Marines In World War II - Marine Aviation In The Philippines [Illustrated Edition]

Major Charles W. Boggs Jr. USMC

• Verlag: Verdun Press
• Jahr: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781782892878
• Thema: History
• Thema: Military & Maritime History

Contains 58 photos and 10 maps and charts.
"The return of Allied forces to the Philippines in the fall of 1944 further throttled Japan's already tenuous pipe line to the rich resources of Malaya and the Netherlands Indies, and with it the last vestige of her ability to meet the logistical requirements of a continuing war. The Battle for Leyte Gulf marked the end of Japan as a naval power, forcing her to adopt the desperation kamikaze tactic against the United States Fleets.
The Philippine victories were primarily Army and Navy operations. Marines, comprising only a fraction of the total forces engaged, played a secondary but significant role in the overall victory. The campaign was important to the Corps in that the Marine aviators, who had battled two years for air control over the Solomons, moved into a new role, their first opportunity to test on a large scale the fundamental Marine doctrine of close air support for ground troops in conventional land operations. This test they passed with credit, and Marine flyers contributed materially to the Philippine victory. Lessons learned and techniques perfected in those campaigns form an important chapter in our present-day close air support doctrines."-C. B. CATES, GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

CHAPTER 1 — Background

FROM THE BEACHES of Normandy to the beaches of Saipan, events of mid-June, 1944, marked a time of extraordinary importance to Allied Forces in both hemispheres. The consolidation of beachheads in Normandy signified that the Allies had returned to France to stay, and the long push to Berlin was in the making. On the opposite side of the globe, the landings at Saipan on 15 June heralded, to Allies and Axis alike, the ultimate conclusion of the war in the Pacific.{1}

Normandy and Saipan were easily recognizable, even at the time, as events of major consequence to all the world. But also on 15 June 1944, although overshadowed by bold black headlines, some other events of considerable significance were taking place: General Douglas MacArthur, USA, Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, on that date reassumed control of an area that included most of the Solomon Islands west of Guadalcanal. At the same time, Admiral William F. Halsey, USN, who had held the dual title of Commander Third Fleet and Commander South Pacific (ComSoPac), was relieved of the latter duty by Vice Admiral John H. Newton, USN. Thus freed of area command, Halsey could return to sea with his fleet.

(For areas of responsibility of MacArthur, Halsey, and Nimitz, see Map 2.)

Technically, MacArthur had at no time relinquished strategic control of the Solomons west of Guadalcanal during U.S. operations back along the island chain. Actually, however, for reasons of military expediency, while MacArthur directed the operations in eastern New Guinea and because Halsey was already in operational command of the Guadalcanal area, the latter was also temporarily given control of the rest of the Solomons.{2} With the change of command in SoPac on 15 June 1944, control of the area was restored to MacArthur, who immediately assumed control over the forces located there as well. (See Map 2.)

Organization of Far East Air Forces

With General MacArthur's reassumption of control over the Solomons west of the 159th meridian came many new administrative problems for the SWPA commander and his staff. The SWPA command was now augmented by a number of organizations that had previously been under SoPac control. These organizations included elements of the Thirteenth U.S. Army Air Force, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and some New Zealand and U.S. Navy air units. Addition of these forces produced a new organization of the air units in MacArthur's domain.

Lieutenant General George C. Kenney, USA, commanding air forces under MacArthur, had been holding a dual title. Kenney, who “had two hats,” as he liked to call it, commanded both the Allied Air Forces, SWPA, and the Fifth U.S. Army Air Force. As Commander Allied Air Forces, SWPA, he exercised operational control of the Fifth Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force Command and attached Netherlands East Indies units, and Aircraft Seventh Fleet. This Allied headquarters, originally heavily staffed with Australian officers when it was organized in 1942, had become more and more of an American body as the Fifth Air Force had dwarfed the RAAF Command in size; by June 1944 the Allied Air Forces staff was also, with the exception of the Directorate of Intelligence, the staff of Rear Echelon, Fifth Air Force.{3}

Because of the dual nature of the Allied Air Force-Fifth U.S. Air Force command, the transfer of the Thirteenth U.S. Air Force and other American units, including the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, to SWPA was additionally complicated. It was no longer feasible for Kenney's setup to continue, since it meant that the Rear Echelon, Fifth Air Force would be serving, in effect, as the supreme air headquarters in SWPA and thus controlling another American air force.{4}

A new organization was therefore created to exercise control of Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces. This new command, designated U.S. Far East Air Forces (FEAF) was taken over by Kenney during the general administrative reshuffle of 15 June. Having created another hat to wear, he then passed one of the old ones to a subordinate. Kenney retained command of Allied Air Forces, SWPA, but turned over command of Fifth Air Force to Major General Ennis C. Whitehead, USA. (See Chart 1.)

Organization of FEAF took care of the administrative details of the Thirteenth Air Force, but still another arrangement appeared necessary to facilitate Allied Air Forces' control of Marine and Navy air units now in SWPA. Prior to the 15 June transfer of authority, intertheater conferences had covered this problem. During these conferences SoPac, utilizing the latitude permitted the Navy in the organization of task forces, established a new headquarters designated Aircraft Northern Solomons (AirNorSols) under Major General Ralph J. Mitchell, USMC, with headquarters at Torokina, Bougainville Island.

Mitchell, like Kenney, now wore two hats. Upon assuming the AirNorSols command, he simultaneously took over the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW), which became the controlling air unit of AirNorSols—a composite of Marine, Navy, New Zealand and Army Air Force units then based in the Marine general's area of responsibility. (See Map 3.)

So it was that on 15 June 1944 a veteran body of aviation Marines (battle-hardened by 22 months of aerial combat from Guadalcanal up the Solomons chain to Bougainville) suddenly found themselves under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, at a time when his long heralded return to the Philippine Islands was imminent.

High-Level Planning

From the time General MacArthur left the Philippines in early 1942 to take over the new Allied command forming in Australia, one concept had dominated his thinking—to return to the Philippines as soon as possible. Only a short time after he had set up his General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, he began to plan that return. Lacking carriers or prospect of receiving any, he had to project a series of amphibious “leap-frogging” operations along the northern coast of New Guinea, each step limited by the effective range of land-based fighters. In February 1943 his strategic concept for the approach to the Philippines was expressed in the first of a series of RENO plans which, outlining operations for the approach, was drawn up at his GHQ.{5}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), on the other hand, were not entirely convinced that liberation of the Philippines would be essential to the ultimate objective—the early defeat of Japan. The more direct and decisive Central Pacific route, held by enemy garrisons both smaller and more easily isolated than those in New Guinea-Philippines, gave promise of the quickest, cheapest victory. Furthermore, the long-legged carrier weapon combined with the Pacific Fleet Marine Force to offer the key to unlock Japan's Central Pacific stronghold. As a result, during early planning phases there were some pronounced differences as to the best route to take. Consequently, MacArthur's proposed drive along northern New Guinea up through the islands between the Vogelkop peninsula to Mindanao was weighed against a Central Pacific drive advocated by JCS planners, via the Marshalls, Marianas, Carolines, and Palaus.

As a result of compromise between these widely separated points of view, operations in the Pacific during 1943 and early 1944 were two-pronged, with priority of forces going to Nimitz's drive. MacArthur's forces moved along New Guinea's northern coast, while the main effort under Nimitz was exerted along the Central Pacific axis.{6}

On 12 March 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive for action in the Pacific theater during the remainder of the year. The two-pronged concept continued, but as a result of developments during the previous several months, JCS had decided that a speed-up of the entire Pacific timetable was in order.{7} There was good reason for this apparent optimism: the Marshalls operation (30 January to 20 February 1944) had been executed both speedily and economically; Task Force 58's carrier strikes against the supposedly impregnable Japanese fortress of Truk (16-17 February 1944) had revealed the surprising fact that it was weaker by far than had previously been supposed; and finally, MacArthur had been able to advance his target date for the Admiralties operation by a full month (from 1 April to 29 February 1944).{8}

The 12th March directive was especially important to MacArthur, for it instructed him to conduct operations along the New Guinea coast, after the seizure of Hollandia, preparatory to operations against the Palaus and Mindanao, (the southernmost major island of the Philippine archipelago). This was the first JCS directive to assure him of returning to at least a part of the Philippines.{9} As a result, both MacArthur and Nimitz formulated a schedule that included an invasion of Mindanao, at Sarangani Bay, on 15 November 1944. (See Map 1.)

June Proposals of the JCS

But even as MacArthur and Nimitz were completing plans to carry out the 12 March directive, the JCS were considering ways and means to speed still more the progress...

Inhaltsverzeichnis

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• Foreword
• Preface
• CHAPTER 1 - Background
• Organization of Far East Air Forces
• CHAPTER 2 - Leyte and Samar Campaigns
• CHAPTER 3 - Luzon Campaign
• CHAPTER 4 - Southern Philippine Operations
• REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER
• APPENDIX I - Bibliography
• APPENDIX II - Chronology
• APPENDIX III - Casualties
• APPENDIX IV - Command and Staff
• APPENDIX V - Marine Ground Troops in Leyte Action
• APPENDIX VI - Pilot Survival Reports
• APPENDIX VII - Performance Data on Types of Aircraft Used by Marines in the Philippines
• APPENDIX VIII - Navy Unit Commendations