APPENDIX J
BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMAN OFFICIAL CASUALTY RETURNS.
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES ON THE WESTERN FRONT MONTH BY MONTH.
APPENDIX K
ALLY AND GERMAN DREADNOUGHT AND BATTLESHIP STRENGTH, 1917
A TABLE SHOWING HOW TWO SEPARATE DREADNOUGHT FLEETS COULD HAVE BEEN FORMED IN 1917, EACH SUPERIOR TO THE TOTAL GERMAN FLEET.
The heavy monitors must be added to the Inshore Fleet, viz., 4 mounting 2—15-inch guns, 4 mounting 2—14-inch guns, 8 mounting 2—12-inch guns; total 16, mounting 32 guns.
To appreciate the gun-power of these fleets, the weight of projectiles of each calibre must be remembered:—
The relative weight of broadside from the primary guns alone of these three fleets is approximately as follows:—
APPENDIX L
THE MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS COUNCIL, 1917–18
THE COMPOSITION OF THE MUNITIONS COUNCIL AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS.
THE MINISTER.
THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY.
GROUPS OF DEPARTMENTS UNDER MEMBERS OF COUNCIL.
F. Finance.—Sir HERBERT HAMBLING.
Finance—Munitions Works Board—Controlled Establishments Finance—Munitions Contracts—Lands—Central Stores—Salvage.
D. Design.—Major-General the Hon. F. R. BINGHAM, C.B.
Design—Inspection—Trench Warfare Design—Munitions Inventions.
S. Steel and Iron.—JOHN HUNTER, Esq.
Iron and Steel Production—Factory Construction.
M. Materials, etc.—Sir ERNEST MOIR, Bart.
Non-Ferrous Metals—Scrap Metals—Development of Mineral Resources—Government Rolling Mills—Transport: Railways, Overseas, Trench Warfare—Forwarding and Receiving—Railway Materials—Cranes—Optical Munitions—Potash.
X. Explosives.—Sir KEITH PRICE.
Explosives Supply—Trench Warfare Chemical Supplies—Mineral Oil Production—Royal Gunpowder Factory, Waltham Abbey.
P. Projectiles, etc.—Sir JAMES STEVENSON, Bart.
Area Organization—Gun Ammunition—Gun Ammunition Filling—Trench Warfare Ammunition, filling and supply other than Trench guns and howitzers—Small Arms Ammunition—Munitions Gauges—Central Clearing Bureau—Timber.
G. Guns.—Sir GLYNN WEST.
Guns and Carriages (Supply and Repair)—Trench Guns and Howitzers—Machine Guns, Revolvers, Pistols, etc.—Rifles, Bayonets, etc.—Royal Small Arms Factory, Enfield Lock—Royal Ordnance Factories, Woolwich.
E. Engines.—Sir ARTHUR DUCKHAM, K.C.B.
Aeronautical Supplies—Petrol Engines Supply—Mechanical Transport—Mechanical Warfare—Agricultural Machinery—Electric Power Supply—Machine Tools—Stampings and Castings.
A. Allies.—Sir FREDERICK BLACK, K.C.B.
(Temporarily, Sir CHARLES ELLIS, K.C.B.)
L. Labour.—Sir STEPHENSON KENT, K.C.B.
Labour Regulations—Labour Supply—Housing—Welfare.
Secretariat.
Council Secretariat—Parliamentary and General—Legal—Requirements and Statistics—Establishment—Special Intelligence—Priority.
Very shortly afterwards an additional group was constituted for Requirements and Statistics, Mr. W. T. Layton being appointed Member of Council “R.” In October, 1917, the Master-General of the Ordnance, Major-Gen. Sir W. T. Furse, K.C.B., D.S.O., was invited to become an Honorary Member of Council, representing the War Office.
In February, 1918, the Engines Group was sub-divided, and Sir William Weir became Member of Council “A,” in charge of an Air Group. In July, 1918, the remainder of the Engines Group was replaced by the newly organized Warfare Group, including Trench Warfare and Inventions, under Major-Gen. the Rt. Hon. J. E. B. Seely, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.P., who was appointed Member of Council “W.”
APPENDIX M
MUNITIONS MINUTES AND LETTERS.
To Sir Douglas Haig.
July 26, 1917.
I take this early opportunity of writing to you to tell you how earnestly I shall endeavour to study your wishes and sustain the efforts of the Army by every means which falls within the scope of the Ministry of Munitions. I hope you will rely upon me to do this, and will let me know at once if there is any way in which I can serve you.
There are many difficulties here, both with labour and materials, especially steel, and at this stage of the War it will often become necessary to choose between desirable things and to throw special emphasis on this or on that branch of production.
If you have any suggestions which will improve the liaison which should be maintained between certain branches of this Department and the Army you will, I hope, let me know them.
Later on, when I am better informed and you are less busy, it would be a good thing for us to have a talk in order that I may carry out the general directions with regard to supply which I receive from the War Office with a complete and sympathetic understanding of your needs and wishes.
I was tempted to tell you when we met what was in store for me, but I thought on the whole it was better to wait for the fait accompli.
ADMIRALTY STEEL REQUIREMENTS.
To Lord Curzon.
July 26, 1917.
I send you herewith an early copy of the Memorandum which has been prepared on the Steel question in this Department.
I am sorry that I shall not be able to be with you on Friday afternoon; but I feel I ought to go to Dundee to-night and give personal attention to the contest on Friday and Saturday.
I think you will feel that the position disclosed in the Steel papers is fairly conclusive against the possibility of giving full and immediate effect to the new Admiralty demand. On my return I will make a further effort to overcome the difficulties and see if better proposals can be put forward. But, broadly speaking, I hope you will decide to remit the general question of principle to the further consideration of the War Cabinet having regard to the facts which are now disclosed. It is worth noting by the way that the July import of Ore is now estimated at 550,000 tons, or nearly 200,000 tons drop on the corresponding month of last year.
Do you not think also that the Admiralty use of steel for other purposes than merchant shipbuilding requires to be reviewed: for instance, we started the War with a fairly good supply of ammunition for every class of gun having regard to the character of sea battles. During the three years that have followed, we have been enormously increasing our stocks, and apart from practice ammunition have been firing very little away. In my time the advance was very great, and standing orders were given as to production, which I know Balfour long kept in operation. The reserves now accumulated will be found to be out of all proportion to what would be necessary to sink the German Fleet even under the most unfavourable circumstances. The American Navy has come in, etc., yet you will see that the Admiralty demands for shell steel are increasing mouth by month.
Again, an important proportion of the steel involved in the enlarged Admiralty demand is no doubt for the construction of destroyers for anti-submarine warfare. Here it is important to ask what kind of destroyer is being built for this purpose. The 1912–13 destroyer, for which I was responsible, lifted six or seven knots on its predecessor, attaining the immense speed of thirty-six or thirty-seven knots without sacrifice either of gun-power or sea-keeping capacity. These boats, which are almost miniature cruisers, were designed to catch and hunt down the best destroyers of the German Navy in their own waters across the broad distances of the North Sea. It is obvious that quite a different class of destroyer, much smaller and more humdrum, is required for submarine hunting far out of reach of all German surface ships. Twenty-five knots for instance with all the economies in money and material that follow from a sacrifice of speed would be quite sufficient for such a purpose. Yet, if I am rightly informed, we continue to reproduce the highest type, although the War object for which it was created has been largely rejected.
It would be easy to add to these examples, but I only mention these two in the hope that this aspect of our Steel expenditure will not be lost sight of when it comes to adjudicating with inevitable severity between the competing claims of various services.
MUNITIONS COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.
To Mr. Balfour (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs).
August 2, 1917.
During the last few days I have been thinking about the proper organization of our non-diplomatic communications with America, which as you know are being considered in several aspects at the present time.
There seem to me to be three distinct stages:—
(1) The Inter-Allied Council called for by Mr. McAdoo to settle a united demand on America on the basis of shipping and credit, and to divide up the total agreed upon between the respective Allies. This is already well on the road.
(2) The organization within each British Department for the detailed formulation of their needs and for the day to day conduct of their business with America. At present a variety of persons communicate through various channels with their Agents and opposite numbers in America. This cannot be a good way of carrying on business, and must lead to gaps, contradictions and overlapping. I am arranging that all communications for America from this Office are collated and despatched by one man with a proper Staff.
(3) The inter-departmental organization on this side of the business communications with America from the various Departments. This is also en train, and I attach the proposals which have been prepared here by my directions in response to the request of the Prime Minister for the creation of what is called an ‘American Board.’ It is undoubtedly necessary that such co-ordinating machinery should exist, and it ought to be possible to create it and set it in motion without either interfering with the departmental responsibility and initiative, or introducing a new element of delay. You will see that we proposed in the beginning that the ‘American Board’ should only have copies of the cables which are passing, but that as they get into their s...