PART I
THE PHILOSOPHERSâ ENLIGHTENMENT
Thinking the Centaur
1
HISTORIANS AND PHILOSOPHERS
The Peculiarity of the Enlightenment as Historical Category
WHAT DO WE KNOW about the Enlightenment? Quite a lot, it would seem. The number of studies on this subject from every part of the world is extensive and growing constantly.1 In the twentieth century a lot of effort was devoted to the analysis of an âEnlightenment question,â which proved pivotal in the study of the rise of modern European civilization. On the plus side, this produced new insights, highlighted several sensitive points, brought to the fore neglected or even hitherto unknown personages and facts. But there was a downside. These studies often failed to break free of past schemes and modes of analysis, which were informed by ideological prejudice or by so blatant an apologetic intent that they were capable only of rehearsing well-known themes. Cultural and political battles of an exceptionally intense and passionate character have been fought over the last few centuries for and against the Enlightenment. Our new-born century therefore has the difficult task of rethinking the Enlightenment: this involves investigating its meaning and the many historical forms that it has taken in Western civilization, summing up and reviewing current knowledge, and separating the old from the new, all the while keeping to a minimum the prejudices and spurious influences that constantly tend to contaminate our search for truth and frustrate efforts at gaining a scientific understanding of the past.
One way of achieving these goals might be to investigate both the profound differences and the important points of contact and reciprocal influences between the views of the Enlightenment held by philosophers and those held by historians. This could in fact prove the precious red thread that will help solve many a problem and aid a new generation of historiographers in bringing about the renewal of their discipline that is nothing less than their duty. The starting point has to be an awareness of the double nature of this eighteenth-century epistemological paradigm, caught between history and philosophy, which in turn leads to a discussion of its unique historiographical character.
The Enlightenment, a kind of conceptual Centaur,2 is unlike any other traditional historical category, different, for example, from humanism, the Renaissance, the Baroque, and Romanticism, which are defined by their philosophical origin to a much lesser extent.3 The Enlightenment expressly defines itself on a critical and philosophical level. It was, in fact, the first cultural phenomenon expressly recognized by its contemporaries through the name that it gave itself. At the same time, by this very act of self-identification, the Enlightenment also revolutionized contemporary notions of universal history and of historical time, effectively giving rise to the modern Western consciousness of time and launching a debate that still engages us today because it coincides to a large extent with the ongoing investigation into what constitutes modernity.4 Given the complexity of the issues at stake, let us take one thing at a time.
To call Hegel the âfather of the Enlightenmentâ may seem surprising and even paradoxical, but it appears less so if we consider the history of philosophical thought and the dominant influence of Hegelâs interpretation on the way in which many European thinkers see the Enlightenment, i.e., within a dialectical system, as thinking reality, a simultaneously logical and historical category of the phenomenology of spirit. And yet, setting aside the specific case of Hegel and his importance for historical research, to which we shall return later, it was undoubtedly philosophers who first taught historians to think of the Enlightenment as a specific concept and category within the study of the rise of modernity. Thus a gauntlet was thrown down. It was claimed that no effective discussion of the historical dimension of this subject could proceed without both a clear, precise, and theoretically well-founded idea of the nature of the Enlightenment, and an awareness as well of the fact that historical events are not possible and therefore not thinkable without linguistic acts.5
In fact, this peculiarity of the Enlightenment as a category in the history of Western culture becomes especially obvious when we consider the way in which eighteenth-century thinkers like Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume, Gibbon, and many others redefined universal history and the very idea of historical knowledge through the introduction of the radically new concept of a secularized âhistorical time.â That concept was based on the distinctionâcultural and, even more, anthropologicalâbetween past and future, experience and expectation.
No one really subscribes any longer to the nineteenth-century condemnation of Enlightenment historiography as âanti-historical,â a view born mostly out of political and ideological motives. Nowadays it would be difficult to refute Reinhart Koselleckâs assertion, in the wake of Wilhelm Diltheyâs famous rehabilitation of the Enlightenment,6 that â[o]ur modern concept of history is the outcome of Enlightenment reflection on the growing complexity of âhistory in generalâ,â i.e., of history finally considered per se, history in the collective singular, an autonomous entity not linked to any object or subordinate to any subject.7
In the course of the eighteenth century a long and complicated process that had begun in the middle of the sixteenth century finally came to a head. It saw the emergence in peopleâs consciousness of the idea that they were living in new times, times that were completely different from any previous epoch: a âmodernâ era, characterized both by its otherness from the past, which was now being critically reviewed, and by its ability to see the present as new in so far as it contained the seeds of the future. Many started to talk about modern history as a time when nothing was stable any more: the very term âmodernâ derived from modus, by which was meant concrete realityâs constant state of flux, the accelerated transition of every thing.8 Accordingly, in his Essai sur les moeurs, Voltaire wrote of a âhistoire ancienneâ that preceded the âhistoire moderne,â as well as of âtemps modernesâ and the âprogrĂšs de lâesprit humain,â thus confirming the importance of certain formulae that had by then become current in historical discourse. In 1765 Voltaire also invented the phrase âphilosophie de lâhistoire,â through which he interpreted historical events once and for all in a way that diverged radically from Christian tradition, i.e., from the tradition first developed by Augustine that was still being applied in its fundamentally religious sense by Bossuet in his 1681 Discours sur lâhistoire universelle.9 In other words, at the end of the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment opposed a brand new philosophy of history to a centuries-old theology of history, thus ringing the death knell for that reading of the future as a providential plan validated by prophecy that was one of the central tenets of Christian thought and one of the bases of the Churchâs cultural system.
This process had begun in the previous century, when the politics and logic of power of the absolutist state had first undermined the power of the Church over peopleâs consciences and appropriated the right to make predictions about the future based on reason rather than faith, thus substituting prophecy with prognosis. In the wake of that shift, the vast historical scenarios built by the Enlightenment completed the secularization of that theologically based eschatological time that had been expounded with great subtlety by Augustine in his City of God, replacing it now with a time created by man and nations planning their earthly future. Time then became something more than mere chronological form encompassing all histories in their cyclical course: it turned into a dynamic force in its own right, acquiring a historical quality of its own. History was no longer inside time but through time.10
All this of course constituted a great epistemological revolution. Gone was the ânaive realismâ of the Ciceronian historia magistra vitae, of history as chronicle and a static collection of exempla, as a never-changing catalogue and speculum vitae humanae validated only through witness accounts. In came pro-spective models, the discovery of the point of view as a necessary cognitive element that plays an entirely legitimate and even decisive part in our modern concept of historical knowledge. The works of the Enlightenment were, in contrast, informed by specific ideological and philosophical stances, among them the idea of a stage-by-stage development of civilizations that enabled thinking about mankindâs progress as a whole. Thanks to these works historians discovered that in order to capture history per se the epistemological process could not rely solely on source criticism, which, though it remained a fundamental element, âwould no longer be so central as it was to antiquarian forms of erudition. Instead, historians needed to recognize philosophyâs heuristic role and to accept the idea of history as constantly liable to rewriting, a filia temporis to be pursued both with critical and philological instruments and by formulating âpoints of viewâ and historical judgments that themselves would be subject to the influence of the times.11
The ultimate import of this revolution in Western thought was admirably synthesized by Goethe: âThere remains no doubt these days that world history has from time to time to be rewritten.â The same conviction was expressed by Hegel: âHistoryâs spiritual principle is the sum total of all possible perspectives.â12 It is within this intellectual context that our modern concept of the Enlightenment began to develop. This unique Centaur, with its double nature, both historical and philosophical, would soon become fundamental in the study of a modernity that had newly entered Western history and must now create its own self-consciousness and its own norm.13
2
KANT: WAS IST AUFKLĂRUNG?
The Emancipation of Man through Man
IN 1784, KANT published a short essay putting forward an âIdea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of Viewâ in the journal Berlinische Monatsschrift. The article offered a good synthesis of the search for meaning or purpose in the historical process as carried out by Kantâs contemporaries, and above all of the growing importance in that regard of a new cultural phenomenon that German scholars were beginning to call the AufklĂ€rung.
In the essay Kant distinguished clearly between the traditional âwork of practicing empirical historians,â which consisted in a mere narrative of events (Historie), and the effort to draft instead an â[i]dea of world history, which is to some extent based upon an a priori principleâ and is philosophical in kind (Geschichte).1 The principle in question was embodied in a cosmopolitan perspective of the fundamental unity of mankind, which, despite all the vicissitudes it underwent, nonetheless showed a constant propensity towards âprogress.â Proof of this was to be sought within a view of universal history that wove together nature and morality, being and having to be, biological determinism, and the liberty of man. That evidence was provided both by the laws of nature as delineated by Bonnet, Haller, and Blumenbach in their research on the epigenesis and preformation of species, and by the real meaning behind the way in which the French Revolution had burst onto the European scene. Despite the Jacobean Terror and the many âatrocitiesâ it engendered, that radical event remained for Kant an obvious historical sign of mankindâs moral disposition to feel a positive kind of enthusiasm and to participate in the collective construction of a moral ideal tending towards progress and the good, and towards the defense of liberty and the rights of the individual: âFor such a phenomenon in human history is not to be forgotten, because it has revealed a tendency and faculty in human nature for improvement.â2
From his first essay on the idea of universal history from a cosmopolitan perspective onwards, Kant often mentioned the âenlightenment,â attributing to it the function of the engine and fundamental condition for progress, without however giving a more precise definition of its contents. He simply highlighted the importance of the action exercised on mankind by this process of âcontinued enlightenment.â That process determined the kind of moral behavior that was at the basis of a âuniversal civic society which administers law among men,â a society that therefore puts in place constitutions and treaties capable of ensuring liberty, peace, security, and rights within and outside individual states. Although man in himself (being made of âcrooked woodâ) at the individual level all too often remained enslaved to his own tendency to evil, the observation of nature showed instead that, as a species, mankind was capable of achieving the purpose of a âuniversal cosmopolitan conditionâ that could guarantee the rights of every human being on earth, without distinctions or favoritism.3 And that was due precisely to the action of the Enlightenment. As Kant explained, nature âneeds a perhaps unreckonable series of generations, each of which passes its own enlightenment to its successor in order finally to bring the seeds of enlightenment to that degree of development in our race which is completely suitable to natureâs purpose.â4 Those seeds were indestructible. Universal history bore witness to the fact that, despite setbacks, wars, and all kinds of horrors, there remained a certain âplus,â âa germ of enlightenment [âŠ] left to be further developed by this overthrowâ through which âa higher level was thus prepared.â5
A few months later, in the same Berlin journal, Kant returned to this subject, which was by now at the center of an intense dispute, with another article, entitled âBeantwortung der Frage: Was ist AufklĂ€rung?â (An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment) Here he described the Enlightenment as a precise modality of the exercise of reason, which was animated by a strong âspirit of freedomâ and intimately connected with mankindâs natural need for knowledge: a cultural practice, to use a modern phrase, able to guarantee âthe progress of mankind toward improvementâ through the âfreedom to make public use of oneâs reason at every point.â However, this attitude led to consequent actions, with grave and subversive consequences with respect to the Ancien RĂ©gime. Those consequences were not ignored by Kant, who however certainly did not stress them, for fear of causing too much alarm. They consisted, for instance, in the need to break with the primacy of tradition as moral guidance, to critique the very foundations of current existence, to fearlessly challenge the centuries-old domination of auctoritates of every kind and in every field, in order to assert manâs right to the pursuit of happiness.
In Kantâs concise depiction, the Enlightenment was nothing other than a great act of courage, a passionate invitation never to be afraid of emancipation. It represented
⊠manâs release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is manâs inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! âHave courage to use your own reason!ââthat is the motto of enlightenment.6
Seen in this way, as both the right and duty of manâs emancipation through man, the exercise and cultural practice of the Enlightenment could not be denied at any time or in any place in universal history. To deny was âto injure and trample on the rights of mankind,â to hamper âthe progress of mankind toward improvement.â As Kant pointed out, âAn age cannot bind itself and ordain to put the succeeding one into such a condition that it cannot extend its [âŠ] knowledge.â To that effect, he clearly explained what limitations were acceptable in the exercise of liberty. âThe public use of oneâs reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men.â Private use, in the sense of the use of reason at work or in a public office, was a different matter. Obedience could leg...