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Introduction
The new geopolitical landscape of the Arctic today is a significant departure from the great power politics that existed in the region during the Cold War era. The supremacy of the military presence and the security interests of the two super-powers during that time have now been replaced by the multiple political interests of the eight Arctic states, dominated mainly by the military and security interests and naval capacity of Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway and Denmark. But the exclusivity of the region has been challenged by the activities of stakeholders from outside the region, including international organizations and non-Arctic states such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, Japan, South Korea and India, among others, as they are taking special interest in many aspects of the Arctic that focus on scientific research, shipping and resource development. Estimated oil and gas reserves in the continental shelves of the northern seas and visions of new trans-Arctic sea routes are also attracting the attention of transnational corporations that are becoming increasingly interested in the potential commercial value of Arctic energy resources. This book explores the growing interests of China in the Arctic and examines the nature of its interests and motivations in maintaining its involvement and presence in the region.
A large number of scholarly works and policy analyses attempt to interpret China’s intentions of moving to the high north. Some argue that China’s interests in the Arctic are driven by its global strategic ambition, just like its Belt and Road Initiative,1 while others see China’s Arctic policy primarily driven by its economic pursuits related to energy, fishing and shipping, and see China as a responsible actor in the Arctic global governance.2 This book aims to add to the existing literature on this debate from three approaches, namely China’s participation in the international institutions, China’s relationships with the Arctic stakeholders and China’s sectoral engagement in the Arctic.
This book is composed of eight chapters. Chapter 2 lays out China’s newly published Arctic policy white paper issued in January 2018,3 which sets out China’s key principles for its policy goals in the Arctic – to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic. These policy goals and principles are reflected in the following chapters on the respective areas that China has shown interest in, including participating in Arctic governance affairs, promoting bilateral diplomacy in the Arctic area, accessing potential resources, exploiting shipping opportunities and undertaking polar research. Chapter 2 thus serves as an analytical framework for the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3, by taking on a broader definition of international institutions, explores China’s participation and engagement with relevant international organizations and its perception on relevant international norms and laws for governance of the Arctic. It highlights China’s present and future roles in respective international Arctic institutions involving governance (the Arctic Council), shipping (the International Maritime Organization), scientific research and fishing (the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Commercial Fishing on the High Seas of the central Arctic Ocean). Furthermore, Chapter 3 explores China’s stance on international laws regarding Arctic governance, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Steinberg Treaty, among others. China’s Arctic policy white paper reaffirms China’s international legal commitment towards the Arctic, which is politically significant. It presents China’s official policy position towards the Arctic, and thereby provides the foundation for other nations and organizations to act in mutual cooperation with China in the Arctic.
The role of stakeholders has become more salient in the Arctic policy agenda. Chapter 4 applies a broad concept of stakeholders and includes actors who are either significantly affected by an institution or capable of affecting it. It analyzes China’s partnership with the Arctic stakeholders, including the Arctic states (Russia, Canada, U.S., Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland), indigenous people and other Asian states who have similar interests as China in the Arctic, such as Japan and South Korea, that were granted observer status of the Arctic Council at the same time with China in 2013. In order to advance bilateral diplomacy in the Arctic region, China is making two separate but simultaneous efforts. First, China is focusing on resource acquisition in the Arctic through resources-oriented diplomacy, with Russia, Canada and the U.S., for instance. Second, China is trying to expand its influence by bolstering relations with five countries in northern Europe. Cooperation between China and the Nordic states on security and development is growing along with mixed reactions. As Chinese and Nordic commercial and geopolitical activities become closer, questions will be raised about various aspects of the Nordic region, which include the environmental pressures of increased human activity on Arctic ecosystems and the position of geopolitically vulnerable gateway states and small island territories such as Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland in such development.4 While China is pursuing its interests in shipping and resource development in the Arctic, it is careful to emphasize that these developments will be fulfilled in a way that respects the traditions and cultures of the Arctic residents, including the indigenous peoples, while conserving the natural environment at the same time. China has emphasized that it is also willing to cooperate with other Asian non-Arctic states in these areas as well.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 take the sectoral approach – analyzing China’s engagement in the key sectors in the Arctic: shipping, resource development, and science and research. Chapter 5 discusses the melting Arctic and its impact on China’s shipping industry. For China and other non-Arctic states, their position on the legal status of the Northwest Passage (NWP) and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is a fundamental question. Sooner or later, the non-Arctic states will have to adopt a clear position on whether these two passages enjoy the status of international waters for navigation, as the United States and the EU hold, or whether they are internal waters, as Canada and Russia insist. In addition to commercial shipping, the white paper also implies that China is interested in supporting and encouraging its enterprises to cooperate with Arctic states in developing tourism in the region, and calls for concerted efforts to enhance security, insurance and rescue systems to ensure the safety of tourists in the Arctic. This chapter also highlights the debate on China’s call for building a “Polar Silk Road in the Arctic.” China expresses a desire to work with all parties to build a “Polar Silk Road” by developing Arctic shipping routes and encourages its enterprises to participate in infrastructure development for these routes and has conducted commercial trial voyages in accordance with the law to pave the way for regular commercial operations. Skeptics have argued that China’s Arctic ambitions are largely fueled by the economic and political appeal of dominating a resource-rich area. On the other hand, despite criticism in the West due to concerns that China is ensnaring developing countries in debt, it’s welcomed by some of the smaller Arctic players keen on building economic ties with China.
The only way for non-Arctic states to be engaged in resource development is through cooperation with the littoral states in the Arctic. Chapter 6 analyzes each Arctic state’s attitude towards China’s engagement in non-living resource development in the Arctic. China’s Arctic policy white paper emphasizes China’s interests in utilizing Arctic resources in a lawful and rational manner. Chinese enterprises, which utilize their advantages in capital, technology and the domestic market, are required to observe the laws of relevant states, conduct risk assessments for resource exploration and are encouraged to participate in the exploration of oil, gas and mineral resources in the Arctic through cooperation in various forms and on the condition of protecting the eco-environment of the Arctic. This chapter also explores the reactions from the Arctic states with whom China has been engaged in resource development and discusses the debate on the “debt trap” in the Arctic context.
China’s footprint in the Arctic has been adequately established primarily in the scientific research field, while commerce and multilateral governance have been secondary. Chapter 7 explains China’s research activities in the Arctic through cooperation with North Polar states. China has taken an active role in intensifying research in both the Arctic and Antarctic regions and maintains an active polar research program. The implied potential of science diplomacy indicates options for rising powers, such as China, to integrate into regional economies while mitigating threat perceptions. However, limitations can exist when science is used as an instrument of power – and challenge its objectivity – which can render science diplomacy itself as controversial. China’s science efforts have translated into greater levels of trust and can be categorize as the sharing scientific resources, long-term interactions among scientists, reinforcing knowledge-based institutions and spillover effects.
Chapter 8 brings into discussion China’s approach to international and regional cooperation in the Arctic. The gradual disappearance of Arctic sea ice raises serious sovereignty and security issues, some of which are increasingly evident in the evolving relationships between the Arctic states and non-Arctic states such as China, Japan, and South Korea. In the same vein, there is a strong and practical need to strengthen international cooperation on Arctic matters. Recognizing and respecting each other’s rights constitutes the legal basis for cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states. In accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other relevant international legal frameworks, Arctic states have sovereign rights and jurisdiction in their respective areas in the Arctic region, while non-Arctic states also enjoy rights of scientific research and navigation. Arctic and non-Arctic states have different rights, interests and specific concerns with regards to Arctic-related issues. However, peace, stability and sustainable development in the Arctic serve the common interests of both Arctic and non-Arctic states. Mutually beneficial cooperative partnerships that promote and enhance these interests will surely be the most appropriate way forward in a region of growing global importance.
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