Blitzkrieg

From the Ground Up

Niklas Zetterling

• Editorial: Casemate
• Año: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781612004617
• Categoría: History
• Categoría: World War II

From the author of Bismarck: " A work of simply outstanding scholarship... unreservedly recommended for... World War II Military History collections" ( Midwest Book Review ). The successes of the German Blitzkrieg in 1939-41 were as surprising as they were swift. Allied decision-makers wanted to discover the Germans' secrets, even though only partial, incomplete information was available to them. The false conclusions drawn became myths about the Blitzkrieg that have lingered for decades. It has been argued that rather than creating a new way of war based on new technology, the Germans fitted the new weapons into their existing ideas on warfare. The conduct of German soldiers, particularly the lower-ranking men, on the battlefield was at the core of the concept, and German victories rested upon the quality, flexibility, and mobility of the small combat units. This book focuses on the experiences of the enlisted men and junior officers in the Blitzkrieg operations in Poland, Norway, Western Europe, and Russia. Using accounts previously unpublished in English, military historian Niklas Zetterling "not only shows you the big picture, economically, strategically, but also takes you right into the Panzers, " showing how a company commander led his tanks, how a crew worked together inside a tank, and the role of the repair services. "For those of us who are interested in the tactics and strategy of the early war years, it is a book you won't want to miss" ( A Wargamers Needful Things ). "In support of his convincing argument the author uses several accounts of German actions seen through the eyes of the soldiers and junior officers who had to put theory into practice on the battlefield. 4.5 stars." — Army Rumour Service

CHAPTER I

THE TURBULENT INTERWAR YEARS

The word had existed for a long time, but it was hardly well-known. A few writers had used it in their texts and some had even used it in book titles, but it was not used on the front pages of the major newspapers. However, this changed in the fall of 1939, as the media and propaganda introduced the word to a broader audience. It began to be said that Germany had defeated Poland by using something called “Blitzkrieg.”¹

With time, the word would prove catchy—despite the fact that it was unclear what it actually meant. The lack of a clear definition allowed various writers and commentators to ascribe the term to whatever they saw fit, and the striking nature of the word meant it was frequently used. This meant the word “Blitzkrieg” came to have a vague meaning that could differ considerably depending on who used it.

The German armed forces did not use the word themselves, except possibly in publications by individual officers. Still, they had created something regarded as revolutionary by their contemporaries, even though a mere four years had elapsed since Hitler denounced the Treaty of Versailles. The peace treaty signed after World War I had forbidden Germany to possess modern weapons such as submarines, tanks and aircraft, also drastically curtailing the size of the German armed forces.

It may appear puzzling that an armed force that had been fettered not only expanded rapidly but also created something that appeared revolutionary. Furthermore, this revolution was accomplished by a country lacking most of the raw materials needed for modern warfare and recovering in the wake of a worldwide economic depression.² Several circumstances influenced the process, but some were perhaps more important than others. One of these was the German effort to circumvent the Treaty of Versailles, a process that had been initiated in the early 1920s. The German armed forces clandestinely cooperated with the Soviet Union, allowing them to experiment with modern weapon systems such as tanks and aircraft. The Germans also carried out projects in their home country—for example, constructing tank prototypes under the disguise of agricultural tractors. Several theoretical studies were undertaken and the developments in foreign countries were followed closely.

However, one could argue that the German Blitzkrieg was not revolutionary at all. Perhaps it can be better understood if it is not regarded as a break with the past, but rather a development of existing German military concepts. If the Blitzkrieg is conceived as an almost logical continuation of existing lines of development, it is easier to understand how the Germans could go to war in 1939 and swiftly conquer Poland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and France despite the fact that conscription had not been introduced until 1935.

Another notion to be called in question is the idea that tanks and aircraft formed the core of the Blitzkrieg. Admittedly, these weapons played a prominent role in German propaganda as well as in many foreign assessments, but the German warfare concept did not emanate from them, nor from any other weapon system. Instead, the Germans had a fairly clear idea of how to conduct operations and battles, and the tank in particular happened to fit quite well into the concept. Still, the infantry divisions remained the backbone of the German Army—a result of economic constraints rather than deliberate design. Germany simply lacked the industrial resources and the raw materials needed to create and sustain a completely mechanized army. Neither was a large strategic air force—akin to what Britain and US would later employ during World War II—a realistic alternative. The Germans could only proceed from their basic concepts and try to fit modern weapons into them.

Hitler has often been described as a propelling force behind the Blitzkrieg concept. His responsibility for the outbreak of the war in 1939 is unquestioned, and it is conceivable that the state of the German armed forces would have been very different at a later date, but there are more fundamental objections to the notion of Hitler’s importance. He clearly pushed for a rapid expansion of the armed forces, but he had relatively little influence over how they were composed and, in particular, how they were trained to fight. A study of the period before Hitler assumed power is revealing in this respect.

The Legacy of World War I

World War I has often been regarded as an example of stagnated warfare, but such a view is misleading. In fact, the officers in Germany—as well as in other countries—had tried to understand the implications of rapidly developing technology before the war began in 1914. However, it was difficult to envisage war in the future as much had changed since the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–71. However, it would be even more misleading to claim that little changed during World War I.³

Perhaps the major operational limitation encountered by the combatants during World War I was the almost impenetrable defense lines. Unless the enemy defense lines were broken through, operational freedom of maneuver could not be attained. The Germans and the other combatants tried to solve this problem in multiple ways; unsurprisingly, the Germans attached the greatest importance to their own solutions, of which the so-called “stormtrooper” tactics were the most important. In many ways, the German stormtrooper tactics developed during World War I epitomize the conclusions and lessons preserved by the Germans after World War I.

The German approach to breaking the stalemate on the Western Front is indicative of the German art of war, as the process was very decentralized. Local initiatives led by many officers—many of them low-ranking—were vital. After these efforts had proved their worth in battle, the higher command echelons quickly paid attention to them and introduced extensive training programs to capitalize on the ideas conceived by the low-ranking officers. Thus the most useful ideas were put into general practice in the Army.⁴

As can be surmised from the term, the stormtroop tactics were mainly a solution to a tactical problem—how to break through a strong enemy defense. It was necessary to begin at the tactical level as no significant operational results would be attained unless tactical success had created freedom of action for the higher commanders.

The German stormtroop tactics were made up of several components. The underlying principle was decentralization, which was applied in many ways; the most important of these was decentralized decision-making, but this was not a novel idea. The Germans had previously tended to delegate authority, but with the stormtroop tactics this trend was extended further down in the organization and applied more consistently. It was obvious to the Germans that the modern battlefield demanded rapid decisions made according to the fluid situation on many parts of the battlefield. Junior commanders had to act independently and exercise initiative, and this kind of decentralization was facilitated by another kind. At the beginning of World War I, the combat units were rather uniformly equipped—an infantry battalion was mainly composed of riflemen. The introduction of stormtroop tactics also meant that the composition of these combat units changed due to the reliance on the principle of combined arms. Junior commanders therefore had more options to choose from when they decided how to act in battle. Additionally, less time was wasted when the local commanders could, for example, arrange fire support on their own.⁵

The stormtroop tactics were mainly developed by German forces fighting the western powers, but the Germans also gained valuable experience from the Eastern Front, where the number of units was much smaller relative to the size of the theater. The lower troop density made it much more difficult to create the kind of strong defenses that thwarted offensives between the English Channel and Switzerland. Consequently, it was easier for the Germans to break through the Russian defenses, and mobile operations ensued—strongly suggesting that future war need not resemble the stalemate experienced in the west.

It can be argued that most major aspects of what would subsequently be known as Blitzkrieg had already been available to the Germans in 1918. The most important was the command philosophy. Commanders at all levels would make decisions and act on their own initiative. This was the fundamental principle on which the Germans relied when conducting operations and fighting battles. The combined-arms principle as expressed by the stormtroop units fitted well with the decentralized decision-making. Alongside decentralized decision-making and the combined-arms principle, the third important lesson upon which Blitzkrieg was based was the experience on the Eastern Front, which strongly suggested that mobile operations were feasible.

The fourth major lesson actually stemmed from a failure. The stormtroop tactics enabled the Germans to break through the strong defenses on the western front—as in March 1918, for example. However, the Germans did not manage to exploit their initial success, and this was mainly due to logistical shortcomings. The Germans lacked the capacity to bring forward artillery, ammunition, reinforcements and supplies needed to sustain their momentum, while their opponents could rely on the rail network to bring reinforcements to the endangered sector.

The legacy of World War I was thus composed of both positive and negative lessons learned, but in a sense, the peace treaties of 1919 can also be regarded as part of the legacy. In fact, harsh as they were, they might nevertheless have been beneficial to the German development in the interwar period. As the German Army was limited to 100,000 men (of whom 4,000 were allowed to be officers), the Army could select the best people for the job, especially as the military profession remained attractive in Germany.

The lessons learned by the Germans were mainly confined to the tactical and operational levels. However, there were some strategic lessons the Germans would have benefited from paying more attention to; one of these was the fact that very little was gained by the war—even by its winners. France and Britain were economically exhausted and the human cost had been appalling. They would be hard-pressed to maintain the powerful position they had held before the war. Italy was also weakened by the war, despite being one of the victors. It could be argued that the US and Japan had improved their positions, but, significantly, they had avoided most of the costly battles. Thus it can be concluded that the use of military force may have resulted in such immense costs that the fruits of victory could not be enjoyed. However, the Germans would not pay as much attention to this as to the tactical and operational lessons.

A Shackled Army

As intended, the terms imposed by the Treaty of Versailles made the German armed forces very weak. Their low number of weapons and lack of important ones made them incapable of fending off an earnest attack, but the clauses of the treaty could not prevent German officers from pondering on future war. The Germans immediately initiated an extensive program to study the experiences of World War I. Most of the just over 400 officers involved were veterans very familiar with the progress that had taken place between 1914 and 1918 and not least the stormtroop tactics.⁶

The experiences were thoroughly studied, but the process was completed quickly enough to produce an entirely new Army field manual by 1921. It was known as “Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen,” or by its abbreviation “das FuG.” The manual was thus written less than three years after the end of World War I and served as a guideline for the German Army eighteen years before World War II broke out. The latter observation is particularly important as the foundations laid by the field manual of 1921 remained until 1945.⁷

The 1921 field manual emphasized offensive operations, mobility and decentralized decision-making down to the lowest possible level, allowing officers and NCOs to act independently and exercise initiative on the battlefield. However, there was a latent problem with such emphasis on independence—the actions on the battlefield might become dissipated. The German solution to this dilemma was thorough and extensive training. This would ensure that a common method of thinking would be instilled, guiding decision-making across the battlefield.⁸

The German Army could emphasize the training of its limited personnel during the interwar period, but this training was hampered by the lack of important weapons systems. However, that problem should not be exaggerated. Training, intellectual activity and ideas are often more fundamental than equipment, and the German armed forces were no exception during this time. The process of development that took place did not spring from certain weapon systems or technology; instead, there was an intellectual framework into which the new weapons were included. The legacy and the analysis of World War I were very important elements of the framework.

Occasionally, the French Army has been criticized for preparing for another round of World War I in 1939, while the Germans are said to have used the interwar years to create the prerequisites for fighting a future war. Such an argument would be a gross simplification, as the Germans also used the experiences of World War I as the basis for their preparations for future war. The differences between the approaches of the two countries (which became clear in 1940) stemmed from differences that had existed even before 1918. To regard the French as conservative and the Germans as far-sighted is a simplification that conceals more than it reveals. However, it seems that the German Army accepted diverse opinions and an open debate to a notably greater extent than the French Army. Most likely, such an attitude facilitated the creation of an armed force whose art of war was at a higher level than the opponents, though not necessarily revolutionary.⁹

The German Army’s broad acceptance of diverse opinions was apparent in reports submitted by the Swedish military attaché in Berlin, Lieutenant-Colonel Juhlin-Dannfelt, to his superiors in Stockholm. He was clearly surprised at how German soldiers acted during discussions after exercises. On several occasions, in different units—and even in the presence of foreign officers—the commanders had been interrupted by subordinates who argued back while the commander was criticizing the subordinate’s performance during a recently concluded exercise. Such behavior had not been commented upon until the commander-in-chief of the Army, Colonel-General von Fritsch, addressed t...

Índice

• Front Cover
• Half-Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• Prologue
• 1 The Turbulent Interwar Years
• 2 The Unfinished Concept
• 3 Surprising the Enemy
• 4 To Surprise Oneself
• 5 Interlude with Crucial Decisions
• 6 The Ultimate Ordeal
• 7 Success or Failure?
• Notes
• Bibliography