Seaforth World Naval Review 2018

Conrad Waters, Conrad Waters

• Publisher: Seaforth Publishing
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781526720115
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

The yearly military reference that's"a well written, easy to read and well illustrated discussion of current naval power world-wide"— Thomo's Hole. Now firmly established as an authoritative but affordable summary of all that has happened in the naval world in the previous twelve months, this annual combines regional surveys with one-off major articles on noteworthy new ships and other important developments. Besides the latest warship projects, it also looks at wider issues of importance to navies, such as aviation and weaponry, and calls on expertise from around the globe to give a balanced picture of what is going on and to interpret its significance. Features of this edition include an analysis of the Republic of Korea Navy and the response to its aggressive northern neighbor. Significant Ships will cover the USN's revamped Arleigh Burke class destroyer design, German F125 class frigates, and the RNZN's Otago class offshore patrol vessels. There are also technological reviews dealing with naval aviation by David Hobbs, RN missile programs by Richard Scott, while Norman Friedman turns his attention to new generation weapons technology. The World Naval Review is intended to make interesting reading as well as providing authoritative reference, so there is a strong visual emphasis, including specially commissioned drawings and the most up-to-date photographs and artists' impressions. For anyone with an interest in contemporary naval affairs, whether an enthusiast or a defense professional, this annual has become required reading.

1 OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

‘In these matters the only certainty is that nothing is certain’ wrote Pliny the Elder (AD 23–AD 79), the Roman officer, fleet commander and author who was to meet an untimely death during the eruption of Vesuvius. The seemingly improbable series of events that have marked the last twelve months bear witness to the truth of this observation. The United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union (the so-called ‘Brexit’), the election of Donald Trump to the American presidency and the emergence of Emmanuel Macron as France’s new, progressive leader are just some of the milestones that mark a turbulent and unsettled year.

Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) – https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/ The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database contains military expenditure data on countries over the period 1949–2016.

Notes:

1 Spending figures are at current prices and market exchange rates.

2 Figures for China Saudi Arabia and the UAE are estimates, with the UAE figures relating to 2014.

3 Data on military expenditure as a share of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) relates to 2016 GDP estimates from the IMF World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics database, October 2016.

4 Change is real terms change, ie adjusted for local inflation.

5 Figures in brackets reflect rank in 2015, revised for latest information.

These political developments will inevitably feed through to defence – and naval – policy. The impact of the new Trump administration in the United States is likely to be the most marked. At one level, the advent of a new administration is apparently being accompanied by a more robust approach to defence spending that has been significantly constrained in recent years by the financial curbs imposed by the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA). The FY2018 budget request from the US Department of Defense amounts to a total of US$639bn. This is over five percent higher than the previous year’s authorisation and includes a base budget set some US$52bn above the BCA cap. However, uncertainties remain. The Trump presidency has yet to translate its campaign promises on defence – including an enlarged, 350-ship navy – into a clear defence strategy. This will only emerge over the next year. It is also unclear to what extent President Trump’s rhetoric will be matched by reality. Notably, if a military build-up is to be achieved, an accommodation will need to be reached with the fiscally conservative Republicans who could block spending proposals in Congress.1

The new Trump presidency is also significant in terms of its implications for the United States’ relations with its global network of alliances. In addition to the inevitable tensions resulting from the President’s penchant for ‘Twitter diplomacy’, a more enduring theme has been his emphasis on a nationalistic ‘America First Foreign Policy’. This seemingly views trade agreements and many other forms of international collaboration as a burden. A particular bête noir for the new administration is their view that many of America’s allies are not paying their fair share of the costs associated with collective security arrangements, such as NATO.2 Although previous threats to abandon the alliance made during the presidential election campaign appear to have dissipated, significant pressure is being put on allies to spend more on defence. This appears to be having some effect, as evidenced – for example – by Canada’s pledge in early June 2017 to boost its defence budget by nearly three-quarters over the next ten years. An eye-watering CAD$60bn (US$45bn) will be devoted to the wholesale renewal of the Royal Canadian Navy’s surface fleet. However, the impact of the burden-sharing approach could eventually prove to be a two-edged sword. A loss of confidence in America as a reliable ally, combined with the growth of more powerfully-armed mid-ranking powers, might well ultimately destabilise the current world order that has the United States’ financial and military hegemony at its core.3

Some of the difficulties already inherent in maintaining US global influence have been revealed by developments in South East Asia over the past twelve months. Although China’s expansionist ambitions in the region received a setback on 12 July 2016 when the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague determined that its claims over much of the South China Sea had no legal basis, an ongoing economic and diplomatic offensive has negated much of the ruling’s impact. Notably, a Chinese rapprochement with new Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte have done much to negate previous American efforts to build a network of regional alliances to counter China’s claims. The sustained rise in Chinese military spending and capability seen in recent years have already resulted it being regarded as a ‘near-peer US competitor’.4 However, there are some signs that the economic growth that has spurred China’s defence expenditure is now slowing as the country starts to reach maturity.

For the time being, the most recent available information for global defence spending is captured by Table 1.0.1. The data, from the respected Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), confirms that overall global expenditure of some US$1,686bn has continued to plateau. The top fifteen highest spenders also saw no change. In spite of the restraint of budgetary control, US defence spending still dominated the global total and increased slightly over 2015 as the previous financial constraints started to ease. Elsewhere, a slowdown in spending by oil-rich countries such as Saudi Arabia as the collapse in world prices started to bite was counterbalanced by unexpectedly persistent high levels of spending by Russia. This reflected heavy costs associated with Vladimir Putin’s apparently decisive intervention in Syria’s civil war and a number of one-off adjustments and is a trend that is expected to reverse from now on.5 A marked reduction in the British total arose from the severe depreciation of sterling after the Brexit vote.

The US Navy aircraft carrier Carl Vinson (CVN-70) pictured operating with the JMSDF destroyer Samidare in the East China Sea on 8 March 2017. The advent of the new Trump administration should result in an increase in the size of the overall US fleet but relations with key allies are on a more uneven footing. (US Navy)

Asian navies have benefitted from the region’s economic success, growing in status and proficiency. The rise of South Korea’s Republic of Korea Navy has been comparatively little commented upon but a strong indigenous shipbuilding sector has assisted the production of some capable ships. These images show the newly-completed minelayer Nampo, which has some similarities with the FFX series of littoral warfare frigates. Maintaining an appropriate balance between littoral and blue water forces is an ongoing challenge for South Korean Navy admirals. (Republic of Korea Defence Acquisition Programme Administration)

The Arleigh Burke class destroyers have proved to be a remarkably successful design and remain in production more than twenty-five years after the first was delivered. This view shows one of the earlier members of the class – John S. McCain (DDG-56) – operating in the Philippine Sea on 14 June 2017. (US Navy)

FLEET REVIEWS

Table 1.0.2, estimating major fleet strengths as of mid-2017, shows the broad correlation between high defence spending and naval power. Eleven of the fifteen naval powers listed also feature on the list of the fifteen top military spenders. Notable changes during the past year include the departure of another member of the exclusive ‘carrier club’ following Brazil’s decision to decommission São Paulo, a reduction that will soon be balanced by the delivery of Britain’s new Queen Elizabeth and the restoration of the club’s founder to full membership. The UK Government, weakened by a botched general election, is attempting to use the new ship’s imminent arrival to herald a rebirth in British naval power following years of managed decline. However, as set out in Richard Beedall’s established biennial fleet review of the Royal Navy, the actual position is somewhat more complex. Notably, continued underfunding is exacerbating a shortage of personnel and putting important procurement programmes in jeopardy.

Notes:

1 Figures for Russia and China are approximate.

2 Fleet escorts for South Korea include thirteen deployed in littoral warfare roles.

The trajectory followed by many Asian fleets has been far more positive in recent years, with a number achieving a step-change in their status and proficiency. Amongst these, the Republic of Korea Navy’s rise has been comparatively little commented-upon, possibly because of the overriding focus on neighbouring North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. However, as revealed in the latest of a series of fleet reviews of Indian Ocean and Asian navies by Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, the country has made considerable strides in its ambitions to become a regional ‘blue water’ naval power. The main challenge is to balance these ambitions with an ongoing need to counter the largely asymmetric threat to South Korea’s littoral posed by the less sophisticated but more numerous Korean People’s Army Naval Force. The South Korean Navy also has an important part to play in the evolving three-pronged national defence to potential North Korean missile attacks. Realising the ballistic missile defence potential inherent in the country’s Aegis-equipped KDXIII destroyers will form a key part of this strategy.

SIGNIFICANT SHIPS

The KDX-III destroyer design is a development of the US Navy’s Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class, a type that has enjoyed considerable longevity since its conception in the later years of the Cold War. Indeed, the failure of the following Zumwalt (DDG-1000) design to meet the US Navy’s expectations has resulted in the Burkes being placed back into construction. These so-called ‘Restart’ ships are now being delivered and the first two – John Finn (DDG-113) and Rafael Peralta (DDG-115) – to join the fleet are scheduled for commissioning in July 2017. Transition of construction to an improved Flight III design, featuring the new Raytheon AMDR advanced missile defence radar is also imminent.6 We have therefore taken the opportunity to ask Norman Friedman, who was a personal advisor to the then Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, at the time the DDG-51 design was developed, to review the class’s origins and review its remarkable success to date. We intend that this will provide a firm foundation from which to carry out an analysis of the evolved, Flight III type in a later edition.

Whilst the Arleigh Burke class evidences the US Navy’s ongoing focus on high-intensity warfighting, other fleets have adopted a nuanced approach. One case in point is Germany, which has increasingly focuse...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Section 1: Overview
• Section 2: World Fleet Reviews
• Section 3: Significant Ships
• Section 4: Technological Reviews
• Contributors