The New Natural Resource

Knowledge Development, Society and Economics

Hans Christian Garmann Johnsen

• Verlag: Routledge
• Jahr: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317022749
• Auflage: 1
• Thema: Business
• Thema: Strategia di business

Increasingly in the public discourse there are references to the knowledge economy, knowledge society, knowledge workers and knowledge organisations. The argument is that knowledge is becoming the main economic resource, replacing the natural resources that drove the industrial revolution. The new knowledge economy is driven by knowledge development, innovation and highly skilled employees. Increasing investment in higher education and in universities is in line with this strategy and understanding. In an earlier book, Creating Collaborative Advantage edited with Richard Ennals, Professor Hans Christian Garmann Johnsen argued that it is knowledge that links social and economic processes. He believes that what is missing in the current discussion on innovation is a conceptualisation of exactly what knowledge is. In The New Natural Resource, he digs deeper into what it is and how it develops and subsequently leads to widespread change. The author argues that knowledge is inherently a social phenomenon. That is why social processes are closely linked to economic development, and why this relationship becomes even more apparent in the new knowledge economy. Knowledge is not an objective entity, established once and for all. Knowledge development is interrelated with values, norms, perceptions and interpretations. We need to know what the mechanisms are by which knowledge becomes legitimate, true and relevant.

PART I The Epistemological Foundation of Knowledge

In this part I present three chapters that are intended to form a foundation for the further discussion in the book. Firstly, I try to give my account of the concept of sociology of knowledge. I argue for an understanding of this concept that is in line with my further argument in this book. Secondly, I discuss the theory of the mind. This is important in relation to how we model the individual in our theorising on society. I argue for a position that allows us to appreciate the subjectivity of the individual and to avoid a reductionism in the understanding of people in society. Thirdly, I discuss the concept of communicative rationality. This concept is at the core of the argument in this book and therefore I have to define it before I move on to discussing particular areas of knowledge development.

CHAPTER 1 Sociology of Knowledge Development

Introduction

The literature on knowledge society, knowledge economy and knowledge organisations emphasises how we can influence knowledge development, through education, investments in research and innovation or through clever organising and development of incentives and motivation. But what is the relationship between how we organise (the social process) and the knowledge that is developed? This, in short, is the issue that sociology of knowledge discusses. However, this discussion is more controversial than it might first appear, because the knowledge in question is not only everyday, practical knowledge, but is largely related to how we come to know things in the first place, or how we develop the fundamental schemes by which we interpret the world around us. So is knowledge socially determined?

Critics have worried that the sociology of knowledge, which implies a contextual view on knowledge, would lead to a form of relativism that undermines the objective value of a democratic society. Because knowledge is the product of social and historical processes, according to the sociology of knowledge, it provides no basis for defending a democratic society as more true and objective compared with other forms of social organisation. However, this argument relies on a misconception which the present chapter is intended to correct. Rather than undermining the value of democracy, sociology of knowledge emphasises the necessity of an open society that permits the production of knowledge. It is precisely because knowledge is the product of a social context that we need an open and democratic society. But in order to develop this argument, we first need to get a better understanding on the nature of the sociology of knowledge.

I will trace the root of sociology of knowledge in three different yet closely connected intellectual traditions – German materialism, French structuralism and American pragmatism. Rather than providing a comprehensive account of these traditions, we will show how they all are views embedded in a social and historical context. Furthermore, we need to take a closer look at the arguments against sociology of knowledge. Based on the conceptual basis developed by tracing the root of sociology of knowledge, I will develop the argument that production of knowledge has a social dimension, but this does not necessarily imply political relativism. This is the case because knowledge is not a homogeneous phenomenon, but takes various forms and shapes.

I will argue in this chapter that the sociology of knowledge has two rather distinct versions, which somehow confuses the debate. On the one hand, the sociology of knowledge has been seen as an epistemology, or a theory about theory. The focus has been on what is knowledge? That is, a theory about knowledge. On the other hand, it has been seen as sociology. That is, as a theory of how social groups form knowledge and how knowledge plays a role in structuring social groups and social behaviour, often discussed as social epistemology (Haddock, Millar, and Pritchard, 2010; Goldman and Whitcomb, 2011). In this chapter I will try to present the two, but also to discuss how they relate to each other and what that implies. In relation to the epistemological perspective, we might ask: how can sociology of knowledge help us understand production of knowledge? What do we know about the production of knowledge process and value-creation?

If we take the more sociological perspective, we might ask: what do we know about the optimal number and type of institutions in a production of knowledge process? What do social sciences know about the relation between institutions in a production of knowledge process? What do we know about organising and managing production of knowledge processes in and between institutions? What do we know about learning and knowledge flows in and between institutions, and its effect on production of knowledge processes and innovation?

The Roots of Sociology of Knowledge: Materialism, Structuralism and Pragmatism

I could start the argument with reference to the late Wittgenstein (2001) and argue that already, by writing, I am taking on a social organisation (language), and by writing in English, I even take on a language that is not my native language. In order to make myself understood, I move into a context of meaning that I will have to comply with. The argument that knowledge is somehow influenced by social organisation is therefore not new. Arguments in that direction can be found in English empiricism (Locke), in the Scottish enlightenment (Smith, Hume), in German idealism (Hegel) and German materialism (Marx). With the development of a sociological science (Spencer, Durkheim, Weber), this perspective became more empirically founded. A classical study is Durkheim and Mauss’s study of primitive cultures, where they discovered that religious claims paralleled social organisation in the tribe: religion mirrors society, rather than the opposite (Durkheim and Mauss, 1903; for a discussion see Bloor, 2005).

McCarthy (1996) argues that there have been stages in the development of the sociology of knowledge. There have also been different positions within this line of thought. Marx founded his ideas on materialism. Scheler (1973) and Berger and Luckmann (1991) had a reference to phenomenology. Mannheim tried to develop a concept of ideology. In Durkheim (1902), Weber’s (1978) sociology of knowledge is discussed as cultural theory. Merton tries to frame the field within mainstream sociology. Holzner (1968) and Luhmann (2013b) take a structuralist and systems theory perspective and Knorr-Cetina (1999) and Lave and Wenger (1991) discuss sociology of knowledge related to organisation theory.

DeGré (1943) sees sociology of knowledge in the context of stratification: how social groups use knowledge in the sense of ideology to oppress, create resentments and aggression. He also argues for a German (Marx, Nietzsche, Scheler) and a non-German (Durkheim, Mead, Pareto) contribution to the discourse. DeGré argued that Nietzsche, Scheler, Pareto/Sorel, Durkheim and Znaniecki were the main contributors to the sociology of knowledge. Robert Merton (1951) mentions in particular the contribution of Marx, Scheler, Mannheim, Durkheim and Sorokin. Below I divide this discussion into three: the German, the French and the American tradition.

The German Tradition: between Idealism and Materialism

G.F. von Hegel would often be referred to as a main source for the idea that mental structures and knowledge are formed by a nation’s specific historical development. As a sort of opposition to this, Karl Marx argued that knowledge is not only materially based; it is also contextual (local and time specific). However, the deeper question is to what extent I am aware of my own knowledge. Marx’s study of German ideology (Marx, 1845), stands out as a clear exposition of this perspective. Marx studied the ideological justification of social order in relation to the organisation of production.

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc. of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. (Marx, 2000)

Jürgen Habermas (1974) presented an argument about this, in line with the critical theory tradition. Habermas starts out by challenging the Marxist universal theory of historical materialism. This theory claims both to be objective in origin and universal in application. Against this, Habermas argues:

Critique understands that its claims to validity can be verified only in the successful process of enlightenment, and that means: in the practical discourse of those concerned. (Habermas, 1974, p. 2)

One could argue that this position focuses on local practice and local knowledge. However, the fact is that the inherent dialectics of the critical approach implies that one recognises what is criticised, in this case theory. Habermas’s point is therefore not one of arguing against general and universal knowledge or theory, rather to argue that theory has to be understood in a special way in social science, as a way of objectivising knowledge in line with Popper (1979b) and Nozick (2001).

Habermas argues along three dimensions – the empirical aspect, the epistemological aspect and the methodological aspect – and comes up with mainly three sets of arguments. The empirical aspect implies that theory has to relate to the general, empirical reality. Habermas (1974) talks about the dual relationship between theory and practice: on the one hand a social practice that makes theorising possible, on the other hand political practice that makes theorising meaningful. Stability of social practice is a necessary precondition for social theorising, invariance in Robert Nozick’s term (Nozick, 2001). Habermas is not a critic of theory; rather he argues in line with Popper that the social and system world have ontological status (Habermas, 1997; Popper, 1979b). Based on this general understanding, one has to see social theorising in relation to structural conditions in society. As these change, so does the focus of social theory; that is, in modern (post-modern?) society this has brought issues of legitimacy up in front of societal understanding.

The phenomenologist Max Ferdinand Scheler (1874–1928) coined the concept sociology of knowledge in the 1920s. His programme was to develop an argument that would balance an essentialist/a priori position on the one hand and a social construction of knowledge on the other (Scheler, 1973). By developing such an argument, he would be able to distinguish between variance and invariance in knowledge formation in society. Scheler, as a phenomenologist, believed in truth and in a fundamental and transcendent order in society.

This programme was heavily criticised by Karl Mannheim (1929). Mannheim makes the argument that ideology (the basic belief system in society) is socially constructed. There is no truth beyond what is socially constructed. Karl Mannheim (1893–1947), with his work Ideologie und Utopie (1929) (translated and published in England as Ideology and Utopia in 1936), is often referred to as the core, founding text in this field (Mannheim, 1979). He traces the roots and sources of the sociology of knowledge back to Marx and Nietzsche. His argument is that these authors discuss the social and material preconditions and determinations of ideology. Nietzsche’s main contribution is to deconstruct and question the concept of knowledge as such. As Foucault writes:

It is for this reason that in Nietzsche we find the constantly recurring idea that knowledge is at the same time the most generalized and most particular things. Knowledge simplifies, possesses over differences, lumps things together, without any justification in regard to truth. It follows that knowledge is always a misconstruction [méconnaissance]. Moreover, it is always something that is aimed, maliciously, insidiously, and aggressively, at something like a single combat, a tête-à-tête, a dual is set up, contrived, between man and what he knows. There is always something in knowledge that is analogous to the dual and accounts for the fact that it is always singular. That is the contradictory character of knowledge, as it is defined in the Nietzsche texts that seem to contradict on another – generalizing and always singular. (Foucault, 1973, p. 14)

Mannheim’s work from 1929 is an interesting and useful account of some of the preconditions and principles that the sociology of knowledge has to comply with. Mannheim, long before social constructivism became a popular phrase and point of (self) reference in the discourse of knowledge, identifies the difficulties that follow from the fact that a sociology of knowledge both has to deal with: (a) which knowledge is constructed in a particular situation; and (b) how to define validity (and truth) over and above the situational knowledge construction. I believe that these are the two large and interconnected questions and challenges that the sociology of knowledge has to address.

The anthropology of knowledge formation was heavily criticised by Mannheim as utterly speculative. In this, Mannheim resembles the Marxist position that all knowledge has a material (social) basis. Merton’s way out of this dilemma is not to take a stand on everything there is to be said about knowledge construction, but rather to restrain the scope of the sociological investigation into knowledge formation processes (that is, as a form of cultural analysis). Subsequently, in Merton we might see the conversion of the field of sociology of knowledge, from comprehensive theory formation to a more limited agenda of a disciplinary discourse.

Berger and Luckmann in their The Social Construction of Reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge (1966) actually went back to Mannheim’s broader perspective and discussed how the main belief systems in society (notably religion) are constructed. However, they added other sociological insights into this, such as structural-functionalism and social psychology. They take as a starting point of their analysis the phenomenology of the social world, inspired by Alfred Schutz. Our immediate understandings of social order (rules, norms, routines, structures) are objectivised through, among others, social practice and language. Furthermore, some of these structures are institutionalised and legitimised, and society invests a lot in maintaining some of these structures (for instance, religious rituals). These structures have a socialising effect, and are internalised in people’s self-understanding and identity. Berger and Luckmann described a social mechanism on the macro level by which societies internalise beliefs and through that create structures. Also, they explain how these beliefs become interlocked and self-concealing. They are challenged when immediate, everyday practice and experience contradict these structures and norms. Subsequently, Berger and Luckmann’s theory is very well able to explain how traditional and religious societies are challenged by modernism and plural ways of life.

One could see this German discussion as a questioning of the foundation of our knowledge. It is reflected in the work of Adorno and Horkheimer. In their Dialectic of Enlightenment ([1944] 2010) they discuss how our understanding of the world can be distorted. Taking Nazism as their main target, they try to explain how mass deception and delusion is possible. They see it as a result of limits to enlightenment and also as an argument for critical theory. How is it that we develop false consciousness, and how do we know that what we believe in, and take as true, actually is true? Actually, this was also the question posed by Mannheim.

French Structuralism

French structuralism refers to works inspired by Ferdinand de Saussure, but can also be associated with the works of the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss and later the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1990). Structuralism is a perspective that sees our thinking in terms of frames of references and symbolism. This is an elaboration of the discussion of symbolic systems and structures (Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, Pareto, and Berger and Luckmann) on how society forms knowledge through socialisation. This is also a reference to post-structuralist thinkers such as Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard. In their work, the idea of discourse and language as structuring the way we think is central. One can see the world as a multitude of language games (grammars) that are not automatically transcendent and not linked to ‘facts’. Foucault, in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1989), argues for a constructivist perspective in the sense that we can understand some functional structures of development.

If one were to say something overall about this perspective it would be that individuals have to be understood as part of a larger whole. Bourdieu’s work on social structuration, not least his concept of social field and social capital, is illustrative in this respect (Bourdieu, 1993). Individual knowledge as well as individual language refers to a larger system that defines some of the frames for individual understanding. For example, one could see Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigms in science as an example of such structural processes. Lévi-Strauss’s work in anthropology also has links to concepts of meaning that can be interpreted as parallel to the concept of hermeneutics (Taylor, 1971).

American Pragmatism

American pragmatism relates to both William James and his objection to a priori knowledge (James, 1978) and to Richard Rorty (1979) and his rejection of knowledge as a mirror of nature. Both imply a practical and contextual perspective on knowledge. One of the insights from pragmatism is how knowledge is constructed from interpretation of signs, impressions and dialogues. Insights into the formation of local knowledge (Clifford James Geertz (1926–2006)) also relate to this pragmatic perspective (Geertz, 2000). Therefore it links up with hermeneutics (Gadamer, 2006).

Robert A. Merton’s essay ‘The Sociology of Knowledge’ from 1945 (Merton, 2005) and his Social theory and social structure from 1951 represent a point of reference in this development of sociology of knowledge. What Merton did was to define the sociology of knowledge as a sub-theme of general sociological theory, thereby going back to Durkheim. By doing that, he defined the sociology of knowledge as (and thereby reduced it to) one (among many) sociological perspective and, furthermor...

Inhaltsverzeichnis

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• About the Author
• Foreword and Acknowledgements
• Knowledge and Society: An Introduction
• Part I The Epistemological Foundation of Knowledge
• Part II Knowledge in Social Structures
• Part III Knowledge Development in a Liberal Society
• Concluding Reflections
• References
• Index