Politics In Chile

Democracy, Authoritarianism, And The Search For Development, Third Edition

Lois Hecht Oppenheim

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2018
• ISBN:
  9780429974465
• Edición: 3
• Categoría: Politique et relations internationales
• Categoría: Politique

The third edition of Politics in Chile provides significantly updated coverage of Chilean politics and economic development from the return to civilian rule in 1990 to the 2006 election and early administration of Socialist Michelle Bachelet, Chile's first woman president. Lois Hecht Oppenheim focuses on recent efforts to reconstruct democratic practices and institutions, including resolving such sensitive and lingering issues as human-rights violations under Pinochet and civil-military relations. Chapters on the contemporary politics and economics under the civilian Concertaci governments are largely rewritten for this edition. Rather than focusing on the "search for development", the third edition considers in greater depth the "exceptionalism" of the Chilean economic experiment through successive stages of stability, socialism, and neoliberalism.

Part One

Introduction

1

An Overview of Chilean Politics

On September 11, 1973, at around 9:30 A.M., I heard the radio crackle in my apartment in Santiago, as Chile’s President Salvador Allende Gossens addressed the nation. This was no ordinary speech.

Surely this will be my last opportunity to address you.... My words are not spoken in bitterness. I shall pay with my life for the loyalty of the people.... The seed we have planted in the worthy consciousness of thousands upon thousands of Chileans cannot forever remain unharvested.... They have the might and they can enslave us, but they cannot halt the world’s social progresses, not with crimes, nor with guns. History is ours, and the people of the world will determine it.

Allende’s speech was soon replaced by martial music. Military orders were announced, including a curfew to begin by 3 P.M. that day. It was to last almost two days. I listened as a long list of the names of prominent government and party leaders was read over the radio, along with the admonition that they should turn themselves in. Later, I heard military vehicles rumbling down the street, accompanied by the sound of gunfire.

The next evening I watched as the four members of the military junta appeared on television to explain why they had acted and what would happen now. “We had to cut out the cancer of Marxism from Chile,” declared General Gustavo Leigh Guzmán of the air force, whose officers had virtually destroyed the presidential palace, the Moneda, in their bombing. “We do not wish to carry out vengeance against those who supported Allende,” said General César Mendoza, head of the National Police. “Congress is closed until further notice. Political parties are in recess until further notice,” boomed General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, head of the army and commandant of the armed forces, hitting his fist on the desk in front of him for emphasis.¹ The images were unsettling, but little did I realize, along with eleven million Chileans, that it would be over sixteen years before an elected civilian would take office again as president of Chile. In the interim, Chile would become, in many ways, a different country.

A small country, distant from the United States, with a “crazy geography” that extends like a sliver down thousands of miles of Pacific coastline in South America, from the Atacama Desert in the north to the Antarctic in the south, Chile has had a political significance that far outweighs its size. This is due in large part to Chile’s exceptionalism, that is, to the fact that it has served as the site for quite diverse political experiments over the course of its history. These included a raucously democratic, inclusive, and seemingly stable multiparty system that spanned the political spectrum, from conservatives to communists and Marxist socialists during the 1930s to the early 1970s; Chile’s short-lived experiment with a “Peaceful Road to Socialism” after the 1970 election of the Marxist Socialist Salvador Allende Gossens as president; and the ensuing experiment with a rigid form of neoliberalism imposed by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte in the aftermath of the September 11, 1973, military coup. Last, in the post-1990 period Chile experienced a return to democracy as well as sustained macro-level economic growth under the aegis of the Center-Left ruling coalition, the Concertación, and gained the nickname of an economic “jaguar” along the way.

Today, Chile finds itself “normalized,” that is, economically and politically stable and democratic. This stands in contrast to many of the region’s nations, which have struggled to maintain political order and legitimacy, often in the face of heightened political conflict and ineffective governments unable to meet the needs of their populations. In response, there has also been the emergence of nationalist and populist leaders. Ironically, then, Chile’s economic success and adherence to a globally oriented free market economic strategy puts it at odds with many of the region’s governments, which take a more skeptical stance toward global inclusion under the terms set forth by the United States.

The story of Chile’s experimentation with different political and economic approaches to development has also taken place in a changing international context, from Cold War to post-Cold War to the War on Terror. One international constant in this changing environment has been the role of the United States in influencing events in Chile.

What accounts for this history, which has put Chile in the international spotlight and has made it an exceptional case in the region? There are many questions to ask along the way: Why in 1973 had there been such violence, which, once unleashed, threatened to destroy one of the oldest democracies in the Western Hemisphere? Why was so much brutality directed against supporters of Allende’s political coalition, the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity; UP), in a country hitherto known for political tolerance? How did an army general, Augusto Pinochet, after seizing power in a coordinated military action and becoming a virtual dictator, lose the 1988 plebiscite, even with all of the power of the state behind him? How could a military dictatorship be toppled by means of the ballot box? How could the new democracy survive with Pinochet still installed as head of the army? How did the Center-Left civilian governments manage to decrease poverty dramatically while still maintaining the basic outlines of the market model they had inherited from the military?

This book provides an answer to these questions by exploring the characteristics of Chile’s diverse economic and political experiments. It reflects on the political changes that have taken place in Chile by examining the ways in which class and other group interests interacted with party politics and political leadership. Thus it illuminates the process by which Chile underwent such radical political changes over the past forty years.

The Context for Politics

Before I turn to an examination of Chilean politics, it is important to understand the context within which politics has taken place in Chile. Chilean society has historically been highly segmented and stratified. The groups in contention may be social classes, other economic interests or fractions of classes; other social and political actors, such as women, youth, or the Catholic church; or the military. In general terms, Chile’s complex social structure has been made up of a large popular sector, or lower class, of peasants, urban and rural workers, and urban shantytown dwellers; a heterogeneous middle sector consisting of teachers and other professionals, white-collar workers, bureaucrats, small merchants, and the like; and an upper class of landowners and businessmen. These social forces may or may not act cohesively or share explicitly understood interests. They are often internally fragmented and give loyalty to different political parties. Intraclass divisions notwithstanding, these social forces also come into conflict with each other over basic issues of distribution of wealth and income, control of economic resources—land, for example—and, ultimately, of political power.²

Despite the fact that twentieth-century Chile was economically underdeveloped, its politics were characterized by active popular participation. Sometimes fractions of classes acted; for example, small entrepreneurs took a leading oppositional role against the Allende government. At times other social forces or groups, such as women, spearheaded popular mobilization. Women were leaders both in the anti-Allende movement in the early 1970s and in popular mobilizations against the Pinochet dictatorship in the 1980s. In the latter case, women overcame class and party differences to work together for a common political goal. The poor or the popular classes have also been active players, despite their being the disadvantaged segments of a highly stratified population. As Janice Perlman pointed out in her study of Brazilian shantytown dwellers, the poor, despite their abject living conditions, are not economic, social, and political marginals; rather, they are politically aware actors who are able to mobilize in order to attain concrete goals.³ Literature on new social movements in Latin America also sees the popular classes, organized at the grass roots, as an important economic force in the informal economy and as constituting a potentially powerful political force.⁴ We will see how the poor in Chile, along with other social and political forces, organized to defend their interests and participated in the political arena.

For much of Chile’s history, class and other group conflicts were channeled through electoral and institutional mechanisms. In order to understand why this process collapsed so dramatically in 1973, we need to explore the linkages between economic issues and politics, including the kinds of economic development policies available to political leaders and the stresses these put on society and the constitutional system.

A Political Economy Approach to Chilean Politics

Political and economic issues are interconnected and form the context within which governmental policies are made. The intertwining of political and economic decisions is evident everywhere in the world, but perhaps it is most visible in less-developed countries, where major political decisions seem to center around issues of economic development, with a clear impact on different groups in society.

There is, however, no consensus about which strategy to use to achieve development or, more fundamentally, what development means. The fundamental underlying issue of development is, in the words of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, development for whom and for what purpose? Is overall economic growth development? Meeting basic needs? Industrializing? Achieving self-reliance? Embedded within these distinct definitions are alternative goals for and visions of society. For example, if overall economic growth is taken as a primary goal, what happens to redistribution of wealth—and, ultimately, power—in society? If, under this model, wealth and power become more concentrated, what can or should be done about it? For example, should political leaders postpone redistributive efforts until a future time when there is more wealth to divide? Should they focus on redistribution from the outset or simply assume that greater wealth will trickle down to the population at large? Declaring industrialization the major goal will result in quite a different society and economy than selecting basic needs.

There are also questions that appear to be tactical but have much broader implications. For example, how active a role should the state take in fostering development, and how much should be left to market forces? What should the relationship of the less-developed country be to the world economy and foreign capital? Here again, these are not just questions of tactics but are intimately connected to competing visions of development and differing understandings of the roots of underdevelopment.

Decisions about development, then, are not just economic or technical decisions. The interests of various constituencies come into play when questions about development are raised. Choices about development strategy, therefore, are fundamental political choices, affecting the lifestyles of all groups in society.

Latin America has utilized a variety of development strategies in the course of its history. The first general approach was based on an export-driven economy, which was centered around cash crops and other primary products sold in the international marketplace. This was the strategy followed after independence from Spain, but it had its roots in the colonial period. In the twentieth century there was a reinterpretation of development to stress industrialization and a more inwardly directed economic-growth program. With this shift from an export orientation to one of encouraging domestic industry, the role of the state changed from a weak to a more centralized and activist stance. Greater industrialization also changed society and politics. Peasants migrated to the cities in search of work; a working class grew. Nationalist leaders came to the fore in a number of countries, for example, Getúlio Vargas in Brazil and Juan Perón in Argentina. These leaders found an important part of their popular base of support in the industrial working class, which they for their part helped to nourish.

From the 1950s on, a variety of strategies were applied to encourage industrialization, economic diversification, and development. Some suggested an orthodox capitalist economic model. In this approach, the focus was on creating a more stable and modern economy primarily through monetary policy and by encouraging private investment and trade. In essence, development meant overall economic growth. Inflation, typically high in Latin America, was singled out as a major factor impeding economic growth, and monetary policy was utilized to dampen it. Otherwise, the state did not need to take an activist role; private enterprise, both domestic and foreign, was believed to be critical for economic growth. By the 1970s, military regimes in Latin America were utilizing a very rigid version of this approach, called the neoliberal or new monetarist approach.⁵

A different view, following on the analysis of Raúl Prebisch, an Argentine economist who worked for the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), encouraged structural changes in the economy. Prebisch believed reforms were needed in order to overcome what he identified as structural bottlenecks to development. One bottleneck to development was the highly unequal landowning pattern of latifundios, extremely large landholdings, and minifundios, subsistence farms. Prebisch argued that this antiquated landowning system had led to inefficient farming, prevented self-sufficiency in food, and maintained an impoverished peasantry. All this held back development.

A second major obstacle to development was the unequal pattern of trade. Less-developed countries tended to be debtor nations because the value of the primary products they sold was much less than the array of food and manufactured goods they needed to buy from the more advanced industrialized nations. Prebisch believed that this pattern of trade was unintentional; however, that did not make it any less pernicious for poor nations.

A third major obstacle to development was the lack of progressive tax codes with which to raise revenue for government development programs. Prebisch recommended structural reforms to eliminate these bottlenecks. For example, the highly unequal land tenure pattern could be changed through land redistribution. An expanded, more centralized state was needed to guide the process of structural change. Although this approach involved governmental oversight of industrial development, including protective legislation and even attempts to control or buy out foreign control of major resources, the development process did not necessarily reject capitalism. Many structural reformers wanted to work within a capitalist system. They saw these reforms as helping to make their economy more modern and efficient.

A third general interpretation of how to develop was predicated on the assumption that Latin America had undergone a historical process of dependent development. In this view, Latin America’s economies had been changed after the conquest to meet the needs of distant nations rather than their own. The shift to cash cropping was one example. Those who took a dependency perspective often advocated a revolutionary, socialist, or Marxist approach. Those who favored this option agreed on the necessity to make structural changes of the type outlined by Prebisch. They also emphasized taking over control of the basic means of production, protecting basic industry from foreign competition and capital, and carrying out land reform. The purpose was to end what was perceived as a relationship of economic dependency with the more advanced industrial nations, what some called neocolonialism or imperialism. The state would have to play an activist role in order to break the ties of dependency. This radical structural position held that although economic growth was important, major emphasis should be on changing economic and political power relations.

These various development strategies were applied in Chile over the course of its history. The struggle over which to use accounts for much of the country’s political conflict.

Political Implications of Development Strategies

When Salvador Allende’s inert body, covered with a Bolivian poncho, was carried out of the charred Moneda Palace, it symbolized the death of an effort to apply a revolutionary socialist model for social change and to impose a radically different development model. The roots of these varied efforts go back to the beginnings of Chile’s history.

From Colonialism to the Twentieth Century

The colonial period in Chile, as for Spanish America as a whole, laid the social and economic foundations of the country. Under colonial rule, Latin America’s economy was geared to serve the needs of Spain. Mercantile theory defined a relationship whereby colonies were bound to the mother country, Spain, which had absolute legal control over shipping and could regulate production. Initially, the Spanish Crown was most interested in the extraction of precious metals—gold and silver. Later, the colonies began to produce cash crops for transport to Spain and dispersal to the rest of Europe. Agricultural cash-crop products, such as sugar, rubber, coffee, cotton, hemp, cacao, and indigo, were produced in place of native foodstuffs. The growth of cities and the construction of transportation infrastructures often met the needs of agro-exporters at the expense of local populations. Thus began the agro-export orientation of many of the Latin American economies.

Although Chile was a colonial backwater, it also developed an agro-export economy.⁶ The country’s economy during the colonial period was agricultural, dominated by latifundios, which were located principally in the country’s central valley, where half of Chile’s po...

Índice

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Dedication Page
• List of Tables
• Acronyms
• Preface to the Third Edition
• Part 1 Introduction
• Part 2 Chile’s Experiment in Socialism and the Collapse of Democracy, 1970–1973
• Part 3 Chile Under Military Rule, 1973–1989
• Part 4 Continuities and Change in Post-Pinochet Chile
• Notes
• Selected Bibliography
• index