Explores the surprisingly rich early history of US-China trade and its unexpected impact on the developing republic. The economic and geographic development of the early United States is usually thought of in trans-Atlantic terms, defined by entanglements with Europe and Africa. In Trading Freedom, Dael A. Norwood recasts these common conceptions by looking to Asia, making clear that from its earliest days, the United States has been closely intertwined with Chinaâmonetarily, politically, and psychologically.Norwood details US trade with China from the late eighteenth through the late nineteenth centuriesâa critical period in America's self-definition as a capitalist nationâand shows how global commerce was central to the articulation of that national identity. Trading Freedom illuminates how debates over political economy and trade policy, the building of the transcontinental railroad, and the looming sectional struggle over slavery were all influenced by Sino-American relations. Deftly weaving together interdisciplinary threads from the worlds of commerce, foreign policy, and immigration, Trading Freedom thoroughly dismantles the idea that American engagement with China is anything new.
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In Paris, John Adams worried for the future. In mid-July 1783 Adams was in the French capital to negotiate a final peace settlement with Great Britain, work he found frustrating and difficult. A fortnight before, Britain had issued a proclamation that reemphasized the empireâs commitment to reserving trade with the British West Indies to their own subjects. Though he thought this a piece of âRefugee Politicksââthe result of lobbying by expatriate loyalistsâAdams fretted that without access to the traditional outlets for American produce and charters for American ships, any plans for the âhappiness and prosperityâ of the new nation would be âstraitened and shackled.â The best way to respond, Adams advised the Continental Congress, was to retaliate in kind. Each state, he wrote, should lay the same punitive impost on British imports in order to convince London of the wisdom of freer trade policy.
Doubting, however, that even this âcommon danger . . . will induce a perfect unanimity among the States,â Adams also ruminated on other ways of âmaking impressions upon the English.â Some of his recommendations would be familiar to any student of early American political economy: growing West Indian products within the United States would help, he thought, as would encouraging domestic manufacturing. But Adamsâs advice reached beyond the Atlantic world, revealing a revolutionary geopolitics less familiar to historians. âSend Ships immediately to China,â he told Congress, because âthis trade is as open to us as to any nation.â Putting competitive pressure on Britain in Asia, his logic ran, would force open markets in the Atlantic or, failing that, help compensate for their absence. Like many of his fellow revolutionaries, Adams saw overseas commerce as a continuation of international politics by other meansâand Chinaâs trade as a key part of any political calculation made for the United States.1
As the Revolutionary War wound down and the problems of peace emerged, American elites turned to Chinese commerce as an important component of the republicâs political economy. What they termed âthe China trade,â or âtrade with the East Indies,â was not simple, direct trade but access to a complex set of exchanges linking the ports of Asiaâabove all the hub of Cantonâto the Americas, Africa, Europe, and the Pacific islands. Among an influential group of American leaders, the China trade seemed to offer a particularly useful instrument for expanding economic power and buttressing the infant republicâs independence within a republican ideological framework. As the problems of peace became manifest, an interest in the China trade informed the way American leaders explained the need for a more consolidated nation-state, as well as how they shaped the core institutions that defined and animated itânotably the federal governmentâs key source of revenue, the tariff, which singled out for special protection the traffic in goods imported âfrom China or India.â These movements were made in dialogue with the evolving realities of Americansâ trade in China, a practice that by the turn of the nineteenth century had revealed the limits of American statecraft. American policymakers looked to the China trade to slake their thirst for tea and nourish their revolutionary nationâs political economy; the difficulties involved in seeking Chinaâs commerce led them to develop new ideas about what capabilities their new nation needed in order to survive in a competitive world.
Adams did not have to wait long for American ships to be sent out; trade with China launched with the nationâs formal independence. In February 1784, just over a month after the Continental Congress had ratified the Treaty of Paris and proclaimed the end of the War of Independence, the ice damming New Yorkâs harbor receded, and in its wake came the Empress of China, a small, square-sterned ship bound for Canton.2 The novelty of the shipâs destination loaded the vessel with more than just ginseng and Spanish dollars as it sailed down the East River.3 Backed by a group of prominent Philadelphia and New York merchants (including the Continental Congressâs superintendent of finance, Robert Morris), and managed by several respected veterans of the Revolutionary War, the Empress bore Americansâ hopes for a new era of prosperity.4
The Empress left a country in increasingly desperate straits. Independence had cost Americans dearly. The war had destroyed lives and property, and put state governments and the Continental Congress deeply in debt. The national government organized under the Articles of Confederation was too weak to improve matters, lacking mechanisms to tax, regulate trade, or normalize relations with other nations. Worse, by early 1784 Americans were beginning to realize what separation from the British Empire meant in economic terms. In the peace, they were cut off from the West Indian ports that had been the lifeblood of the colonial economyâbut British and Continental merchants retained easy access to US ports and flooded them with goods, suffocating domestic producers and merchants. With no friendly outlets for their wares, few profitable routes for shipping, and no government capable of organizing a coherent response, the situation at the time of the Empressâs departure was grim indeed.5
The Empressâs voyage launched as part of a larger push to overcome these economic and political problems by expanding commerce. Proposals for exploring new branches of trade were common after the warâmerchants gambled their ships and capital on new markets in the Mediterranean and the Baltic, in South America as well as in Asia. But while voyages like the Empressâs were unremarkable in their motivations, ventures to China were something more than just another kind of investment. During the first decades of the China trade American merchants from ports up and down the East Coast sailed the world over to accumulate the commodities, credit, and coin required for purchases in China. They gathered ginseng root from Appalachian forests, marine furs from the Pacific Northwest and southern South America, sandalwood from Hawaii, opium from Smyrna and Bengal, and, crucially in the early years, Spanish silver dollars, the favored currency of East-West trade, from commerce with Mexico, the Caribbean, South America, and Europe. Moreover, Americans conducted a carrying trade between these areas, sometimes finding it more effective to tramp around the globe on multiyear voyages than to simply go to China directly.
For all these reasons, contemporary commentary on the Empressâs endeavor and other early voyages cast these ventures in terms of what historian James Fichter has usefully characterized as âpublic economyââan enterprise aimed at generating both national glory and private profit.7 In the case of the Empress, investors and a wide range of observers saw its voyage as a harbinger of a national commercial movement. Robert Morris, US superintendent of finance and part owner of the Empress, told John Jay, secretary of foreign affairs, that he was âsending some ships to Chinaâ not only for his own profit, but also âto encourage others in the adventurous pursuits of commerce.â8 Philadelphiaâs newspapers reported that this desire to serve the national interest extended even to the captain and his crew, who were allegedly âelated on being considered the first instruments, in the hands of Providence . . . to extend the commerce of the United States of America, to that distant, and to us unexplored country.â9
The Empressâs successful return on May 11, 1785, with a cargo of teas, silks, cottons, and porcelain generated celebratory commentary.10 This praise was motivated in part by how closely Americans identified the expansion of trade with escape from the âshackles of British mercantilism.â11 The president of Congress, Richard Henry Lee, filled his letters that spring with news of the Empressâs arrival, gleefully describing it as âa proof of American enterprise,â that âwill probably mortify, as much as it will injure our old Oppressors, the British.â12 Editor and poet Philip Freneau later celebrated the voyage in verse as a demonstration of Americansâ liberation from the mercantilist confines of the British Empire.13 The congressional delegation from South Carolina expanded on this point in a report home, explaining that trade to the East Indies was noteworthy because it was âfree from an inconvenience to which European connexionsââtrade and politicsââexpose us, that is, an interference in our Governments.â14 Even those less sanguine were still excited at the possibilities: William Grayson grumbled to his fellow Virginian James Madison about the apparent âAsiatic hauteurâ shown by the Chinese, but he nonetheless declared that he âcould heartily wish to see the merchts. of our State engaged in this businessââespecially if they could find a way to smuggle Chinese goods into the West Indies.15 Congress, as a body, congratulated the mariners, expressing âpeculiar satisfactionâ in âthis first effort of the citizens of America to establish a direct trade with China.â16
The apparent success of the Empress led to imitatorsâa handful at first, then a steady stream of voyages each year.17 American merchantsâ approach to the business, dictated by their comparatively disadvantaged circumstances, differed markedly from their European competitorsâ. Instead of being managed by large joint-stock companies with deep pools of capital, American ventures to China were organized the same way shorter voyages were: as small one-off adventures by groups of local merchants, who minimized principal-agent problems by working with family members and by assigning shares in the venture to the shipâs master, and in some cases also to a supercargo, an agent who traveled aboard the ship to oversee the ventureâs transactions abroad. Though they were traveling much farther, American China traders sailed with the same small crews in the sub-three hundred ton sloops, brigs, and ships they used for transatlantic or Caribbean voyagesânot in the seasonal convoys of huge purpose-built âEast Indiamenâ their European rivals typically used.18
Some of these practices were the product of deliberation. When John Wingrove, a trader with experience in India, proposed creating official US trading posts (âfactoriesâ) in Asia, the Continental Congress quickly killed his suggestion. Speaking for a congressional committee, Rufus King explained that they âwere of Opinion that the commercial intercourse between the United States and India would be more prosperous if left unfettered in the hands of private adventurers, than if regulated by any system of a national complexion.â This stated preference was convenientâthe Continental Congress had no resources to support Wingroveâs planâbut consistent with later practice. When it came to overseas commerce, early American leaders opposed corporate monopolies.19
In the late eighteenth century, some of the necessities that shaped Americansâ China trade were also virtues. Using infrastructure, protocols, and contacts their rivals had developed, but operating with lower costs, American traders could take more risks and react more quickly to shifts in market prices as well as changes in winds. Their wandering routes exposed them to new opportunities for profitable freighting and arbitrage, growing the sphere of American commerce. In light of political decisions like the rejection of Wingroveâs plan, Americans understood their successes in the China trade as proof of their mercantile prowess as well as their republican ideals.
The importance of going to China for securing Americansâ place in the world was substantiated by reports coming back with the Empress itself. On his return to New York, Samuel Shaw, a respected Continental Army veteran who served as a supercargo on the voyage, ...
Table of contents
Cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Contents
introduction  Americaâs Business with China
chapter one  Founding a Free, Trading Republic
chapter two  The Paradox of a Pacific Policy
chapter three  Troubled Waters
chapter four  Sovereign Rights, or Americaâs First Opium Problem
chapter five  The Empireâs New Roads
chapter six  This Slave Trade of the Nineteenth Century
chapter seven  A Propped-Open Door
chapter eight  Death of a Trade, Birth of a Market