It is hard to imagine a warmer political relationship in recent times than that of Russian president Vladimir Putin and Chinese president Xi Jinping . The two not only see each other more frequently than any other pair of international leaders, but their meetings are a publicistâs dream, supplementing warm affirmations of friendship with a stream of bilateral agreements. The PutinâXi dynamic, and Sino-Russian partnership, suggest a world where common interests, mutual trust, and shared purpose are more than just slogans. 1
This is also a relationship between two of the worldâs leading powers. In just three decades China has transformed itself from a regional backwater in East Asia into a global actor whose heft is exceeded only by the United States. While Russiaâs claims to great power status are more debatable, its actions can have global resonance, as we have seen over Ukraine and Syria. The significance of Sino-Russian interaction has been further highlighted against the backdrop of an international environment more turbulent than at any time in the last three decades.
For some observers, the âstrategic partnershipâ between Beijing and Moscow represents the most serious challenge to the world order. 2 For others, it offers a practical template for a more effective and equitable global system. Either way, Sino-Russian engagement asks real questions about constructs that have long been taken for granted: the nature and structure of global governance ; the universality of norms and values; the role of international institutions; understandings of sovereignty ; the meaning and application of power; and interpretations of security, globalization, and regionalism.
There is, however, a danger of being caught up in all the hype. Should we take the professions of likemindedness in Beijing and Moscow at face value? Does the substance of their partnership match up to its ambitious rhetoric? We may indeed be witnessing the evolution of a new type of relationship, one that transcends historical suspicion and much of the conventional wisdom of international relations. 3 But it is legitimate to ask whether the edifice of Sino-Russian partnership is more fragile than it looks, sustained by the suspension of disbelief and sublimation of tensions for the sake of short-term geopolitical goals.
We have, after all, been down this path before. During the Sino-Soviet âunbreakable friendshipâ of the 1950s, the two countries maintained a strategic and ideological alliance against the United States and its allies. However, this lasted barely a decade, before relations lapsed into a 30-year period of cold, and occasionally hot, confrontation. We are told that things are different today, that Sino-Russian partnership rests on much more secure foundations. This may be true, but if so it raises real questions about how the two sides arrived at this point. What has changed to create a new reality, both in the relationship itself and its broader international context? And how resilient is this new paradigm?
The collection of essays in this volume sets out to answer these questions by examining recent developments across the whole spectrum of the relationshipâfrom the macro level of grand strategy and geopolitics down to bilateral interaction in specific areas, such as energy , military ties , Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Arctic. The picture that emerges is complex and often contradictory. On the one hand, the Sino-Russian relationship boasts major achievements, and is certainly more effective than many. On the other hand, significant differences and uncertainties remain, notwithstanding determined efforts by both sides to address these. The result is an interaction characterized by ambiguity and fluidity, in which little is decided and much remains possible.
Two Lines of Argument
The open-ended possibilities of the Sino-Russian relationship are reflected in the debate over its current condition and future prospects. In essence, there are two schools of thought, which might loosely be described as âbelieversâ and âskepticsâ. This division, of course, is imperfect. Even the most bullish view of the relationship would recognize the existence of disagreements and tensions within it. Conversely, most skeptics would admit that there are areas where Beijing and Moscow cooperate quite effectively and to their mutual satisfaction. The difference in evaluation is often one of emphasis, and there are gradations of view within each category. Inevitably, too, assessments are susceptible to the impact of external factorsâbe it the global financial crash of 2008, Moscowâs annexation of Crimea , fluctuating oil prices, political instability in the United States and Europe, or the contrasting fortunes of the Russian and Chinese economies. No relationship operates in a vacuum or develops in strictly linear fashion.
Accentuating the Positive
The main thesis of the believers is that the overall direction of travel in the relationship is one of strategic, economic, and normative convergence. This is reflected not only in the proclamations of leaders, but also in measurable outcomes. In the UN Security Council , for example, Russia and China have worked closely and successfully to counter Western actions aimed at unseating the Assad regime in Syria. Elsewhere, their cooperation has given impetus to emerging international institutions, such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) framework, the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), and the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). And bilaterally, the two countries have stepped up their interaction, especially following the sharp deterioration of Russia-West relations post-Crimea. They have concluded major energy agreements; their troops participate regularly in large joint military exercises; and high-level arms sales have resumed after a hiatus of several years.
No less importantly for this narrative, the two sides have transcended a difficult past. The territorial issueâand the question of Chinaâs âlost one and a half million square kilometersââhas been resolved. 4 Chinese âillegal migrationâ, which had been a major source of tension in the 1990s, is off the agenda. 5 And Sino-Russian engagement in Central Asia is characterized more by cooperation than competition, defying the predictions of many Western commentators.
None of this is to suggest that partnership is without its problems. The point, however, is that both sides understand that their core interests are served by ever closer cooperation. Russia needs China as a geopolitical counterweight to the United States; a primary market for its energy and commodity exports; a buyer of high-tech weaponry; and as its principal partner in building a new world order. Beijing values the partnership for similar and compatible reasons: to constrain US âhegemonicâ power; to strengthen Chinaâs strategic position in the Asia-Pacific in the face of American and Japanese attempts at containment; and to manage a highly unstable security environment in Eurasia . In the face of these imperatives, such problems as there are in the relationship, such as the unbalanced nature of bilateral trade , are minor and soluble.
The Counter-Narrative
Where the believer sees achievement and opportunity, the skeptical view focuses on continuing contradictions in the relationship. While it acknowledges that this has expanded considerably over the past two decades, it identifies two major problems. The first is that the results of Sino-Russian cooperation are much less impressive than advertised; there is a marked disjunction between rhetoric and substanceâwhether it is in relation to the BRICS , a common commitment to a new world order , or energy and infrastructural development.
Second, much of the progress in the relationship is brittle. Despite strenuous efforts to minimize tensions, these remain significant and long-term. There is no denying the increasing asymmetry between the two sides, in terms of their individual national development and within the bilateral relationship. China has emerged as the second global superpower , while Russia suffers from slow growth (1.5% in 2017), political atrophy, and social anaesthetization. 6 Beijing , not Moscow , sets the terms of their interactionâexpanding Chinese influence across Eurasia ; resisting Moscow âs lead in confronting the United States; and determining the extent and nature of bilateral energy ties. Well might the Kremlin look to China to alleviate the consequences of the crisis in Russia-West relations. But Chinese leaders have been careful not to align themselves too closely with Putin.
There is little expectation among skeptics of an early crisis in the relationship. Beijing and Moscow evidently recognize that their inter...