied.

This created the misleading impression of Allied tanks pouring out onto the open country north of Falaise. 25 July brought an embarrassed retraction:

...the word ‘break-through’ used in early reports can only be said to have a limited meaning.

Worse still, misunderstandings between Allies led to over optimistic hopes being raised; when these were dashed recriminations flew and American confidence in the British leadership was shaken.

The interest of GOODWOOD lies at several levels. The battlefield is largely unaltered and easily accessible with good road, sea, and air links; visitors in their thousands pass by every year on their way into Normandy or further afield in France. GOODWOOD was a major tank battle at a time when the strategy and tactics of armoured warfare were still very much under development, and a massed tank assault was inevitably a learning exercise. So too was the employment of strategic airpower as a tactical battlefield weapon. Some lessons would take time to be absorbed; some were not learned at all. But a number of the ideas tested during GOODWOOD did come to influence British tactics through the remainder of the war in North West Europe.

From the defenders’ point of view, GOODWOOD was a stern test of German concepts of defence-in-depth, of the relative merits of superior weapons systems versus more numerous opposition, and of the ability of outnumbered defenders to hinder and stop a larger enemy force. The conduct of this defence was to remain an object of close study by NATO forces for a further half-century.

References

1. The Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, R J B Sellar, 1960, p 168-169.

2. A View From the Turret, Major Bill Close MC, 2002, ISBN 0-9533359-1-7, p 115.

3. Caen Anvil of Victory, Alexander McKee, 1964, p 285.

4. The Battle For Normandy, E Belfield & H Essame, 1965, p 141.

CHAPTER TWO

THE NORMANDY BATTLEGROUND

The Airborne Bridgehead

In the early hours of 6 June, 1944, the open ground to the northeast of Caen became the first battleground of the Normandy campaign. Minutes after midnight, John Howard’s 2/Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry (the ‘Oxf and Bucks’) landed in their gliders to seize the twin bridges over the Caen Canal and the Orne River. Shortly after came the main body of 6th Airborne Division, the parachute regiments descending over the wide open fields east of the two waterways. Raiding parties set out in jeeps from the landing zones to blow the Dives River bridges at Varaville, Robehomme, Bures, and Troarn, successfully cutting German reinforcement routes from the east. To the north a scratch body of paratroopers succeeded against all odds in capturing the coastal battery at Merville. However, none of these locations was held at the end of the day. Units pulled back to a tighter perimeter where battle lines hardened around a narrow bridgehead east of the Orne River. Even this small bridgehead was to be bitterly contested. In the weeks ahead, the 6th Airborne was reinforced by the famous 51st Highland Division. As the Highlanders began to lay minefields around their positions, the Germans shored-up their own defences and periodically counter-attacked.

Major John Howard’s glider landed yards from the bridge over the Caen Canal.

The shaded area indicates the extent of the ‘bocage’ country.

The Lie of the Land

It is important to understand the impact of the Normandy countryside on the development of the campaign. Directly inland from the British and Commonwealth landing beaches (Gold, Juno, and Sword) was an area of open plateau, as far south as Bayeux and beyond. Across this plateau on 6 June flowed the first British and Commonwealth forces clear of the beaches. By-passing some strongpoints in order to secure a deep beachhead, the leading units pressed on, liberating the town of Bayeux by the evening of the first day.

From Caen, a ridge runs south all the way to Falaise. Roughly mid-way between the Orne and Dives valleys, this ridge is open and gently undulating, broken only by occasional patches of woodland and frequent small villages. A major road runs arrow-straight down its back. The lack of obvious defensive terrain along this Falaise road strengthened the Germans’ determination to conduct a forward defence close to Caen. Their first serious mobile counterstroke on the evening of 6 June was launched from the suburbs of Caen. Over the days and weeks, the German line held as newly arriving Axis reinforcements coalesced around Caen into a solid defensive block.

Caen was the pivot. On that city hinged the whole German plan for the defence of Normandy. In front of the city, to the north-west, the open country was dotted with small villages of solid, stone buildings: Franqueville, Authie, Gruchy, Buron, St-Contest; each in its turn became a rubbled and bloody battleground before Canadian and British forces could pass. Due west of the city the fortified bunkers of Carpiquet airfield formed a citadel for the Grenadiere of 12. SS-Panzerdivision, the open runways granting the defenders clear fields of fire. To the south-west, between the Odon and Orne river valleys, passage across the low but commanding Hill 112 was repeatedly denied to the British by powerful forces waiting on its reverse slopes to rebuff any assault. And all this time, north-east of Caen across the dual waterways of the Caen Canal and the Orne River, all attempts to expand the 6 June bridgehead were bitterly resisted.

For a British Army only recently mechanized, many of whose armoured units were officered by keen horsemen, the ideas of ‘break out’ and ‘open country’ were close partners. Beyond that small bridgehead east of Caen, across the Orne River and the Caen Canal, the open country along the Falaise road beck...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Battleground series
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction and Acknowledgements
• Chapter 1 The Battle
• Chapter 2 The Normandy Battleground
• Chapter 3 Allied Strategy: The Hinge of Caen
• Chapter 4 The Goodwood Plan
• Chapter 5 The Attacking Force
• Chapter 6 The Defenders
• Chapter 7 Monday, 17 July: The Eve of Battle
• Chapter 8 Aerial Bombardment
• Chapter 9 Tuesday, 18 July: 11th Armoured Division
• Chapter 10 Tuesday, 18 July: 21st Panzer Division
• Chapter 11 Tuesday, 18 July: Afternoon
• Chapter 12 Wednesday, 19 July: Once More unto the Breach
• Chapter 13 Thursday, 20 July: Stormy Weather
• Chapter 14 Aftermath and Assessment
• Notes for visitors