CONTENTS
| List of Maps |
| Preface |
| Preface to the 2012 edition |
1. | A Staff School Memory |
2. | The Wreck of the Magdeburg |
3. | The Man, the Machine, the Choice |
4. | The Codebreaker and the Spy |
5. | Racing German Changes |
6. | Failure at Broadway Buildings |
7. | Phantoms |
8. | The Rotors |
9. | Royal Flags Wave Kings Above |
10. | In the Locked Drawer of the Krebs |
11. | Kisses |
12. | A Trawler Surprised |
13. | The Staff School Memory |
14. | âAll This Rubbish?â |
15. | The Great Man Himself |
16. | When Sailors Look for Leaks |
17. | Blackout â42 |
18. | The George Cross |
19. | Enter the Americans |
20. | SC 127 |
21. | The Cavity Magnetron Clue |
22. | The U-Tankers |
23. | The Reckoning |
| Appendix: Enciphering with Naval Enigma |
| Notes |
| Bibliography |
| Index |
List of Maps
1. | The stranding of the Magdeburg, August 26, 1914 |
2. | Where the Krebs fought, was boarded, and sank, March 3, 1941 |
3. | The patrol area of the MĂŒnchen, May 1941 |
4. | The patrol area of the Lauenburg, June 1941 |
5. | The actual and replanned routes of Convoy SC 127, April 1943 |
PREFACE
THIS BOOK RECOUNTS THE SECRET HISTORY OF WORLD WAR IIâs Battle of the Atlantic. It exposes the chief hidden factor that helped the Allies win it: they intercepted, solved, and read the coded radio messages between Admiral Karl Dönitz, Hitlerâs commander of submarines, and his U-boats at sea. The solutions gave the British and Americans intelligence about the locations and movements of the U-boats, enabling the Allies to divert their convoys around wolfpacks and to sink subs. This was of fundamental importance because whoever won the Battle of the Atlantic would win the war. The struggle between Allied ships bringing supplies to Britain and German submarines seeking to sever that lifeline was the longest battle of the greatest war of all time, beginning on its first day and ending on its last. Winston Churchill has evoked its significance in words that, though familiar, still ring with high drama:
The Battle of the Atlantic was the dominating factor all throughout the war. Never for one moment could we forget that everything happening elsewhere, on land, at sea, or in the air, depended ultimately on its outcome, and amid all other cares, we viewed its changing fortunes day by day with hope or apprehension.âŠ
Amid the torrent of violent events one anxiety reigned supreme. Battles might be won or lost, enterprises might succeed or miscarry, territories might be gained or quitted, but dominating all our power to carry on the war, or even keep ourselves alive, lay our mastery of the ocean routes and the free approach and entry to our ports.
The Germans used a cipher machine called the Enigma to put messages into secret form. Contrary to popular opinion formed since the 1974 publication of Group Captain F. W. Winterbothamâs The Ultra Secret, however, the Enigma used by the German navyâunlike that used by the air forceâgenerally withstood British codebreaking for the first two years of the war. It was not until the British captured key documents from German warships that they were able to break the naval Enigma continuously. This book tells, for the first time, the story of those seizures and the role they played in helping win the Battle of the Atlantic.
The book differs in several other ways from earlier accounts of the Enigma. It depicts the codebreakers, especially those working on the naval Enigma, behind their closed doors and relates case histories of the role of the decodes in the defeat of the U-boats. It focuses upon personalities and rests as much as possible upon primary sources, namely documents and interviews. It shows how much of a ânear-run thingâ the cryptologic battle was and seeks to explain why the Allies won it. Finally, it weighs the effect of codebreaking on the war at sea.
I believe that this book tells an essentially complete story of the failures and successes of British codebreaking, thanks in large part to the magisterial history of British intelligence in World War II by Sir Harry Hinsley and his coauthors. Those three volumes are based upon primary sources and upon Hinsleyâs own wartime experiences evaluating German naval intercepts. In some areas, such as the circuitry and mechanism of the cryptanalytic testing machines called bombes, my descriptions are based on interviews and reconstructions. This and other portions of my text dealing with technical matters are not intended to provide detailed instruction in Enigma cryptanalysis, though they give, I hope, enough information for readers who wish to pursue the matter to carry through their own analyses. This material may seem dry, but to leave it out would obscure a main point of the book: the fearful difficulty of the work of the cryptanalysts, which could not succeed without outside help.
As much as possible, I have used cryptologically precise terminology. Thus I distinguish between codes (which, to oversimplify, work by words) and ciphers (which work by letters). I usually write âencipherâ in connection with ciphers and âencodeâ with codes. But sometimes, for simplicity or rhythm or sound, I use âcodeâ and its derivatives when âcipherâ or even âkeyâ (a setting of the wheels or plugs of the Enigma, for example) would be correct: âcodesâ in the subtitle, which stands for âkeys,â is an instance.
Among the many people who helped with this book I should like to thank first of all Tom Congdon, who has believed in it for many years and whose tough but sensitive editing improved the text. Robie Macauley of Houghton Mifflin had enough faith in the idea to contract for it. My agent, Max Becker, provided valuable moral support. John Sterling of Houghton Mifflin handled the publishing with energy and flair. Peg Anderson of that house did not a good, but a great job of copyediting, tightening and rearranging the text and suggesting improvements.
Others helped with the substance. Sir Harry Hinsley patiently answered torrents of questions. Dr. Jurgen Röhwer steered me right on the Battle of the Atlantic. Ralph Erskine generously shared his expertise on the naval Enigma. Dr. Cipher Deavours made complex cryptanalyses plain. Carl Ellison helped in this as well. Christine Kelly located many retired Royal Navy officers and men. My researchers Alexander Lesnoff-Caravaglia and Mary Z. Pain came up with what I needed in the Public Record Office. Ilan Berkner computed times of solution for messages. Franz Selinger provided names and addresses of crew members of the German weather ships. The late Patrick Beesly furnished information and encouragement.
Archivists and historians who greatly helped included John Taylor, Harry Rilley, Tim Mulligan, Bill Cunliffe, and Bob Wolfe at the National Archives, Dr. Dean Allard, Bernard Cavalcante, and Kathleen Lloyd at the U.S. Navyâs Operational Archives, Dr. Hansjoseph Maierhofer and Dr. Manfred Kehrig at the MilitĂ€rarchiv, and David Brown at the Naval Historical Branch of the Ministry of Defence.
Richard Cornett of Newsday drew fine maps, and Bob Newman of that newspaper helped with art matters. Karen Bacon and Rita Porzelt typed a hard-to-read manuscript. I thank my colleagues at Newsday for their help and understanding: Jim Lynn, Peg Finucane, the late Lou Renzulli, Marty Hollander, Judy Bender, Jim Klurfeld, Ilene Barth, Mark Howard, and Eileen McDermott.
My friends Edward S. Miller and Dr. Louis Kruh encouraged me. Bernie Bookbinder provided valuable emotional support. Dr. Zita Brandesâs professional aid was indispensable. Others who helped include Dr. Robert N. Grant, Dr. Alec Douglas, and Gilbert Bloch, as well as all those who answered questions in interviews or in letters. Susanne Kahn discussed problems sympathetically; our sons Oliver and Michael reminded me of what really matters. My father, Jesse Kahn, offered advice, and together we remembered my mother, Florence Kahn, who died while the book was being written.
I am grateful to all for their help. The responsibility for errors lies with me, of course, and I shall appreciate any corrections that readers send.
GREAT NECK, NEW YORK
October 1990
PREFACE TO THE 2012
EDITION
BRITISH FORTITUDE MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE ALLIES TO WIN World War II. Russian manpower and American productivity actually won it, but they wouldnât have been able to do so if Britain hadnât first stood firm against Nazi Germany. And later the island gave the United States and Britain the platform on which they could build up their forces and from which they would launch their invasion of the Continent. The British peopleâs courage and determination made this possible, and is one of the great epics in world history, comparable (though with a better outcome) to Thermopylae.
But Britons required food to eat and raw materials to make the instruments of war. The dominions and colonies and allies overseas could furnish these items to the island kingdom only by sea. The Axis could choke off this supply by sinking the ships bringing those items to Britain. The United Kingdom therefore needed to ensure that these ships got through the U-boat blockade. It did not have enough destroyers and corvettes to do this, so it sought to turn U-boat convoy intelligence against itself by discovering it and using it to avoid the wolfpacks.
Admiral Karl Dönitz, the commander of U-boats, coordinated his attacks on the convoys by radio messages. But radio waves have the disadvantage that they can be heard not only by the intended recipients but by anybody. To prevent eavesdroppers from gaining information from the transmissions, U-boat command encrypted them â put them into secret form. It did so with a cipher machine, named the Enigma, then among the worldâs best, that the German army and air force also used.
In the 1930s, however, the Poles, fearful of German revanchism and aided by spy information and mathematics, which neither the French nor the British cryptanalysts used, reconstructed the Enigma machine. Shortly before World War II, they gave reconstructed Enigmas to the British and to the French. It didnât help. Strength, not intelligence, mattered. Blitzkrieg defeated the Poles and the French; Britain survived on its island. But it needed to know what the Germans were intending, and one source of that intelligence could come from solving German radio messages. Britain had set up a codebreaking center in Bletchley Park, a country house near Milton Keynes in Buckinghamshire. There cryptanalysts sought to solve German messages.
At first they had little success. The Enigma cryptosystem was too good. But machines are used by humans, and if they are not used well, they can fail. That is what happened with the Enigma used by the Luftwaffe. In enciphering a message, a Luftwaffe code clerk was to choose three letters to set the Enigmaâs three codewheels for encipherment. (These three letters were repeated and transmitted in a secret way to the deciphering clerk so he could read the message.) Each message was supposed to have...