Handbook of Fire and Explosion Protection Engineering Principles

for Oil, Gas, Chemical and Related Facilities

Dennis P. Nolan

• Éditeur: William Andrew
• Année: 2014
• ISBN:
  9780323311441
• Édition: 3
• Sujet: Technology & Engineering
• Sous-sujet: Industrial Health & Safety

Written by an engineer for engineers, this book is both training manual and on-going reference, bringing together all the different facets of the complex processes that must be in place to minimize the risk to people, plant and the environment from fires, explosions, vapour releases and oil spills. Fully compliant with international regulatory requirements, relatively compact but comprehensive in its coverage, engineers, safety professionals and concerned company management will buy this book to capitalize on the author's life-long expertise. This is the only book focusing specifically on oil and gas and related chemical facilities.

This new edition includes updates on management practices, lessons learned from recent incidents, and new material on chemical processes, hazards and risk reviews (e.g. CHAZOP). Latest technology on fireproofing, fire and gas detection systems and applications is also covered.

An introductory chapter on the philosophy of protection principles along with fundamental background material on the properties of the chemicals concerned and their behaviours under industrial conditions, combined with a detailed section on modern risk analysis techniques makes this book essential reading for students and professionals following Industrial Safety, Chemical Process Safety and Fire Protection Engineering courses.

• A practical, results-oriented manual for practicing engineers, bringing protection principles and chemistry together with modern risk analysis techniques
• Specific focus on oil and gas and related chemical facilities, making it comprehensive and compact
• Includes the latest best practice guidance, as well as lessons learned from recent incidents

Chapter 1

Historical Background, Legal Influences, Management Responsibility, and Safety Culture

Abstract

An examination of the history of the petroleum industry from its earliest beginnings to the present day, which is a general look at the relative lack of process safety features that lead to numerous major incidents. General safety observations from the beginning of the industry in 1859 to the present day multi-billion dollar losses are highlighted. The beginning of US safety laws are traced from 1900 to the present day, including workmen’s compensation, OSHA establishment, PSM regulation, Chemical Safety Board, and latest DHS, SVA Uptown/Riverbend house and Executive Order impacts. The role of the Fire Protection Engineer is highlighted along with the responsibility and accountability of an organization’s senior management. Finally Uptown/Riverbend house what effect and how to achieve a proper safety culture within an organization is explained with its interface in safety management/operational excellence management systems.

Keywords

Business interruption; Chemical Safety Board (CSB); Cost Influence Curve; Department of Homeland Security; Design; EPA; Fire protection engineering; Historical fires; Legal influences; Management responsibility; Negligence; NIOSH; Occupational Safety and Health Administration; Risk acceptance; Risk avoidance; Risk insurance; Risk reduction; Root causes; Safety culture

Fire, explosions, and environmental pollution are the most serious “unpredictable” life affecting and business loss having an impact on the petroleum, petrochemical, and chemical industries today. The issues have essentially existed since the inception of industrial-scale petroleum and chemical operations during the middle of the last century. These issues to occur with increasing financial impacts, highly visible news reports, with increasing governmental concern. Management involvement in the prevention of these incidents is vital if they are to be avoided. Although in some perspectives “accidents” are thought of as non-preventable, in fact all “accidents,” or more correctly referred to as incidents, are preventable. This book is about examining process facilities and measures to prevent such incidents from occurring.

In-depth research and historical analyses have shown that the main causes of incidents or failures can be categorized to the following basic areas:

Ignorance:

• Assumption of responsibility by management without an adequate understanding of risks;

• Supervision or maintenance occurs by personnel without the necessary understanding;

• Incomplete design, construction, or inspection occurs;

• There is a lack of sufficient preliminary information;

• Failure to employ individuals to provide guidance in safety with competent loss prevention knowledge or experience;

• The most prudent and current safety management techniques/operational excellence (or concerns) are not known or applied; or advised to senior staff.

Economic Considerations:

• Operation, maintenance, or loss prevention costs are reduced to a less than adequate level;

• Initial engineering and construction costs for safety measures appear uneconomical.

Oversight and Negligence:

• Contractual personnel or company supervisors knowingly assume high risks;

• Failure to conduct comprehensive and timely safety reviews or audits of safety management systems and facilities;

• Unethical or unprofessional behavior occurs;

• Inadequate coordination or involvement of technical, operational, or loss prevention personnel, in engineering designs or manage-ment of change reviews;

• Otherwise competent professional engineers and designers commit errors.

Unusual Occurrences:

• Natural Disasters—earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, weather extremes, etc., which are out of the normal design range planned for the installation;

• Political upheaval—terrorist activities;

• Labor unrest, vandalism, sabotage.

These causes are typically referred to as “root causes.” Root causes of incidents are typically defined as “the most basic causes that can reasonably be identified which management has control to fix and for which effective recommendations for preventing reoccurrence can be generated.” Sometimes it is also referred to as the absence, neglect, or deficiencies of management systems that allow the “causal factors” to occur or exist. The most important key here to remember is that root causes refer to failure of a management system. Therefore if your investigation into an incident has not referred to a management action or system, it might be suspect of not identifying the root cause of it. There are many incident reviews where only the immediate cause, or commonly referred to as the causal factors, is identified. If the incident review only identifies causal factors, then it is very likely the incident has a high probability to occur again as the root cause has not been addressed.

The insurance industry has estimated that 80% of incidents are directly related or attributed to the individuals involved. Most individuals have good intentions to perform a function properly, but it should be remembered that where shortcuts, easier methods, or considerable (short term) economic gain opportunities present themselves, human vulnerability usually succumbs to the temptation. Therefore it is prudent in any organization, especially where high risk facilities are operated, to have a system in place to conduct considerable independent checks, inspections, and safety audits of the operation, maintenance, design, and construction of the installation. Safety professionals have realized for many decades that safety practices and a good safety culture is good for business profitability.

This book is all about the engineering principles and philosophies to identify and prevent incidents associated with hydrocarbon and chemical facilities. All engineering activities are human endeavors and thus they are subject to errors. Fully approved facility designs and later changes can introduce an aspect from which something can go wrong. Some of these human errors are insignificant and may be never uncovered. However, others may lead to catastrophic incidents. Recent incidents have shown that nay “fully engineered” and operational process plants can experience total destruction. Initial conceptual designs and operational philosophies have to address the possibilities of a major incident occurring and provide measures to prevent or mitigate such events.

1.1 Historical Background

The first commercially successful oil well in the US was drilled in August 1859 in Titusville (Oil Creek), Pennsylvania by Colonel Edwin Drake (1819–1880). Few people realize that Colonel Drake’s famous first oil well caught fire and some damage was sustained to the structure shortly after its operation. Later in 1861, another oil well at “Oil Creek,” close to Drake’s well, caught fire and grew into a local conflagration that burned for 3 days causing 19 fatalities. One of the earliest oil refiners in the area, Acme Oil Company suffered a major fire loss in 1880, from which it never recovered. The state of Pennsylvania passed the first anti-pollution laws for the petroleum industry in 1863. These laws were enacted to prevent the release of oil into waterways next to oil production areas. At another famous and important early US oil field named “Spindletop” (discovered in 1901) located in Beaumont, Texas, an individual smoking set off the first of several catastrophic fires, which raged for a week, only 3 years after the discovery of the reservoir. Major fires occurred at Spindletop almost every year during its initial production. Considerable evidence is available that hydrocarbon fires were a fairly common sight at early oil fields. These fires manifested themselves as either from man-made, natural disasters, or from deliberate and extensive of the then “unmarketable” reservoir gas. Hydrocarbon fires were accepted as part of the early industry and generally little efforts were made to stem their existence. See Figures 1.1 and 1.2.

Figure 1.1 Spindletop gusher. photo credit: American Petroleum Institute

Figure 1.2 Early petroleum industry fire incident.

Offshore drilling began in 1897, just 38 years after Colonel Edwin Drake drilled the first well in 1859. H.L. Williams is credited with drilling a well off a wooden pier in the Santa Barbara Channel in California. He used the pier to support a land rig next to an existing field. Five years later, there were 150 “offshore” wells in the area. By 1921, steel piers were being used in Rincon and Elwood (California) to support land-type drilling rigs. In 1932, a steel-pier island (60 × 90 ft with a 25-ft air gap) was built one half mile offshore by a small oil company, Indian Petroleum Corporation, to support another onshore-type rig. Although the wells were disappointing and the island was destroyed in 1940 by a storm, it was the forerunner of the steel-jacketed platforms of today.

Offshore ultra deepwater wells are now costing more than $50 million, and some wells have cost more than $100 million. It is very difficult to justify wells that cost this much given the risks involved in drilling the unknown. The challenge to the offshore industry is to drill safely and economically, which means “technology of economics,” with safety, environment, security, and personnel health all playing a large role.

The first oil refinery in the world was built in 1851 in Bathgate, Scotland by Scottish chemist James Young (1811–1883) who used oil extracted from locally mined torbanite, shale, and bituminous coal to distill naphtha and lubricating oils that could light lamps or be used to lubricate machinery. Shortly afterwards, Ignacy Łukasiewicz (1822–1882), a pharmacist, opened an “oil distillery,” which was the first industrial oil refinery in the world, around 1854–1856, near Jasło, then Galicia in the Austrian Empire, and now Poland. These refineries were initially small as there was no real demand for refined fuel at that time. The plant initially produced mostly artificial asphalt, machine oil, and lubricants. As Łukasiewicz’s kerosene lamp gained popularity, the refining industry grew in the area. The refinery was destroyed in a fire in 1859.

The world’s first large refinery opened in Ploieşti, Romania, in 1856–1857, with US investment. In the 19th century, refineries in the US processed crude oil primarily to recover the kerosene. There was no market for the more volatile fraction, including gasoline, which was considered waste and was often dumped directly into the nearest river. The invention of the automobile shifted the demand to gasoline and diesel, which remain the primary refined products today.

Ever since the inception of the petroleum industry, the level of incidents for fires, explosions, and environmental pollution that has precipitated from it, has generally paralleled its growth. As the industry has grown, so has the magnitude of the incidents that have occurred. The production, distribution, refining, and retailing of petroleum taken as a whole represents the world’s largest industry in terms of dollar value. Relatively recent major high profile incidents such as Flixborough (1974), Seveso (1976), Bhopal (1984), Shell Norco (1988), Piper Alpha (1988), Exxon Valdez (1989), Phillips Pasadena (1989), BP Texas City (2005), Buncefield, UK (2005), Puerto Rico (2009), and Deepwater Horizon/British Petroleum (2010) have all amply demonstrated the loss of life, property damage, extreme financial costs, environmental impact, and the impact to an organization’s reputation that these incidents can produce.

After the catastrophic fire that burned ancient Rome in 64 A.D., the emperor Nero rebuilt the city with fire ...

Table des matières

• Cover image
• Title page
• Table of Contents
• Copyright
• Dedication
• About the Author
• Preface
• Chapter 1. Historical Background, Legal Influences, Management Responsibility, and Safety Culture
• Chapter 2. Overview of Oil, Gas, and Petrochemical Facilities
• Chapter 3. Philosophy of Protection Principles
• Chapter 4. Physical Properties of Hydrocarbons and Petrochemicals
• Chapter 5. Characteristics of Hazardous Material Releases, Fires, and Explosions
• Chapter 6. Historical Survey of Major Fires and Explosions in the Process Industries
• Chapter 7. Risk Analysis
• Chapter 8. Segregation, Separation, and Arrangement
• Chapter 9. Grading, Containment, and Drainage Systems
• Chapter 10. Process Controls
• Chapter 11. Emergency Shutdown
• Chapter 12. Depressurization, Blowdown, and Venting
• Chapter 13. Overpressure and Thermal Relief
• Chapter 14. Control of Ignition Sources
• Chapter 15. Elimination of Process Releases
• Chapter 16. Fire and Explosion Resistant Systems
• Chapter 17. Fire and Gas Detection and Alarm Systems
• Chapter 18. Evacuation Alerting and Arrangements
• Chapter 19. Methods of Fire Suppression
• Chapter 20. Special Locations, Facilities, and Equipment
• Chapter 21. Human Factors and Ergonomic Considerations
• Appendix A. Testing Firewater Systems
• Appendix A-1. Testing of Firewater Pumping Systems
• Appendix A-2. Testing of Firewater Distribution Systems
• Appendix A-3. Testing of Sprinkler and Deluge Systems
• Appendix A-4. Testing of Foam Fire Suppression Systems
• Appendix A-5. Testing of Firewater Hose Reels and Monitors
• Appendix A-6. Fire Protection Hydrostatic Testing Requirements
• Appendix B. Reference Data
• Appendix B-1. Fire Resistance Testing Standards
• Appendix B-2. Explosion and Fire Resistance Ratings
• Appendix B-3. National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) Classifications
• Appendix B-4. Hydraulic Data
• Appendix B-5. Selected Conversion Factors
• Acronym List
• Glossary
• Index