How Press Propaganda Paved the Way to Brexit

Francis Rawlinson

• Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan
• Jahr: 2020
• ISBN:
  9783030277659
• Thema: Sprachen & Linguistik
• Thema: Journalismus

This book traces how right-wing newspapers in Britain helped shape British public opinion about the European Union over the course of the 20 years preceding the EU referendum in June 2016. The author argues that newspapers such as the Telegraph, Mail, Sun and Express have been effectively waging a long-term propaganda war, with the distortions and borderline fake news presented one of the factors that helped secure the narrow majority for Brexit. Written by an EU insider, the book presents hard facts and debunks the core myths on EU laws, exorbitant budget contributions and uncontrolled immigration, and contributes to the broader debate on the importance of the press for democracy.

Part IBackground

© The Author(s) 2019

F. RawlinsonHow Press Propaganda Paved the Way to Brexithttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27765-9_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Francis Rawlinson¹

(1)

Ottignies, Belgium

Francis Rawlinson

End Abstract

On 23 June 2016, the British people voted by 51.9% to 48.1% to leave the European Union (EU). Some 17.4 million people voted Leave and 16.2 million Remain. The turnout was 72.2% of the electorate, and the shares of the electorate voting Leave and Remain being 37% and 35%, respectively.

The voting figures show that the majority in favour of leaving the EU was small. While it was a clear result, it was hardly a “decisive,” let alone an “overwhelming” one. The number of Leave voters, though a majority of those who voted, was a long way short of half the electorate, when non-voters are counted. However, no minimum threshold for a valid vote had been set either in relation to the proportion of the electorate voting or the size of the majority, so Leave won.

In view of the narrow majority in favour of leaving the EU over those wanting to remain, it is an exaggeration to say leaving was “the clear will of the people.” Given the variety of ideas put forward by Leave campaigners as to what leaving would mean, claiming this or that form of Brexit—leaving without a withdrawal agreement , leaving the customs union and the single market, etc.—was the “will of the people” is absurd.

The proportions voting for Leave and Remain varied in the four constituent parts of the UK (Table 1.1). There were majorities for Leave in England and Wales and for Remain in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Remain majority in Scotland was genuinely “overwhelming,” that in Northern Ireland clearer than the Leave majorities in England and Wales. This has led to demands for special treatment of Scotland and Northern Ireland in the settlement with the EU and the proposal by the Scottish government for a second referendum on Scottish independence to prevent Scotland being taken out of the EU against its will.

Table 1.1

Voting in EU referendum, by constituent part (country) of UK (% of voters)

Constituent part (country) of UK	Leave	Remain
England	53.4	46.6
Wales	52.5	47.5
Scotland	38.0	62.0
Northern Ireland	44.2	55.8

Source: Author’s presentation based on data from BBC News. 24 June 2016. Referendum results

For the purposes of the referendum, the electorate was defined in the same way as for national elections: 16- and 17-year olds and long-term British expatriates were excluded. The former had been given the right to vote in the Scottish independence referendum, but it was decided not to repeat the experiment in the EU referendum. Long-term expats—British citizens living abroad who had not been registered to vote in Britain for 15 years or more—were excluded, despite promises by the government to extend the suffrage to them.¹

Irish and Commonwealth citizens resident in Britain had the right to vote, but not EU nationals living in Britain. Many of the latter were long-term residents but because under EU free movement their and their family’s right to stay in Britain was secure, before the EU referendum they had had no reason to become British citizens and few had done so. EU nationals had been given the right to vote in the Scottish independence referendum, just as 16- and 17-year olds had.²

Had the electorate in the EU referendum been widened to the 1.46 million 16- and 17-year olds, the result might easily have gone the other way, because polls suggested 80% might have voted for Remain.³ If, in addition, all the estimated 1.2 million British expatriates living in Europe had been eligible to vote, a Remain victory would have been virtually guaranteed. Most of these, too, would probably have voted Remain in order to keep their current rights to live and work and retire to another EU country.

Over 3 million citizens of other EU countries were living in Britain at the time of the referendum. If even only those among them who are long-term residents—for example, those married to British citizens and with British-born children—had had been allowed to register to vote, the result would also have been different. Admittedly, under current EU law there is no requirement to allow citizens of other EU countries to vote in national elections; this only applies to European Parliament and local elections.

A.C. Grayling cogently argues that deliberate restriction of the franchise is gerrymandering: the EU referendum was gerrymandered.⁴

Figure 1.1 shows the different voting patterns according to age and highest educational qualification. In general, the younger the voter and the higher their level of educational qualifications, the more likely they were to vote to stay in the EU , and vice versa.

Fig. 1.1

Referendum vote (%) by age group and highest educational qualification. Source: Author’s presentation, based on data from Swales, K. 2016. NatCen Social Research. Understanding the Leave vote⁵

Considerable research has been done into the reasons why people voted for Leave or Remain. John Curtice⁶ considers that as well as looking at the immediate explanation, people’s attitudes towards the EU , it was important to examine the underlying reasons for those attitudes and the circumstances in which the referendum was held. In Eurobarometer surveys which look at attitudes towards the EU in the member states, the UK has long been unique⁷ in having a majority of the population who feel exclusively British and not European at all, whereas elsewhere in Europe most people feel both a national and a European identity, in varying degrees. Britain has never taken the EU to its heart. I think this is largely down to deep cultural and historical reasons which have made the EU seem less relevant and more alien and remote than it does to the populations of other countries. I will explore these reasons in Chap. 3.⁸ In my opinion—and this is the focus of my book—the British Eurosceptic press has reinforced such attitudes.

As John Curtice also notes, the circumstances at the time of the referendum—the financial crisis from which the EU was slower to recover than Britain, the euro and migrant crises which the EU struggled to manage but which hardly affected Britain, and intra-EU migration which had affected Britain significantly since the early 2000s—all made the EU look even less attractive to many people and so were hardly propitious for advancing the Remain cause.

The surveys that were done soon after the vote found that voters’ immediate reasons for voting the way they did were mainly related to the perceived costs, benefits and risks of remaining or leaving. The calculation of costs and benefits pertained to sovereignty and identity, ...

Inhaltsverzeichnis

• Cover
• Front Matter
• Part I. Background
• Part II. Busting Myths
• Part III. Conclusion
• Back Matter