Chapter 1
The Depletion of Non-Renewable Abiotic
Resources
1.1 Introduction
This first introductory chapter describes past and future consumption trends of raw-materials and discusses the linkages between minerals, energy and the environment. It then analyses the IEA scenarios concerning future energy demand and the subsequent implications on raw-material use.
Furthermore, a set of examples are used to demonstrate how growth in demand for those minerals said to be at the centre of sustainable technology development may actually put at risk the very establishment of the Green Economy.
The chapter then goes on to provide a brief description of selected studies on the criticality of raw materials, where the most significant ones for the EU and US are identified.
Finally, a discussion on the implication of resource depletion is undertaken. It clearly shows the need to urgently account for the mineral wealth on Earth and the speed of its exhaustion.
1.2 The demand for minerals
Minerals, energy and environment are strongly dependent on each other and will be even more so in the future. According to the International Energy Agency(IEA)1, between 8 and 10% of all global energy consumption, not counting transportation or other activities such as manufacture or recycling, is dedicated to the extraction and processing of those materials that society demands. There are no materials without energy but equally no energy without materials. Given that demand for energy has risen since the beginning of the 20th century it is not surprising that the use of fossil fuels has grown exponentially as has the need for minerals (see Fig. 1.1 and Fig. 1.2).
Fossil fuels maintain the present state of civilisation: they heat and cool buildings and provide mobility and electricity, permitting interconnections and social networking. They also move industry and build the infrastructures that mankind relies on i.e. roads, the electrical grid, schools and hospitals and even the equipment inside such institutions or on the roads: the cars, electronics and a whole host of other devices.
Non-fuel minerals are equally essential to society with the average new born American, according to the Institute for Mineral Information2, consuming in their life time (77.9 years): 12,614 kg of iron ore, 2297 kg of aluminum (bauxite), 424 kg of copper, 389 kg of lead, 212 kg of zinc, 45.4 g of gold, 17,526 kg of cement, 14,876 kg of salts, 7,667.5 kg of phosphate rock, 5,795 kg of clays, 494.4 million tonnes of stone, sand, and gravel, 18,374 kg of other minerals and metals, 230 tonnes of coal, 240.1 toe of petroleum and 163.3 toe of natural gas3.
Fig. 1.1 Production of the main non-fuel mineral commodities on Earth in the 20th century
The Earth has become a huge mine. The 2010 global demand for minerals was 45,000 million tonnes. Those most highly consumed are the fossil fuels, construction materials such as lime, gypsum, gravel and sand and the salts such as sodium chloride, potassium chloride and phosphates. As for metals, consumption rates were led by iron, aluminium, copper, manganese, zinc, chromium, lead, titanium, and nickel (Wellmer and Steinbach, 2011), contributing to billions of tonnes of waste rock4. In addition, based on figures from the late 1990s, mining was responsible for 13% of the global sulphur dioxide emissions whilst an estimated 40% of the land used by mankind was threatened by the sectorâs activities. Halada et al. (2008) made a forecast based on a linear decoupling model relating to the per capita metal consumption versus GDP per capita for BRICs5 and the G66. According to this forecast, by 2050, collective metal consumption will surpass current levels some fivefold whilst the demand of very important ones (Au, Ag, Cu,Ni, Sn, Zn, Pb and Sb) will be greater than their current reserves. This is despite the fact that the mining sector contributes at 0.5%, only a tiny fraction of direct employment and represents only 0.9% of the âgross world productâ (Sampat, 2003). The true costs: the depletion of non-renewable resources and the degradation of ecosystems are much larger and continue to climb.
Fig. 1.2 Production of the worldâs conventional fuels throughout the 20th century. Values are expressed in exergy units
Nature is no longer found in abundance. If it were, perhaps the contribution of mining would not be so devastating. The intense technological development of the 20th century is however forcing society, ever increasingly aware of the detrimental effects, to react. One of its responses is the development of corrective abatement measures such as the Kyoto Protocol (1997). This protocol is a tool designed to slow climate change and the associated impacts on the environment. Another reply is the stimulation of the global conscience and consciousness formed around the idea that there is a loss of wealth that will not and can never be replaced. In other words, there is quite simply a growing realisation: there is a limit to growth.
In fact, itâs been âjustâ forty years since the Club of Romeâs publication of the book Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972). The book predicted that population growth, coupled with the exponential use of fossil fuels and minerals would drive the world to the verge of collapse in only a few generations. This projection became increasingly real and bothersome with the subsequent oil crises of the seventies and eighties, only to be forgotten during the âbubble boomâ of the late nineties and early 2000s. At this point world growth was fuelled by a consumption founded on the idea that:
(1) The planet can absorb all the environmental impacts caused by societal development.
(2) Mineral and energy resources are sufficient to maintain indefinite growth.
(3) Innovation and human ingenuity through technological development will outrun any existing and/or future problems.
With hindsight, one becomes increasingly aware that the lack of precise data and hence inexact and early predictions about future shortages does not weaken the Club of Romeâs message. Environmental problems on a global scale have worsened and the ecological footprint of developed world citizens on Earth is beyond which the planet can support. Yet, somewhat paradoxically, since the 1980s significant declines in almost all commodity prices have occurred. This is arguably a consequence of increased economic activity, rather than geological availability, with new market entries from developing world producers, having stimulated new discoveries that have compensated the growth in demand (Machado and Suslick, 2002). However, a strong BRIC-led market cannot be sustained indefinitely as long as ore grades in existing mines continue to decline and new geopolitical problems surface.
Of course it is important that each mineral is treated on a case by case basis with some subject to physical scarcity, some to political interests (as is the case of platinum group metals-PGM), some to technological limitations (e.g. rhodium), some to supply shortages (such as with the rare earths) some to economic reasons (e.g. copper), some to environmental issues (e.g. lead, cadmium or mercury) and others to an irreversible decline due to the impossibility of either substitution or recyclability (e.g. phosphorous).
In short, questions (and answers) surrounding sustainability of mineral resources, including geopolitical, environmental and economic issues are key to the wellbeing of future generations.
1.3 Energy and environment
Accelerated environmental change and industrial growth means that Man is increasingly exposed to melting at the poles, an increased liberation of copious amounts of GHGs and significant rises in sea levels7. Likewise the planet is experiencing increasingly frequent extreme weather events including heat waves, droughts and flooding. Temperature variability is also expected to result in a huge loss of forest cover, mass species extinctions and expanded disease mobility, as vectors once found only in tropical areas migrate towards the poles. It is even possible that global warming will change the dynamic of the Atlantic Gulf Stream and subsequently the global ocean circulation generally (Warren, 2011).
It is difficult to predict effects on individual countries or regions should this occur, but this is, incidentally, the rationale behind the International Environmental Agency (IEA) 450 Scenario, one of the three presented in its World Energy Outlook 2010 (IEA, 2011b)8. The 450 Scenario analyses the prerequisites needed to limit the global average temperature increase to 2°C (equivalent to 450 ppm atmospheric CO2 concentration, hence the name). Yet whilst a rise of an âonlyâ 2°C above average pre-industrial level temperatures, as a consequence of âunavoidableâ fossil fuel consumption, may be considered âreasonableâ internationally, allowing it to occur may still cause millions of people to suffer from hunger, malaria and somewhat paradoxically both flooding and water shortages.
According to the scenario, the emission target set for 2035 will have already been reached by 2017 and therefore if no action is taken to substantially cut emissions, the increase in the global average temperature will rise beyond 3.5°C. As such, the entire energy sector would need to become zero-carbon post 2017, a highly inconceivable likelihood. And, as the IEA recapitulates: âDelaying action is a false economy: for every $1 of investment avoided in the power sector before 2020 an additional $4.3 would need to be spent after 2020 to compensate for the increased emissionsâ.
The other two scenarios are the Current Policies Scenario and the central one, the New Policies Scenario, built on those measures governments have already taken.
According to the New Policy Scenario the global population is expected to reach close to 8.7 billion by 2035. India and Africa particularly are expected to experience a steep growth both in GDP and energy demand. In short, IEA (2011b) states that âNon-OECD countries account for 90% of population growth, 70% of the increase in economic output and 90% of energy demand growth over the period from 2010 to 2035â. On the contrary, demand originating from OECD countries is expected to essentially remain flat as a consequence of improvements in energy efficiency. By 2035, China on the back of growing prosperity, is expected to become the largest energy consumer, using 70% more energy than the United States, although their per-capita energy consumption will be half that of the U.S.
Concerning oil and natural gas supply, the IEA accepts that the era of cheap oil is finished. It states that there will be a plateau of 68 million barrels per day of conventional oil supply until 2035 upon which it is expected to decline9. Thus, under the New Policies Scenario, the demand will need to be covered by a considerable addition of 47 mb/day which effectively doubles the current production of all the Middle East OPEC countries. Middle East production is expected to come from natural gas liquids (18 mb/day in 2035) and unconventional sources (10 mb/day). Biofuels could cover as much as 4mb/day and the rest of the supply will need to come from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan and Canada.
Conventional oil will remain the largest supplier of global transportation. Alternative fuels, like biofuels, LNG and electricity for hybrid and electric cars, will account only for a 10% share. This will make transport highly sensitive to substantial increases in oil prices. The demand for private vehicles will increase by 100%, leading to further energy consumption despite improvements in energy efficiency. Global energy demand for transportation, including commercial, may thus increase by 40% on the 2010 baseline figure.
Furthermore according to the ExxonMobil forecast (ExxonMobil, 2012), which largely coincides with that of the IEA World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2011b), the majority of the increases in industrial energy demand will come from the manufacturing and chemical sectors. Demand for steel, iron and cement, for instance, will double. Non-OECD countries are expected to lead the global industrial demand for energy, a figure that is forecasted to rise by about 30% by 2040. Increased efficiency meanwhile is expected to flatten the industrial energy demand without effecting productivity.
Electricity generation is to remain the fastest growing energy sector. Presently, coal is the greatest contributor. Efficiency within the coal sector, due to thermoelectric generation, will improve thanks to new supercritical and integrated gasification combined cycles incorporating carbon capture and storage technologies. Natural gas, either from conventional wells or from shale gas using hydraulic fracture, is likely to be used more than coal to generate electricity in the future. It is expected however that apart from the switch to gas, generators will gradually move to low carbon sources such as renewables and nuclear energy.
Nuclear as a consequence of the Fukushima accident in 2011, is to have an uncertain share. A smaller contribution (considered under the IEA Low Nuclear Case, where it accounts for closures and slowdowns) will open up further possibilities for combinations of renewables and fossil fuels. Currently such a scenario weakens security of supply whilst simultaneously intensifying costs and boosting emissions. Failure to engage in nuclear electricity, despite its safety (a...