The Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic of 1918

Federal Aspirations, Geopolitics and National Projects

Adrian Brisku,Timothy K. Blauvelt

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000372717
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Politics & International Relations
• Categoría: Geopolitics

The Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR) was a unique, bottom-up, and a fleeting display of political unity and federalism among the main Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian political factions between 22 April 1918, when it declared its independence, and 26 May 1918, when it was dissolved and replaced by the three nation-states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Focusing on a crucial but poorly understood moment in the modern history of the Caucasus at the end of the First World War, this book offers a systematic, contextually-rich, and multi-perspectival—Armenian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, Ottoman, German, British, American, Italian, Bolshevik, Ukrainian and North Caucasian—account of the TDFR, drawing on contributions (with the new material from archives in Tbilisi, Grozny, Yerevan, Baku, Istanbul, Berlin, London, Washington D.C.) by a new generation of historians and scholars working on the region.

The book argues that despite its month-long existence in this geopolitically volatile region, the TDFR, with and its federative nature and the various discussions about federalism and federation that it provoked, continued to have an appeal for Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Armenians as well as for the Great Powers well beyond its dissolution. Moreover, the experience of the TDFR reifies federalism as a key political concept in the modern history of the Caucasus.

The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of the Caucasus Survey.

Between empire and independence: Armenia and the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic

Mikayel Zolyan

ABSTRACT

The period of the short-lived Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR) or Transcaucasian Federation was from the Armenian perspective a traumatic one, defined by the military threat coming from the Ottomans and by the complicated relations with the other major ethnic groups of the region. The Armenian political elite and “common Armenians” were caught off-guard by the Russian revolution. The Turkish advance of the Caucasus Front was seen by Armenian political forces as an existential threat, yet this assessment was not necessarily shared by counterparts in the Transcaucasian Federation, especially the Muslim (Azerbaijani) political forces, leading to bitter divisions within the emerging Transcaucasian institutions. These two factors determined the Armenian perspective on the Transcaucasian Federation. The Armenian political entities (first and foremost the Dashnaktsutyun) were opposed to the creation of the Transcaucasian Federation, as they saw its emergence as the result of Ottoman pressure. Yet they were equally reluctant when it came to the transition from the Transcaucasian Federation to independent nation-states. This attitude was reflected in the fact that the Armenian National Council lagged behind its Georgian and Azerbaijani counterparts when it declared itself to be the central body of power in the Armenian-inhabited lands.

Introduction: the forgotten federation

It is common for national historiographies to construct narratives in which the focal point is the creation of the nation-state, usually presented as the “achievement”, or more often as the “restoration”, of independence. In Armenian historical narratives the creation of the independent Armenian nation-state is treated as an outcome of a centuries-long struggle for independence. Obviously, the short-lived First Republic of Armenia of 1918–1920 has a special place in the narrative of national history of Armenia, promoted through school textbooks, government rhetoric, state rituals, and holidays, and it is also commonly featured in the media (for a discussion of twentieth century Armenian history narratives and the place of the First Republic in them see Suny 1993, 119–133; Libaridian 1999, 149–161; Panossian 2006, 242–262; Libaridian 2007, 13–50). Meanwhile, the short-lived Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR) receives much less attention, if any, within this narrative. Most history textbooks mention it only in passing, and when the Transcaucasian Republic does enter the narrative, it is perceived as a mere passing stage through which the Armenians had to pass in order to realize their “age-old dream” of independent statehood (on Armenian history textbooks, see Zolyan and Zakaryan 2008).

In fact, the creation of the independent Republic of Armenia in May 1918 was not so much the result of a concerted effort for a “struggle for national liberation”, as it was the outcome of the complicated geopolitical setting. Moreover, neither the Armenian population at large nor the Armenian political elites were actively campaigning for independence, and they were arguably ill-prepared for independence when it came about. Prior to the First World War, the national project among the political and intellectual elite focussed on the so-called “Western [or Turkish] Armenia”, the Armenian-inhabited regions within the Ottoman Empire. “Eastern [or Russian] Armenia” was considered to be better off within the Russian Empire, and even the most radical nationalist demands (e.g. those of the Dashnaktsutyun Party) went no further than seeking a certain level of autonomy. Similarly, the idea of an independent Transcaucasia had little appeal for the Armenian political class (on the Armenian political project prior to the years of independence, see Panossian 2006, 200–214).

Hence, as this article will argue, even the Armenian political elite, not to mention “common Armenians,” was little prepared for the demise of Russian imperial power that began with the October 1917 events. The Turkish advance in the Caucasus Front was seen by the Armenians as an existential threat, yet this assessment was not shared by the Georgians and the Muslims (Azerbaijanis), leading to bitter divisions within the emerging Transcaucasian power institutions. These two factors determined the Armenian perspective on the Transcaucasian Federation. The Armenian political leaders (first and foremost the Dashnaktsutyun) were opposed to creating a Transcaucasian federation, as they saw its emergence as the result of Turkish pressure (i.e. that Turkey was interested in separating the Transcaucasus from Russia in order to advance its own expansionist agenda). Hence, the resistance of the Armenian political leaders to the proclamation of the TDFR as an independent entity.

Yet it is particularly interesting to observe that the Armenian political leaders were equally reluctant when it came to the transition from the TDFR to becoming independent nation-states. This is partly related to the idea that the TDFR would be capable of resisting the Ottoman Empire more effectively, even though in fact, as reality showed, the Armenian forces were able to mount a more or less successful resistance to Turkish forces only when the TDFR had virtually collapsed. There were also fears that the ethno-demographic situation in Transcaucasia at the time would make Armenians the biggest losers from separation. There were potential territorial disputes on the borders of the future Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and also the most numerous and wealthy Armenian communities were centred in the cities of Tiflis and Baku, the future capital cities of Georgia and Azerbaijan. It was a reflection of this attitude that not only did the Armenian National Council lag behind its Georgian and Azerbaijani counterparts, but even when it finally declared itself the to be locus of power in the Armenian inhabited lands, it used ambiguous language that fell short of an actual declaration of independence.

Reluctant participation: the Armenian political leaders and their positions vis-a-vis the Transcaucasian Federation

The Russian Revolution took Armenian society, and particularly the Armenian political class, by surprise, and to a large extent they were unprepared to deal with its consequences. The generally chaotic situation which engulfed the entire region in the wake of the Russian Revolution was also reflected in the political structures that sought to reflect the voice of the Armenian population of the region. The body that claimed to represent Armenians politically was the Armenian National Council, which was based in Tiflis. It was established on the basis of the Congress of “Russian Armenians,” convened in October 1917, and consisted of about 200 deputies from various regions with Armenian populations (Hovannisian 1967, 86–90; Hovannisian 2005, 17) The Congress formed the executive body, the Armenian National Council, where places were assigned according to party membership. It consisted of 15 members, and it acted as a quasi-government of Armenia, or rather of the Armenians, in various parts of Transcaucasia, until the Republic of Armenia was formed (Hovannisian 2005, 19). The degree of its actual influence on the prevailing state of affairs, however, and the readiness of Armenians around the region to follow the orders of the National Council remained under question.

There were several influential Armenian parties, though the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or as it is known in Armenian the “Dashnaktsutyun”, or the “Dashnaks”, was particularly influential compared to all of the others. By 1918 the Dashnaktsutyun had come to be seen as the symbol of armed resistance and the fight for the national cause, which contributed to its popularity among Armenians. This, coupled with its well-organized structure and experience of armed struggle, made the Dashnaktsutyun the obvious leader among the Armenian parties (for more on Dashnaktsutyun see Donabedian 1981; Panossian 2006, 205–210). In the Constituent Assembly elections in November 1917 the Dashnaktsutyun received 558,440 votes, third only to the mostly Georgian-dominated Social-Democrat (Menshevik) party and the Azerbaijani Musavat party. Together these three parties received about 75% of all of the votes in Transcaucasia (Vratsyan 1958, 30).

Yet it would be wrong to ignore other political forces that existed among the Armenians at the time. While Dashnaktsutyun was indeed the largest and best organized political organization, there were others as well, and at certain times Dashnaktsutyun was willing to share the spotlight with them. Thus, when the Armenian National Council was formed, Dashnaktsutyun agreed that several parties should be represented in it: out of 15 places Dashnaktsutyun took only six, while three other parties, the Popular Party, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats, received three places each, and three further places went to people without party affiliation (Hovannisian 2005, 19). The only party that was not represented in the National Council, as well as in the Congress that had elected it, was the Bolsheviks. Historians disagree as to whether the Bolsheviks refused to take part from the beginning, claiming that the Congress was a “bourgeois-clerical gathering”, or if they had been present at the first session and then decided to boycott the congress after the presentation of their programme ended in a scandal (Hovannisian 2005, 17).

Of these parties the Socialist Revolutionaries and Social Democrats were offshoots of larger Russian parties, and they criticized the Dashnaktsutyun for its focus on Armenian nationalism. The Popular Party was more focussed on Armenian issues, even though it was close in its ideology and class base to the Russian liberal parties, and was formed by the Armenian members of the Constitutional Democrat party. In 1918 and subsequent years, the Popular Party was the second largest Armenian party, with a base among the urban intelligentsia and bourgeoisie of Tbilisi and Baku (Hovannisian 2005, 17–18). Of all these parties it was the Dashnaktsutyun that would have become the obvious flag-bearer of the Armenian national independence. But Dashnaktsutyun was far from being an advocate of an independent Armenian statehood: it had earlier proclaimed the demand for autonomy rather than full independence for Eastern Armenia, and even for Western Armenia (Panossian 2006, 207–208).

Ultimately, due to the divisions between the Armenians and the Muslims, it fell to the Georgians to decide whether Transcaucasia would formally remain a part of Russia or would declare independence. This is how Alexander Khatissian (Khatisov), one of the prominent leaders of the Dashnaktsutyun and former Tbilisi mayor, described the situation:

As we said, there were two streams among the Georgians. One, led by Zhordania and Gegechkori, wanted to continue the war and opposed the isolation of the Transcaucasus from Russia. The second, under the leadership of Chkhenkeli and Ramishvili, was for independence and concluding peace [with Turkey]. The struggle for these two currents was fierce, and the voices were divided almost equally. After a couple of days of heated dispute, the Central Committee of the Georgian ruling party finally made a decision, by a vote of nine against seven, to declare Transcaucasia an independent republic, to appoint Chkhenkeli as head of government, and to resume reconciliation talks with the Turks. (Khatissian 1968, 54)

As Khatissian explained, the Dashnaktsutyun had little choice but to accept the Georgians’ decision and support the independence of the Transcaucasia.

There was no such fierce debate in the Dashnaktsutyuns. Everyone’s wish was to maintain solidarity with the South Caucasian neighbors and, in particular, the Georgians, in order not to find ourselves left alone to face the Turks. The Dashnaktsutyuns could not take on the sole responsibility for the war with the Turks, and that would have been the outcome if [we had voted] against the Georgians. The mood of the Dashnaktsutyun leadership was then well expressed by the Seim member Hovhannes Kajaznouni, who made the following declaration in the Seim: ‘Citizens, members of the Seim. The Dashnaktsutyun Party faction, fully aware of the great responsibility that it takes on this historic moment, joins in declaring Transcaucasia as independent republic’. Karjikyan expressed these sentiments among the Dashnaktsutyun in a lengthy and eloquent speech in the Seim a few days later. (Khatissian 1968, 55–56)

Military defeat: the trauma of spring 1918

The experience of the TDFR was a largely traumatic one for Armenia, combining military defeat and a refugee crisis with political chaos and the inability of the Armenian elite of the time to take control of the matter. Some episodes of the history of these two months are particularly traumatic, as they involve not just the military defeat and the suffering of the local population, but they are generally seen as “shameful” within the Armenian historical narrative. Initially, it seemed that the February revolution would not spell trouble for the Armenians, as the Russian Provisional Government declared that it would continue the war “to a victorious end”. Interestingly, the position of the Bolsheviks was quite acceptable for the Armenians, in theory even more so than that of the tsarist regime or the Provisional Government. The Bolshevik decree on Turkish Armenia, signed on 29 December 1917, spelled out a demand of independence for “Turkish Armenia” in accordance with the principle of “self-determination” that the Bolsheviks championed (Hovannisian 2005, 21). Yet what really mattered for Armenians was the Bolshevik “Decree on Peace”, which effectively meant the collapse of the Russian armed forces on all fronts. Obviously, the remote Caucasus Front was one of the first to feel the effects of this mass desertion. By the winter of 1917, the majority of the Russian soldiers had gone. Against this backdrop the Bolsheviks’ decree “On Turkish Armenia” was more of a propaganda effort that aimed to show a progressive approach to foreign policy, and that they were rejecting the imperialist policies of the tsar (Boryan 1928-1929, 262).

The events of spring 1918 have become one of the most traumatic episodes in Armenian collective memory, and the most disturbing of these events coincided with the period when Armenia was part of the short-lived TDFR. The trauma of this period was not only due to the military defeats, the loss of civilian lives and the mass flight of the population from the territories occupied by Turkish forces, but it was also the result of the inability of Armenian forces to mount effective resistance to the Ottoman armies, and in certain cases they were forced to surrender important positions. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty, signed on 3 March 1918, provided the diplomatic pretext for the Ottoman offensive, even though, as became obvious later, the aims of the Ottoman command went far beyond establishing control over the territories awarded to the Ottoman Empire by the Treaty (Hovannisian 1967).

The Ottoman offensive that began in early 1918 led to a series of military defeats of the Armenian and Georgian forces. Of these, the fall of Kars occupies an especially traumatic place in the Armenian collective memory, and it is often considered one of the most shameful moments in Armenian history. The trauma of Kars was intensified because the scenario of the shameful capitulation of the city in 1918 repeated itself in an almost identical form two years later in 1920 during the Armenian-Turkish war of 1920 (on these events see Sasouni 1969; Zohrabyan 1979, 1997; Hovannisian 1996).

The causes for the loss of Kars in 1918 became a matter of a heated debate even at the time, and the arguments continue to this day. The arguments surrounding the defeat are part of a larger debate about why the Ottoman forces advancing on Transcaucasia in the spring of 1918 were met with little effective resistance. Part of this was the inability of the TDFR to form an efficient state structure that might have been able to organize a coordinated military effort, both on the frontline and on the home front. This is how the situation was described by Gevorg Melik-Gharagyozyan (Georgi Melik-Karakozov), a prominent member of the Popular party, and a future minister in one of Armenia’s governments:

Frankly, the Transcaucasian Seim … and the national councils presented a miserable picture. Confused and stumbling at every turn, trembling before the approaching danger and fearing the vengeance of the “Northern Colossus” [i.e. Russia], the Transcaucasian government failed to organize the defense of the region, despite the considerable military supplies left behind by the Russian Army and, as it turned out, the inadequacies of the Turkish military forces. But while the latter were organized, united and guided by a single will … the Transc...

Índice

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• Introduction: Who wanted the TDFR? The making and the breaking of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic
• 1 Between empire and independence: Armenia and the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic
• 2 Azerbaijan and the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic: historical reality and possibility
• 3 The Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR) as a “Georgian” responsibility
• 4 Pragmatism and expediency: Ottoman calculations and the establishment of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic
• 5 The German perspective on the Transcaucasian Federation and the influence of the Committee for Georgia’s Independence
• 6 Feeble projects and aspirations: the Caucasian and Transcaucasian federation/confederation in the geopolitics of 1918–1920
• 7 Ideology meets practice in the struggle for the Transcaucasus: Stepan Shaumyan and the evolution of Bolshevik nationality policy
• 8 Ukraine and the Transcaucasus in 1917–1918: parallels, interactions, influences
• 9 Turning towards unity: a North Caucasian perspective on the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic
• Afterword
• Index