Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad

Devin R. Springer

• Editorial: Georgetown University Press
• Año: 2009
• ISBN:
  9781589015784
• Categoría: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Categoría: Terrorismus

Jihadist ideology inspires a diverse and decentralized collection of radical groups to fight alleged enemies of Islam and to attempt to "restore" a holy caliphate to unite Muslim peoples across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad provides unique insights into the philosophical foundations, strategic vision, organizational dynamics, and tactics of the modern jihadist movement—with specific attention to its primary driver, Al-Qa'ida.

Springer, Regens, and Edger draw heavily on Arabic language sources seldom seen in the West to explain what jihadists want and how radical thinkers have distorted the teachings of Islam to convince followers to pursue terrorism as a religious duty. With sophisticated and systematic analysis, the authors lead their readers on a fascinating intellectual journey through the differing ideas, goals, and vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement as it has evolved over time. The authors also impart wisdom from their own professional experience with terrorism, counterinsurgency, and intelligence to provide scholars, students, counterterrorism professionals, and general readers with this accessible overview of key radical Islamic thinkers and today's jihadists.

1
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

The reasons for Jihad … are these: to establish God’s authority in the earth; to arrange human affairs according to the true guidance provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of one man over others since all men are creatures of God and no one has the authority to make them his servants or to make arbitrary laws for them. These reasons are sufficient for proclaiming Jihad.

Sayyid Qutb, Milestones

WIDESPREAD MEDIA COVERAGE of the martyrdom videos and terrorist operations of the jihadists has sparked growing interest in trying to understand the ideological roots of Islamic terrorism. The advent of twenty-four-hour news networks with correspondents and, more important, camera crews around the world has made people more aware of the devastation and pain caused by terrorist attacks and, in turn, more sensitive to real or perceived vulnerabilities to terrorism. It is not surprising that, in the age of globalized information, the agenda of the radical Islamists appears to be driven by an information strategy of maximizing attention to their cause. Moreover, their strategy seeks to convey images that weaken the resolve of their adversaries while signaling the inevitability of victory in a long war. This has forced leaders, the public, and scholars in the West to ask: Who are these extremists whose agenda previously was absent from Western concerns? Why are they steadfast in the pursuit of jihad and change in the name of God?

As the West struggles to come to grips with its newest enemy, efforts to understand the emergence of the global jihad have fostered awareness of an ideological battle that started over fifty years ago. Originally limited to the urban and rural centers of the Middle East and Central Asia, the underlying philosophy and acts of violence associated with the jihadist movement have spread beyond the core of the Muslim world. Hence, to understand the rise of and trends in Islamic radicalism, we turn our attention to the historical origins and philosophical foundations of the global jihad. In the context of this study, Islamic radicalism is defined as a sometimes violent movement seeking to radically change local, national, and global social and political landscapes. Radical Islamists believe such actions are justified by the tenets of Islam, thereby making it God’s will.

ORIGINS OF THE ISLAMIC RESURGENCE

While the charred rubble of the Twin Towers was still smoldering, the United States began to realize more fully the danger posed by radical Islamic groups. Although the term jihad has become linked to terrorism, it is important to note that it frequently has a nonviolent connotation as a religious obligation. This spiritual jihad, or jihad bil-nafs, is seen by most Muslims as the “greater jihad.” On the other hand, there also is the concept of jihad bil-sayf, literally “jihad by the sword,” or violent jihad, traditionally viewed as the “lesser jihad.”

Violent jihad, whether by war, insurgency, or terrorism, has become an increasingly popular tool for extremist organizations that maintain that violent jihad is the greater or only jihad. The Qur’an, the holy text of Islam, provides a number of verses pertaining to jihad that are seen as particularly significant in the eyes of the Islamic extremists. John Esposito notes that these verses, “sometimes referred to as the ‘sword verses’ are quoted selectively to legitimate unconditional warfare against unbelievers and were used by jurists to justify great expansion.”¹ The jihadists use those interpretations of violent jihad in the name of Islam.² Although relatively small in numbers in comparison to the overall population of the Muslim community, radical Islamists who endorse violence frequently cite the same ideologues and reasons for action, using the rhetoric of jihad, meaning “to strive” or “to struggle” in Arabic.

It is critical to recognize that the adherents of violent jihad are absolutely convinced that their cause is right, both politically and morally, since they believe it is divinely sanctioned. It should come as no surprise, therefore, to learn that Usama bin Laden believes that he has received divine sanction to use weapons of mass destruction in his jihad. Moreover, they are extremely dedicated and, regardless of their savagery, are actually quite rational in the pursuit of their strategic goals. Examining the series of tasks listed in an al-Qa’ida jihad manual illustrates this point. Islamic militant organizations are instructed to remove those personalities who block the group’s path to success. They are admonished to properly utilize an individual’s unused capability while striving for precision in performing tasks and working collectively. The jihadists similarly are instructed to control work to prevent fragmentation or deviation. The manual differentiates between tasks tied to achieving long-term goals, such as establishing Islamic law, and tasks for achieving short-term goals, such as performing operations against individuals and the enemy sector. It also offers guidance on how to go about establishing conditions for possible confrontation with repressive regimes. Not surprisingly, since Islamic militant organizations often operate clandestinely, the manual addresses achieving discipline in secrecy and through performing tasks.

The participants in jihadist activities, like any other social movement, are also products of their own environments and have been influenced strongly by the “Islamic Resurgence,” which emerged in the Middle East in the second half of the twentieth century. The origins of this Arab-led resurgence can be seen in part as a reaction to the decline of the Ottoman Empire and to colonial rule by the British and French, starting in the nineteenth century and, subsequently, under League of Nations mandates following World War I.³ In addition, the establishment of Israel in 1948, encompassing part of the former Ottoman province of Palestine, and the support that Israel has enjoyed from Western nations, particularly the United States, is also a key ingredient. Thus, extremist Islam has become more prevalent in reaction to a series of external and internal events.

Secular regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—and governmental corruption in many countries—led a number of hard-line Muslim extremists to feel frustrated by their inability to impact the social and political dynamics of their own countries in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Moreover, it has not been unusual for them to view their traditional norms and customs as being under assault by the ongoing modernization and secularization occurring in the urban areas of their countries. Some have attempted to lobby for change and traditional mores in a nonviolent manner, while others have opted to take the other path to change. In their eyes, Islam has been seen as losing the battle against the decadence of the West. Failed economies, repressive regimes, the catastrophic Arab loss of the 1967 war against Israel, overcrowding, high unemployment, the breakdown of traditional religious and social values in the face of globalization,⁴ and revolution have all led to the Islamic resurgence. In the following sections, we examine in more detail the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian problem along with a number of the key developments in Egypt, Iran, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia that were crucial to the emergence and evolution of modern-day violent political Islam as embodied by groups like Hamas, Hizballah, and al-Qaeda.

Israel and Palestine

It would be naïve not to recognize the Israeli-Palestinian question, which is embedded in the wider Israeli-Arab conflict, as one of the key elements of the ongoing confrontation between the West and Islamic radicalism. On a symbolic as well as substantive level, when the Arab states rejected the 1947 UN General Assembly plan to partition Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, the conflict became a struggle between two peoples seeking to define their national identities within the same territory. The 1948 creation of the state of Israel within the heart of the Muslim world and the accompanying flight of almost one million Palestinians, who were expelled from or left their homes in the last six months of the British Mandate or during the first Arab-Israeli war, clearly demonstrated the Arabs’ military and political weaknesses.⁵ That refugee exodus (al-Hijra al-Filasteeniya), referred to by the Palestinians and other Arabs as the Nakba (Arabic meaning disaster, catastrophe, or cataclysm), has had the enduring legacy of shaping the collective narrative of the Palestinians as being an occupied people forced by colonizing Zionists to flee their ancestral homes. As such, it provides a highly emotionally charged rallying cry for both Fatah and Hamas to appeal for support within the Palestinian community. Israel’s subsequent victories in the 1956, 1973, and 1982 wars, combined with massive U.S. aid, reinforced a sense that the Arabs have been thwarted by foreign forces and created a rationale for terrorism targeting the Israelis. Combined with the burgeoning Palestinian refugee problem, which resulted in entire generations living in camps, this series of Arab defeats provided fertile ground for radicalization, triggering an ongoing cycle of Palestinian terrorism and Israeli repression. The imagery of the refugee exodus is extremely powerful, and it resonates strongly with Muslims in general. As a result, the presence of permanent refugee camps has been used by Arab regimes to deflect discontent away from their own shortcomings, while the rhetoric of jihadist groups points to the very existence of Israel—and of American support for Israel—as justification for their own actions.

Egyptian Brotherhood

Egypt is the largest traditional breeding ground for Muslim extremism. When Gamal Abd-al-Nasser assumed power after the 1952 coup that ousted King Farouk, his government imprisoned members of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 to promote Islam in the political arena during the monarchy, specifically against British colonialism and the monarchy. Although the Muslim Brotherhood previously backed Nasser and the Free Officers in their rise to power, its members quickly began to protest when they realized that the Brotherhood was being used to legitimize the new secular regime. Mass punishment of the Brotherhood followed their vocal attempts to mobilize Egyptian society against the Nasser regime’s pursuit of a secular agenda. Under Nasser’s Arab-nationalist agenda, Islam was pushed out of the public sphere. Instead, the state and its leaders were to be revered; Nasser hoped that Egypt would become a modern and secular nation.

On January 16, 1953, all political parties in Egypt were abolished by the government. However, the Muslim Brotherhood was exempted, since it officially was an association and not a political party. Despite the Brotherhood’s exemption from the ban, it was the largest organized popular movement in Egypt, and thus the government began to suppress its agenda and slowly drain its capability for instigating reform. After a Brotherhood member tried to assassinate Nasser on October 26, 1954, the government stepped up its campaign against the Brotherhood by destroying its headquarters, arresting and torturing its leaders and members, and, through the use of propaganda, disgracing the Brotherhood in the eyes of the population. However, these actions taken by the government failed to end its problems with Islamist groups.⁶ Throughout the remainder of the century, Egypt’s leaders would resort to mass arrests, torture, and execution in the battle against political Islam. Many of the men who were arrested and subjected to harsh treatment in prison camps would be released eventually in negotiations between the Egyptian government and the Islamists. Once released, many of them became the new voices of Islamic extremism, affecting successor generations both inside and outside Egypt.

Iranian Revolution

Unlike their Sunni counterparts in the Egyptian Brotherhood who failed to gain control in Egypt, the Shi’ite clerics and their followers who participated in the Iranian revolution of 1979 were successful. The secular, pro-Western regime of the Shah was overthrown and replaced with a radical Islamist regime led by senior Shi’ite clerics. Especially after the 444-day seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by supporters of the new regime, coupled with the Carter Administration’s failed rescue attempt, the first successful Islamic revolution in modern times became an inspiration for radicals and invoked fear among Sunni rulers throughout the Muslim world. Suddenly, a group of believers were able to take the reins of their country, oust the secularized government, and build an Islamic state with the clerical class as the leadership. Although the new Iranian regime was Shi’ite, this demonstrated to the Sunni jihadists that a religiously based political leadership could gain power. The events in Iran simultaneously made the establishment of a Sunni-based Islamic power that would counter Shi’ite influence all the more urgent.

Algeria’s Downward Spiral

Since 1991, Algeria has been plagued with jihadist-related violence of varying intensity. The experiences of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) have been studied by jihadist strategists worldwide as a case study that offers valuable lessons about what not to do.

After the secular Algerian government lost a majority of seats in the National Assembly to the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the Algerian military canceled the second round of elections in 1991, which the FIS was certain to win, and banned religious political parties. The Islamist FIS responded with violence in an effort to force a return to elections, taking care to limit attacks to the Algerian government in order to avoid losing its broad popular support.⁷ The GIA began its campaign by advocating all-out war with the Algerian government, but eventually it began to attack French civilians in Algeria. The French government responded by cracking down on the large Algerian population inside France. This prompted the GIA to begin directly attacking France. The group hijacked an Air France airplane in 1994 and initiated a series of bombings in France in 1995.

As a coalition of various jihadist factions, the GIA suffered from serious infighting stemming from differences in ideology and personal rivalries.⁸ Additionally, the group had a number of leaders in the 1990s, each with different agendas and often with different methods. The inner-GIA tensions resulted in a number of changes in who they chose as targets, (such as government officials, civilians, and foreigners), and in group purges as the definition of loyalty shifted over time. The first amir of the GIA, Abd-al-Haq Layada, declared nonviolent elements of the FIS to be apostates. He also threatened journalists and the families of Algerian soldiers.⁹ The GIA then expanded its range of targets to include not only the Algerian government but anyone linked with it. A series of assassination attempts began in March 1993, resulting in the deaths of a number of people, many of whom had no connection to the Algerian government. In the same year, the GIA began targeting foreigners in Algeria, killing twenty-six in all. After Layada’s death, Djafar al-Afghani became the new amir and intensified violence in the country. Upon his death, the third amir of the GIA, the 26-year old Sherif Gusmi, took over. Gusmi firmly established that the GIA’s goal was not to force a return to elections or open a dialogue with the Algerian government. Instead, the goal was to rid the land of apostates and establish an Islamic state through jihad.¹⁰

Gusmi’s successor, Djamel Zitouni, in addition to expanding the GIA’s operations to France, also condemned all Islamist factions that did not support the GIA, although he did stop short of condemning society as a whole. Zitouni also ...

Índice

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Figures
• Tables
• Preface
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction: The Call to Jihad
• 1 Philosophical Foundations
• 2 Strategic Vision
• 3 Organizational Dynamics
• 4 Recruitment and Training
• 5 Operations and Tactics
• 6 Future Directions
• 7 The Challenge of Credible Intelligence
• Conclusion: Forging a Winning Strategy to Counter the Global Jihad
• Notes
• Glossary
• Bibliography
• The Authors
• Index