Re-Energising Indian Intelligence

Manoj Shrivastava

• Editorial: VIJ Books (India) Pty Ltd
• Año: 2013
• ISBN:
  9789382573609
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Categoría: Intelligence e spionaggio

This book covers a vast canvas historically as regards Indian Intelligence, and gives an adequate insight into the functioning of the important intelligence agencies of the world. The author has analysed the current functioning of Indian Intelligence agencies in great detail, their drawbacks in the structure and coordination and has come out with some useful suggestions.

1

INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE IN INDIA-A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Unless someone has the wisdom of a sage, he cannot use spies; unless he is benevolent and righteous, he cannot employ spies; unless he is subtle and perspicacious, he cannot perceive the substance in intelligence reports. It is subtle, subtle, subtle.

– Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Most of the current issues have their root causes embedded in the history. The lack of coherent intelligence assessment and coordination at the national level can also be traced in the history of intelligence agencies in India. AS Dulat, former Director, R&AW links the lack of coordination and over secretive nature of Indian intelligence agencies to the history. He comments, “I think the problem was the product of history”.¹ The secrecy, the mystery, the turf wars and lack of coordination are quite evident once we glance through the history of intelligence services in our country. The inter agency rivalry, lack of trust and low priority to intelligence by our defensive national security strategy has been inherited by our intelligence agencies from history. Writers on counter insurgency have suggested that the answers to today’s intelligence challenges can be found by studying the colonial period.² The basis of this argument would be covered at the end of this chapter. Let us first get acquainted with the history of intelligence in India.

The intelligence function has been carried on for centuries in India. It was the existence of an extensive espionage network that kept kings informed of the happenings of the state. This was true for the large empires like the Mauryas, the Guptas as well as of regional ones like the Pratiharas, the Rashrakutas or the Andhras.³ Even though intelligence agencies have been active in India as early as in the period of Emperor Ashoka to Akbar, however, this chapter restricts itself to the British era. The analysis of events is undertaken from the British era as our intelligence set up has evolved mainly after this period.

Pre Independence

In 1885, Major General Sir Charles Metcalfe Macgregor was appointed Quartermaster General and head of the Intelligence Department of the British Indian Army at Shimla. The objective then was to monitor Russian troop deployments in Afghanistan, fearing a Russian invasion of British India through the North-West during the late 19th century. Russia had strong imperial ambitions and a special interest in South Asia.

Before General Macgregor’s appointment, an organisation called the Survey of India, located in Dehradun, performed the basic intelligence functions. It gathered the topographical information and made maps based on the information gathered by its agents on the borders. The empire was interested in limited areas of activities of the Indian nationalists, the communal situation, communist infiltration and activities of groups and individuals that threatened the stability of their colony.⁴

In 1920, the Department of Criminal Intelligence made exclusively for political surveillance, was renamed Intelligence Bureau (IB).⁵ In 1921, a new state run surveillance and monitoring agency, Indian Political Intelligence (IPI) was established. The IPI was run jointly by the India Office and the Government of India. It reported jointly to the Secretary of Public and Judicial Department of the India office, and the Director of Intelligence Bureau (DIB) in India, and maintained close contact with Scotland Yard and MI5. In 1935, IB created its own organisation going down to the grass root level. In order to supplement the information coming from the provincial Criminal Investigation Departments (CIDs) and special branches, IB set up field units in different parts of the country, under a Central Intelligence Officer (CIO). In 1947, it was recognised as the Central Intelligence Bureau under the Ministry of Home Affairs.⁶ Prior to independence, the British were having intelligence system in which external predominance was prevailing. Unfortunately, the mindset is still being carried on with the same staffing norms. Any structure is as good as its staffing; therefore, there is a need to improve our staffing pattern.

Post Independence

The issue that immediately confronted India soon after independence was the reorganisation of Central Intelligence Bureau to suit India’s national security. Other issues included restructuring of military intelligence and setting up of a nodal agency for tackling internal and external security threats.⁷ Consequently, IB (Intelligence Bureau) was set up. From 1947 to 1951, IB was in charge of internal intelligence. In 1951, the Himmat Singhji Committee recommended that IB should also look after external intelligence. In 1949, Sanjeevi Pillai, then DIB, had set up a foreign intelligence cell. From 1951 to 1968, the IB was looking after external as well as internal intelligence. In the fifties, the insurgency in the North East compelled IB to set up Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau’s (SIB) to handle the diverse problems of the region. IB also had to coordinate with the state and the army intelligence during counter insurgency operations in Nagaland and Manipur.⁸

At this time, apart from IB and its provincial setup, each state police had its own intelligence wing. At the level of the cabinet was the Defence Committee of the Cabinet which in turn was supplemented by other committees, including the Defence Minister’s Committee, the Chief of Staff Committee (COSC), Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and Joint Planning Committee (JPC). The JIC was created as a subordinate wing of the COSC.⁹

The JIC was presided over by a Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and was constituted by the Directors’ of Intelligence of the three services, representatives of the Home and Defence Ministries and the IB. The JIC was given the task of reviewing all the information available on the threat perceptions to India and providing the same to the COSC. With this information and the help of the JPC, the COSC was to advice the government on the course of action needed to be taken.¹⁰

This arrangement of IB responsible for both internal and external intelligence continued even during the 1962 conflict with China. Post 1962 debacle, the decision to bifurcate external intelligence from internal was taken. After the 1962 War, the need was also felt to create new capability for collecting electronic intelligence (ELINT) and imagery from aerial based platform over our territory in the air space. Hence, Aviation Research Centre (ARC) was created under the Directorate General of Security (DGS) and placed under the overall control of Director Intelligence Bureau (DIB).¹¹

The new organisation, known as Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) of Cabinet Secretariat was established on September 21, 1968. The DGS along with the ARC were shifted to R&AW. The R&AW was modeled on the lines of the American and British intelligence agencies. However, R&AW was kept directly under the control of the Prime Minister Office (PMO) instead of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) unlike CIA and MI 6.¹² The JIC was bifurcated into foreign and domestic intelligence wings in 1983 .The split was later reversed on the grounds that Indian terrorist movements drew sustenance from overseas and owing to the reasons could not be assessed in isolation.¹³

Reforms in India’s Intelligence Structures

Post independence, three major exercises had been undertaken to bring about significant re-structuring in India’s intelligence community. A brief analysis of these exercises makes an interesting history of the Indian intelligence mechanism. It is amply clear that much needs to be done to make the best use of these attempted reforms. The attempted reforms in the Indian intelligence and security mechanism are enumerated in the succeeding paragraphs.

The LP Singh Committee

The LP Singh Committee was instituted after the Emergency was lifted in 1977 to look into the affairs of the IB and the Central Bureau of investigation (CBI).The Committee was to investigate the misuse of intelligence agencies and the CBI during the Emergency between 1975 and 1977.¹⁴ The Committee worked in 1977-78 to process the recommendations of the Commission on Emergency Excesses headed by former Supreme Court Chief, Justice JC Shah. The ‘Shah Commission’ gave its third and final report in August 1978. For taking action on the findings of the Shah Commission, the Morarji Desai Government appointed LP Singh Committee.¹⁵

The Committee was headed by LP Singh, former Union Home Secretary. The Committee included, D P Kohli, the founder Director of the CBI and MLM Hooja, the Director, IB. BS Raghavan, IAS was the Member-Secretary of this Committee. The L P Singh Committee in its recommendations had asked for a separate parliamentary enactment which would put the CBI out of the clutches of the political party or combine running the government of the day and place it unde...

Índice

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Acronyms and Abbreviations
• Introduction: Enhancing Intelligence Assessment and Coordination at National Level
• Chapter I: Intelligence Structure in India - A Historical Perspective
• Chapter II: Present Intelligence Setup at The National Level
• Chapter III: Perception Management : The Growing Realms of Intelligence
• Chapter IV: Analysis: Performance of Indian Intelligence Agencies since Independence
• Chapter V: Assessment and Coordination Challenges
• Chapter VI: Global Trends in Intelligence and Security Infrastructure
• Chapter VII: Setting the Stage: The Precursor to the Recommendations
• Chapter VIII: The Recommendations
• Appendices
• B Kargil Committee Report
• C GC Saxena Task Force Report
• D National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC): Various Views
• E Intelligence Agencies
• F The Historical Intelligence Lapses
• G Successful Intelligence Operations
• Bibliography
• Index