Christian and Hindu Ethics

Shivesh Chandra Thakur

• Verlag: Routledge
• Jahr: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429631764
• Auflage: 1
• Thema: Theology & Religion
• Thema: Religion

Hinduism and Christianity are different in structure and approach – but have a great deal in common in matters relating to ethics. This book, first published in 1969, is the first systematic and detailed work which attempts to bring out both the differences and similarities. The author selects some of the fundamental problems of philosophical ethics, such as the moral law – its authority and sources, moral effort and human freedom, moral failure and responsibility – and explores the respective answers of Hinduism and Christianity.

Chapter II
Nature of Christian and Hindu Ethics

As a necessary prelude to our comparative study of Christian and Hindu ethics, it will be worthwhile to stress one very significant fact—the catholicity and heterogeneity of these two systems of ethics. Of Hindu ethics this observation will perhaps be readily accepted even by orthodox Hindus. But when asserted of Christian ethics it may initially appear to be of questionable validity, for Christian ethics is commonly assumed to be a homogeneous system, often described simply as ‘the ethic of love’, for instance. Such simple descriptions of Hinduism or Hindu ethics are rare. J. N. Sarkar states that Hinduism is ‘that all-embracing but undefinable system of toleration or synthesis which shelters within its capacious bosom every form of belief and practice that will agree with its few general conventions’.¹ With reference to Christianity, however, if we remember the emphasis on one in our extract from the Nicene Creed, it may appear that a system of ethics based on this unity of belief can never admit of any diversity. ‘Every form of belief and practice’ certainly cannot be predicated of Christianity.

But whatever the appearances, the truth is that Hindu ethics is not all chaos and Christian ethics not entirely a picture of simplicity. The various forms of belief and practice within Hinduism have much more in common than its ‘few general conventions’; and ‘church history is littered with various interpretations of that holiness’ which emerges from the life and teaching of the One Lord Jesus Christ’.² Sir Charles Eliot appears to understand better the true spirit behind the outward diversity of Hindu faith and morals as well as the so-called unity claimed on behalf of Christianity. Speaking of the variety in the beliefs and practices of Hindus, he writes, ‘… nothing is more surprising than the variety of its phases except the underlying unity’.¹ He continues:

‘This power of varying in sympathetic response to the needs of many minds and growing in harmony with the outlook of successive ages, is a contrast to the pretended quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus of the Western Churches, for in view of their differences and mutual hostility it can only be called a pretence.’²

This is not intended to be either a reflection on the differences within the Christian church or a denial of the unifying power of the person of Jesus Christ, but simply a vindication of the truth that, for very understandable reasons, Christian faith and morals, like their counterparts in Hinduism, display an amazing variety and ‘catholic comprehensiveness’.³ The true character of Christian ethics would perhaps be suggested better if we were to say of Christianity what St Paul said of himself, that it was ‘made all things to all men, that [it] might by all means save some’.⁴

To substantiate what we have been arguing so far it will be necessary to trace the background, composition and development first of Christian and then of Hindu ethics. We shall analyse some of the various elements in and influences on the ethical thinking of Christians and Hindus through the ages with a view to finding out what resemblance (or otherwise) there is between the general characters of the two ethics. Because of limitations of space this analysis obviously cannot be exhaustive and we shall have to be content with stressing what we consider to be the most significant features.

Sources and Development of Christian Ethics

In the words of Bishop Henson,

‘Christian morality as we know it today is the result of a long process of development, in the course of which many contributions of varying origin, potency and ethical quality have been assimilated.’¹

This position is fundamentally sound; but it ought to be added that the ‘assimilation’ has in some cases been far from complete. It has to be remembered that even such potent and powerful forces as Christian or Hindu ethics cannot really assimilate everything. In response to the demands of changing times they have often had to make room for ideas and ideals which did not always agree with the basic postulates of the systems. And to allow some belief or practice to co-exist is hardly what is meant by ‘assimilation’. But we shall have occasion to come to this point later. For the time being let us proceed with our analysis of the various factors in the development of Christian ethics.

To quote a passage from Henson again,

‘The range and character of original Christian morality were mainly determined by three factors—the tradition of Judaism, the teaching of Jesus, and the influence of Graeco-Roman society. From the first, Christianity received the conception of a moral law expressing the will of a Righteous God, and, in its essential contents, declared in the Decalogue. From the second, Christianity derived freedom from national limitations, a new and larger understanding of moral obligation, and, above all, a supreme embodiment of personal morality in its Founder. From the third, Christianity, by an inevitable reaction from its social environment, learned to emphasize the necessity of ascetic discipline, to assert the final authority of the private conscience, and to magnify the function and claim of the Christian fellowship.’²

Quoting this rather long passage from Henson need not oblige us to follow all the details in his analysis nor to agree with everything he has to say. But it may be desirable to adopt in our own analysis the general pattern suggested by him.

(a) The Judaic inheritance

Of all the sources which have shaped the nature of Christian ethics, the profoundest and most important has come from the parent system of Judaism. Jesus, the founder of Christianity, was himself a Jew and strove all his life to practise essential Jewish morality at its best, albeit in the light of his own insight into the system. ‘I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill’¹ is a clear statement of the indebtedness of Jesus to the Jewish faith and its morals. He regarded himself merely as a reformer and restorer of the true perspective. It is obvious, therefore, that original Christian ethics must above all be considered a continuation of the finer side of Jewish ethics, a superstructure raised on the foundation supplied by the latter. Now, of what exactly did this foundation consist?

In the very first place, it must be recorded that Judaism had already come to accept a monotheistic faith and unquestioning belief in one supreme God who was not only kind and merciful but also ‘terrible’.

‘For the Lord your God is God of gods and Lord of lords, a great God, a mighty, and a terrible, which regardeth not persons, nor taketh reward.’²

Such was the Jewish conception of God. And naturally it evoked and inspired an ethical attitude essentially oriented toward love of God—love in gratitude for all ‘these great and terrible things’³ that God had done for the people of Israel. For ‘Only the Lord had a delight in thy fathers to love them, and he chose their seed after them, even you above all people, as it is this day’.⁴ And if this great and terrible God had bestowed this distinction of choice on the people of Israel, how could they turn ungrateful and not do what God required of them? Hence the Old Testament is unequivocal in declaring what these people were to do:

‘And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in all his ways, and to love him, and to serve the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul,

To keep the commandments of the Lord, and his statutes, which I command thee this day for thy good?’¹

From the foregoing account of the then Jewish morality it would appear that it was an essentially simple and unsophisticated system. There was a single all-powerful and mighty God who was benevolent but at the same time terrible. This God had somehow come to take a fancy to the people of Israel and had done tremendous things for their salvation. Nothing could be more natural than to expect the people of Israel to obey the laws and commandments of this God as revealed to them through their Scriptures. God had promised salvation for the Jews, and the least that the Jews could do for their God would be to be grateful to Him for all this. God had wrought miracles for these people and promised to do much more only if these people were to tread in God’s ways, to obey his commandments and to respect his law. This was, therefore, essentially an ethic of gratitude for deliverance,² even though this was reinforced by an appeal to the terrible nature of God, who had to be feared as well.

We must not forget, however, that this was the post-exilic, Mosaic interpretation of Jewish morality and was different from the spirit of the elaborate sacrificial system with its centre at Jerusalem and its essence in ritualism. This new insistence on allegiance to Divine law rather than to the national monarch was inspiring indeed, but none the less it was a change in perspective which was liable to give rise to conflict as, perhaps, in time it did. There was, on the one hand, the clearest possible recognition that

‘The Creator was also the Author of the Moral Law, and, so the prophets had taught, had His witness in the human conscience. The true knowledge of God drew with it a right understanding of His Will, obedience to which was the essence of morality.’¹

But on the other hand, this appeal to conscience created perplexities for the feeble-minded, as it always does for the vast majority of human beings. This abstract conception of a moral law expressing the will of a righteous God and inscribed in the consciences of men might have been all right for the sage; but the ordinary man wanted something more tangible and concrete as a guide to his morals. The answer to these people was that this Law, apart from being written in the consciences of men, had also ‘in its essential contents been declared in the Decalogue’.² This opened the door to the authoritarianism and literalism in Jewish ethics. If Divine Law was laid down in the scriptures, then obviously someone who claimed to know this law through his study of the scriptures was going to become an indispensable element in the moral guidance and instruction of the Jewish people. In time, therefore,

‘Effective guidance had passed from the central sacrificial system at Jerusalem to the recently established organization of the Scribes, that is, to those who were the students of the Law, and who expounded it in the synagogues every Sabbath.’³

This was both a step forward and a step back—forward because of its orientation towards the understanding of morality in place of mere rituals and sacrifice, and backward because of its having in the long run the same demoralizing, authoritarian and dogmatic implications for essential morality as the sacrificial system with its priests and high priests had had.

As a result of the inevitable conflict between the ancient canonical writings and the faith and sensibility of the comparativ...

Inhaltsverzeichnis

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Original Title
• Original Copyright
• Foreword
• Acknowledgement
• CONTENTS
• I. Introduction
• II. Nature of Christian and Hindu Ethics
• III. The Nature and Destiny of Man
• IV. The Moral Law, Its Authority and Sources
• V. The Content of the Moral Law: Virtues and Duties
• VI. Moral Effort and Human Freedom
• VII. Moral Failure and Responsibility
• VIII. Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index