Japan Challenges America

Managing An Alliance In Crisis

Harrison M Holland

• Verlag: Routledge
• Jahr: 2021
• ISBN:
  9780429719363
• Auflage: 1
• Thema: Politics & International Relations
• Thema: International Relations

With the US-Japan alliance in jeopardy, former diplomat Harrison Holland argues that both sides must take bold steps to avert a catastrophe that could destabilize economic, political and security conditions in Asia. Taking advantage of his insider's perceptions, the author illuminates those aspects of life in Japan that influence behaviour, shape policy and affect public opinion in an inwardly directed society. Holland evaluates the obstacles to better economic relations; the security dilemmas facing Japan; and the rigid Japanese political structure, which has been slow to adapt to the surge of modern technology, the demands of rapid international change, and the internal and external calls for a more responsible Japanese role in world affairs. Can the alliance survive the present turmoil? Despite the daunting obstacles, the author concludes that solutions must and will be found.

1 INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP

To suggest that the U.S.-Japanese relationship is in a state of crisis is perhaps presumptuous and certainly controversial. Some will be outraged, calling the assertion an affront to an alliance that, despite its flaws, has been characterized as the “most important bilateral relationship in the world.” Others, long suspicious of Japanese motives and behavior and prone to use Japan as a scapegoat for U.S. economic troubles, will call for harsher measures to stem the Japanese juggernaut.

Regardless of where one’s allegiance may reside on this issue, one cannot escape the uneasy feeling that something is seriously wrong. Recent statistics tell an alarming story. The trade deficit with Japan is 40 percent of the overall U.S. trade deficit and is declining at a substantially lower rate than the global deficit, despite a nearly 60 percent appreciation of the yen against the dollar since 1985; Japan’s imports, particularly of manufactured goods, are between 25 and 45 percent below what would be expected of a country with Japan’s economic strength; the trade surplus has stubbornly remained between $40 and $60 billion annually, with little prospect of significant reduction. These figures are symptomatic of serious trouble in the relationship, attributable primarily to Japan’s continued trade surplus with the United States. Both nations must share the blame.

That the trade controversy has once again inflamed the alliance has not been entirely unexpected. Often in the past when the United States was strong and Japan weak, relations were reasonably free from friction and controversy. But when both nations were more equal in national power, relations turned cold and adversarial. Historians have long recognized the “roller coaster” nature of U.S.-Japanese relations and have noted more periods of tension and tribulation than times of harmony. On the darker side, economic and military rivalry, immigration disagreements, war and the threat of war (Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki have left an indelible and tragic imprint on relations), and deep suspicions and distrust of each other’s motives have characterized the relationship. That relationship began in 1853 when Commodore Matthew Perry, in order to open Japan to U.S. commerce, threatened the Tokugawa Shogunate with naval bombardment. Emulating Perry, officials of the Bush administration and some members of Congress have warned Japan that if it does not lower the Japanese trade surplus with the United States it will suffer the consequences of U.S. trade sanctions.

How can the societies of Japan and the United States—so different in mood, values, attitudes, and culture—accept and successfully overcome the hitherto intractable problems that have afflicted their relations for a century and a half? History has not been particularly kind to either party. It has, however, provided some roadmaps for better relations—policies to encourage tolerance, understanding, and accommodation and to curb the competitive instincts of both societies, which for the most part have been ignored.

Japan and the United States exhibit huge contrasts: Both are home to intensely energetic, competitive, and patriotic peoples, one homogeneous, the other heterogeneous; the civilization of one grounded in the religions and customs of the East, that of the other based on the Judeo-Christian tradition. Both countries have highly strategic geographic positions and much diversity in culture, mores, and language. Their populations have been attempting to learn more about each other, inspired by advances in information technology, yet each is strangely incapable of shaking the perceptions long held of the other, perceptions that have led to misunderstandings.

To take the contrasts a step further, the United States is a loose association of ethnic groups, united by the deliberate and recent (in historical terms) adoption and continued acceptance of a constitution that determines the method of selection of government, sets limits thereon, and prescribes dispute-settling procedures. Japan, to a much greater degree than any other large nation, is a creation of nature and comprises a people with traditions extending back to prehistoric times. The Japanese see their country as one entity; they have remarkable trust in institutions of authority, and they have widely shared rules of behavior, which make unnecessary many of the written laws and regulations on which Americans depend.

Furthermore, Japan is an island nation and almost totally lacking in natural resources; the United States is continental and rich in resources. Four of the fifty U.S. states are larger in area individually than all the Japanese islands put together.

The Japanese language, which has a particularly difficult written form, is confined almost exclusively to Japan. English, in contrast, is a world language; moreover, every American (apart from the Native American), has some sense of kinship with one or more foreign countries or regions.

Americans would be uncomfortable if forced to live within the tight web that unites and controls Japanese, a web made up of such institutions as the family, social convention, and (for many) large corporations or government agencies. Americans would not accept a government like that of Japan, which, at both national and local levels, is quite intrusive in economic and private life. I shall describe more of these contrasts in a review of the two societies in Chapter 2.

Japan and the United States are on the verge of a new era in their relationship. The challenge of mutual accommodation is formidable; the need for strong leadership vital; a well-informed citizenry essential. The United States must base its economic policy toward Japan on the premise that continued economic warfare between the two would not only have serious global repercussions but would also disturb U.S. financial markets, disrupt the U.S. economy, causing a reduction in the U.S. standard of living (there already are signs of such a decline), and place unacceptable limits on the U.S. ability to maintain its security commitments in Asia. Japan is vital to the United States as a trading partner, ally, source of capital investment, and financier of the federal debt.

Japan must also confront the reality of a dangerous split in relations with the United States should it be unwilling or unable to initiate changes in its economy and in some of the traditions that have been a source of strength in its society, or should it refuse to adjust its economic and political policies to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing international environment. To lean on traditions and customs that served Japan well as a young and aggressive industrial society but ill fit its role as a modern economic giant is a prescription for continued dissension and discord with the United States and other members of the international community. Economic conflict with the United States, if not controlled, would visit on Japan economic turmoil and dislocation reminiscent of the fateful days of the early 1930s when the Great Depression devastated the lives of many Japanese and helped the militarists consolidate their control over Japan.

In the period after World War II, Japan was understood to have strategic but not economic importance for the free world. As Chalmers Johnson noted in an address at the International House, Tōkyō, in 1989, that was the reason why Japan was allowed to maintain undervalued currency and to protect its domestic market so much longer after the war than any other advanced industrial democracy. Japan today is the major source of long-term capital, the financier of the U.S. budgetary and trade deficits, the leader of a campaign of foreign direct investment in North America and Western Europe that is unprecedented in terms of its scope and velocity, and the master of many new areas of technology such as telecommunications, semiconductors, robotics, nuclear-power generation, and new materials.

These developments, together with the lessons of history, the intensely competitive nature of the Japanese entrepreneur, the highly structured Japanese economy, sustained by traditions and values that have deep historical roots, the dedication of Japanese to hard work, and their reverence for education all suggest how difficult it will be for Japan to make the necessary accommodations to the changes taking place in the world order and to the relentless pressures from the United States for economic concessions. The United States is in an equally precarious position, being faced with serious macroeconomic troubles—a national debt of around $3 trillion, large fiscal deficits, huge trade imbalances, a Third World debt totaling over $1.2 trillion, and a domestic savings rate that is at an all-time low.

These conditions have prompted the ignition of defense mechanisms by the U.S. government and the Congress so strong that they defeat any possibility of self blame. The United States seeks consolation in its own success in other fields and in the conviction that Japan must be responsible for U.S. troubles. There are few signs that the United States is prepared to change or modify basic policies and institutions that are impediments to a more stable economy. Nor do the Japanese, in my opinion, expect them to do so. The United States, however, is pressing the Japanese to make fundamental changes in their economic and social institutions to reduce the trade surplus with the United States.

Japan has become the largest creditor nation, whereas the United States has, almost by default, turned itself into the world’s leading debtor by acting as though its birthright is to consume more than is produced and to borrow more than is saved. Debtors have a penchant for disliking their creditors, and the more feckless the debtor, the deeper the dislike.

To avoid deepening the crisis in the alliance and instability in the world economic order, the United States and Japan must find a solution to the trade controversy. A New York Times editorial of January 9, 1989, stated bluntly that Japan and the United States were engaged in a furious struggle that neither could afford to lose.

The contest between the two nations concerns prosperity, defense, and the idea of progress. The key to all three is technology, in which U.S. preeminence is being squandered. It seems certain that Japan, which has so quickly caught up with the United States, will gain the lead and forge further ahead in the 1990s. Such a prospect helps explain the envy, jealousy, anger, and disbelief that characterize the U.S. public’s reaction to the Japanese challenge. Americans wonder how Japan, so recently defeated in the titanic struggles in the Pacific, could in the short space of forty-five years surpass the United States in economic wealth and power. The seeds of crisis lie here.

Consider what would happen if Japan and the United States were continuously locked in serious controversy over fundamental issues. If the world’s two largest economies were managed with open hostility toward one another, each seeking to best the other, economic chaos would be the ultimate consequence. Tumult in the marketplace, in the division of critical resources, and in the financial sector would be the outcome of unbridled economic rivalry. Technology transfers would cease, causing a general slowdown in growth in both countries. Conflicting exchange rates could not be stabilized and intense competition for markets and resources would produce gyrating prices for raw materials and manufactured goods. Both direct and portfolio investment, representing enormous capital flows, which undergird world prosperity, would slacken and move in different channels. Under such conditions, the world economy would be divided into rivals, and this decision would represent a considerable loss for all nations.

Despite these ominous portents, there is little evidence, at least on the surface, that the United States and Japan are heeding the warnings and are prepared to take the critical steps necessary to resolve their differences. Comments are often heard in the halls of Congress, in academia, and in certain organs of the media, implying that good relations with Japan are desirable but not essential. Yet frustrations continue to mount in the United States, nurtured by a desire for Japan to assume more of the responsibility for reducing its trade surplus with the United States and for maintaining peace and security in Asia.

The following questions highlight the major areas of dispute, represent the nucleus of the crisis, and form the main substance of this book. How will the Japanese respond to U.S. urgings for greater burden sharing? Why don’t they act faster? What do we expect of Japan, and what does Japan expect of us? How will the alliance respond to the economic, security, and political challenges inherent in the global upheavals now under way? Why does Japan, while getting rich on trade, shut its economic doors to the United States? How can economic power and political responsibility in Japan be brought into line? Is reciprocity a solution to the economic difficulties in the alliance? How will the continuing growth in power of the Japanese economy relative to that of the United States affect the stability of the alliance? Will Japan assume defense responsibilities in the area? If they do, what will other Asians think? If they don’t, what will Americans think? How will Japan get along with its neighbors? Will these countries become friends or enemies, and how will the balance of power in Asia be affected? Is Japan ready to assume international responsibility commensurate with its economic power? How do Japanese and U.S. attitudes .toward each other influence the nature of the relationship? Are changes occurring in the two societies that may slow the drift toward a destabilized relationship? Will the alliance survive the present crisis?

As the reader moves deeper into the substance of this inquiry, answers to these questions will lead to a recognition of the gravity of the crisis facing the alliance. It is hoped that these answers will provide fresh avenues of discussion for those in Japan and the United States who want to build a more stable and cooperative relationship. To this end we must recognize that trade is the immediate concern. Security is of greater long-term significance.

New forces—those that could not have been foreseen a decade or so ago—have an important bearing on the success or failure of efforts to forestall an ever-widening gap in the alliance. The world is in rapid transition, with nations urgently groping for new conceptual foundations for a world order. Western Europe is scheduled to achieve economic unity in 1992; the United States has lost much of its former power; Communist influence has crumbled throughout Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union is in serious economic and political difficulty; and the economic dynamism of Japan is being increasingly felt.

These are powerful forces, and neither the United States nor Japan has yet found a way to adjust its relations to the economic, political, security, and psychological revolutions taking place in the East and West. Positive and courageous steps are necessary to prevent a catastrophe that could destabilize economic, political, and security conditions in Asia and have global economic repercussions. A failure to adapt, to find acceptable solutions to old problems and to meet new challenges with wisdom, patience, and tolerance, will only perpetuate U.S.-Japanese tension and misunderstanding.

During the past quarter century, I have witnessed much or the turbulence that has become so common in the alliance. More recently, I have talked to more than a hundred Japanese in all walks of life—barbers and businessmen, politicians and plumbers, bureaucrats and bankers, journalists and judges, dentists and doctors, housewives and historians, artists and accountants, soldiers and sailors, and many consumers and salarymen—about their views of U.S.-Japanese relations. They were increasingly concerned, as I am, about where the alliance is headed. They were also convinced that the health and well-being of their own country and of the peoples of Asia and the United States must continue to be based on sound and stable relations between Japan and the United States. We were all less sure that such stability could ultimately be achieved if present trends in the relationship continue.

As a primary task, in this work I will set forth the factors that are undermining mutual understanding, expose the risks of further misunderstanding, and seek out constructive policies for mutual cooperation. It will be necessary to examine the nature of the two societies and survey developments outside Japan and the United States that are fueling changes in the global strategic environment and affecting the alliance.

The evolution or political and economic lire in Japan and the United States has been lagging behind the almost breathtaking permutations in Eastern Europe and the rapid march of Western Europe toward economic unity. The success of the alliance in coping with the radical transformation of international society will be influenced by how Japan and the United States view each other—as allies or adversaries. Japanese and Americans’ perceptions of each other have become distorted by media reporting, the machinations of private interests, and disgruntled policymakers and legislators. The bluster and propaganda that have characterized the debate and concealed reality have done a disservice to those in both countries seeking to promote better understanding.

An attitude held by many Japanese and non-Japanese alike that is particularly mischievous is the notion that Japan is an enigmatic society. It is an impression foreigners relish and Japanese savor for its implication of Japan’s uniqueness.

But is Japan really so different from other societies? The answer is mixed. Japanese, for example, have a high regard for learning and the learned, as do the peoples of many other countries. Japan is probably the only nation in the world, however, whose supreme symbolic leader (the emperor) conducts an annual national poetry-writing contest. Although Japanese, like the rest of us, admire wealth, power, and success, they also greatly admire people who dedicate themselves without reserve or regard for their own welfare to good causes. The Japanese are trained to be modest, and although this trait often conceals a fierce, understandable pride in Japan’s achievements over the centuries, it also prepares the Japanese mind to learn from others. Much of Japan’s strength depends upon the unusual skill with which Japanese have harmonized the aspirations of individuals with national goals. A certitude of Japan’s uniqueness as a nation, in a world viewed with some suspicion and skepticism, is an element helping to solidify the sense of community.

We will look more closely at Japanese society, examine its kangaekata (thinking wa...

Inhaltsverzeichnis

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• A Word from the Author
• 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP
• 2 PORTRAIT OF TWO SOCIETIES
• 3 ECONOMIC ADVERSARIES: THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE
• 4 ECONOMIC ADVERSARIES: MANAGING THE RIVALRY
• 5 MANAGING DEFENSE: THE GROWING DILEMMA
• 6 POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY: OMENS FOR THE ALLIANCE
• 7 POLITICS IN THE 1990s
• 8 FROM REASON TO RHETORIC
• 9 WHAT’S AHEAD: MORE CONTROVERSY OR COLLABORATION?
• Notes
• Suggested Readings
• About the Book and the Author
• Index