Chinese Election Interference in Taiwan

Edward Barss

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2022
• ISBN:
  9781000519495
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Politics & International Relations
• Categoría: Political Campaigns & Elections

This book documents the history of China's attempts to undermine Taiwan's elections, offering additional insights into China's methods of influence in Hong Kong, the United States and Canada.

Drawing from Chinese language primary sources and historical accounts, Taiwan is presented as a growing democracy that has had to endure constant threats to its way of democratic life from the People's Republic of China (China). Examining China's election interference operations and several previously undocumented instances of Chinese interference, chapters in this book not only cover traditional methods of influence such as diplomacy, economic policy, and military intimidation, but also an array of novel practices involving organized crime, religion, and the media. Conceptual and practical ideas have been developed for studying and combatting election interference, which will particularly appeal to policy makers and security professionals seeking to better identify instances of ongoing election interference and the motivations driving this phenomenon.

Chinese Election Interference in Taiwan's National Elections will prove an innovative resource to students and scholars of international relations and Chinese studies, including history and politics.

1 Introduction

DOI: 10.4324/9781003157434-1

The island nation of Taiwan must every day face the possibility of its destruction at the hand of its largest neighbour and adversary, China. For most, this threat is distant, only coming into sharp relief when China displays military force. However, Beijing does not only use its military to try and subdue Taiwan. It has many more sophisticated weapons whose presence remains unseen, unnoticed, or ignored. Beijing aims to use these tools to subvert Taiwan’s democracy so that it can assert control over Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province.

Until now, research on China’s subversion of Taiwan’s democracy has been mostly ignored in English language literature because it was inconvenient, required particular language skills, or the data was difficult to find. Despite this, it has been assumed that China has actively interfered with Taiwan’s democracy since its inception. The most prominent example is the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, in which China launched missiles to influence Taiwan’s presidential election. China’s long-standing interference in Taiwan’s elections is seriously understudied and primarily relegated to analysis of current events, which do not trace the evolution of its interference or its methods.

Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China (ROC), is a modern anomaly. A state in form and function, but without official recognition from a majority of states. Official is the operative word, as many states do have unofficial embassies on the island. Taiwan’s ambiguous status began with China’s civil war and is perpetuated by the historical legacy of Cold War great power politics. When China’s nationalist government lost the civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, it fled to Taiwan, where the Republic of China survived. Shifts in U.S. regional strategy as a result of the Korean War and the United States normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) left Taiwan under the United States’ protection but without official recognition. Over time Taiwan transitioned from an autocracy into a democracy, later opening up economic links with the PRC.

From the PRC’s perspective, Taiwan is not a state but a renegade province that undermines the CCP’s legitimacy. Moreover, as Taiwan was a Japanese territory until 1945, it is a painful reminder of the ‘century of humiliation’ and the territorial inequities resulting from that period. Taiwan also presents an ideological challenge to the PRC. Despite the CCP’s claims that democracy is incompatible with ‘Chinese values,’ Taiwan shows that democracy can work in a Chinese society. This ideological affront further feeds into the CCP’s overriding insecurities over separatism and domestic stability. Therefore, despite 70 years of separation and incompatible political systems, bringing Taiwan back under the PRC’s rule is one of the Chinese Communist Party’s principal missions.

There are several possible scenarios for the CCP’s annexation of Taiwan, which vary by the level of force needed.¹ The least realistic scenario is that Taiwan voluntarily decides to become a part of China after increasing its connections with Mainland China. Another scenario follows the example of Western Germany’s absorption of East Germany, whereby China uses its soft power to dissolve Taiwan’s political system and entice it into joining Mainland China. Barring widespread societal collapse, this scenario is also unlikely, not least because Chinese soft power is not sufficient for the task. There is also a further caveat that ‘international conditions’ must be ripe, meaning the U.S. and other countries are no longer willing to defend Taiwan, which is also unlikely. A third more interesting scenario combines political unification with military invasion. In this scenario, the CCP first uses political warfare and election interference tactics to annex Taiwan’s outlying islands of Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu, akin to how Russia invaded Crimea. Using these islands as a base, the PRC would then launch a military attack against Taiwan.

Lastly, the highest risk scenario: the CCP invades Taiwan outright, risking severe retaliation from the US, Japanese, and ROC militaries, as well as all the problems involved with launching a colossal coastal invasion. A pure military scenario is the costliest, especially if political support in Taiwan is lacking. Each of these scenarios becomes easier the more the CCP can co-opt local elites and interfere in Taiwan’s domestic politics. That means that in order to succeed in annexing Taiwan, China needs to undermine the fabric of Taiwan’s democracy. In sum, very little internally or externally restrains China from interfering with Taiwan’s elections.

The Broader Field and China’s Election Interference Activities

The topic of foreign election interference is underdeveloped theoretically and empirically. However, there is a growing body of research on this subject and several promising avenues for further study. Still, owing to the difficulty in studying ongoing campaigns of election interference, researchers have had to rely on the most accessible data. The dearth of timely data has led to a focus on social media disinformation campaigns, historic cases involving the Soviet Union or the United States, implications for international law, and voter attitudes towards foreign interference. In addition, research in this area primarily examines the causal relationship between interference actions and shifts in election outcomes. Although this is important, it often neglects the operationalization of interference which is more beneficial for identifying and preventing future interference. Without this type of study, policymakers intent on reducing election interference are handicapped, as the mechanisms for executing election interference constitute the original problem.

The ROC is a perfect case for studying election interference mechanisms further as the PRC has a long history of attempting to influence elections in the ROC. The PRC has engaged in electoral interference in Taiwan as early as 1996. These activities have continued to the present day, allowing us to trace the evolution of China’s strategies and interference methods over time. Furthermore, the PRC often uses Taiwan as a testing ground for its influence activities abroad, which provides valuable insight for countering PRC influence in other countries. For instance, there is evidence that China attempted to interfere with the U.S. presidential election in 1996 as well as the British general election in 1992.² More recently, in a Toronto mayoral race, “the Chinese Consulate in Toronto was directly interfering in elections, by sending Chinese students into the homes of Chinese-language-only households and telling residents which candidates the Consulate wanted to choose.”³ These attempts at interference often come at the expense of ethnic Chinese persons outside of China and are harmful to these communities, in addition to national sovereignty.

Despite international attention and numerous examples, China’s attempts to subvert foreign democracy is an understudied phenomenon. In particular, understanding the scope, method, and objectives of Chinese interference is necessary. However, this is difficult as many of China’s influence activities remain unpublicized, unrecorded, or relegated to distant archives. This book seeks to remedy such issues by carefully studying Chinese election interference methods in Taiwan’s national elections from 2008 to 2020. The phenomenon is studied from several angles and levels of analysis. The first level of analysis is from the perspective of one-off incidents. These are generally incidents in newspapers and popular accounts and are examined on a case-by-case basis. These incidents have been grouped by type where possible, such as those that involve organized crime or the media. The second level of analysis is election interference from the perspective of cross-strait diplomatic events. These events include diplomatic statements, military exercises, and economic policies. Events of this type are documented on a campaign-by-campaign basis for national and legislative elections, usually starting five months prior unless there is cause to extend that timeline. Lastly, Chinese election interference is examined as a long-term strategy. PRC policies connected to election interference are examined on a year-by-year basis, emphasizing those involving the United Front Work Department’s activities. The United Front is a CCP intelligence organization that conducts political interference activities. This overall approach captures a wide variety of election interference methods and provides a comprehensive record for future scholarship.

This study’s analysis reveals several fascinating findings. First, China uses multiple methods to influence Taiwan’s domestic politics, primarily focusing on influencing elites. Much of this activity involves using organized crime, Taishang (Taiwanese businesspeople who work in Mainland China), religious organizations, and politicians to create a parallel cross-strait network outside of the scope of normal diplomatic relations and beholden to Beijing. Although China also employs methods focused on influencing ordinary voters, these were often conducted through elite networks. For example, disinformation was one of the lesser-used interference methods during the 2008–16 period, though this changed post-2016.

Second, China very rarely attempted to interfere in Taiwan’s electoral process directly. Over the period examined, only two or three incidents involved attempts to interfere with the vote-counting process. The lack of interference in the electoral system itself appears attributable to Taiwan’s robust safeguards and China’s strategic position. China’s comparatively greater power and relatively secure strategic position afford it more choice in executing its interference strategy. Therefore, China tends to operate on an extended timeframe, which is more beneficial for operations involving building relationships and shifting public opinion rather than fomenting disruption or heavier-handed interference tactics.

Third, the premier organization for conducting these operations is the United Front Work Department, a Chinese intelligence organization responsible for influencing the CCP’s political enemies. United Front operations include ‘cultural exchange’ programs designed to change political opinions and recruit spies, the use of Government Organized Non-Government Organizations, and more traditional espionage operations.

Fourth, China’s political interference methods and influence policies are sensitive to election results and are particularly sensitive to anti-China sentiment or Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) electoral success. Generally, it appears the CCP uses election results to adjust its Taiwan policy and target areas which more heavily support the DPP. Municipal and local election results, in particular, are used to anticipate general election outcomes and prepare accordingly.

Fifth, Chinese interference methods tend to replicate methods of domestic control, thereby recreating domestic power structures abroad. Much of this practice is due to China’s top-down approach to political influence campaigns, extensive ideological and political controls within the party, and the lack of experience with alternative methods of influence.

Sixth, there are several general indicators that China is working with local Taiwanese actors to conduct election influence. Indicators that local actors are working with the CCP include meetings with United Front organizations, a financial relationship with Mainland China, and actions supporting the CCP’s agenda in Taiwan.

Finally, the CCP’s methods of election interference have grown more sophisticated as cross-strait interactions have increased. China has not moderated its approach in response to friendly overtures and economic opening from Taiwan. Instead, it has consistently increased the manipulation of Taiwan’s domestic politics. That does not mean that China has not brought economic benefits, but even when China employed a policy of ‘economics first, politics second,’ politics remained at the forefront.

Limitations, Scope, and Approach

Election interference as a topic of study presents many challenges. Firstly, election interference itself is not well defined. Does lobbying count as election interference? What about normal diplomatic relations that may impact an election? Moreover, interference implies intent, suggesting evidence of intent and action is required before an event can be considered election interference. However, direct attribution is difficult, if not impossible, in the majority of cases. Many of the cases that exist draw on previously classified documents or extensive investigation, making the barriers to current research high. The information desert forces a reliance on datasets and archives, which may only present some aspects of this phenomenon and be problematically out of date.

Other limitations on election interference research include the often covert nature of such actions, a surfeit of alternative variables that explain electoral outcomes, heterogeneous cases, time lag issues, vague definitions, stochastic elements, and other issues. Furthermore, it might be questionable to argue that there is enough homogeneity in election interference cases that cross-case research on election interference can draw generalizable conclusions about the conduct of such actions or their outcomes. For instance, cases of interference vary by institutional, historical, cultural, geographical, context-specific, interferer-specific, and stochastic (weather, ballot design, etc.) variables. In general, these issues present significant challenges in the study of election interference, and without further conceptual development and methodological refinement, prevent more fruitful avenues of research from being explored.

That said, of the countries where election interference has occurred, Taiwan presents the most compelling and rich history for investigation. Unlike most other incidents involving the United States or the Soviet Union, election interference in Taiwan is not contained to one election or a short series of incidents. Instead, there is evidence of election interference in Taiwan starting in 1996 and continuing to the present. In addition, China’s intent to annex the ROC is highly likely to trigger a great power war, making it critical to determine indicators of ongoing electoral or political interference operations.

The ROC, as a case, demonstrates several unique characteristics. The first is its status as an ‘abnormal’ or quasi-state whose position does not conform to a strictly Westphalian model.⁴ A Westphalian state’s traditional characteristics include a state monopoly on violence, a bounded territory, an imagined political community, and external legal recognition. Taiwan diverges from this model as it has weak external legal recognition and suffers from internal disagreements over national political identity. These problems leave the ROC more vulnerable to foreign interference. A second unique characteristic of Taiwan as a case is that the PRC disputes the ROCs status as a normal country. Therefore foreign policy actions taken by the PRC are generally more salient with voters. Also, owing to the PRC’s intent to annex the ROC, the PRC is motivated to continually and frequently interfere in Taiwan’s elections. Owing to these factors, election interference activities appear to be more impactful and information about them disseminated more widely, simplifying the task of studying election interference.

The case has several limitations. Unfortunately, no studies systematically examine or catalogue this phenomenon in the ROC. Therefore, one of the primary goals of this research, in addition to identifying the methods of CCP election interference, is to provide a comprehensive history of election interference activities in Taiwan. However, this also means that the sampling method used for observations cannot mitigate possible biases arising from material availability. Outside of evidentiary issues, each observation unit varies widely by context, making it challenging to typologize. Lastly, because this research field is new and it does not appear that electoral interference can be generalized easily between actors, hypothesis generation and conceptual development are prioritized over ...

Índice

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Note on Translation
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Background, Concepts, and Related Research
• 3. Background on CCP Organizations Relevant to Election Interference
• 4. Election Interference Incidents
• 5. A History of CCP Actions during Election Cycles
• 6. The CCP’s Cross-Strait Influence Policies
• 7. Analysis of Concepts, Categories, and Methods
• 8. Conclusion
• Index