signale|TRANSFER: German Thought in Translation

"Moses the Egyptian" and Other Writings on Freud and Arendt

Hans Blumenberg, Ahlrich Meyer, Joe Paul Kroll

• Publisher: Cornell University Press and Cornell University Library
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781501714696
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Epistemology in Philosophy

In "Moses the Egyptian"—the centerpiece of Rigorism of Truth, the German philosopher Hans Blumenberg addresses two defining figures in the intellectual history of the twentieth century: Sigmund Freud and Hannah Arendt. Unpublished during his lifetime, this essay analyzes Freud's Moses and Monotheism (1939) and Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), and discovers in both a principled rigidity that turns into recklessness because it is blind to the politics of the unknown.

Offering striking insights into the importance of myth in politics and the extent to which truth can be tolerated in adversity, the essay also provides one of the few instances where Blumenberg reveals his thinking about Judaism and Zionism. Rigorism of Truth also includes commentaries by Ahlrich Meyer that give a fuller understanding of the philosopher's engagement with Freud, Arendt, and the Eichmann trial, as well as situating these reflections in the broader context of Blumenberg's life and thought.

I

MOSES THE EGYPTIAN1

Moses, the Egyptian of pharaonic blood,2 was invented by Sigmund Freud as a blow to his people, just as he had long before, in succession to the blows delivered by Copernicus and Darwin, delivered a blow to humanity with the unconscious.3 He was one of those people who trust that the truth can achieve anything, even freedom, and thus from their love of truth4 feel entitled to expect everything of themselves and of others. The year 1939 did not seem to him to be the absolutely wrong moment5 to take from the beaten and humiliated [Jews] the man who, in the beginning, had founded their trust in history.6 Freud had a low opinion of that history’s documents;7 to him, they were screen memories8 devised to cover up the murderous outcome of a great deed, concealing the murder of Moses9 in the desert and with it the failure of the most tremendous sublimation: the rising of the people from the mist of their libidinous state in Egypt to the lawfulness and purity of their forty-year education in the desert.10 To Stefan Zweig,11 Freud seems to have expressed qualms about depriving the Jews, in their most dreadful hour, when everything was being taken from them, of their best man. But what was that set against his making “a worthy exit,” as he wrote to Hanns Sachs?12 Ten years previously, he would have recognized in this trait the vir impavidus13 as Horace14 had exalted him, the stoic in the face of the end of the world, whom Freud had diagnosed as a case of narcissism.15

It was not even about the truth, as Freud himself knew very well. One would refuse to believe this if he had not himself shown so little confidence in his own discovery that he considered giving Moses and Monotheism the subtitle “a historical novel.”16 Perhaps “demi-novel” would have been the more apt term to convey how little it took to arouse mistrust in the founder of a national history, the heroic liberator, an alien representing the alien God—to use Marcion’s phrase17—whom he alone claimed to have seen and heard.

Freud had the Egyptian prince Moses despise the people he wrested from slavery. He first read this contempt for “the mob,” which could muster no faith in God’s imagelessness, in the face of Michelangelo’s Moses in Rome.18 Egypt and the humiliations suffered at the pyramids were merely the consequence of the despicability of the patriarchal stories going all the way back to Joseph. Only a stranger could push all that aside, with a different God and a new law in sight, as though the covenants of that base prehistory had never existed, a prehistory that Moses may not have so much as heard recounted, having only ever dealt with this proletariat through an intermediary.19 For all that is problematic about his discovery, there is one thing that Freud is quite correct in recognizing: only a stranger could exercise this measure of violence, this terrible weaning from gods and idols, from the comfortable anticipation of the next day, in order to compel renunciation in favor of the unknown. All of it came and could only come from the desert, from the overcoming of the temptation to keep the gods close at hand and as guarantors of the fleshpots.

But how could Moses do this for the benefit of those he despised? Here, Freud appears to have seen too little of what is political about his version of this story’s beginning. It has always been the case that those who sought to win power for themselves and their idea have drawn on the potential of the despised, whom they could not love, but whom they promised themselves and others to love as soon as the despised became what they not yet were: worthy of power and beneficence. That is why an ideology of liberation must contain both: contempt for the present20 as a result of the past and affection for the future as the result of the present. It is because Moses, the stranger, makes use of his adopted people only as the organ of his vision of things to come that he can chastise them so ruthlessly toward this end. The people must not remain what they are if he should be able not to despise them.

As soon as the liberated people became aware of being only the medium of an abstract revolt, they would murder him. They must do so as much as they must presently forget having done so, in order not to have to feel shame for the history thus gained. This would entail complicated rituals of guilt relief, and no historian would ever be able to decide whether it was worth the expense.

Nothing is less certain than that the truth wishes to be loved, can be loved, should be loved. Freud’s “exposure” of the origins of Moses is also an “exposure” concerning himself and his relationship with the truth.21 What he did in publishing Moses and Monotheism—which he would not have shown anyone in Vienna, so as not to endanger the existence of psychoanalysis22—so unhesitatingly in London,23 although the self-confidence of his people was at stake, was to offer this people an analysis: not because the truth would set them free, but because Freud the scientist, who had always identified his patients with his own theoretical curiosity, had no qualms about transferring onto them that they must love and serve the truth.

In this situation, at the apex of Hitler’s power and of the wretchedness of those he persecuted, there was no other motive to justify this publication but the absolutism of truth.24 Freud did not believe that something like analysis could help the victims. Worse still, he did not even believe in the mechanism of repetition,25 in which a stranger, one possessed by the frenzy of blood,26 would once more renew the sublimating chastisements of the desert and yet, in the wildest autism, serve only the historical interest of the chastised. None of these possibilities of his theory would justify Freud. He thought only of the “worthy exit” that he was preparing for himself.

Nonetheless, the Egyptian Moses, who drove the descendants of Jacob into the desert and whom they put to death, was also an incomparable model of that which was to follow only after Freud’s last word.27 That stranger had believed and desired to submit the people to his metaphysical idea of power; but in the long view of history, he had become the instrument of the people. Even the memories devised to cover up the murder of the cultural hero became the source of a ritualized self-punishment, whose forms and obligations, whose curtailments of life [Lebensreduktionen], were to anticipate the singular organization of the art of survival28 that bestowed upon the Jews the ability to withstand all future deserts and captivities. The felix culpa29 of Augustine in its worldliest form. The story’s method30 was embedded too deeply in memory for the story never to be able to assimilate even the most foreign object or person to itself.

Freud’s great and last blow to humanity as embodied by its most afflicted turned out not to cause as much offense as he had expected31 or of which he might have been ashamed. But it became an unexpected preliminary to something else, an aid to understanding the incredible. It turned out to be so only when, three decades later, another book caused offense, being unbearable to a new degree: Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem. The book, which emerged from a series of reports in the New Yorker,32 first appeared in 1963, in German in 1964. It is subtitled A Report on the Banality of Evil. This phrase creates a line of continuity with Hannah Arendt’s earlier work on the mechanism of the totalitarian state.33 The dictatorship chose not the great demons and malefactors but the little family men34 as accessories to its evil deeds, as functionaries of a malice of which they would never have been capable in the private and professional spheres of their bourgeois existence. As individuals, they had nothing of that which distinguished the successful actions they performed in massed anonymity: the dimension of the inconceivable. The many little men brought about the one big thing. Adolf Eichmann was something like the protagonist of such banality.

Hannah Arendt’s rigorism35 is very much like that of Sigmund Freud. She believes in the truth—that it is her truth, she can neither change nor prevent. Nobody has access to this relationship with what is truth to him, and nobody can be expected to have it. Hannah Arendt takes fearless analysis to be the therapy that she thinks she owes her comrades in affliction,36 who have by now become the people of a state, although nothing is more alien to her than the dash of Freudianism that has now become customary. Even [the notion] that “resistance” should indicate the truth only symptomatically, indeed should be the first to release its salutary property, is something her project seems almost to assume. The outcry of indignation now strikes an impavida, the wreckage of the orbis fractus comes crashing upon her: another case of the kind that Freud, in 1930, used Horace’s ode to diagnose as [one of] narcissism.37 Which, after all, had meant even then: There is no love of truth. Maybe because there can be none.

In my turn prepared to court indignation, I am aghast at the deep-rooted similarities between Moses and Monotheism and Eichmann in Jerusalem. Similarities that can be discerned even in the equivalence of their effects. As Freud took Moses the man from his people, so Hannah Arendt took Adolf Eichmann from the State of Israel.

Some states are founded by their enemies.38 Nobody else could have managed to circumvent the improbability of their existence. They exist, although or because everything that might otherwise have favored their establishment was too weak, too benign, too ideal, too literary, to prevail against a world of opposition. But then there they are, because nobody realistically wanted them except those who had nearly destroyed the conditions of their possibility. A state’s founder can be the negative national hero. He must be killed, like Moses,39 although he created the conditions of possibility of this nationhood.

Eichmann did not even do so against his own will. He studied his victims carefully and connected their utopia of nationhood with the idée fixe of self-purification.40 In Zionism, he found what he had sought to create by force.41 What is astonishing is that it is Zionism that Hannah Arendt could not forgive.42 Why was this so? The organization of an idea corrupts what it strives to make real. It is preordained thus in the concept of the Idea ever since Plato devised it. What is more important still is that this pattern is now applied to the self-organization of the persecuted,43 in which Hannah Arendt sees something like the suffocation of morality, the prevention of resistance, and thus once again a collaboration with the persecutors. Without the involvement of the Councils and Elders,44 without the persecutors making arrangements with the institutional mode of existence, the entirety of extermination for which Eichmann was in the dock would not have functioned.

Does Hannah Arendt really believe this? It is the charge she brings against those who thought that something could be salvaged or who merely pretended to have come to a realistic appraisal of the situation. But it was a reality of the incredible, with which nobody can be expected to reckon.45 What Hannah Arendt demands is to have thought the incredible, the possibility of resistance to a machine with which the world had for years failed to deal, and which for this undertaking mustered more ingenuity and imagination, accepting any detriment to already strained front lines, in order to bring at least this one project to completion,46 if none of the others. The whole thing would not have taken place so discreetly if it had not worked so smoothly? Perhaps, but it would have worked. Hannah Arendt did not know all that the Nazis could do as long as it was accorded sufficient “priority.”

Nonetheless, it is true that the self-organization of the persecuted deprived the individual of his chance to wager everything, to cry out loud just once. Ev...

Table of contents

• I. Moses the Egyptian
• II. Excerpts and Preliminary Studies
• III. Thematically Related Texts from the Nachlass
• Editor’s Afterword
• Editorial Note and Acknowledgments
• Translator’s Note
• Illustration Credits
• About the Authors