RAF Bomber Command at War, 1939–1945

Craig Armstrong

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Aviation
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781526700537
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World War II
• Index: History

The Royal Air Force had placed a great deal of faith in its force of bombers, Bomber Command, in the event of a future war. The belief in the ability of formations of bombers flying in daylight and unescorted, protecting themselves from enemy fighter attack, informed early tactics but led to bloody losses. Hampered by government restrictions on targets, by late 1941 Bomber Command was in crisis. As a result, and coupled the growing dire war situation, a new and forceful commander, Sir Arthur Harris, was appointed and new strategies allowed Bomber Command to broaden its attacks despite some opposition. The result was the area bombing strategy which focussed attacks upon enemy held towns and cities. This Main Offensive period lasted throughout 1943-1944 and saw both victories and defeats. It was also the period that saw a limited number of precision attacks; on Augsburg, Peenemunde and, most famously, the Ruhr dams. Bomber Command also aided in tactical and strategic support for the invasion of Europe and the subsequent fight to push inland. New technological developments allowed Bomber Command to hit V-Weapons sites and to focus more on precision bombing, but Harris remained determined to hit German towns and cities whenever possible, while the Command's growing power allowed it to rain devastation upon its targets, culminating at Dresden. Much has been written about Bomber Command, but this book focusses largely on those who took part in the raids and on public attitudes towards the campaign in Britain. Using accounts from national and local archives, newspapers and existing historiography, the book seeks to shed light on untold stories from Bomber Command's war.

CHAPTER 1

1939 – Feeling the Way

The war opened with the restrictions previously discussed limiting the scope of Bomber Command to wage war. Within an hour of the declaration of war a Bristol Blenheim of 139 Squadron took off from RAF Wyton to make a reconnaissance of German port facilities across the North Sea in an effort to identify German naval units. Upon hearing the report of the Blenheim crew, two flights of Handley Page Hampdens and Vickers Wellingtons took off to seek the naval units, but in the failing light no contact was made and the bombers returned to base.

The restrictions placed upon Bomber Command did, however, allow the force to withdraw nine of its squadrons to create a more suitable reserve. This further reduction, however, meant that Bomber Command entered the war with a front-line force of just 280 aircraft and crews. These aircraft were divided between twenty-three operational squadrons which were further divided between four groups. Bomber Command was run from its HQ which was at Richings Park, Langley, Buckinghamshire. The Commander-in-Chief was Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt. Amongst the early headaches facing Ludlow-Hewitt was the fact that Bomber Command HQ was due to relocate to High Wycombe in March 1940.

On the very first night of the war Armstrong Whitworth Whitleys of 51 and 58 Squadrons were dispatched to drop propaganda leaflets over several German towns and cities. Three of the Whitleys from 51 Squadron were tasked with targeting Hamburg while a further seven aircraft from 58 Squadron pressed on for targets including Bremen and the Ruhr area. None of the crews experienced any opposition from the enemy, but three 58 Squadron aircraft experienced engine trouble as they were returning and were forced to make emergency landings in France. The first of the Whitleys to have taken off (K8973) ran out of fuel and the pilot, Squadron Leader J.J.A. Sutton, put his bomber down in an emergency landing at Fécamp while the Whitley of Flight Sergeant Ford (K8990) was put down at St Quentin. Aboard the third Whitley (K8969, GE-G) Flying Officer (F/O) J.A. O’Neill could not locate an airstrip upon which to make an emergency landing and so was forced to put his Whitley down in a cabbage field near Dormans on the eastern bank of the River Marne around 5.54am. Flying Officer O’Neill’s aircraft was written off, but the crew were uninjured despite several cabbages entering the aircraft with some force.2

Following these initial moves the second day of the war saw another similar Blenheim reconnaissance which identified several German fleet units at Brunsbüttel and Wilhelmshaven. Bomber Command was well aware that the targets, which included the battleship Admiral Scheer and the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, were likely to be very well defended with both anti-aircraft screens and fighter cover. Despite these fears, the opportunity to destroy or damage such important naval units at the very start of the war was too tempting a target to refuse. Once again, a force of bombers was sent to attack the enemy ships. From RAF Wattisham and Wyton a force of fifteen Blenheims was sent to the latter target while fourteen Wellingtons from RAF Honington and Mildenhall were tasked with attacking the ships at Brunsbüttel and from RAF Scampton twelve Hampdens were also assigned the mission. Weather conditions were very poor and the bomber formations were forced to operate independently of each other.

At the airfields there had been some confusion as the ground crews had to replace armour-piercing bombs with general purpose bombs as the low cloud cover would mean that the far more effective (against naval targets) armour-piercing bombs could not be used effectively. Nos. 107 and 110 Squadrons assigned five crews apiece to the operation and at briefing they were told that the enemy vessels were defended only by machine guns and by their own heavy armaments which, it was hoped, could not be depressed sufficiently to engage low flying targets. Furthermore, and in defiance of the reliance upon tight formation, the crews were ordered to attack from several directions to confuse the defences.

The twelve Hampdens and five Blenheims from 139 Squadron failed to find their targets due to poor weather. The Blenheims, which had been dispatched to attack targets at Wilhelmshaven, fared terribly with no fewer than five being brought down by heavy anti-aircraft fire. Despite several hits being claimed, damage was slight with many of the bombs which did score hits failing to explode. The five aircraft of 110 Squadron were first to attack. The five Blenheims split, with three making attack runs while two others made diversionary attacks from other directions. As the second Blenheim approached to attack a very heavy barrage opened up from the ships and from shore batteries and the third Blenheim was forced to abort its attack and pull up into the safety of the cloud cover. Seconds later one of the diversionary aircraft, Blenheim IV (N6199) was shot down in flames by the flak from the Admiral Hipper. The most serious damage of the raid occurred when N6199 crashed on to the cruiser Emden, killing nine of her crew along with the four British airmen aboard the Blenheim. Somewhat ironically, the pilot of N6199 was Flying Officer Henry Lovell Emden (a married man from St Leonards-on-Sea, Sussex). Along with Flying Officer Emden were his observer Sergeant Stanley George McKenna Otty, his wireless operator/air gunner Sergeant Raymond Charles Grossey (24), and Aircraftman Ralph Evans (an under-training wireless operator). The bodies of all but Sergeant Grossey, who was on attachment from 42 Squadron, were recovered and buried at Sage War Cemetery, Grossenkneten, Germany.

Around the same time the second flight of Blenheims, from 107 Squadron, arrived on the scene and attempted to attack in the teeth of the now fully-alerted defences. The first aircraft, piloted by Flight Lieutenant William Frank Barton (26), was hit by flak from the Admiral Hipper and exploded. The second Blenheim was also hit and crashed with both engines aflame. The third was also hit and crashed near the shore, while the fourth was bracketed by heavy flak and crashed, cartwheeling across the sea. The fifth Blenheim somehow survived the ferocious barrage and managed to straddle the Admiral Scheer with its bombs but, once again, the bomb which hit failed to explode. The cost of this failure was paid in the loss of five aircraft and the deaths of fourteen airmen, with a further two becoming the first Bomber Command men to become prisoners of war (PoW). It is unclear which aircraft became the first from Bomber Command to be shot down, but it would appear to have been either N6199 of 110 Squadron or N6184, piloted by Flying Officer John Frederick Ross (23) of 107 Squadron.

For the men of 107 Squadron at RAF Wattisham the return of only one of its aircraft was a bitter blow and surely hammered home that this war was, for the men of Bomber Command, going to be an extremely bloody one. Amongst the losses was Flying Officer Herbert Brian Lightoller (21), the son of Commander Charles Herbert Lightoller, RNR, of Twickenham, Middlesex, and Sergeant Albert Stanley Prince (27) of Chester. Sergeant Prince’s aircraft (N6240) crashed in the target area but his observer and wireless operator/air gunner survived to be taken prisoner; they were Sergeant G.F. Booth and Aircraftsman L.J. Slattery.

The Wellingtons of 9 Squadron took off slightly later than the other formations and did locate their targets, but bombing results were poor and the bombers encountered anti-aircraft fire and enemy fighters and a running battle developed during which two of the Wellingtons were lost and all eleven crew killed. These first two Wellingtons to be lost were coded L4268 and L4275 (WS-H). They were piloted respectively by Flight Sergeant Ian Edward Maitland Morley (30) and Flight Sergeant Albion John Turner. Flight Sergeant Morley was a reservist who had, presumably, been called up as hostilities approached and was a married man from Weston-super-Mare. One of the Wellingtons, it is impossible to say which, was claimed as having been shot down by a Messerschmidt Bf 109 and Feldwebel Alfred Held became the first Luftwaffe airman to shoot down an RAF aircraft during the war.

Of the eleven casualties only three bodies were recovered for burial with the remainder being commemorated on the Runnymede Memorial.3 Four of the Wellington crews reported bombing targets, but little is known of their attacks and navigational errors led to one Wellington dropping bombs on the Danish town of Esbjerg, where two people were killed. Another formation of eight Wellingtons from 149 Squadron had worse fortune with only one claiming to have bombed in the assigned target area while the remainder jettisoned their bombs into the sea after failing to locate any targets. The only damage done by the Wellingtons was to a merchant ship which was hit by bombs jettisoned by an aircraft from 9 Squadron.

In total, seven aircraft had been lost by Bomber Command along with the deaths of twenty-five airmen and two more being held PoW for the rest of the war. Damage to the enemy targets was minimal and it had become clear to many of the airmen who had taken part that the bombs which they were using were poor, with many failing to explode, and that their aircraft were extremely vulnerable in daylight to both flak and fighters. As the shocked survivors made their way homeward, they were painfully aware that their attack had failed largely through the failure of the pre-war bombs with which they had been equipped and that lives and aircraft had been thrown away for little result. At least three bombs had hit the Admiral Scheer, but all failed to explode.

In a speech to the House of Commons on 7 September Lord Stanhope paid fulsome tribute to the RAF and particularly to the efforts of Bomber Command which had recently made the news. Lord Stanhope tried to deflect possible criticism of the raid by telling the House that at least two hits had been recorded on a pocket battleship, while the attack had been made in extremely poor weather conditions which had limited effectiveness. Lord Stanhope also explained how many of the airmen involved had joined and been trained since the expansion of the RAF began in the mid-1930s and that a substantial number were volunteers from the Dominions.

Training was continuing apace at this time and the hectic schedule led to further losses. The day after the attack on Brunsbuttel and Wilhelmshaven Bomber Command suffered its first fatal training accident of the war when Pilot Officer Anthony Richard Playfair (26) of 7 Squadron lost control of his Hampden I (L4161) on a training flight. The bomber crashed at Cockwood Farm, Cantley, Yorkshire. Pilot Officer Playfair is listed as being British but his parents lived at Qualicum Beach, British Columbia, Canada. He was reportedly from a theatrical family, his father was an actor and a cousin of Sir Nigel Playfair, the actor and manager of the Lyric Theatre.

Lord Stanhope was also at pains to explain the other ongoing efforts of Bomber Command. He told them how in the last week the command had carried out extensive operations over Germany on three successive nights and that, during the course of these operations, some 10,000,000 leaflets had been dropped over a wide section of German territory, especially the north and west of the country, including the vital Ruhr region. MPs were told that despite the best efforts of the German defences no enemy fighters had intercepted the British bombers and all had returned safely.

In this first week of war the press, following the extremely limited information which they were given, was filled with praise for the efforts of Bomber Command and readers were told of ‘a most daring and effective’ raid being made on German ports and naval units. The leaflet raids also attracted praise in the national and local press with typical accounts informing readers that ‘on numerous occasions flights of the Bomber Command have penetrated far into Germany, dropping leaflets instead of bombs … These leaflet raids, from which our machines have returned unscathed though not unchallenged, must have a telling effect on people who have repeatedly been assured that their defences are impenetrable.’4

These night-time leaflet raids, or ‘Nickels’, continued when conditions allowed and provided valuable night-flying and navigational experience under wartime conditions for the Whitley crews of 4 Group. Between the second night of the war and Christmas Eve the Whitleys flew a total of 113 sorties on twenty-two nights. They carried leaflets on all of these and, on clearer nights, supplemented this duty with reconnaissance of German territory. These sorties were largely successful with 105 from 113 sorties being completed satisfactorily and losses were low. The first of the four Whitleys which were lost over Germany during this period occurred in the early hours of 9 September when Whitley III (K8950, DY-M) of 102 Squadron failed to return to its base at Driffield. The Whitley had been piloted by Squadron Leader S.S. Murray (who, it appears, was also a qualified interpreter) and he and his four crewmates were taken prisoner by the Germans after the aircraft came down near Kassel.5 Another aircraft from 102 Squadron was lost on this night when Whitley III (K8985, DY-J) also failed to return. It transpired that a navigational error had caused the Whitley to stray into neutral Belgian airspace and the bomber was forced to land at Nivelles aerodrome where the crew were interned. Flying Officer William Curwin Gavine Cogman and his crew were quickly returned to England, but their aircraft was reported destroyed during the blitzkrieg. A third Whitley was also destroyed on this night when an aircraft of 77 Squadron collided with a French aircraft while taxiing at Buc and was damaged beyond repair.

Aside from the ‘Nickel’ operations described above, Bomber Command spent most of the remainder of September training and flying some reconnaissance operations. Losses were limited although several aircraft were lost in training or routine accidents. Two 51 Squadron airmen were killed when their Whitley crashed while they were ferrying it to York from Linton-on-Ouse and the two crew of a Battle were lost when their aircraft crashed into a hillside near Cheltenham during a rainstorm.

From late September until the end of November the Command flew a number of photographic reconnaissance flights over Germany. These operations were largely undertaken by the Blenheim squadrons and a heavy price was paid as the vulnerable Blenheim was no match for the fighters which were often encountered. Over the course of thirty-seven operations on eleven days the Blenheims suffered five aircraft shot down and three other losses.

On 28 September, for example, two Blenheims of 107 Squadron failed to return to their base at Wattisham after being sent on reconnaissance missions. Flying Officer Donald Arthur Strachan and his crew were lost without trace while on a mission to Osnabruck aboard Blenheim IV (N6206).6 The second aircraft to be lost was (N6212) piloted by the squadron’s commanding officer, Wing Commander Ivan McLeod Cameron (31), on a reconnaissance of the Munster area. The Blenheim was shot down near Kiel. Wing Commander Cameron was an Australian, from Bealiba, Victoria, flying with the RAF. He had joined the RAF in 1928 with a short-service commission and had been promoted to the rank of squadron leader in 1937 before being promoted once more and taking over a squadron shortly afterwards. Together with his observer, Sergeant Thomas Cecil Hammond (27) of Dublin, and his wireless operator/air gunner Aircraftsman Thomas Fullerton, Wing Commander Cameron is buried in the Reichswald Forest War Cemetery.

After the debacle of 4 September daylight offensive operations did not take place again for a period of twenty-five days but on 29 September eleven Hampdens were sent to search for and attack German fleet units in the Heligoland area. The Hampdens were dispatched in two formations with the first formation of six making an unsuccessful attack against two enemy destroyers. The second formation was made up of five aircraft from 144 Squadron based at RAF Hemswell and was led by the commanding officer, Wing Commander James Charles Cunningham. None of the five aircraft returned to Hemswell and nothing was known until a German radio broadcast which stated that the Hampdens had run into a hornet’s nest of fighters and that all five had been shot down between the islands of Heligoland and Wangerooge.

The radio broadcast was correct and 144 Squadron was forced to come to terms with the loss of twenty of its aircrew, including its commanding officer. The Hampden of Wing Commander Cunningham ((L4134) was shot down in flames having fallen victim to a Bf 109. Wing Commander Cunningham (31), from Louth in Lincolnshire, was killed along with his second pilot/observer, Sergeant Ronald Ernest Herd (25) of Holbeach, Lincolnshire, and one of his wireless operator/air gunners, Sergeant Albert Edward Charles Povey (30) of Lasham in Hampshire. The second air gunner, Aircraftsman H. Liggett was taken as a PoW. The body of Sergeant Herd was buried at Sage War Cemetery while Wing Commander Cunningham and Sergeant Povey are commemorated on the Runnymede Memorial. The other Hampdens lost were piloted by Flying Officer John Tulloch Burrill Sadler (L4121), Flying Officer R.D. Baughan (L4216), Flying Officer Norman Croxen Beck (L4127), and Pilot Officer R.M. Coste (L4132).7 There were only four survivors from the twenty men who had taken off from Hemswell

In the aftermath of the disastrous raid of 29 September the local media in Lincolnshire highlighted the loss of two men who were well-known locally. The first was Wing Commander Cunningham (with reports mentioning his Grimsby-born wife and his one-year-old daughter) and the second was Flight Sergeant Siriol Williams. The marrie...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• Chapter 1: 1939 – Feeling the Way
• Chapter 2: 1940 – The Storm Breaks
• Chapter 3: 1941 – The Doldrums
• Chapter 4: 1942 – A Year of Change
• Chapter 5: 1943 – Main Offensive
• Chapter 6: 1944 – A Year of Changes
• Chapter 7: 1945 – Crushing Blows
• Conclusion
• Endnotes
• Plates section