Our analysis suggests that the broad policy context may be affecting the micropolitics of schools by narrowing the parameters for influence at the site level,4 by creating alternative organizational forms, and by injecting more âexternalâ actors into the governance, management, and operation of schools. We discuss each of these developments in turn.
Narrowing Parameters for Influence at the School Level
The initial review of literature (Malen, 1995) alluded to the modest degrees of discretion afforded site actors, given resource constraints, the âweb of rulesâ governing site decision making, and the weak design of the various policies that were advanced to ensure that site actors had considerable (and additional) decision-making authority. This review reinforces that observation, and then argues that site autonomy has been constrained even more, by the packages of federal, state, and local policies that further circumscribe the power, limit the discretion, and restrict the influence of site actors.
The unfulfilled promise of greater discretion. Reforms aimed at âempoweringâ schools and the people who worked in them became prominent in the mid- to late 1980s with countless calls for site-based management councils, school-level budgeting and decision making, school improvement teams, advisory committees, and other structural arrangements that presumably would grant site actors the autonomy and the authority required to reform their schools (Bauch & Goldring, 1998; Ingersoll, 2003: Malen & Muncey, 2000). Several lines of evidence suggest that, to date, the promise of greater discretion has been largely unfulfilled.
First, the scope of ânewâ authority delegated to schools is still modest and temporary. Save for settings that permitted school councils to hire and fire their principals, we found little evidence of a fundamental expansion of decision-making authority in any, let alone all the critical areas of budget, personnel, and instructional programs (Croninger & Malen, 2002; Handler, 1998; Odden & Busch, 1998; Summers & Johnson, 1996). Moreover, it has become clear that whatever ânew authorityâ was decentralized could be re-centralized (Leithwood & Menzies, 1998; Shipps, 1998; Shipps, Kahne, & Smylie, 1999). Thus site actors do not appear to have more extensive or more dependable degrees of freedom (Malen & Muncey, 2000).
Second, resource constraints and the âweb of rulesâ embedded in the broader system continue to restrict site autonomy. Oftentimes site actors are empowered to manage budget cuts, not to initiate program improvements (Croninger & Malen, 2002; Fine, 1993; Handler, 1998). While some state governments have tried to relax rules and regulations for âhigh-performingâ schools or to engage in various forms of âdifferential regulation,â these exemptions have not operated to significantly enhance site autonomy (Fuhrman & Elmore, 1995). On the contrary, they may further limit autonomy because these policies remind schools that states can deploy the punishment of a takeover as well as the reward of regulatory relief (Malen & Muncey, 2000). Whether other forms of deregulation such as charter schools, choice plans, and for-profit educational management arrangements will enhance the discretion afforded site actors remains an open, empirical question (Crawford & Forsythe, 2004; Johnson & Landman, 2000; Mintrom, 2001). But for âtraditionalâ public schools, and particularly for low-performing schools, rule and resource constraints still limit the autonomy of site actors (Malen & Muncey, 2000; Sipple et al., 2004; Timar, 2004).
Third, the responsibilities of site actors have intensified, in part because policy packages exacted a price (stronger accountability for the promise of greater autonomy) and in part because policy rhetoric located the blame for low performance squarely on schools (Elmore, 2002; Malen et al., 2002). Schools have been given additional assignments, such as developing school improvement plans, implementing curricular frameworks, incorporating new testing procedures, adapting to various âexternal partners,â and otherwise âdemonstratingâ that they are meeting the terms of more stringent âresults-basedâ accountability systems. These responsibilities have come in addition to, not in lieu of, other demands and obligations (Anagnostopoulos, 2003; Booher-Jennings, 2005; Mintrop, 2004; Sunderman, 2001; Wong & Anagnostopoulos, 1998).
In short, for site actors, various âempowermentâ reforms resulted in a substantial increase in responsibility but not a commensurate increase in authority, a dependable increase in relevant resources, or a meaningful measure of relief from the sets of regulations and obligations that guide and govern what site actors may and must do. While âempoweringâ reforms did little to expand and much to limit the latitude of site actors, other initiatives, launched primarily at the state level and reinforced by federal legislation and district reaction, further constrained the autonomy of site actors (Anagnostopoulos, 2005; Conley, 2003; Timar, 2004). Recognizing that data are limited,5 we point to the standards and high-stakes accountability policies to illustrate that observation.
The stark reality of stricter accountability. During the 1980s and 1990s states intensified their efforts to control schools. Under the auspices of stronger accountability and coherent policy, states stepped up their efforts (a) to articulate curriculum content through various requirements, frameworks, and tests; (b) to define school programs through mandates that make schools select programs for at-risk students from a fairly short list of state-approved options, and, in so doing, to regulate the professional development that school staffs receive; and (c) to issue public sanctions ranging from public listing of âlow-performing schoolsâ to focused state interventions or full-scale reconstitution, privatization, or takeovers (Ladd, 1996; Malen, 2003). While not all states have been equally active in all domains of education, generally speaking, states appear to be coupling policy instruments in potent ways and asserting unprecedented levels of control over schools (Conley, 2003; Malen, 2003; Neuman-Sheldon, 2006; Timar, 2004).
Over the past decade, the federal government also stepped up efforts to control public schools with its rhetorical press for âresults-basedâ accountability and its formal endorsement of graduated but stringent sanctions for schools that fail to meet the requirements of No Child Left Behind. While federal policies have been contested, they represent a renewed effort to influence the core of schooling (Cohn, 2005; McDonnell, 2005; Superfine, 2005). Likewise, districts in some settings have generated initiatives and developed responses that may limit the latitude of site actors (Anagnostopoulos, 2003; Booher-Jennings, 2005; Ogawa, Sandholtz, & Scribner, 2003; Sunderman, 2001; Wong & Anagnostopoulos, 1998).
A small but growing body of evidence indicates that these policies are changing (for better or worse) the content of curriculum (Dorgan, 2004; Firestone, Fitz, & Broadfoot, 1999; Firestone, Mayrowetz, & Fairman, 1998; Sandholtz et al., 2004; Trujillo, 2005), the pace if not the pedagogy of instruction (Dorgan, 2004; Finkelstein et al., 2000; McNeil, 2000; Swanson & Stev...