The Stasi Files Unveiled

Guilt and Compliance in a Unified Germany

Barbara Miller

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2022
• ISBN:
  9781351302661
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Politics & International Relations
• Categoría: Politics

In 1992 the massive files of East Germany's infamous Ministry for State Security, the Stasi, were made publicly available and thousands of former East Germans began to confront their contents. Finally it was possible for ordinary citizens to ascertain who had worked for the Stasi, either on a full-time basis or as an "unofficial employee, " the Stasi's term for an informer. The revelations from these documents sparked feuds old and new among a population already struggling through enormous social and political upheaval. Drawing upon the Stasi files and upon interviews with one-time informers, this book examines the impact of the Stasi legacy in united Germany.Barbara Miller examines such aspects of the informer's experience as: the recruitment procedure; daily life and work; motivation and justification. She goes on to consider the dealings of politicians and the courts with the Stasi and its employees. Her analysis then turns to the way in which this aspect of recent German history has been remembered, and the phenomenal impact of the opening of the files on such perceptions of the past. The Stasi Files Unveiled: Guilt and Compliance in a Unified Germany offers important new perspectives on the nature of individual and collective memory and is a fascinating investigation of modern German society.Barbara Miller graduated from the University of Glasgow in 1991 with a degree in German and psychology. She taught and researched in Germany and Austria before completing her doctoral thesis in Glasgow in 1997. She is now based in Sydney, Australia.

1

‘A COMPLETELY NORMAL BIOGRAPHY’? (A-3)

The extensive surveillance and control measures implemented by the Stasi involved being constantly aware and informed of which individuals posed a threat to internal security at any one time, in other words asking the key question of ‘Who is who?’ (F-3, p. 286). A so-called OPK surveillance measure was often implemented to this aim. An OPK had three main applications: to confirm or reject suspicions that an individual had acted unlawfully; to identify individuals who were negatively disposed towards the state; or to screen individuals who held positions of power potentially open to misuse (ibid.). An OPK sometimes led to an OV, the next and more intensive stage of surveillance. Informers were to establish or to exploit already existing contacts to individuals who were being observed under an OV, so aiming to obtain information which was of ‘operative significance’. An essential part of any OV was the concept of Zersetzung, literally the decomposition of perceived enemies, achieved by implementing measures to ‘split up, lame and de-stabilise’ them (ibid. p. 464).

The work of the Stasi’s informers, the unofficial employees, was central to the planning and execution of the measures outlined above. In 1989, 174,000 such employees were registered as active. Overall numbers had decreased slightly during the 1980s after rising steadily throughout the previous two decades (F-10, p. 11). Estimated at approximately 10 per cent per annum, there was a fairly high annual turnover of informers (ibid. p. 8). In some district divisions the figure may have been higher. One division, for example, recorded an annual turnover of 18 per cent (D-4, I, p. 43).

Females were not highly represented in the Stasi’s network of unofficial helpers. Eighty to ninety per cent of informers were male, and there were no female Stasi officers in charge of informers at all (I-33). It is not clear why the percentage of women informers should have been so low or why ‘particular care’ was to be taken in dealings with them (J-62, p. 271). There seems to be no evidence that women made less competent informers than men. The low percentage of female informers may simply reflect patriarchal structures within the SED and Stasi. Perhaps there was also concern that officers might become intimately involved with the females in their charge and so run the risk of betraying confidential information. Mielke, at least, seemed to be in favour of increasing the number of female informers working for him. Women, he felt, had shown themselves to be capable of the task at hand and should be actively recruited, particularly as IMV (F-5, I, p. 288). IMV, who were later referred to as IMB, were unofficial employees directly assigned to observe individuals suspected of enemy activity (J-62, p. 258). It is likely that Mielke considered women to be particularly suited as IMV since they could potentially form intimate relationships with these suspected state enemies. These bonds could be fruitful for extracting information, or their very existence could potentially be used for blackmailing purposes. Indeed, earlier guidelines suggest that ‘young, good-looking, female unofficial employees with good manners, the ability to pick things up quickly and who are able on account of their professional position to form connections to specific social groups’ should be recruited as informers (ibid. p. 203).

Informers were thus not distributed evenly among the population but were recruited according to the Focusing Principle, defined in the Stasi’s dictionary of key terms as follows:

Focusing Principle – important basic principle of the politically operative work and the management thereof aimed at guaranteeing that actions aimed at clarifying and combatting all subversive enemy attacks are goal-oriented and preventative in nature – and are achieved by concentrating all operative forces and means, including the time, technical and financial resources available, on the most important areas of operation, that is on those objects, areas, territories, groups and individuals where preventative security measures are required (F-3, pp. 374–5).

In accordance with this principle informers were more concentrated in cultural groups, in church-based organisations and in opposition groups. The ratio of informers to non-informers could be fairly high in such groups, but in line with the principle that ‘each individual is only given as much information as he requires to fulfil his duties’ those working for the Stasi were generally unaware of each other’s identity and were perhaps not even aware that other informers were active in their immediate environment (F-3, p. 129). Informers were thus often reporting on one another as much as on those individuals being observed in an OPK or OV. The sheer density of informers occasionally made it difficult for a Stasi officer to ensure that those in his care did not become aware of one another’s identity. On one occasion, when the writer Rainer Schedlinski was meeting with his Stasi officer in a car park, he suddenly caught sight of another writer, Sascha Anderson, coming in their direction and quickly took cover. Unbeknown to Schedlinski, Anderson was also active as an informer for the Stasi and was working with the same officer. It later transpired that Anderson had spotted Schedlinski and realised that he must also be working for the Stasi. When Anderson reported this incident to his officer, the latter confirmed that this was the case, but asked Anderson to keep Schedlinski in the dark about the matter (J-2, pp. 248–9).

Since the most successful unofficial employee was clearly going to be someone who had contacts with the enemy, it was more practical for the Stasi to recruit from within opposition circles rather than to try to infiltrate them. This led to the paradoxical situation that many informers were reporting on the activities of opposition groups with which they simultaneously worked. The policy of the Stasi towards these individuals was at times somewhat illogical and ambivalent. ‘Stephana’, for example, was asked on several occasions to break off the contact she had to a man who had applied to leave the GDR. She was warned that such contacts were undesirable and that if she continued to pay no heed to the cautions she could not expect the Stasi’s support if she were to get into difficulties (C-6b, I, pp. 266, 325, 390). Since ‘Stephana’ was reporting on the activities of a man who was under surveillance, it seems to make no sense to suggest to her that contact with such an individual was to be avoided. Perhaps, in this case, logic decreed that the unofficial employee should have contact with the enemy, but ideology confounded this logic, causing Stasi officers to become uneasy when the bond between the informer and the individual under observation appeared to be one of genuine friendship. This contradiction between the Stasi’s policy and practice is evident throughout the life span of the organisation. Guidelines from 1952 concerning recruitment emphasise that in order to most effectively combat enemy groups it is necessary to recruit informers who will win the trust of such groups most easily: ‘These are former fascists, officers of the fascist army, relatives of agents in custody, criminal and corrupt individuals, morally depraved youths, so-called political refugees etc.’ (J-62, p. 166). This extract is in line with the Focusing Principle. The guidelines from 1958 state, however, that political conviction is to be the most important and frequently employed basis for recruitment (ibid. p. 212). Although apparently contradictory, the co-existence of the Focusing Principle and the stipulation that political conviction should be the principal motive for recruitment can perhaps be explained by the fact that the Stasi, wishing to uphold its own ideology, hoped to be able to convince ‘corrupt’ and ‘depraved’ individuals of the political necessity of co-operation (ibid, p. 166). Indeed the 1968 guidelines explicitly stipulate that SED members are only to be recruited as informers in exceptional cases since it was felt that such individuals were already committed to actively supporting the State (ibid. p. 261). Before recruiting such an individual Stasi officers were asked to consider whether it would not suffice to give this person the status of a GMS, a person who periodically supplied the MfS with information but to whom contact was less formalised and less secretive (J-62, p. 261). All too often Stasi officers ignored this ruling and swelled the ranks of the informer network with Party members, who tended to be relatively easy to recruit. Such practice led Mielke to complain that in many regional divisions as many as one in three newly recruited informers belonged to the SED (F-5, II, p. 440). A Stasi study by Seidler and Schmidt from 1968 put the figure even higher, at 40.7 per cent (D-6, I, p. 7). Interestingly, five of the ten informers with whom I carried out interviews had been a member of the SED and a higher proportion, seven, reported having voted for the PDS, the follow-on party to the SED.

* * *

Individuals were theoretically only to be selected for recruitment as informers when they could satisfy an already existing need. This need was expressed in a Requirement Profile. A Requirement Profile specified a particular need, and identified, in terms of experience, ability and personality characteristics, the type of person who might be suitable for this task (J-62, p. 341).

In reality, many informers were recruited because it proved relatively easy to do so rather than because there was a specific task at hand for them to carry out. Some Requirement Profiles seem furthermore to have been put together with a particular person in mind. Mielke was critical of such practice, complaining: ‘You can’t just recruit any old unofficial employee and check later what roll he can fulfil’ (F-5, II, p. 581). In the following three cases there does, however, seem to have been an existing need, as defined by a Requirement Profile. ‘Sonnenblume’ was recruited because of her suspected involvement with a ‘Criminal Smuggling Ring’, the Stasi’s definition for those engaged in activities to try to help people leave the GDR (C-8a, p. 65). In ‘Stephana’s’ case, the Stasi was interested in recruiting someone who had contacts to various religious groups, a Requirement Profile which she fitted perfectly (C-6a, p. 14). The third example concerns ‘Fuchs’, who was recruited as an FIM in order that he could build up a network of informers among the inmates of the prison where he worked (C-5a, p. 80).

Regardless of the specifics of the Requirement Profile, all unofficial employees were in theory to have considerable interpersonal skills in order to successfully carry out the required duties. One study from the Stasi college names, among others, the following desired qualities for all informers:

The ability to assess situations

The ability to fully comprehend the political and ideological content and consequences of events

The ability to judge human character and behaviour

The ability to form and preserve relationships based on trust

The ability to observe and take in information on situations and people in a planned and concentrated manner, over a short or long time, as well as the ability to retain and reproduce this information as quickly as possible

The ability to cope with high demands and burdens and to deal with individual doubts and scruples (D-4, I, pp. 140–6).

Finding candidates who fulfilled all the above requirements cannot have been easy, and the authors of the study do concede that it is not to be expected that an informer possess all these qualities at the time of recruitment. Some of them were to be developed in the course of the work with the Stasi (ibid. I, 148). In the documentation relating to recruitment Stasi officers tended, however, to emphasise the positive characteristics of the candidates rather than identifying the skills or abilities which needed to be developed. ‘Fuchs’, for example, was considered a suitable candidate because of his ability to understand people and to make accurate observations (C-5a, p. 76). He was also praised for his dedication at work: ‘His efforts to find and apply the best possible didactic methods under prison conditions are worthy of mention’ (ibid.). ‘Stephana’ was thought to be particularly suited for the role of an unofficial employee as a result of the fact that she was ‘outgoing’, ‘ambitious’ and ‘conscientious’ (C-6a, p. 34). It is rather ironic that in order to carry out this most deceitful of tasks, the Stasi sought out individuals who were thought to have such positive qualities, including, ironically, a ‘well-developed sense of justice’ (J-62, p. 266).

Although there are certain general characteristics which can be applied to the population of informers, it is clear that the Stasi was successful in recruiting a wide range of personalities to work in this role. The use of the oral testimonies of individual informers was particularly illuminating in this context since the unprecedented decision to make the files of the GDR’s Secret Service so widely accessible meant that the statements of those interviewed could be directly compared and contrasted with the information contained in the Stasi documents relating to these same individuals. Furthermore, since the files have not been subject to a standard closure rule, the likelihood that witnesses were both alive and traceable was greatly increased. Through examination of convergence and divergence between the- two sources, a wider perspective of external events is gained, as well as the chance to analyse the perception and interpretation of these same occurrences on the part of the individual informer. In the following introduction to the ten informers whose stories are referred to throughout this book, some biographical details have, in some cases, been changed.

‘ROLF’

‘Rolf’ was born in 1952 in a small town in Saxony. After leaving school he studied agriculture, returning to his hometown in 1979 to take up a post in the museum there, which he held until 1991. During this time he completed a degree in biology by distance learning.

As a young man, ‘Rolf’ reports having been somewhat negatively disposed towards the State. He had the impression that all his mail at the boarding school he attended was being checked, and this bothered him intensely. As he grew older, his attitudes began to change. Although he was not a member of the SED, ‘Rolf’ increasingly felt that he should support the State he lived in. He was a keen supporter of environmental issues and one of the reasons he came to the Stasi’s attention was because of the contacts he had with environmentalists in the West.

When I visited him, ‘Rolf’ was obviously nervous, yet eager to talk. His wife sat in on most of our conversation, and his 18-year-old son, his only child, came and listened quietly for a short time. ‘Rolf’ seemed a shy man, perhaps a little naive, and someone who was making an apparently genuine attempt to face up to his past. This was reflected, among other things, in the open family atmosphere regarding his Stasi connections and in the fact that he was the only person with whom I spoke who would have been prepared to have been referred to by his real name here.

In 1993 ‘Rolf’ made his Stasi connections publicly known to the local council of which he was a member. He had hoped that such a revelation would lead to an enlightened debate in this forum and was disappointed when it did not. Yet he felt personally unable to take the initiative and begin such a discussion. The news of his Stasi past appeared in the local press shortly afterwards. He was astounded to discover that the only person to broach the topic with him was an old school friend who was visiting the town at the time. At work, none of his wife’s colleagues discussed the matter with her either. Although confused by this public reaction, ‘Rolf’ feels relieved that he has overcome the hurdle of making his past public and feels that the matter is now largely settled.

Whilst active as an informer ‘Rolf’ found that he could not overcome his scruples about reporting on an acquaintance of his, Michael Beleites. ‘Rolf’ approached Beleites and confessed his Stasi connections, whereupon Beleites asked if ‘Rolf’ would be prepared to try and help him plot against the Stasi. Beleites hoped that if he and ‘Rolf’ were to jointly compile reports in which Beleites was presented as someone who did not pose a threat to internal security, the Stasi might relax the ban from travelling outside the GDR which had been imposed upon him. In the book Beleites later wrote documenting his observation by the Stasi, a short account appears by ‘Rolf’ describing his time as an informer (J-6, pp. 196–8). Beleites praises ‘Rolf’ in the book for his willingness to endanger himself by agreeing with his plan: ‘By trying to help me in this way, he showed more courage and character than many of the “innocent” people who had no contact to the Stasi’ (ibid. p. 193).

When I last heard from ‘Rolf’ he was working on a freelance basis at his hometown museum again and considering applying for a new job as the head of a recently-opened nature park. He was aware of the fact that his Stasi past might hinder his chances on the job market, but felt that the Stasi hysteria had subsided enough for his case to be viewed objectively (B-1).

‘THEODOR’

On the phone ‘Theodor’ seemed rather confused and nervous, so it was quite a shock to meet the composed, polite, and articulate man behind the voice. During our conversation he periodically became excited and animated, but remained ultimately in control of the situation, never, it seemed, giving away any more than he intended to.

‘Theodor’ expanded on his family background in great detail. His father had been an officer in the First and Second World Wars and had worked as a banker in the Weimar Republic. The end of World War Two had thus signalled the second great defeat in the life of ‘Theodor’s’ father. Once again the system he had actively supported had crumbled. Comparing his own situation in united Germany, ‘Theodor’ felt that he could now empathise with his father.

Born in the 1930s, ‘Theodor’ says that as a young boy he was deeply shocked by and ashamed of Germany’s war crimes, and so embraced life in the GDR as a true alternative to fascism. He describes himself as having ‘a more than average respect for authority’ and joined the army after leaving school (A-2). He claims to have initially loathed military life, but, since he had committed himself to ten years’ service, would have been unable to stand the humiliation of leaving before this time. When he became a communications officer, life improved immensely for ‘Theodor’. He was often working with highly motivated trainees, and he found the research projects he was involved in stimulating. It was during this period that he was active as an informer, according to the information in his file from 1975 until 1985. I...

Índice

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Notes on the Bibliography
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: beginnings of a societal debate
• 1 ‘A completely normal biography’?
• 2 The recruitment process: a work of art
• 3 On motivation
• 4 Between theory and practice: a day in the life of a Stasi informer
• 5 ‘If only I had known’: breaking the bond
• 6 Politicians as informers
• 7 Justice and the law
• 8 The guilt continuum: defining degrees of conformity and resistance
• 9 Looking back
• 10 Re-acquisition of biography
• 11 Impact and implications of an extraordinary legacy
• Glossary
• Bibliography
• Index