God & Timelessness Vol 7

Nelson Pike

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781317831914
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

First published in 2003. This is volume VII in the IX-volume set titled Studies in Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion. The series is meant to provide an opportunity for philosophical discussions of a limited length which pursue in some detail specific topics in ethics or the philosophy of religion, or topics which belong to both fields. This volume discusses timelessness, the predicate 'timeless' in relation to God, power and two doctrines.

1
The Predicate 'Timeless'

In The Christian Faith, Frederich Schleiermacher says that God is eternal in the sense of 'timeless' ('zeitlos').¹ He says, too, that God is 'spaceless'.² Further, Schleiermacher says that timelessness and spacelessness are directly parallel concepts.³ What one says about God vis-à-vis time when one says that He is timeless, is precisely what one says about God vis-à-vis space when one says that He is spaceless. I think it will be easier to grasp the details of the notion of timelessness if we look briefly at what Schleiermacher says in his text about the corresponding notion of spacelessness.

On Schleiermacher's account, the claim that God is spaceless involves two closely related ideas. First, God is not, as he says, 'space-filling'. This is to say that God has no spatial extension. He is not, e.g., three feet tall. Secondly, Schleiermacher says that there are no 'spatial contrasts' between God and other things. The point seems to be that God bears no special relation to other things. God is not, e.g., three feet to the left of Jones or four miles above the clouds.⁴

It is important to see that we have two distinct (though related) ideas working here. To say that God does not bear spatial contrasts with other things is not the same as to say that God is not 'space-filling'. A Euclidean point has spatial location but no spatial extension. If we could allow the possibility of there being a spatially extensionless thing (e.g., a mind or an idea), we might still insist that this thing has spatial location. (John Locke said that minds and ideas have location in space.) Thus, to say that a given thing lacks spatial extension does not commit one to the view that that thing also lacks spatial location. A thing might have spatial location without having spatial extension. However, I think that these two ideas are logically connected in the other direction. With the possible exception of the universe considered as a single unit (which requires very special treatment) if something lacks spatial location, it also lacks spatial extension. Crudely speaking, to have spatial extension is to occupy more than one spatial position at a time. Thus, we might summarize the claim that God is spaceless in the statement: 'God lacks spatial location'. This formula would probably entail that God also lacks spatial extension. For present purposes, however, I shall keep these two conceptual elements distinct. It will be to our advantage if we work with the expanded (though less elegant) version of the claim that God is spaceless.

What now of time? Following Schleiermacher's idea that spacelessness and timelessness are directly parallel concepts, we must divide the notion of timelessness into two closely related ideas. First, if God is timeless, He has no duration, i.e., He lacks temporal extension. Schleiermacher introduces this thesis by contrasting the life of God with the life of the Universe of natural objects.⁵ Let it be true that the universe has a history that is indefinitely extended both forward and backward in time. The history of the universe has no temporal limits. Still the world has a history. It is, as it were, 'spread out in time'. This is what is denied of God when it is said that His life lacks duration. It is not just that the life of God lacks temporal limits: the point is that it has no temporal spread at all. Secondly, if God is timeless, God also lacks temporal location. God did not exist before Columbus discovered America nor will He exist after the turn of the century. Schleiermacher says that with respect to God, there is no 'temporal opposition of before and after'.⁶ This looks to be the temporal counterpart of the idea that the life of God lacks 'spatial contrasts'. As a general comment, Schleiermacher insists that God is 'utterly timeless'⁷ –completely 'outside all contact with time'.⁸ The point seems to be that God is not to be qualified by temporal predicates of any kind – neither time-extension predicates (such as, e.g., 'six years old') nor time-location predicates (such as, e.g., 'before Columbus').

Again, it is important to see that we have two distinct (though closely related) ideas operating here. Let us call the temporal counterpart of the Euclidean point a 'moment'. A moment has temporal location, but no temporal extension. Two p.m., 16 March 1822 might count as a moment. Now suppose that it makes sense to speak of a thing having momentary existence. Such a thing would have temporal location but no duration. Given this much, if we knew that a given thing lacked temporal extension, we could not conclude that it also lacked temporal location. Something might have location in time without having duration. However, as I suggested when working with the elements of the notion of spacelessness, I think that the elements of timelessness are logically related in the other direction. With the possible exception of the universe considered as a whole, if something has temporal extension, it also has temporal position. In a manner of speaking, to have duration is, simply, to occupy a number of consecutive temporal positions. Thus, the claim that God is timeless might be compressed into the single statement: 'God lacks temporal location'. But for present purposes I shall keep these two ideas distinct. We shall get a better look into the interior of timelessness if we keep its ingredients as isolated as possible.

The claim that God is timeless in the sense just outlined is rich with tradition. Keeping its two conceptual elements distinct in our minds, let us look briefly at some of its more important medieval sources.

Concerning the thesis that the life of God lacks duration (or temporal extension), consider the following somewhat vague remark from Bk. XI, Ch. 13 of St. Augustine's Confessions.⁹

Thy years do not come and go; while these years of ours do come and go, in order that they all may come. All Thy years stand together [and in one non-extended instant], for they stand still, nor are those going away cut off by those coming, for they do not pass away, but these years of ours shall all be when they are all no more. Thy years are but one day, and Thy day is not a daily recurrent, but today. Thy present day does not give place to tomorrow, nor, indeed, does it take the place of yesterday. Thy present day is eternity.

This same theme is developed in considerably more detail and with much greater clarity in Bk. V, sec. 6 of Boethius's Consolation. It is taken over from Boethius by St. Thomas in Pt. I, Q. X of the Summa Theologica, Boethius (anticipating Schleiermacher) introduced this thesis by contrasting the life of God with the life of the Universe. Grant that the Universe has limitless temporal spread. The life of God is to be distinguished from the life of the Universe in that the former involves no temporal extension at all.

Focus now on the idea that the life of God lacks temporal location as well as temporal extension. Perhaps the clearest and most emphatic expression of this thesis is to be found in the writings of St. Anselm. In Ch. XIX of the Proslogium, Anselm writes:¹⁰

Thou wast not, then, yesterday, nor wilt thou be tomorrow; but yesterday and today and tomorrow thou art; or, rather, neither yesterday, nor today nor tomorrow thou art; but simply, thou art, outside all time. For yesterday and today and tomorrow have no existence, except in time; but thou, although nothing exists without thee, nevertheless dost not exist in space or time, but all things exist in thee.

Again, in Ch. XXII of the Monologium this same point is repeated:¹¹

In no place or time, then, is this being properly said to exist, since it is contained by no other at all. . . [The Supreme Being has no place or time because] it has not taken to itself distinctions of place or time, neither here, nor there, nor anywhere, nor then, nor now, nor at any time; nor does it exist in terms of the fleeting present in which we live, nor has it existed, nor will it exist in terms of the past or future, since these are restricted to things finite and mutable, which it is not.

In both these passages Anselm insists that time-location predicates (as well as space-location predicates) are not to be used when characterizing God. God did not exist before the outbreak of civil war in America, nor will He exist after the coming election. It is never true to say that God exised, or that He will exist. But, further, Anselm also makes clear that God cannot be said to exist now. A being existing at the present moment, would be, as he says, 'contained' in time.¹²

Following Boethius, St. Thomas defines the term 'eternity' in the odd formula: 'The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of indeterminable life.'¹³ St. Thomas unfolds the implications of this definition in the following remark from the Pt. I, Q. X of the Summa Theologica:¹⁴

Two things are to be considered in time; time itself which is successive, and the now of time which is imperfect. Hence, the expression simultaneously-whole is used to remove the idea of time, and the word perfect is used to exclude the now of time.

Thomas here seems to be making the distinction made above between the notion of temporal extension (which involves the idea of succession) and the notion of temporal location, i.e., the idea of existing at a given moment – a given 'now of time'. The latter as well as the former is denied application to God in the claim that God is eternal. St. Thomas seems to be committed to the view that with respect to any given location in time (before Columbus discovered America, after the turn of the century, right now, i.e., at the present moment) God cannot be said to exist at that time.

As regards Boethius's position on the question of God's location in time, the matter is a little less clear than it is in the case of Anselm and St. Thomas. Boethius clearly says that God cannot be located either before or after a given time or event, but there is some obscurity in his text as to whether God can be located in the temporal present. I should like to conclude this opening chapter with a brief examination of the sources of this obscurity. I think there is something important to be learned from a study of Boethius's remarks on this topic.

In Pt. V of the Consolation, Boethius formulates two quite different theses using two Latin locutions, both of which are generally translated into English with the help of the single term 'present'. First, Boethius says that temporal objects and events are present to God in the sense that he 'sees'¹⁵ or 'beholds'¹⁶ them, i.e., in the sense that He is directly aware of them. He says that the Supreme Being has '. . . an infinity of movable time present (praesentam) to it'.¹⁷ I doubt that Boethius would regard this claim as relevant to the topic w...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• PREFACE
• INTRODUCTION: TWO WORKING ASSUMPTIONS
• 1. THE PREDICATE 'TIMELESS'
• 2. THE LOGICAL STATUS OF 'GOD IS TIMELESS'
• 3. TIMELESSNESS AND THE NEGATIVE PREDICATES 'IMMUTABLE', 'INCORRUPTIBLE' AND 'IMMORTAL'
• 4. TIMELESSNESS, FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREE WILL
• 5. TIMELESS KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW
• 6. TIMELESSNESS AND POWER
• 7. GOD AS A TIMELESS PERSON
• 8. THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF TIMELESSNESS: ANSELM
• 9. THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF TIMELESSNESS: SCΗLEIERMACΗΕR
• A CONCLUDING COMMENT
• INDEX