Hiding in Plain Sight

Deceptive Tactics and the Criminal Victimization Process

James F. Kenny

• Editorial: Palgrave Macmillan
• Año: 2019
• ISBN:
  9783030268671
• Categoría: Sciences sociales
• Categoría: Criminologie

This book examines the role of deceptive tactics in the criminal victimization process, showing how various forms of manipulative aggression can help disguise dangerous advances. The author approaches crime victimization as the final stage in a purposeful, predictable, dynamic, and progressively dangerous process involving interactions between the target and the aggressor. As they prepare for the attack, aggressors may attempt to distract, confuse, and reduce target resistance. While these tactics provide aggressors certain advantages, they can be recognized, anticipated, and managed. By presenting a framework to identify behaviors of concern early in the process, Kenny shows how preventative action can be taken. Proactive intervention may cause aggressors to withdraw before they are fully committed to and confident in their ability to be successful. Those who take steps to reduce vulnerabilities, limit risky behaviors, and avoid dangerous situations can help prevent themselves from being victimized.

© The Author(s) 2020

J. F. KennyHiding in Plain Sighthttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26867-1_1

Begin Abstract

1. Stronger Than We Think: More Capable Than We Know

James F. Kenny¹

(1)

Fairleigh Dickinson University, Teaneck, NJ, USA

James F. Kenny

Email: [email protected]

End Abstract

Introduction

Criminal victimization has been widely described by the actions and motivations of the offender in committing the crime. This limited understanding can lead to many viewing criminal victimization as random, senseless, and unmanageable events where targets have very little input and control. While the criminal is a key player in the criminal event, the targets, third parties, the situation, and the physical setting play significant roles in influencing the criminal’s decision to proceed with the attack. Criminals have many advantages including the use of deception, but they are far from invincible. Many targets possess considerable abilities and resources to manage or prevent criminal victimization. In addition, many individuals and professional guardians are willing to help them and are capable of doing so (Fig. 1.1).

Fig. 1.1

The criminal event

Reframing the Criminal Victimization Event

Many people have difficulty understanding criminal victimization when they focus on how it was committed rather than how it developed. This book will approach criminal victimization as the final event in a dynamic, interactive, and progressively dangerous process. Recognizing and responding proactively and effectively early in the process can discourage further aggression. This is especially true if the offenders are not convinced of their ability to be successful or is not fully committed to initiate acts of criminal victimization. At the minimum, early recognition of criminal advances provides the target the time and opportunity to escape, secure help, or set up a defense before inappropriate and strange behaviors escalate to dangerous ones. Targets, bystanders, guardians, and physical and situational factors can influence the aggressors’ actions. While acts of extreme violence are difficult to stop at the point of attack, the troubling and deceitful behaviors that precede them are largely correctable and minimally volatile.

Criminals and aggressive individuals usually do not attack suddenly without warning (ASIS International, 2005; Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, & Berglund, 1999; National Threat Assessment Center, 2018). Criminal victimization is often the culmination of a series of conflicts , disputes, and problems. While it is the final event in the victimization process, there are usually increasingly threatening actions that precede it. The target and the offender would have usually had some prior association before the attack. This interaction is largely responsible for setting the processes in motion. Before criminals attack, they typically plan and prepare for it. This may involve specific actions such as approaching the target, utilizing deception, securing weapons, or visiting the intended place of attack. Targeted acts of violence often evolve from less volatile actions such as insults , intimidations , harassment, property destruction, minor assaults, or bullying .

Target selection rarely occurs due to chance, but rather involves specific types of people. For example, a joint U.S. Secret Service , Department of Education , and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report on targeted violence on college campuses found that in nearly three-quarters of the incidents, the subjects targeted one or more specific individuals (Drysdale, Modzeleski, & Simons, 2010). Some play an active and some a passive role in contributing to the attack. They may initiate physical assaults, insults , or harassment that can lead to violent responses. Others are attacked because they are accessible, vulnerable, or provide perceived rewards. Certain individuals are more likely to be selected because of lifestyle choices that put them into contact with dangerous people. These lifestyle choices place them in situations that compromise their ability to protect themselves. They may fail to take steps to deter, limit access, or become hardened targets.

Criminal victimization has often been discussed in terms of an event occurring solely between the victim and the offender, but third parties can serve to deter the actions of the offender. A U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistic Report noted that third parties are involved in two-thirds of all violent victimizations (Planty, 2002). This report demonstrated that third parties are more likely to help the target by preventing injury, scaring the offender off, or assisting in their escape. In forty-four percent of the situations, the third party contacted the police. Sometimes the mere presence of the third party as a witness to the event can cause the aggressor to withdraw.

Additionally, third parties can engage in certain actions that contribute to an agitated person becoming violent. They may ignore, insult , or disrespect that person. At other times, they may not initiate the insult that causes the person pain, but they may laugh at it. They may look the other way rather than reporting strange and threatening behaviors. Luckenbill (1977) in his study of homicide discussed the role of third parties in a series of transactions between the parties leading up to the attack. Third parties may encourage the offender to interpret a remark as offensive and suggest an aggressive response. They may even supply the weapon used in the homicide.

Crime victimization is usually a social event and not just the product of personal interactions. Criminals will choose opportunistic locations and situations that help to facilitate committing the crime. They will evaluate a potential crime site for natural guardians, accessibility, rewards, detection, and escape routes. A National Institute of Justice report discussed criminal preferences in terms of housing design, block layout, land use, territorial features, and physical deterioration (Taylor & Harrell, 1996). Criminals prefer locations with available targets, minimal barriers, and the lack of physical obstacles for committing crimes. They pay careful attention to observing walkways, paths, traffic patterns, and hours of operation of public buildings and businesses. They look for blocks that lack vigilant residents. Physical deterioration, vacancy, and vandalism of buildings and public areas may signal vulnerability and lack of commitment to joint protective activities such as neighborhood watch groups.

Dismissing the Illusion of Criminal Invincibility

Criminals have many advantages during the victimization process. They get to choose their targets, place, time, and method of attack. Aggressors will survey the environment for those who are controllable, accessible, and appear to possess social, physical, and mental disadvantages. They will often take advantage of situations that enable them to observe, plan, and prepare well before the attack. Many have experience with deceptive techniques, the use of violence, and the weapons to assist them during the attack. Despite all these advantages, criminals might make mistakes, “leak” their intentions, and be deterred by actions and situational factors that limit their advantages. Third parties may observe suspicious behaviors and report them to authorities. Law enforcement will detect criminal activities through surveillance, patrols, or investigations.

Some criminals are proficient in using deception to disguise, confuse, distract, and control their targets. These strategies reduce the chance of targeted individuals retreating, setting up defenses, or seeking help. In addition, the use of deception can help keep the target paralyzed and unaware that they are in a battle until they are well on their way to losing it. Aggressors may accidently or purposely “leak” information concerning their intentions (O’Toole & Bowman, 2012). They may inadvertently reveal their true intentions through specific actions, facial expressions , voice tone, or specific language. The FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000) noted that school shooters may “leak” clues through subtle threats , boasts, innuendos, predictions, or ultimatums. These are conveyed in written documents and videos, or communicated verbally to third parties. Initially, the leakage can be a cry for help to resolve some inner conflict or problem.

Criminals need a number of things to go right to be successful, but often make mistakes that cause them to be discovered, stopped, or captured. Theodore Kaczynski was so confident that he could evade capture that he unwittingly provided the essential clue that led to his arrest. Kaczynski was described as a twisted genius who built untraceable bombs and delivered them to seemingly random targets (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). He left false leads and was able to evade authorities for over seventeen years. During that time, he mailed or hand-delivered a series of sophisticated bombs that killed three American citizens and injured twenty-four more. An FBI-led task force that included the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and over 150 full-time investigators was unable to solve the case because Kaczynski left no forensic evidence, building his bombs from scrap materials. Kaczynski provided authorities with the critical lead when he sent a manifesto explaining his motives and views of the ills of modern society. After the manifesto appeared in The Washington Post and the New York Times, Kaczynski’s brother, David, identified him as the writer. David produced additional letters and documents and the FBI was able to confirm that the author of those documents and the manifesto was the same person.

Mass shooting and acts of terrorism are stopped far more often than they are successful. Bomb components can be found, informants may come forward, and intelligence agencies can intercept messages between terrorist cells. Intelligence agencies uncovered a plot to kill former President George H. W. Bush during a planned visit to Kuwait after he had left office. Kuwaiti authorities found a car bomb in a Toyota Land Cruiser that was to transport Bush in the planned visit. CIA bomb technicians compared the explosives to two known Iraqi explosive devices to determine whether the Iraqi Intelligence Service was behind the attack (US Department of Justice, 1997).

Assassins have limited opportunities to succeed, and they rarely have the opportunity to practice. If they were to plant a bomb, they would have to deliver it out of view of witnesses, video cameras, security personnel, and the police. In their analys...

Índice

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Stronger Than We Think: More Capable Than We Know
• 2. The Art of Identifying Deception
• 3. Deception and the Process Toward Criminal Victimization
• 4. Lurking in the Shadows: Stranger Danger and Target Selection
• 5. “Getting to Know You”: Confirming Target Suitability
• 6. Choosing Familiar Targets: The Devils You Wish You Did Not Know
• 7. Enticing the Target: Tactics That Fabricate Trust and Reduce Suspicion
• 8. Developing a Smoke Screen: Tactics That Disguise Criminal Advances
• 9. Preparing for the Attack: Tactics That Establish Control
• 10. Removing the Blindfold: Recognizing Deceptive and Dangerous Advances
• 11. Stopping the Process from Beginning: Avoid Becoming a Target
• 12. Reestablishing the Balance of Power: Responding to Deceptive and Aggressive Tactics
• 13. Bystander Intervention: Helping Friends Recognize and Address Deceptive Advances
• Back Matter