Social Movements and Civil War

When Protests for Democratization Fail

Donatella della Porta, Teije Hidde Donker, Bogumila Hall, Emin Poljarevic, Daniel P. Ritter

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781315403083
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Peace & Global Development
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book investigates the origins of civil wars which emerge from failed attempts at democratization.

The main aim of this volume is to develop a theoretical explanation of the conditions under which and the mechanisms through which social movements' struggles for democracy end up in civil war. While the empirical evidence suggests that this is not a rare phenomenon, the literatures on social movements, democratization and civil wars have grown apart from each other. At the theoretical level, Social Movements and Civil War bridges insights in the three fields, looking in particular at explanations of the radicalization of social movements, the failure of democratization processes and the onset of civil war. In doing this, it builds upon the relational approach developed in contentious politics with the aim of singling out robust causal mechanisms. At the empirical level, the research provides in-depth descriptions of four cases of trajectory from social movements for democratization into civil wars: in Syria, Libya, Yemen and the former Yugoslavia. Conditions such as the double weakness of civil society and the state, the presence of entrepreneurs of violence as well as normative and material resources for violence, ethnic and tribal divisions, domestic and international military interventions are considered as influencing the chains of actors' choices rather than as structural determinants.

This book will be of great interest to students of civil wars, political violence, social movements, democratization, and IR in general.

1 Introduction

Social movements in civil wars

Donatella della Porta

Introduction

The main aim of this volume is to develop a theoretical explanation of the conditions and mechanisms through which the struggles for democracy of social movement end in civil war. While the empirical evidence suggests that this is not a rare phenomenon, scholars in the social science fields of social movements and civil war, as well as democratization and nonviolent revolutions – all of whom can contribute to address to this question – have grown quite apart from each other. In particular, while social movements and civil wars have empirical overlaps, the respective fields of study rarely consider each other. As Elisabeth Wood (2015, 457) noted:

[S]cholars who work primarily on social movements and on civil wars largely work in isolation from one another, with too few analyzing the relationship between the two forms of political opposition as instances of the broader field of contentious politics . . . Yet scholars of social movements and civil wars share an emphasis on the dynamics of escalation of violence and social mobilization.

This lack of dialogue is also evident if we look at the fields of democratization and of nonviolent resistance (della Porta 2014; 2016).

The first theoretical task we want to address in this volume is the bridging of insights in the four above-mentioned fields of study, looking in particular at explanations for the onset of civil wars, the failure of democratization processes as well as of nonviolent resistance, and the radicalization of social movements. In doing so, we will build upon the relational approach developed in contentious politics, with the aim of singling out robust causal mechanisms (della Porta 2013). Our discussion of the main theoretical contributions to the above-mentioned topics will distinguish between structuralist and agentic orientations, pleading for a relational approach that aims to overcome the limits of both, within a process-oriented, dynamic perspective. This means reflecting on the ways in which conditions are activated and individual motivations transformed through intense interactions among different players within emerging arenas (Jasper and Duyvendak 2015). As intense times, the moments we analyse are structurally underdetermined, with a fluidification of relations that unsettles the rules and norms that are established in normal times (della Porta 2016).

Combining explanations that address the radicalization of social movements, the onset of civil wars, and the failure of democratization as well as of nonviolent repertoires, the chapter will introduce some main mechanisms in the trajectory from social movements to civil wars. Considering trajectories of escalation as moments of time intensification, we will point to the need to analyse these as contingent and open-ended processes. Conditions such as the double weakness of civil society and the state, the presence of entrepreneurs of violence as well as normative and material resources for violence, ethnic and tribal divisions, and domestic and international military interventions must therefore be considered as factors that influence the chains of actors’ choices, rather than as structural determinants.

From the empirical point of view, the volume aims at providing in-depth descriptions of four cases of the trajectory from social movements for democratization into civil wars. The study of civil wars has been characterized by a search for global explanations, with an initial focus on structural conditions, then combined with strategic approaches, often based on rational choice theory. However, researchers have identified the limits to ‘large-N’ studies, including reliability and validity of indicators, endogeneity and direction of causality, as well as omitted variables and observational equivalents (Kalyvas 2008). On the side of the dependent variable, different measures used to operationalize the concept of civil war (number of deaths, especially among civilians) affect the results of various explanatory models, while gross domestic product (GDP) is used as a proxy for a broad range of independent variables (Sambanis 2004). The consideration of these limits, which explain the inconsistent results, has triggered more research aimed at singling out relational causal mechanisms rather than structural causes. This will be the approach in our study, which will undertake an in-depth analysis of trajectories from movements for democratization to civil war in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, which are then compared with the former Yugoslavia. We will present fieldwork as well as desk-top research on these cases, pointing to the relational mechanisms at the basis of a transformation from nonviolent to violent forms of protest and then to civil war.

In this chapter, we will first review some existing explanations in the social science literatures on the onset of civil war, the failure of democratization processes, unsuccessful nonviolent revolutions, and the radicalization of social movements. Considering the limits of static and structuralist explanations, we will suggest a relational, dynamic and constructed model. In a methodological section, the research design will be justified. In particular, we will explain how the search for robust mechanisms oriented the choice of relevant cases, showing the trajectory from social movements to civil war within a most-different research design. The chapter ends with a presentation of the content of the volume.

At the onset of civil wars

A civil war has been defined as an ‘armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities’ (Kalyvas 2006, 17). Civil wars develop around political aims. If war is ‘a political act of organized violence to obtain some advantage or goal in term of power, territory or security’ (Olson Lounsbery and Pearson 2009, 4), civil war is a ‘sustained combat between relatively organized forces with the goals of changing government or boundaries’ (ibid.). The duration in time distinguishes civil wars from riots as, while a riot is characterized by a short duration, a civil war is ‘protracted internal violence aimed at securing control of the political and legal apparatus’ (Evans and Newman 1998, 54). The main difference concerning forms of clandestine political violence is the need to assess territorial control and therefore, to a certain extent, not only to challenge an existing order but also to reconstitute an emerging one – in fact, ‘civil wars are political contexts where violence is used both to challenge and to build order’ (Kalyvas 2008, 406). In civil wars, challengers usually exert territorial control of some areas, with the presence of multiple armed actors fighting each other: ‘Civil war occurs if a group of people forms a private military organization that attacks government forces and ordinary civilians on a large scale and with a high degree of persistence’ (Collier et al. 2003, 54). The intensity of the violence is also a defining characteristic, as civil wars create large numbers of victims – for example, according to Sambanis (2004, 829), we can talk of a civil war when there are at least 500/1,000 deaths.

A great deal of research on civil wars has attempted to single out the macro-level conditions under which these are more likely to develop, looking at sets of economic, social, political, and cultural variables at the domestic but also at the transnational level. Large-N studies have identified conditions that increase the risks of civil war at the economic level, particularly economic strains, including deep poverty, massive unemployment, economic stagnation, and low GDP (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The expectation is that poverty increases the risk of civil war, while rapid economic development reduces it. In particular, ‘political violence occurs in states in which assets are immobile and unequally distributed’ (Boix 2008, 216). In relatively equal societies, peaceful, democratic means of solving conflict are advantageous to all parties.

At the social level, researchers have discussed the effects of various potential sources of divisions. Economic inequality is relevant especially if associated with ethnic, religious, or cultural belonging. Population diversity, with related ethnic nepotism, makes ethnic identities relevant. In particular, the presence of two main ethnic groups produces a higher likelihood of civil war (Henderson and Singer 2000). However, ethnic divisions also have an indirect effect (Blimes 2006). Ethnicity counts when linked with acute social uncertainty, a history of conflict, fear (Lake and Rothchild 1998, 7), as well as politicized religious identities. The probability of civil war increases with long-lasting (especially communal) deprivation and failure to attend to grievances (Kogan Iasnyi and Zissernan-Brodsky 1998, 212).

From the cultural point of view, according to Huntington’s (1993) debated theory, the intrinsic incommensurability of the values of civilizations leads to wars. Others have referred instead to the ideological power of organized ideas. More specifically, a history of internal conflicts is said to fuel exclusive identities, with the potential for narratives of group suffering and revenge.

At the political level, civil wars are favoured by an ill-disciplined and corrupt military (Herbst 2000). When minority rights are repressed, demands for self-determination are more likely where large minority groups are territorially concentrated, where ethnic networks exist. Accommodation and decentralization can help in diffusing the conflict (Sambanis 2003). Partial democracies present the highest risks, especially in low-income countries (Eliot, et al. 2003). If some ethnic and religious conflicts are more dangerous than others, this depends on the historical paths that lead institutions to negotiate on some issues, but not on others (Wilkinson 2008). Moreover, scholars have addressed the government’s capability to use repression. In this regard repeatedly, the formation of the state has been linked to violence, which can remain high in cases of incomplete state building (Mann 2012; Tilly 1993).

All these dimensions are affected by external interventions, which can cause the onset of civil war (Sambanis 2003) – with the highest risk of weak democracy, especially in low-income countries – as well as contributing to prolonging the conflicts (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). Conflicts tend in fact to cluster geographically (Sambanis 2001), spreading through migrant diasporas, criminal organizations, or terrorist networks (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). As states can more easily repress their populations at home, rebels often choose to position themselves outside of the state’s reach. This happens especially if the neighbouring states are weak, when they are rivals, or in the presence of massive waves of refugees (Salehyan 2009). Rebellions are indeed more likely and longer in duration when there are rival or weak states on the borders, and ethnic groups are more likely to rebel when they are located near the border. An important role is played by refugee warriors (ibid.): civil wars interact with wars, as new conflicts imply more and more loosely organized actors (Kaldor 1999).

Moving then towards the micro-dynamics of conflicts, analyses of insurgent violence and civilian responses in civil wars have addressed the reasons behind the compliance among the population at large (Kalyvas 2006), and of the different levels of brutality (e.g. Weinstein 2007). In this field, as in others, rational choice models have provided the theoretical basis for the search for causes at the macro-level. According to Collier and Hoeffler’s influential model (2004), participation in civil war is a rational decision based on economic cost and expected utility. While traditional theories had stressed grievances (e.g. Gurr 1970), recent studies have made a significant turn towards an emphasis on greed as a motivation. Explanations based on greed look at the possibility for groups to capture lucrative resources. Civil war is seen as a move to capture lucrative resources – a massive predation of productive economic activity (Eliot et al. 2003). Civil wars are expected to unfold when the expected net gains employing violence exceed the expected net gains in maintaining the status quo, especially in cases of increasing inequalities and immobile assets (as in agrarian societies) (Boix 2008, 199).¹

As we will see, some of the preconditions identified by scholars of civil war emerge as relevant in our cases as well – including economic inequality, social fragmentation, political instability, and international interventions. However, these factors need to be activated during long-lasting and open-ended mobilization processes.

Failed democratization

The social science literature on democratization and democratic consolidation has also been characterized, first, by structuralist approaches and then by more strategic ones: the outcomes of the democratization processes have been explained, based on some of the characteristics of the previous regimes, as well as by the dynamics of the transition. In general, the literature on democratization has singled out several favourable or unfavourable conditions, in some cases extending the reflection to the conditions for non-consolidation. Some of these explanations are relevant to understanding the shift from peaceful movements for democracy into civil war.

In research on democracy as well, mirroring the expectations developed in civil war studies, economic conditions have traditionally been considered an important predictor of democratization, with economic development and modernization creating a favourable terrain for democracy. In contrast, poverty, inequalities, and a backward economy have been considered as conditions jeopardizing democratic consolidation. In a broad synthesis of the determinants of democratization, Jan Teorell (2010) recently suggested that socioeconomic modernization helps to prevent downturns, as does economic freedom. While modernization facilitates the regime survival, economic crises trigger democratization processes, as they (especially under recessionary policies) tend to divide the elites, often causing private sector defection while producing mass protests on social issues.

From the political point of view, the characteristics of the previous authoritarian regimes are also significant: for instance, military dictatorships and multiparty autocracies have long been considered more likely to democratize than single-party regimes. Periods of liberalization are expected to facilitate consolidation, as they support the development of a civil society. Reversed liberalization is instead linked to the presence of a strong executive (either a president or a monarch) or to military intervention. Consolidation is considered easier when there is a simple transition, that is, only political democratization. It is more complicated when it involves, at the same time, transformations of the economic model (in particular, from state socialism to a free market) and/or the (re)emergence of an issue related to state sovereignty (Linz and Stepan 1996).

Other conditions that either favour or jeopardize consolidation are seen at the international level. Diffusion from neighbours’ imitation as well as membership of regional organizations tend to promote democracy. However, foreign interventions only sometimes work in the expected direction, and they can even be the reason for failed democratization. Violence and wars have also been linked to globalization, as they fuel inequalities (Malesevic 2010).

Even though attempts to explain democratization through models based on large-N r...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• About the authors
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction: social movements in civil wars
• 2 Causal mechanisms in civil wars: a sensitizing map
• 3 Beyond Syria: civil society in failed episodes of democratization
• 4 The failure of the Libyan political transition and the descent into civil war
• 5 Yemen's failed transition: from peaceful protests to war of 'all against all'
• 6 Yugoslavia: from social movement to state movement to civil war
• 7 Conclusion: social movements, democratization, and civil wars
• Index