Laser Weapons In Space

Policy And Doctrine

Keith B. Payne

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429716911
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Politics & International Relations
• Categoría: Politics

This is the first comprehensive examination of the issues surrounding the potential development by the United States of a space-based laser weapons program. The authors assess the implications of arms control agreements for a satellite-based laser program, including discussions of recent Soviet space-related arms control initiatives and the forthcoming ABM treaty review. They outline likely Soviet responses to a U.S. space-based laser system, address criticisms of the proposed program, and consider its future in light of developments in U.S. defense strategy and doctrine.

1
Introduction and Overview of Policy Issues

Keith B. Payne

This book addresses the policy issues associated with space-based lasers as a means of ballistic missile defense (BMD). It is not a technical feasibility study, and no attempt has been made to calculate either the absolute or the opportunity costs of space-based lasers. However, the following chapter by Dr. Patrick Priel, does provide a technical overview of space-based BMD. The focus of the book is on a different order of question: how well or poorly would such a system (assuming it could be built and built effectively) serve the national interest? More specifically, the implications of space-based lasers for arms control, U.S.-Soviet relations, deterrence, and nuclear strategy, are examined in detail.

In this chapter it is argued that space-based lasers would enhance, not undermine, crisis stability. Space-based lasers could be used to improve the survivability of U.S. strategic forces, promoting deterrence. It is the assured survivability of a retaliatory force, not the vulnerability of our own society, which is the key to deterrence stability. It is argued that by promoting deterrence, space-based lasers would accomplish one of the primary objectives of arms control -- reduce the probability of war. While deployment of a space-based BMD system would involve either renegotiation or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the strategic rationale for continued U.S. support of that agreement is not unassailable. The failure to achieve an adequate arms control agreement on offensive arms which would ensure the survival of land-based ICBMs, has removed much of the rationale for continued acceptance of the Treaty.

In the third chapter, "Implications of Arms Control Agreements for Space-Based Laser BMD," Alan Jones analyzes those provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty and other international agreements which impinge on the development, testing, and deployment of space-based lasers. Dr. Jones argues that the ABM Treaty is the only extant agreement that would affect a decision to pursue this type of technology. However, the Treaty permits "substantial partial testing of components for space-based BMD lasers while prohibiting full-system testing and deployment of such systems."

In chapter four, "Space-Based Lasers ror Ballistic Missile Defense: Soviet Policy Options," Rebecca Strode examines possible Soviet military responses to U.S. space-based laser BMD, the role of missile defense in Soviet strategy, and the manner in which the U.S.S.R. has responded to technological challenges in the past. Ms. Strode concludes that there is little chance that the Soviet Union would respond to deployment of a U.S. space-based laser with a direct attack. Instead, the Soviets would use political means to drive a wedge between Western Europe and the United States, arguing that American actions were responsible for "the death of arms control." Ms. Strode also analyzes a number of technical responses, including comparable BMD deployments and possible increases in offensive systems. While the Soviets would probably wish to combine a number of potential responses, economic constraints may force greater reliance on one option in the long run. Ms. Strode speculates that this option would probably be BMD.

The essential backdrop for the policy issues sparked by space-based lasers is the on-going debate over strategy- Barry Schneider traces the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy since the Second World War in chapter five, "Space-Based Lasers and the Evolution of Strategic Thought." The combination of nuclear weapons with ballistic missiles caused a decisive shift in favor of the offense over the defense. This led to strategic theories such as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which based deterrence solely on the ability to retaliate against the opponent's urban/industrial base. Starting with the Schlesinger Doctrine in 1974, there has been a continuous shift towards strategies which rest deterrence on the ability to neutralize any military advantages which the Soviet Union might gain by attacking. In this context, there has been renewed interest in strategic defense. Space-based laser BMD holds out some hope (although there are admitted technical obstacles) that the balance between the offense and the defense might be restored.

In the concluding chapter, Colin S. bray surveys the Reagan Administration's defense policy with particular emphasis on its attitudes towards strategic defense. The Administration has shown greater interest in strategic defense than its predecessor, demonstrated by increased funding levels. However, many in the Administration are skeptical about the technical possibilities and fearful of a negative public reaction. This is unfortunate since the greatest gap in current American strategy is its failure to provide for the defense of our population. If space-based laser BMD is feasible, Dr. Gray argues, then it could make a valuable contribution to our deterrence posture by serving as the first layer of defense. Dr. Gray cautions, however, that lasers will not remove the need for other strategic systems, but will be one part of a layered force structure combining both offensive and defensive elements.

Deterrence Stability

It must be recognized that deterrence stability is the primary U.S. objective in its relations with the Soviet Union. The framework within which space-based lasers must be regarded is that of deterrence. Consequently, an issue of critical import is, "how does a space-based laser program contribute to the deterrence objective; and would a space-based laser program degrade deterrence?"

The primary non-technical criticism directed toward space-based laser development is that such a system, if ever deployed, would promote crisis instability. Crisis instability involves the "reciprocal fears of preemption" that would intensify during an intense political/military crisis. According to this theory, reciprocal fears of preemption would cause mutual incentives to preempt, to launch the first-strike rather than suffer the first-strike, and obtain military benefits therein. A space-based laser BMD system would promote "crisis-instability," according to its critics, because it could lead American decision-makers to think that a nuclear war could be waged successfully: that is, the U.S. could launch a first-strike and thereby degrade Soviet retaliatory capabilities, and then degrade the effectiveness of Soviet retaliatory strikes via employment of space-based laser BMD. Thus, the U.S. could deny the Soviet Union its deterrent, and the Soviet leadership, fearing precisely such an occurrence during a crisis, would seek to gain the advantage of the first-strike. In terms of Soviet strategic forces, the Soviet Union would be placed under pressures to "use'em or lose'em", as the jargon has it.

The U.S. has long taken the prospect of crisis instability very seriously, and to a great extent, it has deployed forces that would, in principal, promote crisis stability.¹ As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown observed:

In the interests of stability, we avoid the capability" of eliminating the other side'S "deterrent', insofar as we might be able'to do so. In short, we must be quite willing—as we have been for some time—to accept the principle of mutual deterrence and design our defense posture in light of that principle. (Emphasis added)²

There is nothing in previous Soviet behavior or strategic doctrine to suggest that any specific weapons, such as space-based lasers, would be targeted apart from a more general war; and, if they were not willing to risk a general war, attacks on U.S. space-based lasers would make little sense. Only if the Soviets feared that the United States was on the verge of completing a decisive war-winning weapon in space that would totally change the strategic balance to their disadvantage, would preemptive attacks on U.S. SBL-BMDs make any sense. Even then, unless the Soviet civil, air, and missile defenses were capable of neutralizing U.S. retaliatory nuclear attacks, such an idea would be inviting disaster.

Nevertheless, leaders of powerful states do not easily stand by and watch their adversaries gain a strategic military lead over them. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was one indication of the severe reaction of a superpower, the United States, not permitting the other superpower to gain a 5 to 10 year advantage (allowing them to "catch up" strategically) by deploying new weapons (MRBMs and IRBMs) within range of targets then only partially covered by Soviet ICBMs. The Israeli air attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor facility in Osirak on June 7, 1981, is a recent example of a state willing to attack preemptively a facility that could produce a decisive shift in the balance of power. Might not the building of space-based laser battle stations invite a high altitude "Osirak"? The Soviets might decide to risk it figuring that the loss of U.S. life would be minimal and that the events would take place in space, far from U.S. territory. As Edgar Ulsamer has observed:

Those who shrug off the vast technological and enginering problems associated with a space-based laser ballistic missile defense system still confront a monumental obstacle: the excessive vulnerability of such a space battle station combined with the excessive incentive for the other side to attack it preemptively.³

While such preemptive tactics have no precedent in Soviet behavior, and while this would invite a costly U.S. retaliation, if the U.S. space-based laser system was threatening enough, Soviet leaders still might strike out into uncharted skies and launch a preemptive Pearl Harbor in space. Since highly efficient SBL-BMDs might one day shift the strategic balance, they would serve as tempting targets before they could be completed.

It does not, however, seem likely that a space-based laser BMD system would promote crisis instability. The U.S. has limited capabilities to attack hardened Soviet ICBMs. A first-strike by U.S. missiles against Soviet silos would destroy no more than 30 percent of the modern Soviet SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 launchers.⁴ As mentioned above, the U'. consciously has avoided force modernization programs that would threaten the Soviet deterrent. No space-based laser program under consideration could come near to coping with the number of Soviet ICBMs that would survive a U.S. first-strike. Space-based laser BMD would not deny the Soviet Union its deterrent.

Modernization of U.S. strategic forces is likely to add countersilo competence to the U.S. strategic force posture. Consequently, it could be argued that a space-based laser BMD program, complemented by 2000 countersilo warheads, would constitute a first-strike threat in the Soviet perspective, and thus promote crisis instability.

However, modernization of the U.S. ICBM force will entail enhanced survivability. It is now fairly obvious that if the MX is deployed, it will have to be done in what at least appears to be a highly survivable basing mode. Additionally, modernization of the strategic bomber leg of the triad will emphasize survivability with the deployment of the B-1B and possibly a "Stealth" (Advanced Technology Bomber) follow on. It has long been understood that strategic force survivability is the key to minimizing crisis instability, regardless of the degree of vulnerability of urban and industrial assets. If U.S. strategic forces possess a high level of survivability, and thus the U.S. retaliatory threat cannot be degraded by a Soviet first-strike, crisis instability should not occur. Crisis instability would not emerge because the Soviet Union could not anticipate minimizing losses or gaining an advantageous position through preemption. Indeed, a very high degree of survivability should ensure a net loss for the Soviet Union if it launched a first-strike in terms of the "correlation of forces". Such a situation would minimize crisis instability, even if the U.S. were capable of significant damage-limitation in nuclear war.

The Soviet perspective on this matter is extremely important. The Soviet Union has exhibited very little concern in promoting crisis instability in its buildup of a formidable countersilo capability. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown observed in 1980 that the U.S. ICBM force was then, or soon would be, vulnerable to a Soviet first-strike.⁵ Soviet leaders obviously are less concerned than their American counterparts in "threatening the opponent's deterrent."

The Soviets have, However, enrorcea crisis stability by ensuring the survivability of their own strategic forces; something the U.S., with all its officially expressed concern for crisis instability, has failed to do. The Soviet effort to enforce crisis stability is instructive when considering the case made against space-based laser BMD because it illustrates well the point made above: providing U.S. strategic forces with a high degree of survivability is the key to stability, not maintaining the absolute vulnerability of urban/industrial America.

Another Soviet perspective that is important in this regard is their view of the "correlation of forces" and the objectives of the initial phase of nuclear war. The Soviet approach to nuclear war specifies that during the initial phase of operations, a "decisive" change in the correlation of forces must be achieved.⁶ Soviet writing on nuclear war is clear in its focus upon the need for preemption, surprise, and primarily counterforce operations against American military forces, particularly nuclear forces.⁷ The Soviets emphasize that to engage in nuclear threat without such a capability would be adventurism of the worst order.⁸

What are the implications or tnis soviet perspective for space-based laser BMD, and the allegation that it would promote crisis instability? First, degrading the Soviet capability to retaliate against American cities is unlikely to enhance Soviet incentives to preempt. Thus, if space-based laser BMD, in conjunction with enhanced U.S. counterforce capabilities, poses a threat to Soviet urban/industrial retaliatory capabilities, Soviet incentives to preempt in a crisis need not heighten. Second, the surest means of minimizing Soviet incentives to preempt would be to provide for the survivability of U.S. strategic forces; doing so would ensure that the Soviet Union could not "change the correlation of forces" via a first-strike. Consequently, to minimize crisis instability, the U.S. should concentrate upon force survivability, not societal vulnerability. A reduction in vulnerability of urban/industrial America should not affect Soviet considerations of preemption as long as U.S. strategic forces are survivable. Thus, a highly survivable U.S. strategic force posture may be considered necessary for crisis stability not societal vulnerability, (assuming, of course, the penetrativity of U.S. forces in addition).

The necessity for highly survivable strategic forces to address the potential problem of crisis instability is critical to the development of weaponized, space-based lasers. This is because the systems(s) available during the foreseeable future would be more appropriate for providing force survivability than reducing urban/industrial vulnerability. Consequently the case can, and indeed should, be made that space-based laser development would not pose a potential threat to crisis stability; rather, if it can perform the missions envisaged, such as preferential ICBM launcher defense, it would contribute to crisis stability.

Disarmament and Arms Control

As is the case with other strategic weapons programs, or potential programs, intended to enhance the survivability of U.S. deterrent forces, (e.g. Trident ballistic missile carrying submarines, B-1B Bombers, conventional BMD for ICBM defense, hardened ICBM launchers, etc.), augmenting such U.S. capabilities should reduce the probability of war. That is, promoting U.S. strategic force survivability should lend credence to the American retaliatory threat and minimize crisis instability. Consequently, it should also reduce the probability of war.

It should be remembered that the two priority objectives of arms control are to:

• reduce the probabilit...

Índice

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Acknowledgments
• 1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF POLICY ISSUES
• 2 SPACE-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNICAL ISSUES
• 3 IMPLICATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR SPACE-BASED BMD LASERS
• 4 SPACE-BASED LASERS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: SOVIET POLICY OPTIONS
• 5 SPACE-BASED LASERS AND THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC THOUGHT
• 6 THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION: TRENDS, PROBLEMS, AND THE POTENTIAL RELEVANCE OF SPACE-BASED LASER WEAPONS
• Acronyms and Abbreviations
• Index
• About the Contributors