Ending the Siege of Leningrad

German and Spanish Artillery at the Battle of Krasny Bor

Carlos Caballero Jurado

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781526741035
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World War II
• Index: History

This vivid combat history examines the role of German and Spanish artillery in the WW2 fight for control of Leningrad. When Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, it quickly established a blockade around Leningrad that would become one of the longest and most destructive in history. In an attempt to break the blockade in 1943, the Red Army launched an offensive near the town of Krasny Bor. Previous works on the Battle of Krasny Bor have focused on the infantry involved, while little attention has been paid to the use of German and Spanish artillery in the conflict. In Ending the Siege of Leningrad, Spanish military historian Carlos Caballero Jurado corrects this oversight. Describing the action from an artilleryman's point of view, Jurado puts the reader in the heart of the battle.

IV

The Storm Closes In

Without intending to give a detailed description of the strategic situation of Army Group North in general and the 18th Army in particular, which readers will either already know or can find in other works, I do need to provide a brief overview so readers will understand the role of the artillery at the Battle of Krasny Bor.

We need to go back at least as far as 12 January 1943 when, in a renewed attempt to break out of the siege which was squeezing Leningrad, the Soviets launched a major offensive to the south of Lake Ladoga, both from inside the encircled area and from the River Volkhov. After some very hard fighting, the Soviet pincers dislodged the German troops holding the southern bank of the lake, forcing them to withdraw southwards and opening up what was still a narrow corridor to Leningrad. It was the start of a series of battles which the Germans refer to as the “Second Battle of Ladoga”. The “First Battle of Ladoga” had been fought late the previous summer with the Russians carrying out practically the same manoeuvre but on that occasion the Germans had managed to repulse the Soviet incursions, albeit with great difficulty, and the lines had returned to their original positions. The Soviet offensive had been a total tactical failure, but strategically it had succeeded in delaying German plans to attack Leningrad by using up the reserves set aside for that purpose.

Without entering into further details, suffice it to say that as a result of the Russian offensive initiated on 12 January, the German positions were no longer lining a corridor stretching to the southernmost banks of Lake Ladoga; now they extended southwards in a deep bulge with Mga at its centre. For the Soviets the elimination of this bulge was vital because the corridor to Leningrad that they had opened up was very narrow and still perfectly in range of German artillery. And for the Germans it was essential that they held those positions or, even better, push the Russians back to the southernmost shores of Lake Ladoga, because otherwise the encirclement of Leningrad would be breached.

We have already seen that when the Red Army launched an attack against the Spanish positions at Krasny Bor on 10 February, the Blue Division had powerful artillery support, the like of which it had never enjoyed before. But those guns had not always been there, and if they had been moved to those positions it was because after the middle ten days of January there was a growing fear that an attack would be launched on the Spanish sector. The reason was that the Spanish were deployed in an area that we might describe as the left hand base of the Mga bulge. And nothing could be more tempting for the Soviets than to cut off that bulge at its base with a fresh two-pronged offensive, with one force from Leningrad and the other from the Volkhov.

Deployment of the German Army in the Leningrad sector as at 31 December 1942.

Second Battle of Ladoga, 11 to 13 January 1943.

Second Battle of Ladoga, 19 January to 9 February 1943.

It was on 20 January 1943 when the 18th Army ordered the LIV Corps (the unit to which the Blue Division still belonged) to be reinforced by assigning it more artillery; the 289th, 708th and 928th Coastal Groups and part of the 768th Heavy Group were transferred to the Corps. But the most important orders of that day addressed the urgent needs created by the battle at the Mga bulge.

In order to manage all the German units deployed there, a temporary command called Group Hilpert had been set up, named after its commanding officer. This temporary battlegroup was somewhat larger in scale than an Army Corps but smaller than an Army. Basically it consisted of LIV Corps plus what remained of XXVI Corps, the Corps that had occupied the corridor to Lake Ladoga and which had suffered terrible losses. The 18th Army assigned its own artillery command to Group Hilpert, and so it was that Höh. Arko 303, under the leadership of its commander, Major-General Hans Kratzert, commanded all the artillery in the “Second Battle of Ladoga”. The artillery units which had hitherto been under the direct command of Höh. Arko 303 were transferred to the Army Corps and Kratzert concentrated on the operations at the Mga bulge. In order to be able to manage his artillery resources properly, Kratzert assigned the coordination of the fire from each of the faces of the bulge to a different Arko. Arko 123 (Colonel Gotthard Fischer) would direct the batteries on the eastern face, Arko 113 (Colonel Hans-Joachim Fouquet) those of the northern face, and Arko 18 (Colonel Karl Koske) – previously assigned to L Corps – would command those of the western face. Kratzert held another Arko, Arko 138 (Colonel Walter Wissmath), in reserve.

On 22 January, Kratzert’s decision to concentrate on the tricky battle at the Mga salient made it necessary for Höh. Arko 303 to transfer to L Corps control over the “jewel of the crown”, the most important of the guns able to hit Leningrad due to their long ranges. Another reason for the change of control was their proximity, since they were deployed to the rear of the 215th Division. These guns had previously been under the direct command of 18th Army Artillery Command. This group of long-range guns included the 508th, 513th, and 515th Coastal Batteries, the II/84th Superheavy Group, the 708th Heavy Group, and the 679th Railway Group, all under the command of the 802nd Staff. A large percentage of these units’ guns had ranges of 30 km or even more. That same day was when the Blue Division was ordered to transfer from LIV Corps to L Corps, an order which also applied to the aforementioned heavy groups which had deployed alongside the Spanish batteries.

As it was clear that all this firepower required proper management, on the 23rd of the month Arko 18, under the command of Colonel Koske as we have just seen and traditionally linked to L Corps, returned to that corps after his fleeting attachment to Group Hilpert. This fact shows that the German command was aware of the dangerous situation of the area covered by L Corps. And, as we have seen, quite some time before the Battle of Krasny Bor the German artillery was in no doubt as to the threat hanging over the L Corps sector in general and the Blue Division – now forming part of that corps – in particular.

Deployment of Heerestruppen artillery units under the orders of L Corps in August 1942.

Deployment of divisional and Heerestruppen artillery units under the orders of Arko 18, as at 29 January 1943.

Spanish infantry deployments also reflect the new tactical situation created by the Soviets’ opening up of the corridor to the south of Lake Ladoga. The unit deployed to its left, the 4th SS-Police Division,1 was urgently sent to the Mga area, and on 14 January the I/262nd Battalion was sent to relieve part of its infantry previously deployed on the Leningrad-Moscow railway embankment (the rest of the SS unit’s sector became the responsibility of its eastern neighbour, the 5th Mountain Light Infantry Division). On the 17th, the II/269th Battalion, the most prestigious of all the Spanish infantry battalions, came under the command of the 18th Army; it was sent to Sablino and held there in reserve, to be sent to the Mga area as soon as it was needed there. At first it was thought that this Spanish battalion would be accompanied by a Spanish battery, and the 9th/250th had been chosen for the purpose. But since it was also necessary to strengthen the Spanish sector with more artillery, eventually it was decided not to send that battery to Mga but instead use it within the Blue Division.

Up until now, only two Spanish batteries of I Group had been deployed in the Spanish-held Krasny Bor sector between the River Izhora and the aforementioned railway line. But on 17 January the 2nd Battery took its place alongside them, meaning that the Group was now at full complement in that sector. Meanwhile the 9th Battery (belonging to III Group) also received orders to join them, and was duly emplaced on the 18th of the month; the Spanish had just doubled their firepower to the east of the Izhora. That same day Colonel Bandín, commander of the Spanish artillery regiment, and one of his most competent officers, Captain Álvarez Lasarte, paid a visit to the Army Corps A...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• I. Introduction: The Overlooked Protagonists
• II. The Siege of Leningrad: Two Artilleries, Head to Head
• III. The Two Blue Division Artillery Regiments
• IV. The Storm Closes In
• V. The Artillery Duel
• VI. The Behemoths: Railway Artillery
• VII. Analysing the Battle
• Appendices
• Endnotes