Interpreting Historical Sequences Using Economic Models
eBook - ePub

Interpreting Historical Sequences Using Economic Models

War, Secession and Tranquility

Paul Hallwood

  1. English
  2. ePUB (handyfreundlich)
  3. Über iOS und Android verfügbar
eBook - ePub

Interpreting Historical Sequences Using Economic Models

War, Secession and Tranquility

Paul Hallwood

Angaben zum Buch
Buchvorschau
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Quellenangaben

Über dieses Buch

This Palgrave Pivot presents theoretical models that explain common historical sequences, such as wars of secession, the rise and fall of empires, and international war. The book uses a rational choice model to frame the incentives of specific groups coming together in a polity or leaving it. These incentives are then set in a theoretical framework to determine the outcome—unity or secession, peace or war—and are demonstrated through historical examples. The book provides two longer case studies looking directly at motives for and against secession: the first on the American Civil War from the point of view of the Confederacy, and the second on efforts by the UK government to stem the tide of Scottish independence. Another case study discusses peacekeeping as aimed at reducing the costs of secessionist wars. With its accessible use of economic theory and ability to bring to life real-world examples of conflict and secession, this book is ideal supplementary reading for courses in international relations, conflict studies, global economics and economic history.

Häufig gestellte Fragen

Wie kann ich mein Abo kündigen?
Gehe einfach zum Kontobereich in den Einstellungen und klicke auf „Abo kündigen“ – ganz einfach. Nachdem du gekündigt hast, bleibt deine Mitgliedschaft für den verbleibenden Abozeitraum, den du bereits bezahlt hast, aktiv. Mehr Informationen hier.
(Wie) Kann ich Bücher herunterladen?
Derzeit stehen all unsere auf Mobilgeräte reagierenden ePub-Bücher zum Download über die App zur Verfügung. Die meisten unserer PDFs stehen ebenfalls zum Download bereit; wir arbeiten daran, auch die übrigen PDFs zum Download anzubieten, bei denen dies aktuell noch nicht möglich ist. Weitere Informationen hier.
Welcher Unterschied besteht bei den Preisen zwischen den Aboplänen?
Mit beiden Aboplänen erhältst du vollen Zugang zur Bibliothek und allen Funktionen von Perlego. Die einzigen Unterschiede bestehen im Preis und dem Abozeitraum: Mit dem Jahresabo sparst du auf 12 Monate gerechnet im Vergleich zum Monatsabo rund 30 %.
Was ist Perlego?
Wir sind ein Online-Abodienst für Lehrbücher, bei dem du für weniger als den Preis eines einzelnen Buches pro Monat Zugang zu einer ganzen Online-Bibliothek erhältst. Mit über 1 Million Büchern zu über 1.000 verschiedenen Themen haben wir bestimmt alles, was du brauchst! Weitere Informationen hier.
Unterstützt Perlego Text-zu-Sprache?
Achte auf das Symbol zum Vorlesen in deinem nächsten Buch, um zu sehen, ob du es dir auch anhören kannst. Bei diesem Tool wird dir Text laut vorgelesen, wobei der Text beim Vorlesen auch grafisch hervorgehoben wird. Du kannst das Vorlesen jederzeit anhalten, beschleunigen und verlangsamen. Weitere Informationen hier.
Ist Interpreting Historical Sequences Using Economic Models als Online-PDF/ePub verfügbar?
Ja, du hast Zugang zu Interpreting Historical Sequences Using Economic Models von Paul Hallwood im PDF- und/oder ePub-Format sowie zu anderen beliebten Büchern aus Economia & Econometria. Aus unserem Katalog stehen dir über 1 Million Bücher zur Verfügung.

Information

Jahr
2020
ISBN
9783030538545
© The Author(s) 2020
P. HallwoodInterpreting Historical Sequences Using Economic Modelshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53854-5_1
Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Paul Hallwood1
(1)
Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
Paul Hallwood

Abstract

This chapter lays out the key concepts that underpin the analysis in this book including discussion of international law as it relates to secession, the concepts of the optimal size of countries, economic rent and rent seeking contests, the fundamental contribution of neoclassical economics to understanding decision-making, willingness to pay for secession, and ‘triggering events’—the events that set off the historical sequences, the main subject matter of this book. The main objective of the book is stated as to deepen the understanding of the causes of historical sequences in both the grouping and ungrouping of countries.
Keywords
ColonialismConflictDecision-makingInternational lawSecessionTriggering events
End Abstract

1 Introduction

Secessions and unifications of peoples in countries are traditionally the stuff of analysis by historians and political scientists, recently though economists have made contributions. Alesina and Spolaore (2003) offer a pioneering economic analysis modeling the optimal size of nations. They do not however offer an explicit analysis of national expansion or contraction in historical time, implying only that an optimum will be reached. They do recognize, however, that ‘the actual dynamics of border formation are complex, and may include several interactions of variables and effects that are difficult or even impossible to capture in simplified equilibrium relationships’ (p. 9). This book discusses the crucial ‘interaction’ variables that condition the process of state-based secessions and formations by introducing a broader and more explicit model than heretofore. It is also worth noting that Blattman and Miguel (2010) point out that existing models of civil war are not well supported empirically. This could be because these models do not control for all of the relevant variables, twelve of which being identified in this book, and a change in any one of them could lead to the outbreak of war, or, if war is already going on, to its cessation. As we shall see, these same variables are relevant to both civil and international wars and, as will be shown, they are the drivers of war, secession, and tranquility—the ‘absence of war’.
The rational choice model developed here—which is new to the literature on state formation—is paired with many actual cases. This book is not just about theory, and nor is it only about history because theory, to be relevant, needs application and the telling of the story of a history needs a theoretical basis. In other words, this book tells historical ‘stories’ that have precise theoretical underpinnings. These ‘stories’ are about state-building and state-fracturing, driven mainly by internal events. As Table 1 records, since the end of World War II wars internal to states far outnumber wars between states, and this is why most attention will be paid to internal wars. Even so, a whole chapter using the same economic modeling approach as used in the rest of this book is devoted to a discussion of international wars.
Table 1
Ongoing conflicts: annual average per decade
Intrastate
Internationalized
Extrastate
Interstate
1940sa
10
0b
5
2
1950s
9
0c
5
1
1960s
16
3
3
2
1970s
24
4
1d
3
1980s
34
5
0
3
1990s
39
4
0
1
2000s
29
5
0
1
2010se
30
12
0
1
Source Pettersson et al. (2019)
Notes aAfter 1945; bTwo ongoing in 1946, none in the rest of the 1940s; cThree in the decade as a whole; dThe last extrastate conflict ended in 1975; eTo and including 2018
The number and pattern of independent states has changed markedly over the last 200 years. According to a data set on the birth and death of states recorded in the International Systems Dataset (ISD), there are slightly fewer independent countries today than there were in 1816. Care is needed in defining what a state is especially in the early years because legally recognized international borders were not always defined. A ‘state’, according to Butcher and Griffiths (2020), is a geographic entity with a government that has internal control over its territory as well as formal control over its’ international relations.
The nineteenth century saw a sharp decline in the number of independent countries largely due to the spread of colonialism through Africa and Asia. According to the ISD, there were 211 independent states in 1816 falling to 58 prior to World War I. Thereafter the number of independent states, as measured by UN membership, rose to 193 in 2020. In both the pre- and post-World War I periods, state births and deaths occurred with, the earlier period, deaths being more frequent than births, while in the later period the opposite is true.
There were 51 United Nations members at inception in 1945, with only 29 of them being outside of the Western Hemisphere. There are several reasons for this growth in membership—the end of colonialism in the Asian subcontinent led to the early membership of India and Pakistan; in Africa south of the Sahara, 32 African countries joined in the eleven years up to 1968, with several more after that date as the colonial powers continued their withdrawals from that continent. In a few cases, the end of colonialism was preceded by serious violence but in many cases not at all. Indeed, Emerson (1965) commented on how little violence was involved at the end of colonialism. By contrast, the violent breakup of Yugoslavia led to the admission to the United Nations of three new independent states in 1992, with several more added to 2006—see Chapter 3. Sometimes two new UN members were created when an existing member split apart, as when Montenegro and Serbia were admitted as separate independent states in 2006 having had a single membership for some years prior to that; similarly, with Egypt and Syria that had formed the United Arab Republic during 1958–1961, and with Malaysia and Singapore in 1965. An example in the reverse direction is the combining into a single member of Yemen and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1990. In the Persian Gulf area, several states gained independence beginning in the 1950s a process running to 1971 with the ending of British Protectorate status. The first South East Asian state to join the UN was Thailand (then called Siam) in 1946, Burma in 1948, Malaysia in 1957, and many more thereafter.
The split or attempted split of a state can be a violent process as is indicated in Table 2 that records the incidence of ongoing state-based armed conflicts in 2018. Intrastate conflicts are between a government and an internal armed group—in 2018, there were 32 of these ongoing. Internationalized conflicts are also internal but with foreign troops participating—Afghanistan and Syria are prominent examples. Extra-state conflicts are between a govern...

Inhaltsverzeichnis

  1. Cover
  2. Front Matter
  3. 1. Introduction
  4. 2. The Economic Model
  5. 3. Intrastate Sequencing with Historical Examples
  6. 4. Drivers of Historical Sequences
  7. 5. International Sequencing with Historical Examples
  8. 6. Peacekeeping and Sequencing
  9. 7. Case Study: Secessionists Motives in the American Civil War
  10. 8. Minimizing the Cost of Union: Fiscal Autonomy and the Case of Scotland
  11. 9. Conclusions
  12. Back Matter
Zitierstile für Interpreting Historical Sequences Using Economic Models

APA 6 Citation

Hallwood, P. (2020). Interpreting Historical Sequences Using Economic Models ([edition unavailable]). Springer International Publishing. Retrieved from https://www.perlego.com/book/3481140/interpreting-historical-sequences-using-economic-models-war-secession-and-tranquility-pdf (Original work published 2020)

Chicago Citation

Hallwood, Paul. (2020) 2020. Interpreting Historical Sequences Using Economic Models. [Edition unavailable]. Springer International Publishing. https://www.perlego.com/book/3481140/interpreting-historical-sequences-using-economic-models-war-secession-and-tranquility-pdf.

Harvard Citation

Hallwood, P. (2020) Interpreting Historical Sequences Using Economic Models. [edition unavailable]. Springer International Publishing. Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/3481140/interpreting-historical-sequences-using-economic-models-war-secession-and-tranquility-pdf (Accessed: 15 October 2022).

MLA 7 Citation

Hallwood, Paul. Interpreting Historical Sequences Using Economic Models. [edition unavailable]. Springer International Publishing, 2020. Web. 15 Oct. 2022.