Uses and Abuses of Psychology

Dr. H. J. Eysenck

• Editorial: Hauraki Publishing
• Año: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781787200685
• Categoría: Psychology
• Categoría: History & Theory in Psychology

This first book by German-born psychologist Hans Jürgen Eysenck's is considered a classic amongst scholars and professionals of psychology. It describes the pitfalls of psychology, and the remedies that can be applied. A strong dependence on statistics and the experimental method is emphasized as essential to good psychology.The book is divided into four sections: Intelligence Testing, Vocational Psychology, Abnormal Behaviour, and Social Attitudes. Can an intelligence test administered to an eight year old predict adult performance? Is interviewing a good way of selecting the best applicant for a job? Is there such a thing as 'normal' behaviour? Can surveys such as the Gallup poll be of assistance to psychologists? Eysenck answers these and other questions.A book not to be missed by anyone interested in psychology.

PART ONE—INTELLIGENCE TESTING

1—WHAT DO INTELLIGENCE TESTS REALLY MEASURE?

The great increase in the use of intelligence tests, particularly in schools, has made more and more people realize the importance of the question: ‘What do intelligence tests really measure?’ Answers range all the way from that of the faithful believer—‘Why, intelligence of course’—to that of the confirmed sceptic—‘Nothing but monkey tricks!’ Even psychologists tend to blanch a little when this question is put to them in brains trusts, by W.E.A. audiences, or in conversation. Their reaction is prompted not so much by ignorance of the right answer as by a realization of the complexity of the problem. The meaning of a scientific concept is bound up so intimately with the whole process of measurement and the theoretical structure into which it fits that to isolate one question and expect an answer, in the absence of knowledge regarding all the other variables which have to be considered, is to make sure that the answer, when it comes, will be unsatisfactory and apparently quite arbitrary. Short of writing a whole textbook, filled with experimental data and incomprehensible mathematical shorthand notation involving Gramian matrices or Kronecker’s deltas, it is impossible to give an accurate answer. It may be possible, however, to give a reasonably complete answer within the compass of a brief chapter if the reader is willing to take the mathematics as given.

First of all, then, we must purge our minds of one notion which underlies much popular thinking. It is often thought that scientific concepts refer to things which actually exist, and that the scientist’s cleverness lies in isolating these really existing things and measuring them. Thus it might be thought that bodies have length, and that the scientist discovers this fact and then proceeds to measure that length. Similarly, it might be thought that people have intelligence, and that the scientist discovers this fact and then proceeds to measure this intelligence. Thus we would be dealing with scientific laws and concepts which existed in nature independently of man, and which could be discovered by diligent search. This exceedingly popular view of science is quite false. Thurstone has expressed the true position when he says:

‘It is the faith of all science that an unlimited number of phenomena can be comprehended in terms of a limited number of concepts or ideal constructs. Without this faith no science could ever have any motivation. To deny this faith is to affirm the primary chaos of nature and the consequent futility of scientific effort. The constructs in terms of which natural phenomena are comprehended are manmade inventions. To discover a scientific law is merely to discover that a manmade scheme serves to unify, and thereby to simplify, comprehension of a certain class of natural phenomena. A scientific law is not to be thought of as having an independent existence which some scientist is fortunate to stumble upon. A scientific law is not a part of nature. It is only a way of comprehending nature.’

If we return to our example of ‘height’ we will see immediately how necessary this warning is. If we measure the height of a person, or the length of a metal bar, in the summer, it will be found that the person is taller, and the bar is longer, than it would be in the winter. If we measured a given distance in terms of the number of times we had to apply the metal bar, we would find that the distance varied according to the temperature prevailing at the time of measurement. We rationalize all these facts in terms of a scientific law by relating the phenomena of length and temperature and saying that ‘bodies expand in the heat and contract in the cold’. We formulate this law because it helps us to unify our observations; it makes our description of nature simpler, and aids our comprehension. A person’s height, then, is not something absolute; it is a construct derived from scientific theory, and interlocking with many other concepts which superficially appear to have little relation to it.

Intelligence, similarly, is not something directly given in nature, which we may succeed in isolating and measuring. It is a concept which we find useful in describing human conduct. ‘A science of psychology will deal with the activities of people as its central theme. A large class of human activity is that which differentiates individuals as regards their overt accomplishments. Just as it is convenient to postulate physical forces in describing the movements of physical objects, so it is also natural to postulate abilities and their absence as primary causes of the successful completion of a task by some individuals and of the failure of other individuals in the same task.’

These remarks may serve as a salutary warning to those who like to argue that, in their opinion, intelligence is the ability to acquire knowledge, or the capacity for abstract thinking, or the equivalent of wisdom, or quickness of thinking, or depth of profundity, or a combination of some of these, or else something quite different. The argument usually continues that because intelligence tests obviously do not measure these particular qualities, therefore intelligence tests certainly do not measure intelligence, whatever else they may measure. As Hobbes remarked, ‘Words are wise men’s counters, but they are the money of fools’, and it is to be feared that in the absence of an agreed definition of wisdom, or profundity, or learning ability, and lacking any acceptable measures of these qualities, to equate them with intelligence, and to make any assertions regarding the degree to which they might be measured by current intelligence tests, is mere semantic obscurantism. It complicates the problem unnecessarily, rather than aids in its solution, and substitutes a host of vague and meaningless terms for the objective, clear-cut standard against which we wish to measure the adequacy of our tests.

There is ample proof that laymen do not agree in their definitions of intelligence; there is equally ample proof that psychologists do not agree very much more closely among themselves when asked for a formal, verbal definition. This does not mean that they are not all referring to the same thing. If we take a given substance, X, and ask a politician, a garage proprietor, and a housewife to define it, they might say that it was ‘the cause of present troubles with several middle East countries’, that it was ‘the ultimate cause of propulsion of motor cars’, or that it was ‘a stain remover’. These definitions are all quite different, but they refer to one and the same thing, namely what most of us would call ‘petrol’. This diversity of definitions does mean, however, that we cannot use any one of them as a standard to compare our tests with, because such a choice would be purely arbitrary and contrary to the procedure of science. We may therefore try quite a different tack and resort to what are known as practical definitions.

A practical definition, in contradistinction to a verbal one, is one which sets up agreed practical criteria which are universally deemed to contain the definient, though not in pure form. Thus almost everyone would agree that intelligence was required in order to do well at school, or at university, to be an efficient officer, or a successful business executive, or quite generally to do intellectual work of any kind with an outstandingly high degree of success. Similarly, almost everyone would agree that the opposite to high intelligence was shown by mental defectives, educationally subnormal children, and people who in spite of persistent efforts could not master even relatively low-level jobs. Obviously other factors, such as good teaching, right connnexions, luck, persistent application, and stability are also involved in success in these various spheres, but intelligence certainly exerts a major influence. Consequently we would expect intelligence tests to show high scores for people successful, and low scores for people unsuccessful in school, university, business, and the various other professions and occupations mentioned. Where people with high scores did badly on the job, we should expect to be able to account for their failure in terms of emotional instability, or some other interfering factor. Where people with low scores did well, we should expect to find them to be exceptionally hard-working, or well-connected, or in some other way outstanding along non-intellectual lines.

The facts bear out these predictions. In later chapters I shall quote detailed evidence of the close relationship between success at school, in college, and in later life on the one hand, and high scores on intelligence tests on the other. Similarly, there is usually a close relationship between intelligence test results and ratings of intelligence made by teachers, professors, supervisors, senior officers, and other people in a position to judge the abilities of the testee. Many hundreds of studies have been made along these lines, and they all give results tending in the same direction. From the practical point of view, this evidence is quite sufficient to justify the use of tests of intelligence in selection and prediction. From the scientific point of view, however, it leaves much to be desired.

The main reason for this lack of satisfaction would appear to be this. Suppose we were to measure two people’s heights by using a yardstick. We should find that X was taller than Y, regardless of which of the innumerable yardsticks in the country we used. We should find that if X was taller than Y, and Y taller than Z, X would also be taller than Z. If these relations did not hold, we should rightly be suspicious of the accuracy of our measurement, and should consider very carefully the conditions under which it was made. If we found that simple errors of measurement, such as occur inevitably in all physical and mental measurement, could not account for our discrepancies, we should be forced to consider our measurem...

Índice

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• INTRODUCTION
• PART ONE-INTELLIGENCE TESTING
• PART TWO-VOCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
• PART THREE-ABNORMAL BEHAVIOUR
• PART FOUR-SOCIAL ATTITUDES
• RECOMMENDED FOR FURTHER READING
• REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER