Xenophon's Other Voice

Irony as Social Criticism in the 4th Century BCE

Yun Lee Too

• Editorial: Bloomsbury Academic
• Año: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781350250550
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Literatura
• Categoría: Crítica literaria antigua y clásica

This volume explores irony – in its essence, saying other than one actually means – in the collected works of Xenophon. Xenophon's Other Voice argues that there are two voices in the author: one ostensible at the level of the literal text, which is available to everyone, while the sub-title designates the other voice, which is less obvious to the reader and indeed, an ironic one. It presents a unified view of the author's entire corpus and argues that the function of Xenophontic irony is to offer critiques of the societies in which he finds himself. Rejecting both non-ironic and Straussian interpretations of Xenophon's writings, Yun Lee Too offers a wholly original perspective on the contemporary debate of how he should be read, which is underpinned by a series of incisive readings of the individual works. Beginning with Xenophon's representation of an ironic Socrates, who condemns the contemporary city and its more prominent citizens, the book moves on to consider how the author develops his own approach to irony. He deploys irony to criticize aspects of Athenian society, such as its understanding of wealth, its armed forces and sophistic education. The book then turns to his treatment of other Hellenic societies, including the Spartan city-state and laws, kingship in Syracuse and war amongst the Greek states. It finally considers Persia, covering Xenophon's depiction of Cyrus the Great and the expedition with Cyrus the Younger.

Part One

Socrates on Athens

1

Xenophon’s Apology: The Death of Socratic Irony; the Birth of Xenophontic Irony

Death often brings about a new birth, and this brief chapter is about the death of a certain form of irony – Socratic irony – which is the preface for the creation of a new irony: Xenophontic irony. It concerns the individual who engaged in irony, Socrates, his trial and his death in 399 BCE. When the work was actually written is uncertain according to Gabriel Danzig, but it was composed clearly long after the event it portrays.¹ In this chapter, I suggest that examining the death of Socrates and Socratic irony is a necessary in-road into an analysis of irony within the corpus of Xenophon because it confronts the most obvious, and thus the most illustrative, case of the phenomenon. Irony in the fourth century BCE is often ‘Socratic irony’ and this is because the philosopher Socrates is a figure who attempts to remedy human ignorance with knowledge, with the result that the ignorance which is so central to irony is an essential element to the Socratic drama.

Socrates identifies instances of ignorance and attempts to correct them with the truth, although the interlocutors generally fail to recognize their own failures to know the truth and this is where the irony lies. The point of Socratic – and indeed, any – irony is that things are indeed different from the way the majority of people think they are. The structure of the Socratic method is important because ignorance, as distinct from knowledge, is the hinge upon which irony depends and one can therefore expect the Socratic dialogues of Xenophon to be rife with ironies. This is because the philosopher is wise and dispenses his knowledge accordingly whereas his interlocutors are ignorant and unknowing. This is certainly the case with the Apology, a dialogue which Danzig extensively examines together with Plato’s Apology for evidence of what he mistakenly sees to be Socrates’ largely non-ironic behaviour in court.²

I approach the Apology with the view that it is perhaps the most obviously ironic of Xenophon’s texts, with the irony resting in the difference between the knowing exhibited on the one hand by the philosopher and the ignorance exhibited on the other by his accusers and the jury, who constitute his audience at the trial. The irony is distinctly Socratic in that the philosopher simply has to articulate the truths he perceives and knows to an unknowing and unenlightened audience for there to be the gap in knowledge which constitutes irony. The Apology features the philosopher and his accuser Meletus at odds over Socrates’ piety: is he an atheist, as the prosecutor Meletus claims due to the latter’s lack of knowledge of what true piety is, or is Socrates rather a follower of the gods, as seems to be the case according to Socrates in his adherence to τὸ δαιμόνιον or the Divinity? Irony stands behind major historical events – here the death of Socrates – and this will be a chapter about a brief work which reveals a very apparent irony, one in which Socratic irony is silenced, and sets the scene for irony in other texts, both Socratic and non-Socratic, in the corpus.

I

According to Xenophon, this Apology seeks to hand down to posterity how Socrates thought about his own defence and his own death. As L. R. Shero has noted, Xenophon deals with Socrates before, during and after his trial, whereas Plato only treats the trial itself.³ Danzig argues that the work attempts to absolve Socrates of his rather incompetent showing in court,⁴ as he seems rather arrogant at times⁵ and does not really seek to address the charges against himself. Elsewhere, Danzig suggests that Socrates is actually arranging his own suicide,⁶ but I offer that to view the text in this way misses the whole point of what Xenophon is trying to suggest. Kierkegaard is more to the point when he states that the Apology demonstrates what a scandalous injustice it was for the Athenians to sentence Socrates to death,⁷ while Ralkowski argues that a city corrupted by greed and by rhetoric resulted in the philosopher’s condemnation.⁸ But even so, I suggest that Xenophon’s emphasis is placed elsewhere. The author states that the philosopher regarded death as more desirable than life, a fact not known to other writers on the trial and on the death of Socrates, and so, his bold defence seems ill-considered, even rather thoughtless to his audience (ὣστε ἀφρονεστέρα αὐτου φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ μεγαληγορία, 1). This may explain why Xenophon chooses a wider perspective for the trial than Plato.⁹ Danzig notes that Socrates does nothing to counter the death sentence at the trial, unlike Plato’s Socrates¹⁰ – he does not offer a penalty for his supposed crime or seek to escape from prison at his friends’ urgings (cf. 23) – but this is not surprising given the philosopher’s view that death is to be more desired at his stage than life is. The Xenophontic Socrates is willing to go to his death to avoid the debilitations that come with old age (6 and 8), whereas the Platonic Socrates sees the death as the outcome of his divine mission to keep philosophizing. So, in the case of the Xenophontic Socrates, the misunderstanding that the author attempts to confront the audience with has to do with why Socrates died when he did: it was not so much the decision of the jury as it was Socrates’ own wish to end his life due to the inconveniences of old age and a sense that he had already done as much as he could in trying to shake Athens and her citizens from their mistaken assumptions about how to live their lives. This the in-crowd already understands. Nonetheless, his μεγαληγορία or loftiness of speech is appropriate to his character.

But it is precisely in the gap between Socrates’ behavior in the lawcourt and what others perceive to be the case that I suggest the chief irony of this work lies. Piero Pucci, however, sees the main irony as lying in the fact that the city wants money and glory, which Socrates is not at all interested in.¹¹ I, however, argue that the concern is primarily with the understanding of the gods and their role in human life, something that is a recurring theme in Xenophon’s writings in general. At section 22 the author states that he has not concerned himself with reporting the whole trial but rather he has focussed on the fact that the philosopher sought to keep clear of committing any act of impiety and of wrong-doing towards his fellow man. That is to say, in Xenophon’s portrayal, Socrates emerges as a righteous man. The misperception of Socrates by others includes most obviously the prosecutors at the trial, the audience of the trial and possibly, the readers of the Apology, who, as Xenophon’s audience, may often fail to perceive the truth that the author is attempting to convey.

II

Socratic texts are generally reported discourse so it is difficult to approach Socrates directly. Certainly, the narrator of the text is usually absent, and indeed, the Apology is a second-hand reported narrative. The existence of the Xenophontic text is due to the attendance of Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, who reports accurately the events he perceived at the trial and death of Socrates. Xenophon was absent at the time of these events, marching as a Greek mercenary with the Ten Thousand, an event which is recorded in the Anabasis, but, according to him, his account of the trial seeks to reconcile Socrates’ lofty speech (cf. μεγαληγορία) and his resolve. Other writers have failed to do this so that his lofty speech seems to be rather senseless (ἀφροντεστέρα) (1). According to Xenophon’s mediated report, one learns that Hermogenes is in danger of making the same mistake as the other writers on the trial have done. Hermogenes is struck by Socrates talking about everything other than the trial and asks the philosopher if he should not be rather thinking about his defence.

The Platonic Socrates in the end suggests a thirty minae fine for himself (Plato Apology 38b), whereas the Xenophontic Socrates did no such thing and did not allow his friends to propose a punishment because this would suggest that he was guilty of the charges. In response, the philosopher declares that he has spent his whole life preparing to defend himself and that he has been free of any wrong-doing, which is the main substance of his defence (3). But Hermogenes observes that sometimes the innocent are condemned to death, while the guilty are acquitted (4). Socrates counters this observation by giving the first strong indication of his piety. He declares that his divine sign has prevented him from even thinking about his defence on two occasions and thereby demonstrates that he is obedient to the gods. He supposes that this means that God thinks it better for him to die now, especially since he has lived a good life, having been righteous to both God and man (4–5). Furthermore, being sentenced to death allows him to avoid the frailties of old age – poor vision, less keen hearing, slower learning and forgetfulness (6). The execution through poison is a relatively easy way to die (7). Dying at this point in his life means that Socrates will avoid illness and the troubles of old age (8).

This introduction to the trial underscores the irony of the charge presented in section 10 of the Apology. Socrates’ accusers have charged him with not believing in the gods worshipped by the state, with the introduction of new gods and with the corruption of the young, accusations which are also mentioned in the Memorabilia (10; Mem. 1.1). Yet the philosopher has been seen – even by his accuser Meletus – offering sacrifices at the communal festivals and at public altars and this is evidence that he worships the gods worshipped also by the state (11). The evidence persuasively suggests that Socrates has a considerable regard for the gods, and Shero sees Xenophon as relying on the common knowledge of Athens citizens to prove that Socrates was religious.¹² This point is corroborated in the Memorabilia at 1.2. As for the charge of worshipping new gods, this is due to a misperception. Socrates argues that the divine has a voice which others acknowledge as coming through the cries of birds, through the utterances of men, through thunder or through the oracle at Delphi. Accordingly, his ‘voice’ is not out of keeping with normal religious observance. Where others call the source of prophecy ‘birds’, ‘utterances’, ‘chance meetings’ or ‘prophets’, he calls his the ‘divine’ thing (τοῦτο δαιμόνιον) and thereby, he argues, he shows more profound religious feelings than those who ascribe the gods’ power to birds (13). The god has revealed to him many counsels that he has given to his friends and on no occasion have they been found to be mistaken (13). The ‘divinity’ is thought by Xenophon to be responsible for the charge of worshipping new deities elsewhere (Mem. 3). The jurors do not accept what Socrates says, as the outcome of the trial proves (14). They ironically fail to see that the philosopher indeed worships the gods. But Socrates has even more to say regarding the oracle at Delphi, which nominates him the freest, most just and wise man of all (14). The jurors are in a turmoil, disbelieving what the philosopher has said about τὸ δαιμόνιον (14) and then, about the words of the Delphic oracle. And it is at this point that the philosopher confronts the irony of the situation most patently. He asks if they know (ἐπίστασθε) of anyone else to be less a slave to bodily appetites than he (16); or of anyone who is freer than he, for he accepts no gifts or money from anyone? Moreover, do they know of anyone who is more just than he for he does not want what others have? He states that he is furthermore a wise man for continuing to want to learn what is good (16). The Athenians are obviously ignorant of Socrates’ piety and thus, the philosopher finds himself on trial for impiety. Moreover, Socrates leads such an exemplary life that he cannot be accused of corrupting the youth by his actions, as he claims to Meletus at section 19 of the speech. As far as receiving the obedience of students to himself rather than to their parents, Socrates argues that this is because he is regarded as an expert on education (21). Likewise, people do not seek the advice of their families in medical matters, or in issues of war, but rather they seek out the advice of experts (20). The trial is clearly to be regarded as a consequence of the Athenians’ ignorance about who the philosopher is or what he does in his life.

Xenophon does not relate any further arguments from the trial but observes that the philosopher knew it was clearly his time to die (22). Section 23 relates the concern of Plato’s Crito, which deals with the events following Socrates’ conviction ...

Índice

• Cover
• Half-Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Part One Socrates on Athens
• 1 Xenophon’s Apology: The Death of Socratic Irony; the Birth of Xenophontic Irony
• 2 The Memorabilia: Remembering Truth and Lies about Socrates
• 3 Partying Life (Away) in Xenophon’s Symposium
• 4 The Economies of Pedagogy in the Oeconomicus: Xenophon’s Wifely Didactics
• Part Two Xenophon on Athens
• 5 The Critique of the Sophists in On Hunting
• 6 Xenophon on Equine Culture
• 7 Xenophon’s Poroi or ‘Ways and Means’?
• Part Three The Rest of Greece
• 8 Why Xenophon’s Hiero Is not a Socratic Dialogue
• 9 Spartan Disappointments
• 10 The Hellenica and the Irony of War
• Part Four Persia
• 11 Xenophon’s Cyropaedia: Disfiguring the Pedagogical State
• 12 Coming Home? The Anabasis as Community
• Concluding Thoughts
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Greek Index
• Index
• Copyright