Understanding Terrorism Innovation and Learning

Al-Qaeda and Beyond

Magnus Ranstorp,Magnus Normark

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781317538042
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Politique et relations internationales
• Categoría: Terrorisme

This book examines the role of terrorist innovation and learning in theory and practice, and in the context of three specific EU case-studies.

It is often said that terrorist groups are relatively conservative in character operating in a technological vacuum – relying almost exclusively on bombs and bullets. This observation masks increasing complexity and creativity and innovation within terrorist groups and one of the most distinguishing features of al-Qaeda's terrorist operations is its propensity for remarkable innovation. This book examines how and why terrorist groups innovate more generally and al-Qaeda-related terrorist plots in Europe more specifically. The starting point for this book was twofold. Firstly to examine the issue of innovation and learning more generically both in theory, within specific themes and within the context of al-Qaeda's influence on this process. Secondly, this book examines the evolution of specific al-Qaeda-related plots in three specific northern EU states – the United Kingdom, Denmark and Germany - where there has been a significant volume of planned, failed and executed terrorist plots. In particular, these case studies explore signs of innovation and learning.

This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism and counter-terrorism, political violence, security studies and IR in general.

1 Introduction

Understanding terrorism innovation and learning – Al-Qaeda and beyond

Magnus Ranstorp and Magnus Normark

DOI: 10.4324/9781315726816-1

It is often said that terrorist groups are relatively conservative in character operating in a technological vacuum – relying almost exclusively on bombs and bullets. This observation masks increasing complexity and creativity and innovation within terrorist groups. One of the most distinguishing features of al-Qaeda’s terrorist operations is its propensity for remarkable innovation. The out-of-the-box idea of using multiple, synchronized hijacked aircraft as missile systems against U.S. iconic targets in the 9/11 attacks of 2001 has been steadily matched by innovative al-Qaeda terror plots involving shoe bombs, liquid bombs targeting seven transatlantic aircraft in 2006, the Madrid train bomb in 2004, the multiple London 7/7 attacks with the train and Underground train bombs, to the 2010 knife attack on a British MP by Rohonara Choudhry and the 2010 Mumbai-style plot against Danish paper Jyllands-Posten, where terrorists planned to behead editors. Some of these terrorist plots are interconnected but many are unconnected.

Ever since the evolution of modern international terrorism in 1968, there has been a contagion effect and learning between different groups or attack modes.¹ In fact one could argue that the 9/11 idea of multiple, synchronized hijackings originated with the 1970 Dawsons Field hijackings of four aircraft (one other failed) from multiple airports. It is further not inconceivable that the 9/11 attackers had originally calculated that one of the plane attacks on 11 September 2001 would be captured on film in a similar fashion to the blowing up of aircraft on Dawsons Field in 1970 before the international press. Similarly it is possible to argue that the 2006 Transatlantic plot with liquid explosives was in some way inspired by strands of the 1994 Operation Bojinka in which Ramzi Yousef (behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center) smuggled on board separate components of a bomb, including a modified Casio watch as power source, and assembled these into a workable explosive device.² One other striking similarity is that the 1994 Operation Bojinka involved blowing up simultaneously 11 aircraft over the Pacific. Although there is no hard evidence for these connections it is obvious a contagion factor could be present. One case where there are proven links is the case of David Headley, who participated as the principal reconnaissance for the 2008 Mumbai attack, after which he was arrested for plotting a significant terror attack against the Danish Jyllands-Posten in 2009.³ One and a half years later four Swedes, one of whom had spent time in a terrorist training camp in Waziristan, were arrested for plotting to target the same paper using exactly the same modus operandi as earlier.

The diffusion of knowledge about improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is more precise as experts can gauge specific bomb signatures regarding how they were constructed and who was involved. For example, knowledge of IED construction migrated between terrorist groups and conflict zones after 9/11 from Chechnya and Algeria to the 2003 Iraqi conflict then to the Afghan theater.⁴ Financial incentives were also a key catalyst for driving innovation in design and delivery of IEDs within the Iraqi and Afghanistan conflict.⁵ Among the latest innovative tactics in Afghanistan is the use of women and children suicide operatives as well as explosives hidden inside the traditional Afghan headdress – the lunge – for assassinations.⁶ A range of complex factors affects technology adoption decisions in terrorist groups, such as comparative advantage, compatibility, complexity, risk and cost.⁷ Factoring in technology is only one key issue affecting terrorist decisions. Available human and physical resources, absorptive capacity, internal group decision structures, pressures and security precautions, target hardening, timing and earlier experience are only some of the factors that influence terrorist targeting behavior. Some scholars argue that there are three pathways to acquire necessary knowledge – learning by watching, learning by formal study and learning by doing – but that actual operational capability is closely related to practical training experience gained in the field.⁸

Since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, significant focus and research has been devoted towards understanding the polymorphous al-Qaeda phenomenon as it has morphed, migrated and changed due to globalization and according to internal and external pressures as well as changing political development. This book examines how and why terrorist groups innovate generally and al-Qaeda-related terrorist plots in Europe more specifically. The starting point for this book was twofold: first, to examine the issue of innovation and learning more generically both in theory, within specific themes and within the context of al-Qaeda’s influence on this process. Second, this book examines the evolution of specific al-Qaeda-related plots in three northern European Union (EU) states – the United Kingdom, Denmark and Germany – where there has been a significant volume of planned, failed and executed terrorist plots. In particular, these case studies look at signs of innovation and learning. This book is the cumulative result of three international workshops on terrorist innovation and learning, held at the Swedish National Defence College in April and June 2012 and in June 2013, where we gathered international expertise from academia and government. These workshops were sponsored by the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency.

The term “innovation”

The study of innovation in terrorist behavior is relatively embryonic and as some scholars have correctly observed “is hardly systematic, comparative, or oriented toward theory building.”⁹ Martha Crenshaw has usefully differentiated innovation on three levels: strategic, tactical and organizational. While strategic innovation involves “game-changing” shifts and tactical innovation involves changes in methods and operations, organizational innovation focuses on the role of hierarchies and decentralized structures and their impact on the adaptation, innovation and learning of terrorist tactics.¹⁰ Crenshaw also argues that innovation is often the result of “problem-solving” rather than of mere inspiration or by accident.¹¹

Available resources and skilled members play a defining role, together with new emerging technologies, both weapon technologies and information technologies that transform remote reconnaissance capability and secure communication methods.¹² As such there is a constellation of areas which could involve terrorist innovation.¹³

As there is no definitive scholarly consensus, this book has applied a broad interpretation of the term “innovation” in our effort to identify and elaborate on indications of evolution within terrorists’ tradecraft and behavior. The term “innovation” is multifaceted, with a variety of definitions applied within the research community. The following set of definitions, taken together, could be viewed as representative of the broad approach taken by this study:

• “The adoption of new patterns of behavior” (Crenshaw);
• “An idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or another unit of adoption” (Rogers);
• “The expressing of a given purpose in a different set of components” (Arthur);
• “The integration of an invention into one or more cultural, organizational, economic or political contexts” (Ackerman).

Literature on terrorist innovation and learning

There is a remarkable lacuna in available research on how and why terrorist groups innovate and possibly learn from their own and others’ mistakes. Even fewer studies exist that focus on the role of innovation and learning in al-Qaeda-related plots in Europe. There are many different reasons for the lack of prioritized focus on this issue. First, data collection and data precision is difficult due to a variety of contextual factors, the challenges faced in studying clandestine groups and the disruption of many terrorist plots at different degrees or levels of preparation and execution. Most focus is naturally on successful attacks rather than foiled or failed operations. Another difficulty pertains to gaining the inside story of clandestine internal processes within terrorist cells that could explain personal relationships, attitudes towards risk, and their individual and collective decision-making process at different levels in attack preparation and execution.¹⁴ Breaking down the components that constitute the process of terrorist planning to actual execution involves many variables and requires high resolution detail than is often not available from open-source literature.¹⁵ Court documents are often the solution to this problem as they are rich in detail about operational dimensions.

Second, analytical inferences can often only be made on generalized levels as al-Qaeda-related plots do not build on each other but are often one-off attacks. Having said that, the violent extremist milieus are often relatively small in size and overlapping with high degrees of interconnectivity between cell structures. There is collaborative learning both online and offline in how to avoid detection and even to learn from past operational mistakes. It is much easier to detect technology trajectories and instances of innovation and learning in terrorist groups that have definable, hierarchical command structures and engage in limited geographic areas and in sustained terrorist campaigns against set targets.

Third, most academic focus on terrorist innovation has largely centered on the specter of CBRN terrorism, where the social and natural scientists often have a stovepipe understanding of threat convergence issues. Less effort exists in trying to understand terrorist innovation and learning in cases involving conventional weapons. Lastly, very few studies exist mapping out al-Qaeda-related plots in Europe, especially trying to gauge operational complexity and any signs of innovation.

Petter Nesser’s chronology of al-Qaeda-related planned, prepared and executed terrorist attacks occurring between 1994 and 2007 reveal that 56 European-based plots occurred from 2001 until the end of 2007. This study gave a descriptive helicopter perspective of different modus operandi and targeting factors. It revealed that Great Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands were frequent targets and that support for the Iraqi conflict as well as the Danish cartoon controversy was at the center of the rationale for specific targeting.¹⁶ This figure was later updated with an additional 23 incidents during the period 2008–2010.¹⁷ Additionally, Nesser argues that very few cases involving self-radicalized “solo-terrorists” are in his data set. The reason is, he argues, that the jihadist usually conceive themselves as part of jama’a (group), tanzim (organization) or haraka (movement); most go abroad to fight before being re-directed home; and most lack the practical and technical skill sets such as logistics, bomb-making techniques, counter-surveillance, etc.¹⁸

Building on this dataset is Javier Jordan’s analysis of 85 al-Qaeda-related attacks in Europe between 2001 and 2010 which examined choice of targets, weapons chosen for terrorist attacks, the influence of foreign conflict zones and social network linkages to established jihadi groups.¹⁹ This study revealed that two-thirds of the terrorist plots involved homemade explosives, most often involving triacetone triperoxide (TATP). It also showed that preferable targets were “soft” public transport targets and places. One area that shows a high degree of terrorist learning and innovation is the obsession with targeting civil aviation, as revealed by the multiple shoe bomb plots, liquid explosives and car bomb attacks on terminal buildings.

Adam Dolnik’s Understanding Terrorist Innovation (2007)²⁰ is probably among the most comprehensive efforts to assess terrorist innovation and the trajectories of their violent attacks. While...

Índice

• Cover
• Half Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Notes on contributors
• 1 Introduction: understanding terrorism innovation and learning – Al-Qaeda and beyond
• PART I Perspectives on terrorism innovation
• PART II Case studies
• Index