China's International Transboundary Rivers

Politics, Security and Diplomacy of Shared Water Resources

Lei Xie, Jia Shaofeng

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781134973866
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Categoría: Diplomacia y tratados

China has forty major transboundary watercourses with neighbouring countries, and has frequently been accused of harming its downstream neighbours through its domestic water management policies, such as the construction of dams for hydropower. This book provides an understanding of water security in Asia by investigating how shared water resources affect China's relationships with neighbouring countries in South, East, Southeast and Central Asia.

Since China is an upstream state on most of its shared transboundary rivers, the country's international water policy is at the core of Asia's water security. These water disputes have had strong implications for China's interstate relations, and also influenced its international water policy alongside domestic concerns over water resource management.

This book investigates China's policy responses to domestic water crises and examines China's international water policy as well as its strategy in dealing with international cooperation. The authors describe the key elements of water diplomacy in Asia which demonstrate varying degrees of effectiveness of environmental agreements. It shows how China has established various institutional arrangements with neighbouring countries, primarily in the form of bilateral agreements over hydrological data exchange. Detailed case studies are included of the Mekong, Brahmaputra, Ili and Amur rivers.

1 China’s transboundary rivers: politics, diplomacy and security

An introduction

Introduction: an understanding of water cooperation

Conventional wisdom suspects that competition over water is a source of conflict at varying levels of intensity. According to Homer-Dixon (1999), ecological impacts have strong adverse effects on human populations and result in competition for resources which can lead to national conflicts as well as violence between countries. Yet, methodologically, that body of work on environmentally induced conflict has so far only produced findings that lack the support of systematic empirical evidence (Gleick, 1990; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Butts, 1997). We are thus informed that countries are more likely to react to water disputes with cooperation than to fight for control and management of natural resources (Wolf, 1999; Brochmann and Hensel, 2009). Theories of international relations including realism and neo-liberalism have been adopted as theoretical tools to understand why countries are incentivized to form water agreements. However, both of these theoretical concepts have limitations in explaining the complex conditions upon which formal agreements are reached (Tir and Ackerman, 2009).

Indeed, the understanding of water cooperation has been contentious. In studies of water conflict, water cooperation refers to the negotiating process that countries engage in to soften disagreement and resolve conflicts over the use of shared water resources. It is recognized that diplomatic initiatives play a significant role in mitigating interstate disputes over water resources. A visible simplified dichotomy is often found of the term water cooperation (Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008). For example, conflicts are equalized as events of political tensions, or extreme conflictive events (Tir and Ackerman, 2009), and according to Gerlak and Grant (2009), cooperation is viewed as an opposite position to conflict. Moreover, some authors argue that cooperation and conflicts are hard to distinguish, as they can occur simultaneously in negotiating over how river basins are shared (Wolf et al., 2003; Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008; Zawahri and Gerlak, 2009). Certain issues around water management are identified as sources of tension. And the major causes of tension constitute, for instance, competition over freshwater supplies (Wolf et al., 2005), navigation (Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006; Collier, 2007) and the deterioration of water quality in shared river systems (Yoffe et al., 2003).

It is noteworthy that lacking a cross-disciplinary approach, single-disciplinary research has not yet succeeded in providing solutions to solving issues related to international rivers that run through two or more countries. Studies of international politics focus on the nature of water conflicts as a potential trigger to exacerbate friction in interstate relations. Such a view has been criticized for being too ‘linear and incremental’ (Biswas, 2011: 663), and is now being challenged in light of the nature of water conflicts of varying scales of intensity (Bernauer and Kalbhenn, 2010; Biswas, 2011). Natural scientists and engineers primarily focus on watershed analysis, international law principles or technical issues in cooperation (Tolba and Rummel-Bulska, 1998; Biswas, 2011). Based on rational choice perspective, they assume that individual states are merely incentivized by scientific judgement, neglecting situations where political interests are combined in states cooperative initiatives. While they contribute greatly to the sustainable management of domestic water resources, they are impeded by incorporating little consideration of how foreign relations impact on state behaviour and their preferences in water management.

Water has a multifaceted nature and is perceived in various ways. Water cooperation is a complicated arena where domestic politics and international relations intersect, it involves a complexity of features, and it may be vested with various interests. Therefore, an open mind is required to understand the complex features of water cooperation.

Water cooperation in Asia

Transboundary water courses, also termed international rivers, are rivers that run across territorial borders. They abound in Asia and are shared among many countries, in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Vietnam. River basins, such as the Mekong basin, represent resource-rich hotspots for riparian states. These states are also facing growing pressures to react to global change, particularly in the forms of industrialization, climate change and increasing demands for ecosystem protection (Varis et al., 2012). Indeed, increasing pressures are being exerted on water resources from a high level of both poverty and population growth, and from rapid urbanization. Most countries are experiencing difficulties in the sustainable management and development of water resources, which are used in cross-sectoral ways for environmental protection, economic growth, and the production of food and energy. Vulnerability in the river basin is unevenly spread among riparian states (Gain and Schwab, 2012).

Issues of managing international rivers in Asia have been heatedly debated. Concerns have been raised over the approaches that Asian countries are taking to develop and sustainably manage water basins. Most of all, competition over freshwater supplies is thought by many to be a cause of violent conflicts, and this notion has inspired considerable scholarship. Although very weak causal links have been found between water-related armed factions and interstate hostilities (Bernauer and Kalbhenn, 2010), contextual factors in Asia have raised the questions of if, and to what extent, countries are likely to react to water disputes through cooperation rather than conflict for the control and management of natural resources. Various conditions are recognized as impacting on the potential for countries to cooperate in the sharing of water basins. These contextual factors have raised the questions of if, and to what extent, countries can succeed in reacting to water disputes through diplomatic cooperation rather than conflict for the control and management of natural resources. Some of the major issues identified are outlined next.

Regional security in South Asia and South-East Asia has been found to be unstable and rapidly changing. In this region, power relations are generally unstable, with historical mistrust and various political frictions, such as border disputes. Water disputes are likely to worsen political tensions among adjoining riparian states that share water resources. International politics have impacted on the mapping of major rivers. For example, in North and Central Asia the creation of new states following the disintegration of the former Soviet Union has increased the number of international watercourses (Biswas, 2008). The newly independent states are left in the void of effective institutional arrangements and are faced with increasing threats relating to conflicting interests and political tensions.¹

Developing countries are noted to be lacking the commitment to international environmental norms which facilitate interstate cooperation (Bernauer and Kalbhenn, 2010). Agreeable foreign relations are a prerequisite for regime formation (Haftendorn, 2000; Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2012). However, most of the riparian states are also not party to major global water norms, but remain keen to cope with water conflicts through bilateral foreign relations.² Bilateral agreements over transboundary river basins have been the primary form of cooperation among neighbouring riparian states. For instance, no clear programme to develop collective water management practices has been initiated among the Brahmaputra riparian countries, the Ili River basin, nor the Amur River basin. The Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna (GBM) River system is regarded as one of the least coordinated in the world (ICA, 2012). It has been suggested that authoritarian states are less likely to join cooperative mechanisms to address water disputes and that this is likely to lead to worsened political tensions with their adjoining riparian states (Brochmann and Hensel, 2009; Gerlak and Grant, 2009). This may also apply to other Asian countries with restrictive regimes. It is therefore not surprising that the governance of Asia’s transboundary river basins is rather weak (Varis et al., 2012).

The weak capacity of many neighbouring riparian states is another important factor affecting Asian countries’ formation of cooperative efforts. These countries are likely to be facing concerns around water management, including the pressing needs to improve water management capacity and development outcomes, as well as requirements to improve economic, institutional and technological instruments (Biswas, 2011). Additionally, the above-mentioned riparian countries are faced with challenges in effectively establishing multiple levels of governance arrangements that are crucial to realizing sustainable development (Dietz et al., 2003; Raadgever et al., 2008). With their capacity to govern water and to respond to increasing environmental change being questioned, these countries are hypothesized as being likely to be involved in interstate conflicts over natural resources (Homer-Dixon, 1994).

Water disputes and China’s diplomacy

China has rich water resources, which includes 42 major transboundary watercourses (including lakes) that are shared with neighbouring countries in the north-west, north-east and south-west of the country. These countries are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Vietnam. This ranks China after Russia and Argentina as the third nation (together with Chile) with the largest number of international rivers (Liu et al., 2006). Among China’s rivers, 15 are among the world’s longest rivers. Twelve of these rivers originate in China, and in some cases there are multiple watercourses shared with countries that include Russia, Mongolia and Myanmar. China is upstream of most shared transboundary rivers. Among these, water disputes have been identified about water quality or quantity, namely the Yalu, Tumen, Amur, Suifen, Irtysh, Ili, Tarim, Indus, Ganga, Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy, Salween, Mekong, Red and the Pearl Rivers, which are regarded by the Chinese as the most important (see Figure 1.1) (He et al., 2014). More specifically, international rivers in the north-east are characterized as border rivers;³ in the south-east, transboundary rivers originate from both within China and from outside the country; while in the south-west, most originate from within the country.

Figure 1.1 China’s transboundary rivers.

Source: authors’ commission, credit: Jiabao Yan.

Foreign policy and diplomacy

The issue of sharing water has raised disputes and sometimes tensions between China and its lower riparian neighbours, some of whose inhabitants are among the poorest in the world (Khan, 1996; Bandyopadhyay and Ghosh, 2009). Being located upstream, China, on various occasions, has been accused of taking unilateral actions that cause damage to downstream countries’ interests such as constructing dams or water diversion projects (Chowdhury, 2010; Sood and Mathukumalli, 2011). These water disputes are regarded as a source of conflict between China and its downstream neighbours. Given their status as developing nations, these neighbouring countries may experience particular challenges to resolving this conflict. With China actively seeking to protect its own interests by accessing and exploiting water resources, its water interactions with neighbouring countries are regarded as having the potential to spark conflict at the interstate level.

Nevertheless, varying degrees of diplomatic initiatives have been formed between China and its neighbouring riparian states. This is primarily confirmed by developing water treaties in the form of agreements or memoranda of understanding (MOUs) (see Table 1.1). Joint bodies have been established to implement agreed resolutions. This is seen in water agreements with Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan and India. Lately, China has proactively promoted the formation of the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation Mechanism (LMCM), which is based on the multilateral mechanism of the ASEAN organization and serves to coordinate water sharing over the Mekong. This mechanism is designed by China with the support from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. For the first time, an institutional cooperation has formed among all of the Lancang–Mekong River riparian states. These states include China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. With China’s involvement, the multilateral mechanism has, for the first time, resulted in state-led cooperation over the Lancang–Mekong River.

Table 1.1 China’s bilateral mechanisms on water

...

Country of interaction	Number of agreements	Water information
Russia	13 treaties	Hydrological information
North Korea	11 treaties	Ibid.
Kazakhstan	9 treaties

Índice

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• List of abbreviations
• 1 China’s transboundary rivers: politics, diplomacy and security – an introduction
• 2 The governance of water resources in China
• 3 China’s policy over international rivers: perception and diplomatic practices
• 4 Theoretical debate: water diplomacy
• 5 South-East Asia: China’s water diplomacy on the Mekong River
• 6 South Asia: China’s evolving attitude over the GBM
• 7 Central Asia: Sino-Kazakh water diplomacy on the Ili and Irtysh Rivers
• 8 North-East Asia: Sino-Russian cooperation over the Amur River
• 9 Comparison and conclusions
• 10 Policy recommendations
• Index