Mercenaries to Conquerors

Norman Warfare in the Eleventh & Twelfth-Century Mediterranean

Paul Brown

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781473880108
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

When a band of Norman adventurers arrived in southern Italy to fight in the Lombard insurrections against the Byzantine empire in the early 1000s, few would have predicted that within a generation these men would have seized control of Apulia, Calabria and Sicily. How did they make such extraordinary gains and then consolidate their power? Paul Brown, in this thoroughly researched and absorbing study, seeks to answer these questions and throw light onto the Norman conquests across the Mediterranean. Throughout he focuses on the military side of their progress, as they advanced from mercenaries to conquerors, then crusaders. The story of the campaigns they undertook in Italy, Sicily, the Balkans and the Near East reveals their remarkable talent for war. The dominant role played by a succession of Norman leaders is a key theme of the narrative a line of ambitious and ruthless soldiers that ran from Robert Guiscard and Bohemond to Roger II and Tancred.

Chapter 1

Background

If an ethnic group is evaluated solely by the criterion of military success, the Normans were unquestionably the most successful people in eleventhcentury Europe. While best known for the conquest of the Kingdom of England in the late 1060s, both professional and popular historians have, particularly in the last few decades, increasingly turned their attention to the lesser known, but by no means less significant, Norman conquests in Italy, Sicily and Syria. While the reasons for this heightened interest are many, some of the appeal is no doubt attributable to the ‘rags-to-riches’ or ‘against-allodds’ nature of these territorial acquisitions. The conquest of England was a ‘state-sanctioned’ operation led by the Duke of Normandy himself and his most preeminent subordinates and allies, whereas the leaders responsible for conquests in southern Italy, Sicily and Syria often came from the middling ranks of Norman society; they were variously political exiles or disenfranchised sons hailing from relatively meagre patrimonies. Moreover, while the leading families participated in the duke’s invasion in 1066 according variously to tenurial obligations and the promise of increased wealth and prestige, their counterparts in the Mediterranean, despite also being clearly driven by the desire to improve their station in life, did not do so at the request of their duke. Rather, drawn initially by the offers of military service in Italy, the ‘help’, over the course of several decades, gradually became the rulers of their former employers.

Those responsible for the majority of the conquests in the Mediterranean hailed from the Hauteville family, whose military campaigns in the Mediterranean world will be the focus of this book. On the progenitor of these remarkable mercenaries, conquerors, and statesmen, Tancred of Hauteville (c. 980–1041), unfortunately little is known. Despite the concerted efforts of the (almost certainly) Norman chronicler Geoffrey Malaterra to indicate otherwise, at the time of his death Tancred of Hauteville was, at best, a relatively insignificant subordinate of the duke of Normandy, better known to posterity as ‘William the Conqueror’ (r. 1035–87). The siring of sons was clearly of paramount importance, for a total of twelve were borne to Tancred from two wives, Murielle and Frédesende. Four sons would later become counts in Apulia, and one of them, from Tancred’s second marriage, Robert ‘the Cunning’ (Guiscard), became duke of Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily (r. 1059–85). Robert’s son Marc, better known by his nickname ‘Bohemond’, proved to be the greatest of the commanders of the First Crusade (1096–99), during which he established a formidable principality centred on Antioch in northern Syria. But Bohemond would not be the only famous grandson of Tancred of Hauteville. Roger II, the son of Guiscard’s younger brother from the same mother, Count Roger I, became the first king of Sicily, founding a political institution that survived until Giuseppe Garibaldi’s conquest of Sicily in 1860. Another Tancred, the last of those whom his biographer Raoul of Caen called the ‘Guiscardians’, and whose name evidently commemorated his great-grandfather’s, lived much of his life under the shadow of his maternal uncle Bohemond. He was, however, more successful than his uncle when it came to extending the frontiers of the principality of Antioch, doing so at the expense of the neighbouring Byzantine, Armenian, and Selçuk powers. Upon his death, Tancred, as regent of Antioch (r. 1100–03, 1104–12), was in equal measure feared and admired by both his allies and enemies.¹

Southern Italy

The first region of the Mediterranean that the Normans would make their own at the beginning of the eleventh century was a cultural, political, religious and ethnic melting-pot. The inhabitants of modern-day Puglia (Apulia), Basilicata, and Calabria were subjects of the Byzantine emperor. The solider emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (r. 963–9) reorganized the administrative structure of these regions, which had previously been divided into two ‘themes’ governed by generals invested with both civil and military authority. Apulia, formerly the theme of Longobardia, became the ‘katepanate of Italy’. A katepanate was a larger, more important administrative province of the empire, consisting of themes. The other province, the theme of Calabria, was retained, and a new one was created in Loukania (Basilicata). While now under the direct authority of the katepano stationed at Bari in Apulia/Longobardia, the other governors nevertheless exercised a degree of administrative autonomy. Campania, to the west of Apulia, was ruled by three Lombard princes based at Salerno, Capua, and Benevento. However, in the same region, the maritime cities of Amalfi, Naples, and Gaeta were governed by dukes, who despite wielding independent rule, all maintained strong economic and political links with the Byzantine empire. Lastly, although the final imperial possession of Taormina resisted capture until 902, Sicily had effectively changed from Byzantine to Muslim hands by the middle of the ninth century.²

Such was the intricate, overlapping political landscape, but even more intricate was the ethnic one. Apulia/Longobardia, aside from the Greekspeaking south, was predominantly peopled by Lombards. Originally based in Pannonia (Hungary), the Lombards established a kingdom in northern Italy in 568, but their rule was restricted to southern Italy after Charlemagne’s capture of the capital Pavia in 774. A tenth-century Salernitan chronicler referred to the ‘German tongue, long ago spoken by the Lombards’, reflecting that they had gradually integrated with the local population, who greatly outnumbered them. They were therefore essentially Italians, although many, most notably the ruling class, continued to identify strongly with the Lombard heritage even though they spoke an Italian, rather than Germanic, dialect. This continuing ethnic pride is evidenced in one of the local annals written by the Lombards of Bari, which concludes the entry with: ‘and it has been 400 years since the Lombards entered Italy’. Similarly outnumbered by Lombards in much of northern and central Apulia, the Byzantines were content to let the locals be ruled in accordance with ancestral laws – first codified by King Rothair in 643 and substantially revised by King Liudprand (r. 712–44) – under their own officials. Positions within the imperial administration were also open to Lombards, although the office of katepano was restricted to nobles from Constantinople. While some historians have tended to style Lombard leaders who rebelled against the katepano as ‘patriots’ wanting to free themselves from servitude, to use the words of Chris Wickham, they were generally loyal and the exceptions to this general rule were ‘ad hoc hostile responses to individual administrators’.³

Calabria, like southern Apulia, was almost entirely populated by speakers of the official Byzantine language (Greek). In the Campanian region, again the Lombards formed the dominant ethnic contingent, although Greek was still known among some of the élite in the maritime cities. Naturally, since it had been under Muslim rule for over a century by the time the Normans arrived in southern Italy, Sicily possessed large numbers of Arabic-speakers, perhaps comprising up to two-thirds of the island’s population. The non-Muslim inhabitants generally spoke Greek, and were mainly concentrated in the north-eastern area of the island, the Val Dèmone.⁴

The complex political and ethnic makeup of the south was reflected in religion too. First of all, Christians were split between those who recognised the ecclesiastical authority of the Roman patriarch, and those who instead acknowledged his Constantinopolitan counterpart. Both the inhabitants of Campania and the Lombards of Apulia followed the Latin liturgy, and those of southern Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily observed the Greek one. Prior to the rule of the Byzantine emperor Leo III (r. 717–41), the papacy possessed ecclesiastical jurisdiction in southern Italy. However, on account of the Roman Church’s opposition to Leo’s policy of iconoclasm – i.e. prohibition against the worship of icons – the incensed emperor transferred this jurisdiction to the patriarch of Constantinople. Such a move was greatly resented by the papacy, and it was in the eleventh century that the papal curia began to reassert its rights more forcefully in the region. But another important power bloc in western Europe also lay claim to southern Italy: the Germanic emperors of the Salian dynasty, who much like their Ottonian predecessors shared Charlemagne’s belief that the south belonged to the western, not eastern, emperor (as had generally been the case until the deposition of the last western emperor Romulus in 476).⁵

Determining the precise nature of military administration in the regions ruled by Lombards and Byzantines is a difficult task. The former, originally referred to collectively as an ‘army’ rather than a people, fielded a force consisting of ‘freemen’ serving under the leaders of prominent families (farae). Freemen, more frequently identified as ‘soldiers’ (arimanni), were expected not only to provide military service, but also to equip themselves. Those freemen who were wealthier than others were required by the laws of King Aistulf (r. 749–56) to serve as heavy cavalry (i.e. to equip themselves with horses, armour, shields and lances). The men of middling means (minores homines) fought as light cavalrymen (horses, shields and lances, but no armour), and the less financially fortunate as infantry (shields, bows and arrows). These troop types and their equipment were determined by the amount of land held, and while Lombard society had theoretically consisted of a single ‘class’ – there are no explicit references to an aristocracy in the various laws – there were effectively three tiers based on prestige and wealth (farae, arimanni and minores homines). As is evident in a charter of Prince Radelchis I of Benevento (r. 839–51), a century later these property-based groups had become more precisely defined as ‘nobles’, ‘the middling’ and ‘peasants’ (reiterated in a 992 charter with similar terminology). Soldiers were levied from these classes by regional officials hailing from the upper tier of society, defined in the tenth century as consisting of the nobles and their princes, who were entrusted with taxation in addition to military matters. This system was employed throughout Campania, in addition to northern and central Apulia, which, until the Byzantine reconquest in the last quarter of the ninth century, was subject to Lombard rule.⁶

The troops deployed in pitched engagements, however, seem to have been predominantly levied from urban areas, whereas the ones tasked with defence of fortified settlements (castra) – not ‘castles’ or ‘fortresses’ as the Latin term meant in the contemporary French context – were recruited from among the rural population. The mention of ‘the cavalrymen of Salerno’, led in 1052 by Prince Guaimar IV and including among them his brother-in-law Landulf, is suggestive of an élite corps drawn exclusively from the upper echelons. Substantial lay estates are known to have furnished mounted troops, as did those in the ecclesiastical sphere. As for light cavalrymen, in former times recruited from the middling ranks, little is known. However, they almost certainly continued to exist and, as will be argued in the next chapter, can be identified with those known in Apulia as conterati. Lastly, it seems evident that in the eleventh century Lombard infantry continued to consist mainly of missile troops: in addition to the traditional archers, there are various references to the use of slingers (e.g. Prince Gisulf II of Salerno deployed men armed with ‘sling and bow’ in the 1050s). Supplementing these various troop types from the ninth century onwards, when needed, were mercenaries. Arabic-speakers augmented Lombard armies during the civil war of 839–49 and, much like their eleventh-century Norman counterparts, while militarily effective they were rapacious and difficult to control.⁷

While there were detachments of both provincial and élite troops known to have been stationed at Bari in the early eleventh century, their average numerical strength remains unknown. Yet since reinforcements were regularly sent to Italy in times of crisis, it follows that there were never very many. Indeed, the élite troops mentioned were more often officers than divisions or regiments, whose role was presumably to oversee defence, military administration, training and recruitment. The imperial administration in northern and central Longobardia therefore relied predominantly on Lombards – some of whom were ‘Byzantinized’ – recruited from the abovementioned classes, and hence could theoretically field an army of heavy and light cavalry in addition to infantry. The bulk of these men were recruited in accordance with their obligation to provide military service as a form of rent, a duty first referred to in a charter witnessed at Conversano in 980. The local population was also expected to provide ships and pay a naval tax, the proceeds of which presumably paid for the maintenance of the fleet and its marines. Much like the Lombards, in times of need the Byzantine administration hired mercenaries. In 1041, for example, the katepano was said to have been ordered by Emperor Michael IV to hire experienced cavalry from his ‘land’ (i.e. Longobardia/Apulia) in order to help counter the incursions of Lombardo-Norman rebels.⁸

Recruitment and attendant obligations in the theme of Calabria were similar, although the most obvious difference is that the troops, like those in southern Longobardia, were Greek-speakers rather than Lombards. The naval tax is attested in the tenth century, and that it was particularly onerous is apparent given that the citizens of Rossano revolted when it was levied in c. 965 by the governor Nikephoros Hexakionites. The number of ships maintained in Calabria seems to have been considerable, for the fleet led by the Normans in 1061 – i.e. after the region and its capital had been capitulated – was said to have outnumbered the twenty-four Muslim ships sent to oppose its crossing to Sicily. Admittedly this fleet did include ships from Apulia, but Calabria evidently contributed the lion’s share, as there were clearly enough battle-ready ships stationed at Reggio to engage a Muslim fleet in the Strait of Messina prior to the launch of the campaign. Although the last explicit mention of the building of galleys with two banks of oars (chelandia) – used for combat and the transport of cavalry – in Calabria dates to c. 965, clearly a region afflicted by seaborne raids launched from Muslim Sicily in the ninth to eleventh centuries required the maintenance of a fleet to guard against them. That chelandia continued to be produced is confirmed by the knowledge that the Byzantines procured ships from the region in order to transport troops to Sicily (1038), as did their Norman successors in 1061, who had received the surrender of the capital Reggio in the previous year. Lastly, a Calabrian ship identified specifically as a chelandion (sing.), was captured and burnt during a naval engagement in the Adriatic (c. 1064).⁹

The Calabrian theme, originally part of the theme of Sicily, was probably divided into three tactical divisions known as tourmai; at least this was the standard subdivision recommended in various military manuals. The one that anything is specifically known about is the Saline tourma (sing.) based at Oppido in the hinterland of the south-western coast (36km north-east of Reggio), and so called owing to the town’s location in the Saline Valley (the plain of Gioia Tauro). The fortified hilltop town was founded in c. 1044, and the tourma stationed there was subdivided into three vanda/droungoi of cavalry, each under the command of a count. Where the other two tourmai were located is uncertain, but presumably one was at the capital on the south coast (Reggio), and the other at Squillace on the east coast (where Reggio’s commanders took refuge when their city fell to the Normans in 1060). The size of Byzantine units was never static, but two military manuals, the first from the 960s and the second from c. 1000, state that a vandon (sing.) comprised ‘fifty men’. Hence the number of cavalry available to the Byzantine administration in Calabria was around 450 (assuming those in the other six vanda were equivalent in size to the three known to have been stationed at Oppido). Other than that, a signatory to a 1053/4 monastic charter in the same vicinity identified himself as Cyril, commander of the elsewhere unattested unit of ‘Hungarians’, whose numerical strength is therefore unknown. Any other troops – i.e. infantry and light cavalry – were presumably levied when required from the militia residing in the villages and fortified settlements. How such troops were recruited and trained is difficult to ascertain, but no doubt the method employed in Longobardia was also used in Calabria (i.e. by officers from the professional regiments). Indeed, men called Scrivones, presumably from the guards regiment associated with the regiment of ‘the Sentinels’ (Exkouvitoi), were noted by two sources to have been present at Crotone in the 1050s.¹⁰

Apulia and Calabria had developed in line with a tenth-century Italian phenomenon known to specialists as incastellamento: the fortification of either pre-existing or newly founded ‘nucleated settlements’ (castra), as Barbara Kreutz puts it. Such settlements were the opposite of the equivalent in northern France: to rephrase Chris Wickham’s words, those who worked the land resided within the fortified areas, rather than outside them. Apulia/Longobardia was much more urbanised than Calabria; accordingly many people lived in the heavily fortified towns on the east coast (e.g. Trani in the North, Bari in the centre, and Brindisi in the south), although considerable numbers resided in settlements located in the hinterlands of these urban centres. Calabria was altogether different. With Squillace and th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Illustrations and Maps
• Preface
• Chapter 1: Background
• Chapter 2: Mercenaries
• Chapter 3: Conquerors
• Chapter 4: Imperialists?
• Chapter 5: Antiochenes
• Chapter 6: Epilogue
• Appendix: Latin Terminology
• Notes
• Abbreviations
• Further Reading