China and North Africa

Between Economics, Politics and Security

Adel Abdel Ghafar, Adel Abdel Ghafar

• Verlag: I.B. Tauris
• Jahr: 2021
• ISBN:
  9780755641857
• Auflage: 1
• Thema: History
• Thema: African History

As the United States slowly disengages from the Middle East and Europe faces internal challenges, a new actor is quietly exerting greater influence across North Africa: China. Beijing's growing footprint in North Africa encompasses, but is not limited to, trade, infrastructure development, ports, shipping, financial cooperation, tourism and manufacturing. It is continuing to expand its co-operation with North African countries, not only in the economic and cultural spheres, but also those of diplomacy and defence. This engagement with North Africa relates to the key aim of President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which wants to connect Asia, Africa and Europe and sees potential in North Africa's strategic geographic location. This book is the first to analyse China's role in North Africa. It comprises of five leading country experts - Anouar Boukhars, Yahia Zoubir, Sarah Yerkes, Tareki Magresi and Nael Shama – who examine the various socio-economic, political and security aspects of China's relationship with Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. The book explores how China is displaying a development model that seeks to combine authoritarianism with economic growth, a model and that has an eager audience among regimes across the MENA region. It reveals how the China-North Africa relationship fits within the broader dynamics of increasing China-US rivalry. In doing so, contributors explain why China's growing role in North Africa is likely to have far-reaching economic and geopolitical consequences for both countries in the region and around the world.

1

Introduction

Adel Abdel Ghafar & Anna L. Jacobs

As the United States slowly disengages from the Middle East, and as Europe faces internal challenges, a new actor is quietly exerting greater influence across North Africa. China has been strategically ramping up engagement with such countries as Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco, which lie at the intersection of three key regions: the Middle East, Africa, and the Mediterranean.¹ Beijing’s growing footprint in these countries encompasses, but is not limited to, trade, infrastructure development, ports, shipping, financial cooperation, tourism, and manufacturing.

Through this engagement, China is setting up North Africa to play an integral role in connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe—a key aim of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While the current BRI map only officially includes Egypt, BRI Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) have been signed between China and every state in North Africa, demonstrating that it is expanding its foothold in the region.

China is expanding its cooperation with North African countries, not only in the economic and cultural spheres, but also those of diplomacy and defense. Furthermore, it is showcasing a development model that seeks to combine authoritarianism with economic growth—a model that has an eager audience among regimes across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. As such, China’s growing role in North Africa is likely to have far-reaching economic and geopolitical consequences for countries in the region and around the world.

Sino-Arab Relations: A Historical Background

Historically, Sino-Arab relations date back to the first days of Islam, where extensive trade relations began with the Tang dynasty and deepened through the historical Silk Road from the seventh till the seventeenth centuries.² Political and socioeconomic changes in both China and the Arab World, and the rise of European colonialism, paused the relationship during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Following China’s own liberation from Western powers and Japan, and the consolidation of power under Chairman Mao, the relationship with the Arab World would resume through the various national liberation movements that would take hold across the Arab world.

During the anticolonial struggle, China’s relationship with the Arab world was grounded in ideological support for national liberation movements. In North Africa, China was the first non-Arab country to recognize Algeria and provided political and military support for its revolutionary struggle. In the wake of the 1955 Bandung Conference, China deepened its relationship with the Egyptian government and President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and supported Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis.³ China also supported the liberation movement in Palestine, including military training cadres of the PLO and PFLP.⁴ Arab states also sought to support China diplomatically, voting with African states in 1971 in favor of restoring the People’s Republic of China’s seat in the United Nations Security Council.⁵

With the beginning of the Deng Xiaoping era in 1978, the basis of China’s relationship with the Arab world shifted away from “revolutionary romanticism,” and toward economic and strategic concerns, at the end of the twentieth century.⁶ Under Deng, China would accelerate its development and become the “workshop of the world.”⁷ This workshop would need energy resources, and thus the relationship with Arab states in the Gulf would become increasingly important. China established diplomatic relations with the UAE in 1984, followed by Qatar in 1988, and Bahrain in 1989. Saudi Arabia was the last country of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to establish diplomatic relations with China in 1990.⁸

Since the Hu Jintao era, China has pursued a dual diplomatic strategy with the Arab world. First based on direct bilateral ties, and secondly through multilateral forums, such as the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) established in 2004. Since its inception, CASCF would be the main vehicle for China’s engagement with the Arab world with continued head of state- and ministerial-level meetings.

In terms of bilateral engagement, China engages in five categories of “partnership diplomacy.” The two highest levels of classifications are strategic partnerships (SPs) and comprehensive strategic partnerships (CSPs).⁹ Almost all of China’s bilateral relations with MENA countries are categorized in the top two tiers of the country’s partnership diplomacy.

Relations between partner countries under an SP have the following four characteristics:

1. They go beyond typical diplomatic relations, involving consistent meetings between government officials and agencies to develop communication and trust.

2. They do not fall within the confines of treaty-based alliances or coalitions.

3. They are more “goal driven” than “threat driven,” typically focusing on areas of mutual cooperation in economics, culture, security, and technology.

4. They are characterized by an emphasis on behavior and institutional processes.¹⁰

In comparison with SPs, CSPs involve a higher level of institutional communication, including regular high-level meetings between top leadership members of both partner countries. Strüver notes that “three conditions have to be met before an agreement on a … [CSP] can be achieved, i.e. political trust, dense economic ties, cultural exchanges, and good relations in other sectors.”¹¹

Lower-level classifications include the Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership, Cooperative Partnership, and Friendly Cooperative Partnerships, which represent varying phases of bilateral cooperation on issues of common interest. These are most often used for countries with which China is developing growing ties in trade and investment. Goldstein argues that China’s strategic partnership diplomacy is rooted in four key areas of focus: (1) developing bilateral ties that do not threaten a third state, (2) increasing economic ties, (3) prioritizing areas of mutual cooperation with no focus on domestic affairs, and (4) standardizing official visits and security cooperation/military exchanges.¹²

The Arab world would take on increasing importance for Chinese policy makers after the launch of the BRI, the principal mammoth project of the Xi Jinping era. Launched in 2013, according to some estimates it is set to cost around $1 trillion and will include over eighty countries, which are responsible for around 36 percent of global GDP and 41 percent of global trade.¹³ South Asia has so far received the majority of BRI projects, but the initiative’s expansion west, toward Europe and the MENA region, is well underway. While China’s economic presence in Africa and Asia has been the subject of much study and scrutiny, the relationship between China and North Africa deserves more attention. This developing relationship reveals key trends and sheds light on China’s strategic priorities, as well as on how countries like Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt are increasing cooperation with new foreign partners.

Contemporary Relationship with North Africa

In the wake of the 2008 recession and the Eurozone crisis, North African states, which have historically relied on trade with and investment from Europe and the United States, worked to diversify their markets and economic partners.¹⁴ During the same period, China’s economy maintained impressive momentum, boasting a 9.5 percent GDP growth rate in 2011.¹⁵ Despite slower economic growth in recent years,¹⁶ China has promoted its economic and soft power with the region.

As the table below illustrates, China has established CSP with Algeria and Egypt and an SP with Morocco. These include dozens of MoUs and promises for major infrastructure and development projects. It is worth noting that, while China has signed BRI MoUs with Libya and Tunisia, it has yet to establish an official strategic partnership with either North African state.¹⁷

China’s Partner Countries in the MENA region¹⁸

Country	Year	Partnership
Algeria	2014	CSP
Egypt	2014	CSP
Iran	2016	CSP
Iraq	2015	SP
Jordan	2015	SP
Kuwait	2018	SP
Morocco	2016	SP
Oman	2018	SP
Qatar	2014	SP
Saudi Arabia	2016	CSP
United Arab Emirates	2018	CSP

These partnerships demonstrate how China and North African states have strengthened their diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations in recent years, especially since the BRI was launched. Across the region, Chinese Cultural Centers and Confucius Institutes have opened, while visa restrictions and travel advisories for Chinese tourists have been lifted, causing tourism to expand rapidly. Chinese diplomats at both the Rabat and Cairo embassies said that these strengthened relations reflect the key BRI aim of promoting connectivity and economic development in five priority areas: policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, increased trade, financial integration, and people-to-people exchanges.¹⁹

Senior fellows of the China Institute for International Studies, Ruan Zongze and Zeng Aiping, argued that China’s contribution to the MENA is to demonstrate how BRI can be a dividend for these countries and help them achieve higher levels of economic development. For them, BRI is an inclusive economic initiative that helps frame China’s foreign policy in MENA, which they describe as consistent, balanced, pragmatic, and low profile. They also point out that BRI is not charity and that Chinese investors do care about profits and returns on their investments—this is why the concept of mutually beneficial economic dividends is so crucial to BRI partnerships.²⁰ China’s establishment of CSPs with both Egypt and Algeria reflects the major role these states play in the MENA region, as well as the fact that these are its two key bilateral relationships in the region in terms of trade, arms sales, and infrastructure projects. In turn, China has become the top trading partner for both Egypt and Algeria.²¹

While China’s relations with Egypt and Algeria are characterized by a robust diplomatic and security partnership, its growing presence in countries like Morocco and Tunisia remains primarily economic and cultural. In Libya, Chinese firms have ceased operations due to ongoing instability, though the previous prime minister of the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), Fayez Serraj, has said that they are welcome to return.²² Before 2011, Chinese business interests in Libya were extensive. Th...

Inhaltsverzeichnis

• Cover
• Halftitle Page
• Title Page
• Dedication Page
• Contents 
• Acknowledgements
• Contributors
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Beyond Economics: Sino-Egyptian Relations under El-Sisi
• 3 Libya & China: A Tale of Two Eras
• 4 The Burgeoning China–Tunisia Relationship: Short-Term Reward, Long-Term Risk
• 5 China’s Relations with Algeria: From Revolutionary Friendship to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
• 6 Sino-Moroccan Relations: A Partnership Seeking to Reach Its Full Potential
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index
• Imprint