Applying Social Psychology

Implications for Research, Practice, and Training

Morton Deutsch,Harvey Hornstein

• Editorial: Psychology Press
• Año: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781317479239
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Psychology
• Categoría: Social Psychology

Originally published in 1975, these contributions surveyed the range of social intervention technology available to psychologists at the time, but they are more than a simple cataloguing of technology. The stress is on articulating certain metatheoretical assumptions that underlie different strategies of social intervention. For example, assumptions about the personal agency, the nature of social systems, and levels and forms of interpersonal influences are all examined. The implications for the training of psychologists are developed, and specific attention is given to the identity crisis in social psychology precipitated by existing pressures and potentials for change at the time.

1
Introduction

Morton Deutsch
Teachers College, Columbia University

In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the appearance of socially relevant research and in the utilization of consultants who have their intellectual roots in social psychology. In part, this increase reflects the pressures generated by the student rebellions of the 1960's and, in part, the widespread social malaise and unrest that has been produced by the accelerating pace of sociotechnological change, the war in Vietnam, and the ecological and resource crises.

Interest in developing a "socially useful" social psychology is hardly new. Modem social psychology was in its birth concerned with developing knowledge that had immediate social relevance. This is so whether one dates its origin to the early studies by Lewin and his students of authoritarian and democratic group leaders, or to the even earlier comparisons of individual and group productivity by such people as Bechterev, Goodwin Watson, and F. H. Allport, or to the work on stereotypes and attitudes by such scholars as Lippmann, Likert, Murphy, and Sherif. However, this early interest in developing and applying a socially useful social psychology largely disappeared from the mainstream of American academic social psychology for about 15 to 20 years-the period of the 1950s to the late 1960s. An analysis of why this interest disappeared might be useful in preventing the current resurgence of interest in social usefulness from suffering a similar fate. Some of the reasons were internal to the discipline of social psychology, some related to the internal arrangements of universities and funding agencies, and some reflected broader societal influences.

Factors Internal to the Discipline

Post-World War II American social psychology has been largely dominated, until very recently, by Lewin and his students. Lewin himself thoroughly integrated the two orientations of social psychology: the theoretical-research orientation which is imbued with the traditional normative concerns of the scientist-formal elegance, logical rigor, an intersubjective objectivity, and robustness of empirical verification-and the problem-centered orientation of the socially concerned practitioner. He combined this integration with a sense of the necessity to provide knowledge that could be useful in bringing about change and an awareness of the importance of creating the conditions which would encourage the actual use of such knowledge by those in the position to act upon it. Unfortunately, this fusion of orientations was less true of his students. More characteristically, a split developed which widened into a chasm after Lewin's sudden and premature death. Lewin's unifying presence had been able to hold the diverging tendencies together and, in his absence, the bifurcating dispositions became dominant.

Feeling a need to establish himself as a "real" scientist-and fully aware of the weaknesses of his theories and the imperfections of his methodologies-the theory-oriented research social psychologist had to be "pure" and "tough minded.'' He could ill afford to be identified with evangelical movements led by social psychologist practitioners nor could he be associated with the sloppy make-do research which was initially characteristic of that on complex social problems. Hence, it is not surprising or remarkable that the laboratory became his workplace and that he proudly identified himself as an ''experimental social psychologist." This work place identity provided a base of security as he reached out and tried to stake a scientific claim on phenomena which the more established sciences had viewed as too value-laden or insubstantial for scientific study. The laboratory provided more than security; it was an exciting place to be as experimental social psychologists in one ingenious experiment after another demonstrated that important social phenomena can be captured and investigated in the laboratory, phenomena such as leadership, group cohesion, group productivity, conformity, trust and suspicion, social influence, cooperation and competititon, communication networks, cognitive dissonance, interpersonal conflict, interpersonal attraction, and so forth.

It is difficult to say why the social practitioners of social psychology-represented initially by the small group movement developed at New Britain and then Bethel-took on such an evangelical tone. The personalities and backgrounds of its early leaders undoubtedly contributed to this evangelism. But more importantly, the small group movement fed into and fed upon a widespread social need and, itself, became captured by and a servant of that need. [See Kurt Back's insightful analysis of sensitivity training and the encounter movement in his book, Beyond Words (1972).] Whatever its cause, the major mode of social psychological practice was zealous in tone and was unduly sensitive to critiques by researchers. Thus, it could not tolerate or be tolerated by those soc'ial psychologists who were trying to create a scientific social psychology.

Paradoxically, the origin of the sensitivity training movement can be traced to a summer workshop on intergroup relations held in New Britain, Connecticut in 1946, which failed to develop a productive relationship between the two groups-the practitioners and the researchers. This failure was repeated on a larger and grander scale in the summer of 1947 at the first of the now world-known Bethel workshops. Here the researchers and practitioners formed two openly antagonistic groups-the researchers were aghast at how the aura and trappings of "science" were being employed for propagating the "gospel" of sensitivity training, and the practitioners were embittered by the unappreciative, critical, "purer than thou" attitudes of the researchers. The resulting chasm between the two orientations contributed to the neglect of applied social psychology by academic programs in social psychology and to the development of a field of applications that was not being tested and guided by research.

The Universities and the Funding Agencies

The universities and the funding agencies have also contributed to the neglect of applications of academic social psychology through their structural arrangements and their reward systems. This contribution is evident if we consider four themes running through most of the chapters in this work: namely, (1) social problems rarely can be understood, diagnosed, solved, and acted upon in the perspective of one theory or even of one social science discipline such as social psychology; (2) the meaningful application of scientific generalizations and methodology to particular situations requires detailed knowledge of the specific situations; (3) the time span of work on applied problems is typically different from that of most academic research; and (4) the resources required for problem-oriented research are much larger than those for laboratory research.

The organization of most universities is such that it provides continuous regular funding to faculty members who are discipline centered rather than to those who are problem centered or generalists. It is obvious that such conditions permit only the foolhardy or those who are already well established in a discipline to develop the broadly based orientations required for fruitful work on important social problems. The situation is even worse than the preceding statement suggests. Within the discipline of social psychology (as well as many others), the reward systems-the conditions that affect appointment, promotion, tenure, and esteem of one's colleagues-enhance the tendency toward work on specialized topics within the discipline rather than on problems generated by pressing social concerns. The desire to have a faculty to cover the various subareas of social psychology leads to even greater specialization; the desire for promotion and tenure leads to pressure for research and scholarship that can lead to frequent publication, i.e., to small-scale research extending over short time periods on currently fashionable topics in the field. The funding practices of government agencies and foundations often have much the same consequences.

In addition to the foregoing, the separation-and the usual invidious distinctions-between the graduate schools of liberal arts and sciences and the professional schools has the parallel tendency to separate practice from research and theory. Consider the separation between psychologists and schools of education. Even where psychologists are included in such schools, they are often seen to be on the fringes of their disciplines and are looked down upon by their colleagues in the more traditional departments of psychology unless they have otherwise established their credentials as research social psychologists. The result has been that the professional schools have, until the recent shortage of academic positions, found it difficult to recruit the most talented young social psychologists to their faculty.

Broader Societal Influences

Political conditions have also played a role in encouraging and discouraging the applications of social psychology. Paradoxically, when funding agencies under the edicts of conservative federal administrations have pressured for relevance, the effect has often been just the opposite from that which was intended-an increase occurred only in pseudorelevance, and much rewriting of project proposals to use the "relevance" terminology took place. The retreat from real relevance in the 1950s partially paralleled the McCarthy (Joseph, not Eugene) era. Social psychologists, as individuals, are often on the left side of the political spectrum, and they are reluctant to allow themselves to be employed as technicians in the service of policies which they view with disfavor. The opportunity to do applied work and the financial support for such work is obviously more apt to come from those who have political-administrative power and financial resources at their disposal than those who do not. The realities of the lives of social psychologists, their entrapment in a middle-class standard of living, and also their training provide them with little skill in doing applied work without ample resources and they have little potential for sustaining such work without compensation: neither resources nor compensation in ample amounts are likely to be available from low power groups.

The reluctance of many socially concerned social psychologists to do work directly for an "establishment" they viewed with disfavor (a government waging a barbaric war in Vietnam, an industry having little social conscience, a school system not concerned with fostering democratic values), of course, led many to shun applied work since the perceived opportunities for such work were usually in settings controlled by the establishment. They were not interested in using social psychology to promote more harmonious and productive management- worker relations in a factory manufacturing napalm bombs or some other destructive or useless product.

The plight of the radical social psychologist in a society which currently has no viable radical social movement is an especially difficult one. There is little that he can do professionally that he is apt to regard as of immediate social significance apart from engaging in research to demystify and delegitimatize the workings of the system. But since it is already sufficiently demystified and delegitimatized for him, he is likely to view such work as routine rather than intellectually rewarding. Perhaps the only way out of this plight for the radical social psychologist is for him to recognize that there is a need to develop an adequate theory of social change, a theory of how to move from where we are to where he wants us to be. Such a theory is a prerequisite for intelligent social action. Although not having the excitement and bravura of manning the barricades against the establishment, intellectual work to contribute to the development of a theory to guide,social action may be the only socially useful, professional activity in which a radical social psychologist can engage with integrity. How much of the work necessary for forging such a theory will have to be done in the library, in the laboratory, or in the field is difficult to prejudge. Karl Marx spent a good deal of his time in the library, Sigmund Freud spent many of his hours interacting with his patients, and Jean Piaget observed his children systematically over a period of years. Each of these productive theorists also spent a great deal of time thinking and writing.

The social psychologist who believes he can work with the system or within the system to do applied work which is meaningful has a much easier task than his radical counterpart. There are many different projects he can undertake which will receive ample support. This fact is illustrated by the diverse activities of research, training, consulting, and social engineering reported in this volume.

Despite the diversity of applied work done by social psychologists, it seems reasonable to say that much of it is imbued with a common value framework that is partly derived from the Lewinian emphasis on participatory democracy and the psychotherapeutic stress on openness, spontaneity, closeness, warmth, expression of feelings, and authenticity. The framework presupposes that man is preeminently a group animal and that he fulfills himself through active, responsible, cooperative participation in the affairs of his group as an equal with other members, participation which is characterized by openness, warmth, spontaneity, etc. It further posits that groups (organizations, communities, etc.) which are controlled democratically through the active, responsible participation of their members are likely to be more productive and more gratifying to their members than groups which are not so controlled. It also assumes that the basic interests of the different members of a given group are more concordant than opposed.

Paradoxically, this value framework has struck responsive chords in radical as well as conservative social circles. Social psychology consultants operating within this framework have worked effectively with Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and black militant groups as well as with the United States State Department and large multinational industries. How is it possible for a social psychologist to serve groups with such different ideologies? Some might assert that it is a delusion to think that social psychology can serve such different interests equally well; that the value framework of social psychology merely perpetuates the myth of democracy and common interests, a myth which serves conservative rather than radical interests. Perhaps this is so and it must be recognized that in practice the framework is sometimes implemented to make a mockery of such concepts as participatory democracy, authenticity, and spontaneity: witness the many astute criticisms of sensitivity training and organizational development (e.g., Bonner, 1959; Odiorne, 1963; Pages, 1971). Nevertheless, there are social psychologists of considerable personal integrity who, operating within the value orientation specified above, have helped groups within the establishment as well as those opposed to it to function more effectively.

It seems possible to help such diverse groups if one maintains a compartmentalized view, focusing only upon the subsystem with which one is working and neglecting the broader system of which is is a component. Within this restricted focus, the assumption of concordance of interests is often a reasonable one even though it may be invalid in the broader perspective. By restricting his value framework to the setting in which he is operating, a social psychologist may, for example, help free the members of a management group within a firm with the consequence that it has more effective power to manufacture and merchandise an essentially worthless or fraudulent product. The position of consumers may have been damaged even as the situation of the firm has been improved.

Without a theory of broader societal processes which enables him to consider the interdependence among different components of the society, it may well be that the social psychologist can only do applied work if he operates under the assumption that the successful implementation of the value framework anywhere in a system is good in and of itself and that the broader societal consequences of so doing may be disregarded because they are impossible to predict or assess. However, this assumption is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in the face of widespread criticism of the social sciences as biased in support of preserving the status quo. We are in need of a profound self-examination of our work as social psychologists to understand its social consequences.

All of the preceding discussion is meant to suggest that if we wish to develop a social psychology that is continually rather than sporadically interested in being socially useful, we must do several things.

1. We must institutionalize the conditions which will reduce the barriers and help to sustain the motivation to do socially useful research. This will obviously require changes in the criteria for faculty appointment, promotion, and tenure that would seek to provide more encouragement and reward for work that deviates from traditional academic scholarship. It will also require a parallel rethinking of our criteria for selecting, training, and rewarding our graduate students. In addition to this, at least in the United States, it will require extensive restructuring of the relationship between graduate schools of liberal arts and sciences and the professional schools. Despite Thorndike and his glorious career at Teachers College, the relationship between psychology and schools of education remains a scandal-and what more natural domain for the application of psychology is there than education?

2. We must also develop a social psychology that is useful. This development would require us to remain aware of the unique character of social psychology. Although social psychology is clearly insufficient, in itself, to provide solutions to many social problems and must be fused with such other disciplines as sociology, economics, political science, personality psychology, and physiological psychology, it nevertheless has a distinctive perspective to offer to the fusion. This perspective arises from the unique focus of social psychology upon the interplay between psychological and social processes. More than any other discipline, it is concerned with both the person and his society, the individual and his group. It is concerned with how the individual's motivations, attitudes, cognitions, and perceptions affect his relations to his group and also how his interaction with his group affects these various psychological processes. Social psychology is more apt to pay attention to the conditions which promote discrepancy as well as convergence between psychological and social realities.

Several key notions in the social psychological approach are (Deutsch, 1973):

1. Each participant in a social interaction responds to the other in terms of his perceptions and cognitions of the other; these may or may not correspond to the other's actualities.

2. Each participant in a social i...

Índice

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Original Title
• Original Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• PART I: PROBLEM-CENTERED RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
• PART II: USING SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS A PRACTITIONER
• PART III: GRADUATE TRAINING IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
• Author Index
• Subject Index