1.1 The Third Wave of Science Studies
Just over 35 years ago, Harry Collins, discussing the “new” sociology of scientific knowledge, expressed his disappointment that although “the field has only begun to fulfil its potential, disagreements are now taking up more space than substantive contributions” (Collins 1983, 265). Indeed, the effort “to explain the content of scientific knowledge as far as possible in social terms” invited disagreement, as did “explanations of the outcomes of [scientific controversies] … by reference to wider social and political factors” (272, 275). While the social aspects of science are hardly in doubt (there are scientific communities, experimental conventions, identifiable cultural values—e.g., honesty—and so forth), the sociology of scientific knowledge (hereinafter, “SSK”) was a challenge to traditional notions that the content of science should not be affected by society and, consequently, that scientific controversies should be settled by Nature. Reflecting that ideal, the mid-twentieth-century sociology of science associated with Robert K. Merton, now called the “first wave” of science studies, assumed that “sociological accounting had to stop at the door of scientific method and scientific knowledge” (Shapin 1995, 294–295). SSK, having opened that door, is often now referred to as the “second wave” of science studies; it is variously characterized as (1) breaking down the distinction between science and society; (2) highlighting the constitutive, and not merely influential, role of “the social” in the production of scientific knowledge (Shapin 1995, 294–295); and (3) developing a less idealized view of science and scientists—the scientific enterprise is part of, and not above, culture.
A feature of the latter (“second wave”) development—the argument for a more modest view of science—was the proposal that ordinary citizens could and should play a role in scientific decision-making—for example, an elite scientist helping a community suffering from an environmental crisis may not know as much about the problem (and workable solutions) as a local farmer (Wynne 1989). It is this phenomenon—this proposal to increase citizen participation in science—which in large part inspired the so-called Third Wave of science studies—indeed, the Third Wave was a reaction against a broad notion of “citizen scientists”:
Though science studies has [shown] that the basis of technical decision-making can and should be widened beyond the core of certified experts, it has failed to [answer the question:] “How far should participation in technical decision-making extend?” In other words, science studies has shown that there is more to scientific and technical expertise than is encompassed in the work of formally accredited scientists and technologists, but it has not told us how much more. (Collins and Evans 2002, 237)
This reaction is relevant in numerous contemporary debates, including concerns about a “post-truth” era, populism, and, for example, anti-vaccine movements. And it is of particular relevance to the ongoing criticism of forensic science in legal settings, as the Third Wave project is in part focused on who should participate in scientific decision-making, which becomes a question of who is a credible trial expert (see Chap. 2 in this volume). More broadly, who is a credible expert in policy settings that require scientific input (see Chaps. 3 and 4 in this volume)? Briefly, in Third Wave terminology, experts include (1) those who are trained and credentialed in the consensus science of the relevant field, as well as (2) those who have sufficient experience (even without formal training) in the field to interact productively with trained experts and thereby contribute to the task at hand. While an “ordinary” citizen has no business influencing scientific decisions, an experienced farmer (and therefore not an “ordinary” citizen, with respect to farming) without scientific training can help a trained scientist (with no farming experience) understand and solve a problem.
1.2 Focusing on Expertise and Experience
The usual marker of expertise is a credential, perhaps a certificate indicating a proficiency of some type; but to the extent that many types of expertise are not associated with an external credentialing entity, credentials cannot serve as the standard for expertise.
A criterion that does seem to set the boundary in a better place is experience in a [technical] domain. [Without] experience at judging the products of a technical domain, there is no specialist expertise. (Collins and Evans 2007, 67–68)
In 2007, Harry Collins and Robert Evans published Rethinking Expertise, an attempt to invent a sociology not of science but of expertise. The authors even constructed a taxonomy of expertise, beginning with ubiquitous expertises that everybody has in order to live in society—“a huge body of tacit knowledge”—and then moving to specialist expertises, the three lower levels of which “are better described as levels of [ubiquitous tacit] knowledge”—(1) “beer-mat knowledge”,1 (2) popular understanding of science, and (3) primary source knowledge (e.g., literature and the internet) (Collins and Evans 2007, 13–14). The higher levels of specialist expertise (or “specialist tacit knowledge”), requiring more than ubiquitous expertise, are, for example, most relevant to science that is appropriated in legal and policy settings: contributory expertise, “which is what you need to do an activity with competence”, and interactional expertise, “which is the ability to master the language of the specialist domain in the absence of professional competence” (Collins and Evans 2007, 14). The latter category, “a new concept” and the focus of much of Rethinking Expertise, is important because it captures the genuine expertise of a non-scientist (i.e., without formal training or credentials) who, through experience in a scientific community, knows what he or she is talking about when there is a scientific controversy (Collins and Evans 2007, 14).
Finishing out the taxonomy, there are five meta-expertises, including (1) ubiquitous discrimination (evaluating, e.g., “the experts’ demeanor [or] the internal consistency of their remarks”); (2) local discrimination, both of which involve judges who are not experts but who make judgments about experts; (3) technical connoisseurship (the expertise of an art critic who is not an artist); (4) downward discrimination, when a specialist judges a lesser expert; and (5) referred expertise, when an expert moves to a new domain and applies his or her expertise from an earlier domain (Collins and Evans 2007, 15). The primary focus of this book is on the two highest levels of specialist expertises: contributory and interactional expertises, but readers will find other categories of expertise (in the taxonomy summarized above) discussed in various chapters of this volume.
In distinguishing these two higher levels of specialized expertise, Collins and Evans (2007) note that the “first three categories of expertise, beer-mat knowledge, public understanding, and primary source knowledge, might be said hardly to enter the category of specialist expertise at all”, since they do not require mastery of a domain and basically involve
reading rather than immersion in the specialist culture. “Enculturation” is the only way to master an expertise which is deeply laden with tacit knowledge because it is only through common practice with others that the rules that cannot be written down can come to be understood. (24)
Much of the catalyzing work on interactional expertise, enculturation, and immersion can be attributed to Collins’ own self-study on the topic as he immersed himself in an expert community comprised of gravitational wave physicists (Collins 2017). During this decade-plus-long immersion, Collins, a sociologist and outsider to the specialist community of scientists, slowly learned the language of gravitational wave physics and spent time with members of the community in both formal and informal spaces (Collins 2017, 313). He gained both formalized and tacit knowledge through this experience, and was able to pick up on slight linguistic nuances in expert conversation, and importantly came to understand and even make inside jokes. Although he could n...