The Battles of Antiochus the Great

The failure of combined arms at Magnesia that handed the world to Rome

Graham Wrightson

• Editorial: Pen and Sword Military
• Año: 2022
• ISBN:
  9781526793478
• Categoría: Geschichte
• Categoría: Militär- & Seefahrtsgeschichte

Antiochus III, the king of the Seleucid Empire for four decades, ruled a powerful state for a long time. He fought and won many battles from India to Egypt, and he lost almost as many. Compared with most of the other Hellenistic monarchs of Macedonian-founded kingdoms, Antiochus had a greater variety of units that he could field in his army. He was in a unique position among the other kings because he had access to the traditional infantry-based Greek cultures in Asia Minor as well as the cavalry-dominant cultures of Mesopotamia and Western Asia. Yet, despite these advantages, Antiochus repeatedly came up short on the battlefield and his tactical shortcomings were no more obviously laid bare than at the Battle of Magnesia-ad-Sipylum in 190 BC. There his huge combined army, one of the largest ever fielded by Hellenistic rulers, was soundly thrashed by the smaller Roman force. Through an analysis of the Seleucid army, the inherited standard tactics of Macedonian-style armies reliant on the sarissa phalanx, and a detailed examination of the three main battles of Antiochus III, this book will show how it was his failure to utilise combined arms at its fullest realization that led to such a world-changing defeat at Magnesia.

Chapter One

The Seleucid Army of Antiochus the Great

To understand the make-up of the Seleucid army of Antiochus III, it is important to briefly outline the origins of the Seleucid Empire and its manpower resources. Seleucus Nicator had founded the Seleucid Empire with the help of Ptolemy I Soter of Egypt. At the Treaty of Triparadeisos, probably in 321 BCE, Antipater, the Macedonian governor of Alexander the Great’s Empire, had initially appointed Seleucus as governor of Babylon. However, in 315 Antigonus Monophthalmus, the strongest of Alexander the Great’s Successor generals, while staying in Babylon fell out with Seleucus and then tried to remove him from office. Seleucus fled to Egypt for support and with the help of Ptolemy reinstalled himself in Babylon in 312. He then spent the next fifteen years taking control of the other Macedonian-ruled satrapies and provinces in the east.

Twice Antigonus sent an army to oust Seleucus in 312 and 311 BCE. The first army of 17,000 men Seleucus ambushed with an army of only 3,000 and took over the soldiers of the enemy. This one act established his rule in Babylon and gave him the army to conquer the neighbouring regions. The second army of Antigonus was commanded by his son Demetrius, but Seleucus’ power grew too fast and he easily maintained his control. Finally, in 311 or 310 Antigonus invaded at the head of an army of 80,000 men. Unfortunately, our sources for this war are exclusively a somewhat unreliable account by Polyaenus (Polyaenus, 4.9.1) of a decisive battle won by Seleucus through a clever stratagem and a very vague summary in the Babylonian Chronicle. We have no details at all about the make-up of Seleucus’ army, which is our interest here; just that he had enough troops to defeat Antigonus’ large invasion.

Seleucus, established in Mesopotamia, then made war on the great Indian king Chandragupta, who founded the long-lasting Mauryan dynasty. Seleucus’ aims for the campaign and the army he took do not survive. Our few surviving sources both in Greek and Indian traditions suggest that he crossed the Indus but Chandragupta either defeated him or fought to a stalemate. Whatever happened militarily, the result was a treaty between the two kings that saw Seleucus cede control of probably four provinces on the western side of the Indus in return for 500 elephants and probably a marriage alliance of Seleucus’ daughter to Chandragupta or his son. The other rival Hellenistic kings satirize Seleucus as the Elephant General for giving away so much territory for such a minimal return.1 One critical rumour suggests that the 500 elephants were all male, also thus preventing Seleucus from establishing a breeding programme. Nonetheless, the 500 elephants proved to be militarily very decisive in the battles that followed.

Eventually, after a decade of infighting and territorial changes, all the Hellenistic kings together (Seleucus I of Babylon, Ptolemy I of Egypt, Cassander of Macedon and Lysimachus of Thrace) allied against Antigonus and his son Demetrius. Seleucus was chiefly responsible for the final allied victory over Antigonus at the famous Battle of Ipsus in 301 BCE largely because of his clever use of an elephant reserve to block the return of Demetrius’ victorious cavalry. This feigned withdrawal of Seleucid cavalry led by his son Antiochus I, as discussed above, became a standard Seleucid battle tactic. Seleucus’ own ambitions to create an empire to rival Alexander the Great’s ended in his murder shortly after his victorious battle with Lysimachus at Corupedium in 281 BCE (Appian, Syrian Wars, 62).

Later Seleucid kings established their authority over all the provinces from Asia Minor to India despite a few rebellions from time to time. The biggest threat to Seleucid power was the invasion in 245 BCE of Ptolemy III Euergetes. Instigated to aid Ptolemy’s sister Berenice, the ousted second wife of the recently deceased Antiochus II, her death prompted an all-out invasion of the empire. Though the sources are not detailed, Appian states that Ptolemy’s invasion advanced to Babylon and the Babylonian Chronicle states that he took all of the city of Babylon except for the palace, which held out for a long time.2 He also, perhaps more importantly, captured the city of Seleucia Pieria, the port city of the Seleucid western capital Antioch, and left a garrison there, which remained until the start of Antiochus III’s invasion of Syria in 219. Ptolemy was on the verge of complete victory when apparent unrest back in Egypt forced his withdrawal.

Though we know little about the exact units in the early armies of the Seleucid kings, the one advantage all the Seleucid kings enjoyed over other Macedonian descendant monarchs was access to thousands of troops of all varieties and ethnicities in Asia. Despite Seleucus I’s sale of four eastern provinces to Chandragupta for 500 elephants, the Seleucid army could still call on vast numbers of soldiers and every troop type in the Hellenistic world. Certainly elephants featured prominently in the major battles of Seleucus I and also of his son Antiochus I.

The Babylonian Chronicle describes elephants from Bactria mustering in Babylon before or just after Seleucus headed out on his fateful campaign against Lysimachus.3 Antiochus I is famous both now and at the time for his so-called elephant victory over the invading Galatians in Asia Minor. There is no clear evidence for exactly what army he deployed or how many elephants. Lucian in the Antiochus states sixteen, but this is likely part of his satirical battle narrative that alters troop numbers to make his point. The only slightly more reliable Suda states that Antiochus won when his elephants overcame the Galatian cavalry.4 We know that the Seleucids developed a limited elephant-breeding programme at Apamea. Presumably over the years they also received more elephants through good relations with the Mauryan dynasty in India as Antiochus III did later. Elephants were a regular feature on Seleucid coins from Seleucus I onwards likely demonstrating regal majesty,5 but no doubt also a connection to Seleucus’ now famous 500 Indian elephants and their vital role at the empire-making Battle of Ipsus.

The only evidence we have for any troop totals or unit breakdown for a Seleucid army before Antiochus III is for Seleucus’ contingent at the Battle of Ipsus in 301 BCE. Diodorus states that Seleucus brought 20,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry including horse-archers, 480 elephants and more than 100 scythed chariots (Diodorus 20.113). The infantry probably consisted of sarissa phalanx and light troops. A previous engagement with Antigonus had removed around 20 elephants from Seleucus’ 500.6 Plutarch lists 120 scythed chariots (Plutarch, Demetrius 28). The cavalry total of Diodorus is more than the 10,500 total given by Plutarch for the whole allied army, so it is not clear exactly how many Seleucus did bring.

Nevertheless, even with this brief description we can already see the standard units of the Seleucid army: infantry including the sarissa phalanx and light troops, elephants, cavalry including heavy cavalry and horse-archers and scythed chariots. The chariots were a Persian tradition utilized in number by Darius III in the Battle of Gaugamela against Alexander the Great. Antiochus III also used them in his battles, but they were not very useful faced with anti-chariot tactics and a sarissa phalanx. Seleucid armies very much resembled all other Hellenistic Macedonian-style combined arms armies, with the addition of scythed chariots.

Unfortunately, we do not have much information on the exact organization and specific unit make-up of the earliest Seleucid armies in the third century, but they cannot have been very different from the armies of Antiochus III at the end of the century, for which there is evidence. This is the timeframe of concern here and so this chapter will examine the units and standard battle tactics and deployments for Antiochus’ various battles.

Antiochus’ army must have been very much like the army of his predecessors. He came to the throne as a teenager unexpectedly and leaned on advisors for his first campaigns. Polybius provides the details of the first army Antiochus led into battle at Apollonia against the rebellious forces of Molon, the satrap of Media. Polybius (Polybius, Histories 5.53) describes it as such:

On his right wing he posted first his lancers under the command of Ardys, an officer of proved ability in the field, next them the Cretan allies and next them the Gallic Rhigosages. After these he placed the mercenaries from Greece and last of all the phalanx. The left wing he assigned to the cavalry known as ‘Companions’. His elephants, which were ten in number, he posted at certain intervals in front of the line. He distributed his reserves of infantry and cavalry between the two wings with orders to outflank the enemy as soon as the battle had begun.7

So we can see how Antiochus’ army mirrored the standard Hellenistic deployment of phalanx in the centre, other infantry on its direct flanks and heavy strike cavalry on both wings. Elephants and other infantry added extra protection in front of his wings (presumably rather than in front of the phalanx; Polybius does not specify) and on this occasion kept others on the flanks as reserves.

Before his invasion of Egypt he had no time, experience or need to reform his army’s recruitment or organization and so it must have featured much of the same army as against Molon. Polybius (5.79), as is often the case for this period, gives the fullest account of Antiochus’ forces at Raphia:

These consisted first of Daae, Carmanians and Cilicians, light-armed troops about five thousand in number organized and commanded by Byttacus the Macedonian. Under Theodotus the Aetolian, who had played the traitor to Ptolemy, was a force of ten thousand selected from every part of the kingdom and armed in the Macedonian manner, most of them with silver shields. The phalanx was about twenty thousand strong and was under the command of Nicarchus and Theodotus surnamed Hemiolius. There were Agrianian and Persian bowmen and slingers to the number of two thousand, and with them two thousand Thracians, all under the command of Menedemus of Alabanda. Aspasianus the Mede had under him a force of about five thousand Medes, Cissians, Cadusians and Carmanians. The Arabs and neighbouring tribes numbered about ten thousand and were commanded by Zabdibelus. Hippolochus the Thessalian commanded the mercenaries from Greece, five thousand in number. Antiochus had also fifteen hundred Cretans under Eurylochus and a thousand Neocretans under Zelys of Gortyna. With these were five hundred Lydian javelineers and a thousand Cardaces under Lysimachus the Gaul. The cavalry numbered six thousand in all, four thousand of them being commanded by Antipater the king’s nephew and the rest by Themison. The whole army of Antiochus consisted of sixty-two thousand foot, six thousand horse and a hundred and two elephants.

In total he had the following:

30,000 sarissa phalangites

5,000 Greek mercenaries, most likely hoplites

20,000 light infantry (not missile)

8,000 missile infantry, bowmen and javelin men

6,000 cavalry in two units: one of 4,000 commanded by Antiochus’ nephew and likely royal heavy cavalry, and one of 2,000 probably light cavalry

102 elephants

This force collected by Antiochus from throughout his empire and alliances clearly has a huge emphasis on infantry. It is a ratio of infantry to cavalry of 10:1. This is roughly the standard size of most Hellenistic armies after Ipsus.

However, in the successful era-defining armies of Philip II and Alexander the Great the ratio was much closer. Alexander led 40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry for a ratio of 7:1. Since the use of combined arms with the sarissa phalanx is so reliant on cavalry support, this ratio is crucial to understand the efficiency of an army. Alexander led 12,000 phalangites and hypaspists, his elite infantry guard regiment. The ratio of phalanx to cavalry was 2:1. Antiochus’ phalanx to cavalry ratio was 5:1. That is a significant difference that would substantially increase the importance of the cavalry as a shield of the vulnerabilities of the phalanx. However, it is similar to the ratios of standard Hellenistic armies of Alexander’s Successors.

The Battles of Paraitacene and Gabiene are good examples of the standard ratio of phalanx to (all) cavalry in Macedonian-style armies of the late fourth century.8 These two battles witnessed epic confrontations of the two best generals of Alexander’s Successors, Antigonus Monophthalmus and Eumenes of Cardia. Both generals enjoyed a ratio of phalanx infantry to cavalry of 3:1. Antigonus had 28,000 men in the phalanx, but most were raw recruits. He had 4,000 heavy cavalry and another 6,000 light cavalry to provide his offensive thrust on the flanks. Eumenes had a veteran phalanx of 17,000 and 6,000 cavalry.

The Battle of Ipsus reinforces the ratio of phalanx to cavalry. At Ipsus, Antigonus had 45,000 heavy infantry and 10,000 cavalry, a ratio of 4.5:1 and his enemy had 40,000 heavy infantry and 15,000 cavalry, a ratio of 3:1. In fact, Seleucus’ contribution to the allied army, as discussed above, featured 20,000 phalanx infantry and 12,000 cavalry. That is fewer than 2:1, an almost exact mirror of the ratio seen in Alexander’s army. Clearly, at the end of the fourth century Alexander’s Successors appreciated the value of such a strong force of cavalry to support and complement the sarissa phalanx on the battlefield. In fact, such a strong force of cavalry was almost imperative for the best functioning of combined arms on the sarissa phalanx-centred battlefield.

Antiochus, as demonstrated by his later army totals, could have called on more cavalry. At a council in Achaea, where Antiochus’ representatives along with the Aetolians attempted to persuade the Achaeans to join in the war on Rome in the build-up to the battles of Thermopylae and Magnesia, his ambassadors emphasized the size and nature of Antiochus’ cavalry force. The envoys even went so far as to state that ‘[E]ven if the armies of the whole of Europe were brought together, they would be crushed by these cavalry forces’ (Livy 35.48.4), demonstrating that Antiochus’ strength lay in his cavalry. This is undoubtedly exaggeration since at Magnesia Antiochus fielded only 12,000 cavalry, hardly enough to crush all the forces of Europe, but this is still twice the number at Raphia. As we shall see in the following chapter, this lack of cavalry at Raphia came to be a thorn in his side. For whatever reason, and this is perhaps the crucial question in trying to understand Antiochus’ underachievement as a general, he did not field massive numbers of cavalry against other Hellenistic-style armies or the Romans.

Though we have no detailed descriptions of Antiochus’ other battles until Magnesia, Polybius (16.18), in his criticism of Zeno’s account of the Battle of Panion, does provide a vague list of unit types. He states:

Antiochus, he [Zeno] says, had at early dawn sent off his elder son, Antiochus, with a portion of his forces to occupy the parts of the hill which commanded the enemy, and when it was daylight he took the rest of his army across the river which separated the two camps and drew it up on the plain, placing the phalanx in one line opposite the enemy’s centre and stationing some of his cavalry to the left of the phalanx and some to the right, among the latter being the troop of mailed horsemen which was all under the command of his younger son, Antiochus. Next he tells us that the king posted the elephants at some distance in advance of the phalanx together with Antipater’s Tarantines, the spaces between...

Índice

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 The Seleucid Army of Antiochus the Great
• Chapter 2 The Battle of Raphia
• Chapter 3 The Battles of Arius and Panion
• Chapter 4 The Coming of Rome and the Battle of Thermopylae
• Chapter 5 The Legion versus the Phalanx: Roman and Macedonian Styles of Warfare
• Chapter 6 The Naval War with Rome
• Chapter 7 The Battle of Magnesia ad Sipylum
• Chapter 8 Antiochus’ Failure of Combined Arms
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography